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EDITORIAL NoTE: The second volume of Ernst Rabel's comparative treatise on the conflict of laws was originally published in
1947. This new edition completes the plan to revise the first two
volumes, as arranged with the approval of the author before his
death on September 7, 1955. Pursuant to this plan, the present
edition has been made possible through the continued support of
the work by the University of Michigan Law School and the
generous co-operation of the Max-Planck-Institut fur ausHindisches
und internationales Privatrecht in Hamburg, in making available
the competent services of a member of the staff of the Institut,
Dr. Ulrich Drobnig, who utilized the special facilities at the Legal
Research Building in Ann Arbor from July, 1955, to June, 1956.
In accordance with the advice of the author, whom Dr. Drobnig
fortunately was able to consult before undertaking the revision
of the two volumes, the collection and inclusion of new material in
the author's text has been strictly limited to the addition of new
citations and illustrations. Consequently, alterations of the text
proper, as distinguished from the footnotes, have been avoided as
far as possible. The additional material covers publications up to
July 1, 1956, but with the continued co-operation of the Institut
after Dr. Drobnig's return to Germany, account has been taken of
later developments up to January 1, 1959. The efficient assistance
of Mrs. Alice DeLana (nee Mohler) in the revision of the manuscript is acknowledged. The editor wishes to express special
appreciation of Dr. Drobnig's contribution in bringing the work
more nearly to date. It is to be hoped that, when further revisions
of this monumental survey of the laws of conflict of laws become
necessary, equally competent hands, supported with equal generosity, may be found to undertake the task.
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PART SIX
CORPORATIONS AND KINDRED
ORGANIZATIONS

In this part, with respect to Latin America, short citations will
be used for the following articles, all published in the Tulane Law
Review:
Grant, Schuster and Harold Smith, "Legal Problems Affecting
American Corporations Abroad: A Symposium," in 8 Tul. L. Rev.

{I934) sso.
Voelkel, "A Comparative Study of the Laws of Latin America
Governing Foreign Business Corporations," I4 id. (Ii)4o) 42·
A series of articles on "The Judicial Status of Non-Registered
Foreign Corporations," regarding the laws of Chile, Argentina and
Uruguay by Rives in 6 Tul. L. Rev. (I932) 558; Brazil by Knight
in 7 id. (I933) 2IO; Mexico by Schuster in 7 id. (I933) 34I;
Colombia by Rives in 8 id. (I 934) 542; Ecuador by Greaves in 9 id.
(I935) 409; Nicaragua by Eder in Io id. (I935) 58; Guatemala
by Schuster in I2 id. {I937) 74; Panama by Eder in IS id. (I941)
521; Venezuela by Crawford in 12 id. (1938) 218 and by Goldstone in I7 id. (1943) 575·
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Types of Organizations, Nationality,
and Domicil

T

HE essential incidents of the activities of any legal
entity are controlled by one municipal law, a single
ubiquitous personal law, parallel to the statute personal of individuals. This is recognized in the legislation of
all countries in the world, despite a contrary theory propounded by Pillee which has created much doctrinal confusion, and despite a useless theoretical dispute whether a
corporate entity is susceptible of "status" or of "capacity."
Even the American conflicts law, which has tended to reduce
the sphere of the law of domicil as governing the status of
individuals, gives broad effect to the law of the state in which
a corporation has been created.
This law governs existence, capacity, internal structure,
external legal relations, modifications of the charter and dissolution of the legal entity. The importance of this principle
cannot be overemphasized.
In the United States this conception is essentially, though
not to its full extent, implemented by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution. Thus, state courts
have been required to follow the constitution, laws, and
judicial decisions of the corporation's home state in order to
determine such questions as that of stockholders' liability. 2
PILLET, Personnes Morales 46 §§ 34ff.
Converse v. Hamilton (1912) 224 U. S. 243; Selig v. Hamilton (1914) 234
U. S. 652. CoRWIN, "The Full Faith and Credit Clause," 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
(1933) 371,386 ad n. 65, classifies this case into the formula of Mr. Justice Holmes,
that relationships ought to be governed by the law under which they were formed.
But this idea does not explain why the law of the corporation and not that ot
the stockholder governs.
1

2

3
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But the criterion determining this personal law may take
either of two forms. While, in common law countries and a
few others, the law of the state of incorporation controls, in
most civil law countries a corporate entity is ~ubject to the
law of the state in which it has its permanent central office of
management (headquarters, domicil, "seat"). 3
The details of this contrast will be discussed later. At
this place we consider, with the help of elementary comparative observations respecting the municipal laws, what organizations are potentially susceptible of havi~g a personal law.

J.
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Survey
The Restatement, 4 in an elaborate chapter on "corporations," declares "incorporation" to be the process by which
official representation is substituted for individual action in
causing liability of members, whether limited or unlimited
and whether in contract or tort. 5 This description has its origin
in the theory that a corporation is nothing else than the members acting in their capacity as a corporate body. 6 Whatever
the merits of this theory may be (and it may have some virtue
as an antidote for the noxious fiction th~ory likewise adopted
in the Restatement), representation will not serve as an exclusive mark of incorporation because, on the one hand,
partners also may be represented by administrators, possibly
widely empowered, and, on the other hand, a membership
corporation may reserve all important decisions to the general meeting of the members.
1.

8 In English, the expression "seat" has been repeatedly used to translate the
French siege social, German Geschaftssitz, and officially in the English text of
Pan-American documents, particularly so in the Presidential Proclamation of
August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 1201, 1204, on the juridical personality offoreign companies.
sa A valuable comparative analysis on the qualification of foreign business
organizations as "corporations" in BADR, Alien Corporations in Conflict of Laws

(1953) 5- 33·
4 As in the first volume, "Restatement" means the Restatement of the Law ot
Conflict of Laws (1934).
6 Restatement § 152 comment e.
6 Restatement § 152 comment a.
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Thus, the concept of "corporation" itself, which the Restatement fails to define, remains somewhat obscure. The
Restatement does, however, make clear that the chapter on
corporations is limited exclusively to incorporated "associations of individuals." Hence, the rules therein adduced do
not apply to foreign states, to what are called in this country
municipal corporations, nor to civil law foundations. In
modern theory, the state recognized as a legal person is
an institution, not a mere association of individuals. In fact,
although "corporation" in American terminology may denote
(I) any distinct legal entity, equivalent to "juristic person"
in the conception of civil law, ordinarily, however, it seems
either to indicate ( 2) private incorporated associations formed
by persons, or to refer (3), still more narrowly, to associations incorporated for business purposes, this being the most
common usage. The Restatement conceives of a corporation
as "any association of individuals," adopting thereby the
second meaning with the only difference that in speaking
of individuals the possibility of corporations being members
of a corporation is overlooked. In the further course of its
development, however, without saying it, the Restatement
gives attention almost exclusively to business corporations,
which in itself is justified. The emphasis on these corporations corresponds with their prevalence in legal practice,
and the gaps thus left uncovered by the Restatement are
not difficult to fill.
More serious than the neglect of nonprofit corporations
and the disregard of public corporations is the silence regarding all associations that are not corporations. The Restatement has simply provided a chapter on corporations and a
chapter on "contracts." In the latter, it has set out a few rules
merely purporting to fix the place of contracting in contracts
concluded among partners(§ 342), or between partners and

6
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third parties (§§ 315, 318, 328-331), and a few rules in
which the powers of partners to act for the partnership are
identified with the authorization of any other agent (§§ 343345). Apparently, the neat old contrast of company and
partnership is responsible for this arrangement. The innumerable mixed forms of association that have developed
in the last century are ignored. Moreover, the common
assumption is perpetuated that a partnership can be adequately analyzed in terms of contractual relationship. But
partnership, as it exists in England and the United States
and in .commercial use all over the world, is not a societas,
as in ancient Rome (or in the German Civil Code), based
on a contract as distinguished from an association and
existent only in the person of the partners; it has entity
aspects, a fact that requires recognition in conflicts law.
To find our way through these doubts, we may be permitted to adjust the usual American terminology to a broad
classification of the organizations involved under the following scheme:
(a) Legal (or juristic, or moral) persons are entities
having separate existence as subjects of rights and obligations in private law. They include:
(i) Public legal persons, such as the state itself, a~d the
municipal and other public organizations created by the state
as distinct persons, as well as certain other bodies.
(ii) Private incorporated associations (corporations in the
second meaning supra), these beingI: Business corporations,
2. Incorporated nonprofit associations,
3· Co-operative associations.
(iii) Private foundations, constituting independent units
after the model pia corpora of the law of Justinian. Charitable
corporations and charitable trusts may be put in this class.
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(b) Unincorporated associations, 7 including( i) N onincorporated nonprofit associations,
(ii) Limited partnerships, limited partnership associations,
joint stock companies, and business trusts,
(iii) General partnerships.
(c) Contracts of joint undertaking, that is, contractual
arrangements such as joint adventures (societas unius rei),
contracts of joint tenancy, et cetera.
Whatever comparisons may be made in this field, the
basic concept, valid for the legislation of every country and
every purpose, must be and is that of legal personality. This
is a very simple concept developed by the Roman jurists and
adoptEd everywhere. The essential feature of a legal person
is that it is a person other than an individual and entirely
distinct from any individual. An incorporated association is
"a legal person apart from its members," a notion thoroughly
familiar to American lawyers. 8 The complete independence
of the corporate person as a subject of rights and duties in
respect to third parties, and not any form of representation
of the members, is the decisive factor. Incorporation is the
process by which this legal person is brought into being; an
organization is endowed with personality.
It seems opportune here to mention the most important
types of business organizations in common use and, as we
shall have to concentrate mostly on commercial organizations, to add a brief survey of the other legal persons.
2.

Private Business Organizations

The prototype of all corporate bodies in the modern world
of private business is the regular stock corporation with transferable shares, the liability of the members being limited to
7

Terminology following § I par. XIV of the Model Business Corporation Act.
Corporations, Ch. I § I.

8 STEVENs,

8
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their contribution to the capital and the members participating in the profits ·and surplus according to some fixed
proportion. There are varied additional characteristics inherent in the different types of stock corporations, represented by the usual American shareholder corporation, the
English public company, the French societe anonyme, and
the German Aktiengesellschaft, but the indicated elements
are the features common to all. 9
Akin to this fundamental type are French and German
stock corporations with shares en commandite, that is, having
at least one member with unlimited personal liability for
the company's debts.
Furthermore, "private limited companies" 10 have sprung
up in recent decades as younger brothers of the ordinary
stock company. Based on capital stock quotas rather than on
the personal liability of the members, these are definitely
not partnerships in the ordinary sense. But restrictions on the
transfer of shares and other measures to lessen the dangers
to the public, make it possible for legislatures to reduce the
onerous formalities and security requirements that regular
stock corporations have to bear in Europe and Latin America.
The model for all these minor forms of stock corporations
has been the German Gesellschaft mit beschrankter H aftung
(GmbH.), introduced in I 892 and since then adopted in
almost all civil law countries with more or less modifications
(societe a responsibilite limitee, sociedad a responsibilidad
limitada, et cetera). In England, a modified form of stock
company, developed in the legal practice, has been authorized by the Companies Acts of 1913, 1929 and 1948.11
9 G. HAMBURGER, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 59 at 6o, r26. Cj. also
STREICHENBERGER, Societes anonymes de France et d'Angleterre (Lyon 1933) 31.
10 ScHuSTER, The German Commercial Code (London I91I) 235.
11 See WRIGHTINGTON, "Private Companies," ro Am. Bar Asso. Jour. (1924)
475 who advocated a similar type for this country to unburden private business
in restricted associations.
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Where an organization did not satisfy all the conditions
of incorporation, the traditional theory saw in it nothing but
some kind of contractual arrangement. The Restatement, as
indicated, conforms to this tradition. It was also adopted in
the highly elaborate provisions of the German Civil Code,
framed toward the end of the last century. These prescribed
that associations not having obtained juristic personality
should be treated under the rules on "society," the members
of which, among other particulars, may not be changed and
are liable for the debts (BGB. § 54, sent. 2). The German
courts, however, were not long embarrassed by this awkward
construction; through ingenious interpretations, they arrived
at conclusions ascribing to various "unincorporated associations" almost every attribute of incorporated associations.
This perhaps most outstanding example of law, judge-made
against the express direction of the legislature, appeared
indispensable for the many thousands of groups that otherwise would have operated in a dubious legal status. Parallel
developments can be found in the adjudications of all the
other countries, such as, for instance, the various types of
the so-called de facto corporations.
There is a rich variety of instances in which corporate and
partnership elements appear mixed in one combination or
another. Many doubts and learned discussions have arisen
concerning the two questions: ( 1) whether a mercantile
partnership is an aggregate or a legal unit and ( 2), if this
is denied as by the dominant theory of the common law or
the German law, then nevertheless whether a partnership
should not be assimilated to fully incorporated bodies in
certain important respects or for certain purposes. There
have been analogous disputes about the nature of business
trusts, de facto corporations, and other organizations "hybrid
in nature, savoring of both corporations and partnership." 12
12

Oklahoma Fullers Earth Co. v. Evans (1937) 179 Okla. 124, 12), 64 Pac. (:zd)

899, gor.
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Among the particular reasons for emphasizing the corporate elements of these mixed types, is the fact that on
the existence of such entity aspects may depend a decision
whether a personal law is to be ascribed to a business organization. Then too, significant conflicts problems are produced
by the diversity of legal conceptions according to which
parallel organizations are differently classified. For instance,
mercantile partnerships are regarded as legal persons in
the French doctrine, followed in Belgium, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Brazil, Mexico, and most other Latin countries,
whereas Anglo-American, German, Swiss, Dutch, Argentine,
and other courts prevailingly regard partnerships under their
respective laws as mere aggregates· of individuals.
Modern theory has paved the way to do justice to every
one of the many types of combined structure. If doctrinal
prejudices are avoided, it will become possible to formulate
the conflicts rule applicable to partially corporated bodies. 18
It is significant that in the legal language of all civil law
countries one finds a single comprehensive term to embrace
corporations, partnerships, and all intervening types, such
as French societes, Spanish sociedades, Italian societa, German Handelsgesellschaften. In the documents of the PanAmerican Union, sociedad is translated by company, a term
recently much employed in England and in bilateral treaties
in the same broad meaning. In this country, the term business
association reflects the feeling, which appears universal at
present, that all these types are functionally and analytically
related.
3· Public Legal Persons
States. From Savigny's time, the generally accepted view
has been that recognition given to a state according to the
rules of public international law, implies recognition of its
18

See infra pp.

101,

116, 117.
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capacity in private law matters. 14 States thus enjoy full
capacity without any special grant. 16 In particular, they may
bring suits to the extent allowed to all foreigners in general
and, in principle, may receive donations and legacies as well
as immovables on the same basis. Their activities, however,
like those of other foreign persons, may be restricted by the
locallaw. 16 International law does not guarantee states more
than a right to the usual buildings for diplomatic and consular representation. 17 All these propositions18 were decided
in the careful consideration of two cases: that of Zappa, a
former Greek national, who appointed the Greek state heir
to his immovables in Rumania and South Germany; 19 and
that of the Countess de Plessis-Belliere, who left her estate
in France to the Holy See.20
Public corporations. By further universal acceptance, recognition of a state extends ipso jure to all instruments of
government exercising political powers of the state and endowed by it with separate legal personality, such as provinces
or municipal corporations. The same is true with respect to
charitable, educational, and religious corporations, performing public but nongovernmental functions and established
14 FooTE 87; 1 FIORE § 303; WEiss, 2 Traite 390; MATOs § 119; on the Code of
Chile, see 3 VIco §§ 40-42. In application to the United States, Story,]., in U.S. v.
Tingey (I83I) 5 Pet. s. c. us; as to the states, Grier,]., in Cotton v. u.s. (I850)
II How. 229.
16 C6digo Bustamante, art. 32; Montevideo Treaty on Civil Law (1889) art. 3;
Argentina: C. C. art. 34; 3 Vico § 71.
16 2 BAR 67I; 2 WHARTON§ 746 ,%';WESTLAKE § 192; Trib. Montdidier (Feb. 4,
1892) legacy to the Pope, see RENAULT, Clunet 1893, II 18; App. Colmar (Dec. 12,
1933) Revue 1935, I78.
17 See below, p. 166 on the applicability of the French C. C. art. 9Io; p. I67 on
the capacity to acquire immovables.
18 German RG. (I9I3) 83 RGZ. 367; (1918) 92 RGZ. 76.
19 Case Zappa (I892), see DESJARDINs, "Des droits ·en Roumanie d'un Etat
etranger appele par testament a recueillir Ia succession d'un de ses sujets," Clunet
1893, 1009; opinions by RENAULT, WoEsTE, and LEJEUNE, Clunet 1893, 1118,
and of the Faculty of Berlin, J Z.int.R. (1893) 275.
to Case of P!essis-Belliere (1890) App. Amiens (Feb. 21, 1893) Clunet 1893, 384;
cj. Dusors, "La papaute devant le droit international public et prive," Clunet
I9IO, 374·
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by the state as legal entities in private law. 21 These latter
"juristic persons of public law," which do not correspond
with geographical segments of the country, are called in
France "etablissements publics," 22 and in Germany "offentlichrechtliche Stiftungen" or ccAnstalten." 23
It follows that the question whether legal personality is
bestowed upon a governmental unit, is determined by the
state to which it belongs, and by no means according to the
lex fori. 24 Accordingly and by way of example, a state university not exclusively maintained by the state is not deemed to
be a public corporation, if its own state denies it this nature. 25
Exceptions to the ipso jure recognition of foreign public
establishments seem, however, to be made in some LatinAmerican countries, 26 especially in the case of church institutions. Quite generally speaking, the C6digo Bustamante
does not assure recognition for foreign administrative organisms ( corporaciones) according to the law "that has created
or recognized them," 27 but leaves it to the pleasure of the
"territorial law." 28
2 1 PILLET, Personnes Morales § 49· This does refer to chambers of commerce
but not to the so-called foreign chambers of commerce, the first of which was in
Yokohama in 1866, and the second the Belgo-American chamber in New York.
The French Supreme Court, Cass. (req.) (Nov. 7, 1933) Revue Crit. 1935, 109 held
a "foreign chamber" in Paris to be a private association.
Argentina: C. C. art. 34·
22 See 7Repert. 65o No. 2.
2 3 NEUMEYER, 1 Int. Verwaltungs R. 140.
24
7 Repert. 65off. No.2.
26 This is' the doctrine of internal law developed in this country according to
BALLANTINE, Corporations 46, 810.
26 Infra p. 167 n. 198. Rules are missing in e.g., Venezuela, GoLDSTONE, 17
Tul. L. Rev. (1943) at 587. The C6digo Bustamante, arts. 31-33 grants unconditional recognition only to the states; Treaty of Montevideo on Civil Law (1889)
art. 3; Savigny's antiquated theory of "persons of necessary existence" has complicated rather than facilitated the Latin-American doctrines.
27 This obscure language may induce one to think that State X has to recognize a legal person invalidly created in State Y because its personality has been
recognized in State Z which is participant in the convention. This, in my opinion,
is not the meaning, nor do these words express adherence to the principle of incorporation. The same words were used by the Spanish Civil Code, art. 37, c/. art. 28,
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4· Foundations and Trusts 29
In the civil law countries, a foundation is a juristic person
of private law, consisting of assets perpetually bound to
serve a certain purpose and existing independently of any
individuals. The administrators of the assets are not owners
at law as is an Anglo-American trustee or as in the case of
a gift subject to a charge (donatio sub modo).
The problem of conflicts law has been thoroughly reviewed
in the litigation respecting the foundation of Niederfiillbach.
King Leopold II of Belgium created a private foundation
with large funds in the city of Coburg, Germany, with the
governmental authorization of the Duchy of Coburg, but
for purposes which were to be performed in Belgium. The
experts were of the unanimous opinion that the validity of
the foundation depended upon the law of the place where
the "seat" or central office of administration was to be. The
country where its activities had to be exercised (Belgium)
was considered quite as immaterial as were the national law
of the founder and the place where the deed was executed.
There was controversy only upon the question whether the
stipulation of the deed fixing the seat of the foundation in
Coburg, corresponded with reality or was fictitious. 30
Accordingly, the rule has been generally sustained that
the creation, organization, capacity, and supervision of founand did not prevent the Spanish doctrine from following the ordinary theory of
central control. Probably the expression refers to the two methods in municipal
law of giving birth to legal persons, namely, by special charter, the state creating
the person, or by autonomy of the parties, on the grounds of statutes authorizing
the creation. The expression recurs, for instance, in Guatemala, C. C. (I933) art. 17,
and Honduras, C.C. art. 58.
28 C6digo Bustamante, art. 33, cf. 32, on which see infra p. 33 n. II.
29 For comparative municipal law, see Les fondations, Part III of Travaux
de Ia Semaine internationale de droit (Paris I937).
so The seat was assumed to be in Coburg by App. Bruxelles (April 2, I9I3)
S.I9I3-4-9; NEUMEYER, 22 Z.int.R. 484 and Revue I9I3, IS; voN LISZT, 27 Z.int.R.
125, I28; contrarily, CHARLES DE VIsSCHER, Revue I9I3, 183, I88.
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dations are to be governed by the law of the real central
office of administration. 31 This is a conflicts rule substantially
si~ilar in all respects to that concerning corporations in
most civil law countries.
The nearest analogue in common law to the civil law
foundation is a trust created for charitable uses. If the assets
of a trust are liable, apart from any liability either of the
trustees or of the beneficiaries, as, e.g., under an Oklahoma
statute, the analogy is very close. Since the American conflicts
rules on trusts differ in regard to immovable and movable
objects and according as they are created by settlement or
other transaction inter vivos or by will, this topic is correctly
treated in connection with property rather than the law of
persons. 32 However, it may be remarked in passing that the
tendency, indicated in the leading case of Hutchison v.
Rosl3 and in the New York legislation,34 of referring trusts
settled with New York trust companies to the law of New
York coincides with the continental conception. In fact, this
result would b~ more correctly reached by localizing a trust
at the place of its management rather than at the accidental
situs of the assets or, still worse, by ascribing a wholly
fictitious localization to choses in action held in trust.

s.

Associations for Nonprofit Purposes

Associations incorporated for purposes other than gain
have, I believe, been included in the Restatement's treatment of corporations. They are governed by a personal law,
determined practically in the same manner as that of business
corporations. Differences exist, however, in the manner of
recognition. (Infra Chapter 22.)
31 German BGB. §So; NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. I43, I46; MrcHouo,
2 Personnalite Morale§§ 320, 321; ARMINJON, Revue I902, 434; CREMIEu, 8 Repert.
430 No. I9. On the scope see PILLET, Personnes Morales § 300; 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2)
§ I78.
32 Cf. Restatement§ 294 and infra Vol. IV, ch. 75, p 445·
33 (I933) 262 N.Y. 381, 187, N. E. 65, see also supra Vol. I, znd ed., 392, 397
84 Personal Property Law, art. 2 § 12a.
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Conclusion. In summary, we see that the recognition of
public establishments raises certain problems, while foundations and nonprofit associations clearly live under a personal
law analogous to that of business corporations.

6. Legal Persons with International Purposes85
Supranational legal bodies. The Holy See, before regaining temporal power by the Lateran Treaties, the International and the European Danube Commissions, and later
the League of Nations were examples of autonomous organizations with undoubted capacity in private law, although
not derived from one particular state. The United Nations
and the Pan-American Union are now outstanding examples.
Capacity is based either on multilateral conventions or on
general recognition. 85•
Plurinational centralized legal bodies. Such public organizations as the International Postal Union, the World Red
Cross, the Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
W arks in Bern, the International Health Office in Paris, and
the International Institute for Agriculture in Rome36 seem
to be explained as legal persons simultaneously constituted
in several states. Their private law capacity, however, as a
rule, flows from the one state charged with the enforcement
of the underlying multilateral agreement.
Plurinational decentralized legal bodies. There are many
hundreds 37 of business organizations and nonprofit associations for humanitarian or scientific purposes-among the
oldest are the World Evangelical Alliance (1846) and the
Young Men's Christian Association (I 855 )-which carry on
16 See NoRMANDIN, Du statut juridique des associations internationales (Paris
1926); GuTZWILLER, 12 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1933) 116; FERRARA,
Le persone giuridiche, in Trattato di diritto civile (ed. Vassalli 1938) Vol. II 2, 172.
36 • For specialized agencies of the United Nations, the UNRRA, the Dutch
H.R. (May 19, 1950) N.J. 1951 No. 150; the IRO, IRQ v. Republic S.S. Corp.
(1951) 189 F. (2d) 858. Cj. Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 12, 1951) Revue Crit. 1952, 463
("Comite des obligataires de Ia Co. de chemins de fer Danube-Save-Adriatique").
88 Cass. Ita!., Sezioni Unite (Plenary) (Feb. 26, 1931) Rivista I9JI, 386.
37 According to the lists annexed to the circulars of the International Chamber
of Commerce.
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activities throughout the world or over large territories, but
under the present rules have to do without an adequate legal
unity. They have either to seek separate incorporation in the
several states or to be content with acquiring personality in
one state only. Both methods have grave drawbacks. Plurinationality except under special treaties37 a lacks sound rules
thus far. Ari organization intended to work internationally
is split into national branches, tied to a central office by free
will and convenience rather than by law. Three great associations of this kind, the Institute for International Law, the
International Law Association, and the International Chamber of Commerce, encouraged by a Belgian statute of October
2 5, I 9 I 9, allowing activity in the country to "scientific"
international associations, 38 have inspired treaty proposals,
but their efforts failed. 39
Cartels. International cartels and business trusts, too, have
felt compelled to adjust their structure to the law of one
state. Where antitrust legislation, as in the United States, is
not affected, the parties have been able to organize under a
certain chosen law. 40
But also within the United States, multiple incorporation
has had a difficult development. 41 According to the theory
that a legal person is an artificial creature of the state, as
37a E.g. the statutes of the Suez Canal Company of I856, Art. 73 par. 2 (seats in
Alexandria and Paris) and concession of I866, Art. I6 (Egyptian law governs
constitution; French law relations between shareholders), cj. The Suez Canal
(London I956) 26, 38, and French law on the status of the Company of June I, I957,
Revue Crit. I957, 435-446. The "Union charbonniere rhenane" was transformed, by
Art. 84 of and Annex 29 to the French-German Treaty of Oct. 27, I956 (BGBl).
I956 II I589) into a French-German corporation with seats in France and Germany,
cj. Barmann, I 56 Arch. Civ. Prax. (I957) I56f.
38 Foreign corporations of this type are, thereby, legally recognized (art. 8);
they must fulfill, however, certain conditions (arts. 2 and 3) in order to exercise
their activities in Belgium. See PouLLET 234 No. 214.
39 See Il).stitute of Int. Law, Drafts of I9Io, see Revue I9IO, 559; of I923, see 30
Annuaire (I923) 97, 348, 385; Int. Chamber of Commerce, Discussions in I923
and I928, cj. GuTZWILLER, supra n. 35, I 53 n. 85; Report Politis, Clunet I923, 465.
All these propositions were inadvisable in fact and were disapproved in opinions
by the Institute of Foreign and International Private Law in Berlin and the Institute for the Unification of Private Law in Rome.
40 See REINHOLD WoLFF in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwi:irterbuch 62I; GEILER,
I2 Mitteilungen dt. Ges Volker R. (I933) I96; and in particular GuNTER HoFHEINz,
Die Kartellbindung bei internationalen Kartellen (Heidelberg I939) 63ff.
41 See FoLEY, "Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation, and the Conflict of
Laws," 42 Harv. L. Rev. (I929) 516.
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many corporations were believed to exist as there were
incorporating states. 42 This obstacle is being gradually overcome by the courts, but also in this case an entirely satisfactory solution frankly recognizing the corporate unity has
not yet been reached.
International public corporations for economic purposes. 48
The most recent and important problem in this connection
concerns governmental institutions functioning like private
economic enterprises. The idea of clothing an undertaking
with the power of government but adjusting its daily life
to the pattern of business corporations was resorted to in this
country when the Tennessee Valley Authority was formed
and, in the international sphere, by conferring large autonomy upon the Bank for International Settlements and, to a
certain extent, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration. 43 a Recently the creation of the International
Air Transport Board, the International Monetary Fund and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with many other organizations proposed, predicts the
rise of an international corporate life never before imagined.

II.

THE NATIONALITY oF CoRPORATIONs

44

r. Difference of Purpose from Conflicts Law
As a matter of strict classification, only conflicts problems
relative to corporations should be included in the subject of
42
This theory has been urged by Beale as late as in his treatise, 2 BEALE 902;
cj. FusiNATO and ANZILOTTI, Rivista 1914, 151, 158.
43
A useful summary is given by W. FRIEDMANN, "International Public Corporations," in 6 Modern L. Rev. (1943) 185; cj. also C. PARRY, The International
Public Corporation, in W. FRIEDMANN, The Public Corporation (I9S4) 493ff.
On the Bank for International Settlements, see Sir JoHN FISCHER WILLIAMS,
Am. J. Int. Law 1930, 665.
43
• See supra n. 35a.
44
The best qualified guides to the literature are the following works:
YouNG, "The Nationality of a Juristic Person," 22 Harv. L. Rev. (Igo8) 1,
particularly describing the antiquated theories; ScHUSTER, "The Nationality and
Domicil of Trading Corporations," 2 Grotius Soc. (I917) 57; ARMINJON, "La
nationalite des personnes morales," 34 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1902) 38I;
NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. (1910) 106, and 12 Z. f. Volkerrecht 261; and,
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conflict of laws. However, the Restatement411 and many
treatises on conflicts law include a considerable part of the
rules of municipal law relating to foreign corporations. The
inclusion of this subject matter has some advantages; the
two aspects of corporate activities, national and international,
are interconnected, and the effort to separate them completely
results in giving a misleading picture. However, there is a
serious danger of confusion in the usual intermingling of
conflicts rules with local rules. Once Pillet attempted to
integrate both sets of rules in a broadly conceived law of
aliens (condition des etrangers). 46 This effort could not be
more successful than the opposite tendency to extend conflicts law. While all aspects of corporate activity do need to
be seen in relation to one another, the conflicts rules applicable
to corporate action ought to be distinguished from legal and
administrative restrictions on the action of foreign corporations.
Failure to discern precisely the various purposes of the
rules regarding foreign corporations has largely contributed
to another unfortunate controversy, with a literature of fantastic proportions, on the question whether legal persons are
able to have a nationality, as though there were to be found
an answer necessarily covering international private law and
all branches of public law. Although the simple truth of
the matter has been known for decades to a number of
writers, 47 the literature is too voluminous not to weigh
to be particularly recommended, NEUMEYER and GuTZWILLER, Reports, in z
Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (I9I8) I49; IZ id. (I933) IZ9; PILLET, Personnes
Morales; MAZEAuo, "De Ia nationalite des societes," Clunet 1928, 30-66; CAuvv,
ro Repert. (1931) 465. ·
45 In the long Chapter 6 of the Restatement, choice of law is treated in topic 1
(with exceptions); §§ r65, r66, topics 4 and 6.
46
PILLET, Principes r68ff.; id., Traite 5371f., 334/f.
47 See, for instance, BALLANTINE, Corporations § 8; almost all German authors;
I PoNTES DE MIRANDA 458 § 8; C6digo Bustamante separating "nationality" from
"capacity"; and the study originally by Gil Borges, submitted by the Delegation
of Peru to the Eighth Pan-American Conference (Diario de Sesiones, Lima I938,
6r8-8).

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS
heavily on many minds. Numerous authors and courts persist in using a language which suggests that they still believe
that a legal person, like an individual, has a nationality for
all purposes. Others deny that legal persons can have any
nationality at all. Both sides are right and wrong. A better
view is the following.
2.

Where Unity of Criterion Desirable

The conflicts problems of what law governs the existence
and activities of a corporation, are soluble without any regard
to the concept of nationality and must be solved separately
from all municipal rules. Under this aspect, a corporation is
called foreign when it is considered governed by the law
of a foreign state. In the United States, corporations created
in another state and, in Canada, those created in another
province, are foreign in contrast to corporations created by
Congress or by the Dominion of Canada through its Secretary
of State, respectively.
But when recognition of foreign corporations and, in the
more frequent cases, when carrying on of business is made
dependent on reciprocity or on some kind of authorization,
it may be relevant to state to which particular country a corporation is considered to belong.
In all these three respects-personal law, recognition, and
permission to do business-the first two of which pertain to
conflicts law and the third to administrative law, the criteria
for ascribing a corporation to a determinate state should
evidently be identical. This important postulate of convenience seems to have been widely neglected.
A fourth application of the same test, once a test is chosen,
ought to be made in the fortunately rare cases in which conflicts rules themselves contain a discrimination between
nationals and foreigners. For instance, the German rule on
torts ( EG. BGB. art. I 2) declares that a German national
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cannot be held liable for tort under foreign law to a larger
extent than under German municipal law. This rule applies
also to German corporations, and what is a German corporation is to be inferred from the German conflicts rule providing that a corporation centered in Germany lives under
German law. Under the conflicts rules of many countries,
nationals are entitled to avail themselves of the inheritance
law of the forum for claiming assets found in the territory,
despite divergent distributary statutes of the law governing
the succession upon death. 48 Here the term "national" again
may include legal persons.
3. Separate Fields
Outside of this circle of problems, there exist innumerable
rules granting or denying the legal powers of domestic corporations to all foreign-created corporations or other legal
persons, or: to those of certain favored countries. Merely as
examples, consider the multitudinous and heterogeneous provisions of taxation; the rules of jurisdiction regarding litigation of foreigners and attachment against them; the rules
relating to the choice between federal and state courts; procedural burdens such as the obligation to furnish security
for costs; 49 the prohibitions on owning or managing objects
such as immovables, ships, banks, radio stations; on receipt
of gifts and legacies; the principles of diplomatic protection
and international arbitration.
These rules of international, administrative, fiscal, juris48 France: Law of July 14, 1819, art. 2, droit de prelevement.
Belgium: Law of April 27, 1865.
The Netherlands: Law No. 56 of April 7, 1869.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 25 sent. 2.
Brazil: C.C., Introductory Law of 1942, art. 10 § I, and numerous other LatinAmerican codes.
49 The clause of fibre acch in the treaties is not considered as exempting from
the caution iudicatum so/vi, see Swiss BG. (July 12, 1934) 6o BGE. I 220 (construing
the Treaty of Commerce of United States-Switzerland, of Nov. 25, I85o, Nov.
8, 1855).
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dictional, procedural, and private law, to which those of penal
law and criminal procedure may be added, are so different in
purpose that they cannot be construed on the same footing,
whether they refer expressly to domestic or to foreign juristic
persons, or to foreigners, citizens, or nationals in general.
In the correct method, each rule should be interpreted separately.
At present, the word "nationality" is intentionally avoided
in connection with corporations by some British and United
States official documents, consistently so by the Institute of
International Law and several Latin-American statutes. 50 On
the other hand, corporations have had nationality distinctly
ascribed to them by many statutes, treaties, 51 and recent
drafts, such as that of the Experts of the League of N ations 52
and the C6digo Bustamante. 53
The American umpire in the Mixed Claims Commission
between the United States and Germany had no doubt in
describing the Standard Oil Company of New York and two
other corporations as "American nationals," notwithstanding
the definition of an American national, which he under lined,
as "a person wheresoever domiciled owing permanent allegiance to the United States of America." 54
That allegiance can properly be owed only by individuals,
is the main argument used against the nationality of juristic
60 Annuaire I 929 II 30I, cj. J4I, I43ff.
For a survey on the language of the Latin-American statutes, see BoRGES,
lnforme I30-I33·
61 E.g., Peace Treaty of Versailles, art. 54 par. 3 (status of Alsace-Lorraine
people); Convention on Air Navigation of Paris, Oct. I3, I9I9, art. 7 par. 2. Also
British Peace Order. On the varying language of the treaties, see TRAVERS, 33
Recueil (I930) III 28; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. I86.
62 Am. J. Int. Law I928, Supp. I7I, 204 arts. I, 2, 4·
63 Art. I6.
64 Mixed Claims Commission, U. S. and Germany, Administrative Decisions
and Opinions 66r, compared with the definition in Administrative Decision No. I,
id. I and 189, I93· United States on behalf of Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Germany
(Oct. 31, I939) Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, Opinions
and Decisions in the Sabotage Claims 32I, 324.
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persons. But, as usual, inexact terminology is innocuous when
its defects are known. If "nationality" is limited to the purposes of public law and if it is defined as the connection of a
corporation with another country, there can be no harm in
the use of the term. Only, it should be clear which purposes
are involved and which are not. Dangerous generalizations,
arising in fact from a careless use of the term nationality,
conspicuously appeared when the so-called theory of control,
grown up in matters of war seizure and liquidation, invaded
for a time the field of conflicts law. 55
However, the traditional doctrine confusing all these purposes has caused Anglo-American lawyers to look usually
to the state of incorporation 56 and civil law lawyers to the
state of central office, 57 as being the home state of a legal
person in all respects. This view is incorrect without doubt.
Nevertheless, it is a fact in itself, and the reasons or predilections that engendered the two opposite tests of personal
law may well have presided also over their extension to
other fields.
We may take it that incorporation here, and central office
there, are widely applied criteria with a claim to subsidiary,
though not normal, application.
A few illustrations must suffice. Swiss authorities constantly declare companies to be citizens and nationals of the
country where they are incorporated and have their center. 58
Similarly elsewhere, the test usual in conflicts law has been
51

Infra p. 57·
BORCHARD, Diplomatic Protection§ 277; ScHUSTER in 2 Grotius Soc. (1917) 64.
67
Cj. 2 STRE1T-VALLINDAs 82; KosTERS 6S9 n. 6; Italian Council of State
(May 27, 19I8) Giur. Ita!. I9I8 III ISO, Rivista 1919-20, 391-4o6 and Note,
S.UVIOLI.
Spain: state of incorporation and central office, cf. RoDRIGuEz RoBLES in Revista
Inst. Comp. No. IO/I9S8 at 136.
58
See Federal Council, BBl. 1876 III 246; I892 II 8II (diplomatic protection);
RuEGGER in Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir Internationales Recht No. Io (I918)
(neutrality); BG. (July 22, 1889) IS BGE. S70, S79i (Feb. 28, r89S) 20 BGE. 6r
and other decisions on the application of treaties on jurisdiction and establishment. For decisions of other federal agencies see ScHNITZER 313 n. 8S, and cf.
SAUSER-HALL,
Bull. Legis!. Camp. (1921) 236, 248.
66

so
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applied to foreign corporations in defining their constitutional
rights 59 or their liability to provide security for costs,60 or
used as a criterion for jurisdiction61 or as sufficient to establish
federal jurisdiction because of diversity of "citizenship."62
Yet, in contrast with the choice of law rule of the forum,
the center of a corporation may be deemed to be the nominal
place designated in the charter, 63 or the main place of business,
or despite adoption of the seat principle, the place of incorporation as such. Residence-"or some degree of residence"
-is a test in England for income tax, liability to be sued, and
to give security for costs,64 and in the United States for the
purpose of venue65 or for qualifying a corporation as not
liable to foreign attachment. 66
u United States: Muller v. Dows (1876) 94 U.S. 444 (on diversity of citizenship);
St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. James (1895) 161 U.S. 545·
France: Cass. (req.) (May 12, 1931) and Report Bricout, S. 1932.1.57.
England: Limerick and Waterford R. Co. v. Fraser (1827) 4 Bing. 394i Edinburgh & Leith R. Co. v. Dawson (1839) 7 Dow!. P. C. 573; Kilkenny & Great S.
and W. R. Co. v. Feilden (1851) 6 Exch. 79, 83, Pollock, C. B.
60 Austria: OGH., Opinion on § 57 ZPO., see PoLLACK, System des osterr.
Zivilprozessrechts (ed. 2) 177; WALKER 149 n. 29.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (April 13, 1877) Clunet 1878, 16o; Clunet 1899, II3i
App. Colmar (Oct. 29, 1925) S. 1927.2.33; Trib. civ. Seine (March 12, 1952) Revue
Crit. 1952, 703; NIBOYET § 304; id., Revue 1927, 402.
Germany (formerly): RG. (Nov. 25, 1895) 36 RGZ. 393·
The Netherlands: Arnheim (June 28, 1927) W. II723, N.J. (1928) 438 (Scottish
principal establishment determinative).
61 Austria: Law of Aug. I, 1895 (Jurisdictionsnorm) § 75·
France: (Competence under C.C. arts. I4 and IS) Trib. civ. Nevers (Dec. 15,
1891) Clunet 1892, 1023, Clunet 1899, 899, Clunet 1913, 1236. Contra: Trib. civ.
Seine (April 30, 1932) S. I932. 2. I74, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. (I932-35) 22; Trib. civ.
Mulhouse (May 2, 1950) Revue Crit. 1951, 153, 17 Z.ausl.PR. (1952) 284 (control
theory).
Germany: ZPO. § 17.
62 United States: See D. 0. McGovNEY, "A Supreme Court Fiction," 56 Harv.
L. Rev. (I943) 853.
Argentina: See 3 Vxco 79 § 82.
83 E.g., Germany: ZPO. § 17 (jurisdiction of courts); BGB. §§ 22, 23 (jurisdiction
of administrative authorities).
Switzerland: BG. (Jan. 21, 1927) 53 BGE. I 124, IJI, 134 (jurisdiction over a
corporation at its domicil).
84 See VAuGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACH1, 49 Law. Q. Rev. (1933) 337·
86
Cj. 2 BEALE § 153·5·
88
Farnsworth v. Terre HauteR. Co. (1859) 29 Mo. 75; HENDERSON 189.
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Taxation67 may refer to any one of these places or to that
of doing business. That taxation is reasonably distributed
according to the various local contacts of an enterprise is, to
put it mildly, not characteristic of many systems.
The writers who have advocated one theory for everything are right in deploring the present chaotic experimentation. Obviously, however, no single theory is adequate for
the task.

III. THE

LATIN-AMERICAN

VIEw

In South and Central America, a peculiar current of opinion
obtains, which we ought to notice and try to analyze. This
trend evidently started in 1876. 68 When the British Government protested against measures taken in the Argentine
province of Santa Fe against the Banco de Londres y Rio de
la Plata en e1 Rosario, the Argentine Foreign Minister
Irigoyen rejected diplomatic intervention on June 23, 1876,
by answering that the bank was an anonymous company
(stock corporation by shares), which could not have any
nationality. In a further note of August 2 I, he added that
the entity, distinct from the members, had nothing to do
with their nationality, while the entity itself was merely a
capital stock. Obviously, the fiction theory was used, perhaps
in the form advocated by Brinz that makes the purpose of
a corporation the subject of right (theory of Zweckvermogen ). This denial of nationality to corporations, supported
in several quarters in South America, 69 was adopted in Rio de
Janeiro in 1927 by the Committee of American Jurists representing seventeen republics, and was repeatedly expressed on
67 Taxation at the domicil has been regarded as the "general principle" in Europe,
see ALux, Recueil 1937 III 572. The real domicil, not that indicated in the Articles
of Association is decisive in France (see infra p. 43 f.) and the Netherlands, Rb.
Amsterdam (Dec. II, 1924) W. II3J4·
68 See ZEBALLos, Clunet 1906, 695; ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 38-40.
69 The doctrine is a part of the general complaints advanced, for instance, by
SE1JAS (Venezuela), II Annuaire (1889-92) 442. See also TRAVERS, Recueil 1930
III 37·
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the occasion of the signatures to the C6digo Bustamante in
Habana, I928. The Argentine Delegation signed the treaty
(which later was not ratified by Argentina) with the reservation that:
"It does not approve provisions affecting directly or indirectly the principle upheld by the civil and commercial
legislation of the Argentine Republic to the effect that 'juristic persons owe their existence exclusively to the law of the
State which authorizes them and are therefore neither national nor foreign; their functions are determined by said law,
in accordance with the precepts derived from the "domicile"
which that law acknowledges to such persons.' " 70
And the Delegations of Colombia and Costa Rica observed:
"Juristic persons cannot have any nationality either under
scientific principles or in the view of the highest and most
permanent interests of America. It would have been preferable that in this Code, which we are going to enact, there
should have been omitted everything which might serve to
assert that juristic persons, particularly those with capital
stock, have nationality."
To satisfy this so-called Argentine doctrine, the Constitution of Colombia of I 9 3 6, for instance, which repealed the
article of the Constitution of I 8 86 requiring reciprocity for
the recognition of foreign corporations, limited itself to the
statement in Article I 2: 71
The capacity, the recognition, and generally the regime of
companies and other juristic persons are determined by
Colombian law.
This does not mean that Colombian internal law should
always be applied; conflicts rules may be established, but
70
Reservation 4; practically similar, the reservations of the Paraguayan (3) and
the Dominican Delegations (2, cf. 3).
71
C/. Tuuo ENRIQUE TAscoN, Derecho Constitucional Colombiano (ed. 2, 1939)
comment on art. 12; similarly the Law on Stock Corporations of July 27, 1950,
art. 228.
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the intention is clear not to recognize as corporations belonging to a foreign country those operating within Colombia.
Thus, an erroneous legal theory was developed as a justification for political action. The aim was to defend against
diplomatic intervention, on the background of unpleasant remembrances of foreign complaints, naval demonstrations, and
claims to arbitrate expropriations and riot damages, before the
era of the good neighbor policy.
As a positive support for the rule, it has often been adduced
that foreigners, whether individuals or legal persons, have
equal civil rights with nationals, a general Latin-American
progressive rule, emphasized in nearly all constitutions. The
argument, of course, tends to imply that a company enjoying
all privileges of domestic fellow-companies, has no claim to
anything more. But, even if equality were not riddled with
exceptions72 and the conclusion were true, logic would lead to
the conversion of all corporations into domestic legal persons rather than into persons not belonging to any state.
As a matter of fact, the stand taken by the Mexican Government in r938 in the case of the Eagle Oil Company, was
that British .intervention was excluded because the legal person was Mexican, whereas the British Government complained of the forced local incorporation of the company. 73
Also, the very frequent legislative acts of Central and
South American governments barring foreign corporations
72 See the impressive discussion of the legal reality of the Latin-American
countries "as to the civil inequality of foreigners" by ZoRRAQUIN BEcu, El Problema del Extranjero en Ia reciente legislacion latino-americana {Buenos Aires
1943) 93, 95 and ff.
73 Note of April 12, 1938. The British government replied {note of April21, 1938)
that "if a government first can make the operation of foreign interests in its territories dependent upon their incorporation under local law and then plead such
incorporation as the justification for rejecting foreign diplomatic intervention,"
••• (39 Bull. lnst. Int. (1938) 67). See also JosEF L. KuNz, The Mexican Expropriations {New York 1940) at 49; and documents cited by 2 HYDE 908.
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from business without special authorization, have a tendency
toward requiring domestication. 74
These remarks have had the exclusive purpose of conceptual clarification. While a book like the present does not
deal with political aspects, the universal need of international
collaboration will have to be stated at the end of this part.
But the conclusion should be drawn at once that an equitable
compromise between the interests of invested capital or
skilled techniques and those of the territorial population,
cannot be obtained either by artificial theories or by denying
the existing international connections. Indeed, international
law, apart from all possibly doubtful problems, permits a
government to extend diplomatic protection to a corporation
constituted in its territory, and at least under some circumstances, to espouse the cause of nationals who are holders
of a considerable part of the capital stock or bonds. 75
Both the Treaties of Montevideo and of Habana have
distinctly perceived the necessity of connecting public and
private legal persons with determinate states, and the latter
has simply called this connection nationality. 76 The same is
true of many Latin-American statutes and constitutions.

IV.

DoMICIL oF CoRPORATIONS

Another futile controversy based on traditional concepts
for a long time has existed concerning whether and where
corporations have a domicil. 77 These questions originated in
74

See infra p. r85.
BoRCHARD, Diplomatic Protection (r9I5) 622; CHARLES DE VIsscHER, "La
technique de Ia personnalite juridique en droit international public et prive," 63
Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I936) 475, 484; CHARLES DE VIsscHER, "Le deni de
justice en droit international," 52 Recueil (I933) II 387; 2 HYDE § 279.
7& COdigo Bustamante, art. I6.
77 For American law, see the brilliant article by J. F. FRANCIS, "The Domicil of a
Corporation," 38 Yale L. J. (1928-29) 335· For a recent comprehensive, though
objectionable, treatise, see A. FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil of Corporations (I939) reviewed by KAHN-FREUND, Annual Survey of Eng!ish Law (1939)
374; F. A. MANN, 3 Modern L. Rev. (I940) 174.
76
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the same practical grounds as the question regarding nationality. In large part, tax laws, commerce regulations, and
jurisdictional rules were drafted originally with only individuals in view. Lawyers had to construe the legislative references to domicil with respect to corporations and partnerships. Unfortunately, many solutions are unsatisfactory, as
when corporations are said to have no domicil but only "residence" or, at common law, are said to have several domicils
in contrast to physical persons.
As an outgrowth of the fiction theory, in the United States
every corporation is declared to be "domiciled" at its principal office in the state of incorporation 78 and, in the absence
of an actual office, at a substituted fictitious business place in
such state. In the words of the Supreme Court:
"This statement has been often reaffirmed by this court,
with some change of phrase, but always retaining the idea
that the legal existence, the home, the domicil, the habitat,
the residence, the citizenship of the corporation, can only be
in the state by which it was created, although it may do business in other states whose laws permit it.m9
Hence, a corporation has a necessary domicil by force of
law in the state where it was incorporated and cannot acquire
a domicil outside that state. 80 This rule is also settled in
Canada apart from Quebec. 81 In other words, a corporation
is localized by its creation in a certain state and by this fact
is domiciled there.
Obviously, this doctrine would be quite as well expressed
by omitting any reference to the concept of domicil and by
Restatement § 41 comment a.
Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pet. S. C. 519; Shaw v. Quincy Mining
Company (1892) 145 U. S. 444, 450 citing the case of Bank of Augusta with approval.
80 Restatement § 41 and comment b. Mr. Justice Holmes in Bergner & Engel
Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus (1898) 172 Mass. 154, 51 N.E. 531; 1 BEALE § 41.1,
81 Bank of Nova Scotia v. McKinnon (1892) 12 C.L.T. (Occasional Notes) 178
N. B.; Victoria Machinery Depot Co. v. The Canada (1913 B. C.) 17 D.L.R. 27;
78

79

I JoHNSON

175

n, 2.

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS
simply referring to the state of charter. 82 Moreover, the
purposes for which this fiction of a domicil has been invented are mainly taxation and jurisdiction, and, although
in these matters the state of first incorporation has retained
some significance, it has not such a prominent role at present
as to justify an exclusive qualification as center. 83 Most
recently, first the entire intangible personality, wherever
located, and then the entire revenue from securities have
been deemed susceptible of taxation in the state in which a
corporation has its principal place of business. The state of
charter, however, does not seem to be correspondingly
eliminated. 84
In most civil law countries a corporation is localized for
conflicts purposes as well as for many others, at its "seat," 85
i.e., in the place where central control and management is
exercised. The same definition is unanimously given by
English writers 86 for such matters as taxation and trading
with the enemy. 87
The English and American opposition to the general attitude of the civil law reverses in curious fashion the contrast
existing in determining the status of individuals. On the
Continent, the status of a corporation is subject to the domiciliary test, applied to individuals at common law, which, in
reference to corporations, repudiates its own familiar criter82

See HENDERSON 190; FosTER, Recueil 1938 III 455·
See FRANCIS, supra n. 77, 352, 353·
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox (1936) 298 U. S. 193; 35 Mich. L. Rev. (1936)
1032; Chestnut Securities Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (C.C.A. roth 1942)
125 F. (2d) 571, (1942) 316 U.S. 668; Note, HoFFEINs, 41 Mich. L. Rev. (1942) 559·
86 See below p. 33·
86 DICEY, Rule 77, 478, speaking of residence; FooTE II9; WESTLAKE 368;
ScHUSTER, "The Nationality and Domicil of Trading Corporations," 2 Grotius
Soc. (1917) 59, 69; CHESHIRE 196 ff., (commercial domicil, residence).
8 7 By an inadequate argumentation, FARNSWORTH, supra n. 77, first contends
a priori that domicil must determine the "status" of a corporation (pp. 210, 231)
and then impeaches the dominant opinion of the English writers because the usual
definition of the domicil (as a central place of control) would give the corporation
a status impossible in English law (p. 274). The author denaturalizes the conception
of domicil to no useful purpose at all.
83
84
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ion and adopts that of the legal connection; this inversion
seems to have struck some English lawyers so much that they
have thought that a "domicil of origin" should be construed
as in the country of incorporation. 88 The C6digo Bustamante
(art. 1 6) mentions a "nationality of origin." These conceptions seem to correspond to the doctrine of this country assuming a necessary domicil in the state of incorporation.
88 See recently, FARNSWORTH, supra n. 77, 209; Gasque v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners [1940]2 K.B. So, 84 per Macnaghten, J.; Cheshire 200.

CHAPTER

19

T'he Personal Law of Business
Corporations
N LOCALIZING the personal law of legal persons, the
two chief rival systems may be termed the incorporation
principle, pointing to the law of the state of incorporation
as such, and the central office principle, which needs explanation.
I. LAw OF THE STATE oF INCORPORATION

I

Anglo-American law. In all common law countries, a corporation lives under the law under which it has been created1
or "incorporated," the law from which, in Westlake's expression, it "derives its existence."2 The English cases, the oldest
of which dates from I 724, have always followed this theory. 3
The particular historic or rational causes for this rule are
not known, although it originated upon the current background of pedantic axioms now antiquated. In any event,
the rule appears to have been accepted as self-evident. It
is not astonishing that common law lawyers should think so,
since even some Continental writers, educated under the opposite system, have advocated the Anglo-American principle
as the logical outgrowth of the act of constituting a corporation.4
In fact, the proposition that the legal entity of an association as a body separate from the members must be based
1

DicEY Rule 75, 78 (2), 475, 480; I WHARTON 238 § 105a.
WESTLAKE 367.
a Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques Van Moses (I724), I Strange 6I2; FooTE
I62 and in Clunet r882, 465 at 473, n. 2.
• See infra p. 67 n. I29.
2
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upon the law of a particular state, is obvious under any possible theory. But this is not the point. The problem is
whether the conflicts rule should be satisfied with the formal
creation of a corporation in some state. The Anglo-American
rule is satisfied; the fact of incorporation alone suffices. Thus,
the English Companies Acts are held inapplicable to companies registered abroad/ and the personal law of a company "depends not upon the place at which its center of administrative business is situated, but upon the place at which
it is registered." 6 And very distinctly the firmly settled
American rule refuses to take account of the place where the
activities of an association occur. As the Restatement puts
it:

"§ I 52. Without regard to the place of the activities of an
association or to the domicil of its members, incorporation
may take place in any state ...
"§ I 54· The fact of incorporation by one state will be
recognized in every other state."
This conception ought to be examined in terms of considerations of convenience rather than of logic.
Other countries. The law of the state of incorporation has
been adopted under American influence in the Philippines8•
and is said to be applied in the Soviet Union. 7 It is apparently
contemplated also in the language of the recent legislation of
Peru (I936) and Brazil (I942), referring to the law of the
state where the corporation has been "constituted,''8 and in
See YouNG r82, 205.
YouNG 205 comment on Attorney General v. The Jewish Colonization Ass'n
(1900) 2 Q. B. 556, C.A.; [I90I] K. B. 123.
Ba Philippines: C. Com. art. 15; Corporation Law of 1906, as amended, ss. 69, 73·
7 Thus, in absence of a proper source, with feeble support in a former instruction,
MAKARov, 35 Recueil (1931) I 473 at 524ff. and Precis 225; RABBINOWITSCH,
r BI.IPR. 212; but see also STOUPNITZKY, Revue 1927,418 at 442. LuNZ 172 declares
that the question lacks any practical importance.
s Peru: C. C. (1936) Tit. Pre!., art. IX parr.
~!"Brazil: lntrod. Law (1942) art. II par. r; cf. IRrooYEN, Consultas de Ia Comisi6n
de Reforma 14 (but see infra p. 35).
B
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9

a few other Latin-American legislations. The corresponding
text of the Montevideo Treaty on Civil Law10 actually was
changed in I 940 so as to refer to the law of the domicil of
the association.
The C6digo Bustamante (art. I 7) refers to this "nationality of origin" of associations, but not to determine the law
applicable to them (art. 33), including a set of rules mexplicable to all commentators.11

II.
I.

LAw oF THE PLACE oF CENTRAL CoNTROL

Countries

In most civil law countries, the personal law of a private
law corporation is that of the state in which it has its center
or "domicil," French "siege social," German "Geschaftssitz"
(seat).
This system has been followed by:
Austria: Ges.m.b.H. Ges. (Act on Limited Partnerships)
of March 6, I906, § I07 and common opinion, see
Walker I47; Ehrenzweig-Krainz § 82 n. 4·
Belgium: Lois coordonnees sur les societes commerciales
(Consolidated Companies Act, I873) art. I72; revised
(I935) art. I97; Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., 3
Recueil des decisions 573·
Bulgaria: Act of Limited Partnerships, of May 8, I924,
art. I27.
Denmark: S. Ct. (Nov. 8, I9I7); (March 8, I922) see
9 Cuba: C. Com. art. 15; C. C. art. 37·
Guatemala: C. C. (1933) art. 20.
Uruguay perhaps likewise: C. C. (1914) Tit. Fin., art. 2394: "where a legal
person has been recognized as such," as amended November 25, 194I.
10
Art. 4 par. r. The official report in Republica Argentina, Congreso Sudamericano 146 shows some disagreement with this change.
11 C6digo Bustamante, art. 34 refers the civil capacity of civil, commercial, or
industrial companies to the respective stipulations of the contract of association.
Cj. art. r8 and see the criticism by Gil Borges, reproduced in the motion made
by the Delegation of Peru, Diario de Sesiones, Octava Conferencia lnternacional
Americana, Lima, 1938, rr8. See, moreover, art. 32, which was not contained
in the draft of De Bustamante, and has been sharply censured in 2 PoNTES DE
MIRANDA 448.
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6 Repert. 2I7 No. 29; Law of Feb. IS, I895·
France: Cass. (civ.) (June 20, I87o) S. 1870.1.373; Cass.
(req.) (March 29, 1898) S. I901.1.70. Loussouarn
48 ff. Associations are specially discussed by 2 Arminjon
§ I99· French Morocco: Dahir of August 12, I9I3,
art. 7·
Germany:RGZ. Vol. 7, 70; Vol. 83,367 (a business corporation of Wisconsin); Vol. 88, 54; Vol. 92, 73; Vol. 117,
2I7; Vol. I 59, 46; Aktiengesetz of Jan. 30, I937, § 5. 12
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. IO. Decisions up to I934= 2
Streit-Vallindas 79 n. 9; for I935-I937, Note in Clunet
I938, 613.
Hungary: C. Com. arts. 2 I o, 2 I I ; Act on Limited Partnership, § 106 (implicit).
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. 2505; Consiglio di Stato (May
27, I9I8) Giur. Ital. I9I8 III I53, Note, Salvioli,
Rivista I9I9-20, 39I; Cass. (July I3, I936) Rivista
I938, 225; Diena, 2 Prine. 290; D'Amelio, Clunet
I9I7, I235·
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 232 par. 1.
Luxemburg: Corporation Law of I9I5, art. I59·
Formerly Montenegro: C.C. art. 787.
The Netherlands: Until recently, general opinion based
on Rv. art. 4 (2) (3); Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 25, I9I6)
N.J. (I9I7) 270; and others; Kosters 659; Mulder
I98. Contra for lex fori, only Rb. Amsterdam (Dec.
I9, I924) W.11346, N.J. ( I925) Io6s. Now strong
tendency in favor of incorporation-rule, cf. infra p. 67
n. I29.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 1 No. 3; Interlocal Priv.
Law, art. 3 No. 3·
Portugal: Taborda Ferreira, 89 Recueil ( 1956 I) at 630.
Rumania: C. Com. ( I938) art. 353·
12 Decision in the special case of "Gothaer Gewerkschaften" does not justify
the objections raised by some writers to the general rule, see MELCHIOR 466;

RAAPE 154·
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Spain: C. C. art. 28, cf. Trias de Bes 379; Spanish Morocco: Dahir of June 1, 1914, art. 6.
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 8-q, 1904) 31 BGE. I 418,466,
473; (April 1, I924) soBGE.Il 511,Clunet 1924, 785;
(May 23, I928) 54 BGE. II 257, 27I; Federal Council,
Message of August 20, I 9 I 9 introducing the revised
draft of the Code of Obligations, BBl. I 9 I 9 V 720.
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, I330/ I9I4, art. I, cf. 7 Repert,
250 No. I27.
Yugoslavia: C. Com. (I937) § 50I par. I.
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 3·
Egypt: C. C. (I 948) art. I I par. 2 sentence I; App.
Alexandria (Feb. I9, I927) S. I927·4·9·
Japan: C. Com. art. 482, on which see infra p. 48 at n.
63 (better opinion).
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § 7·
Syria: C. C. (I 949) art. I 2 par. 2 sentence 1.
Argentina: C. C. arts. 6 and 7, cf. art. 34; see 3 Vico § 8 I;
Zeballos, Clunet I906, 604; C. Com. art. 286.
Brazil: Thus far prevailing opinion, see Carvalho de
Mendon~a, 4 Trat. Dir. Com. § I5I3, cf. Espinola,
8-C Tratado I777 § 100; see now supra n. 8.
Honduras: c. c. art. so; c. Com. art. 3IO par. I; Foreigners' Law, Decree No. 3I of Feb. 4, I926, art. 4·
Mexico: "Almost unanimous doctrine," see Caso § 193.
Venezuela: C. Com. (I9I9) art. 359 (new 334), at least
with respect to Venezuelan corporations, see Crawford,
I2 Tul. L. Rev. (I938) 2I9.
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law (I 889) art. 5;
on Com. Terr. Law ( I940) art. 8 par. I; on Civil Law
( I940) art. 4 par. r.
Also, numerous bilateral treaties assuring the establishment
of nationals of one contracting state in the territory of the
other party have adopted the same principle. It is natural that
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civil law countries should do so among each other/ 8 but rather
strange that they do not do it in every treaty. 14 On the other
hand, it is remarkable that even the United States, Great
Britain, and the Soviet Union in some111 of their treaties,
especially in recent times, 16 have employed the usual Euro13 For instance: France with Japan (Aug. 19, 1911) art. 4, 105 British and
Foreign State Papers (1912) 101 at 6o3; with Greece (March 11, 1929) art. 20,
par. I, 95 L. of N. Treaty Series (1929) 401 at 415, 134 British and Foreign State
Papers (I9JI) 773 at 781; with Germany (Aug. 17, 1927) art. 26,76 L. of N. Treaty
Series (1928) 7 at 24, 126 British and Foreign State Papers (1927) Part I, 689 at 700;
with Czechoslovakia (July 2, 1928) art. 22, 99 L. of N. Treaty Series (1930) 107 at
121, 129 British and Foreign State Papers (1928) Part II, 305 at 314; with Cuba
(Nov. 6, 1929) art. 7, par. r, 114 L. of N. Treaty Series (1931) 36o at 363, IJI
British and Foreign State Papers (1929) Part II, 194 at 197; Germany: see the list
of treaties in MELCHIOR 476 n. 2.
14 E.g., Germany with Italy (Oct. JI, 1925) art. 8, par. 1, 52 L. of N. Treaty
Series (1926) 179 at 185 and JII at 315, 124 British and Foreign State Papers
(1926) Part II, 629 at 63r; Germany with Sweden (May 14, 1926) art. 5, par. r,
51 L. of N. Treaty Series (1926) 99 at 103 and 145 at 147, 124 British and Foreign
State Papers (1926) Part II, 741 at 743; Siam and France (Oct. 7, I939) art. 6,
2oi L. of N. Treaty Series (I940) IIJ.
Similarly, Swiss treaties up to I892, see ScHNITZER, Handelsr. 8I who thinks
it was done under the influence of the fiction theory.
16 Incorporation ("Constitution") alone is mentioned, e.g., in the treaty of
U.S.S.R. with Iran (Aug. 27, I9JS) art. 8, par. I, I76 L. of N. Treaty Series (I9J7)
299 at 305; U.S.S.R. with Turkey (March I6, I9JI) art. 7, IJ4 British and Foreign
State Papers (I9JI) II28 at IIJO. In the treaty United States with Greece (Nov. 2I,
I936) art. r, U.S. Treaty Series No. 930, I8J L. of N. Treaty Series (I9J7) I69 at
I7o, corporations and associations "of the United States and of Greece" are
mentioned.
16 United States with Germany (Dec. 8, I92J) art. 12, par. I, U. S. Treaty
Series No. 725,52 L. ofN. Treaty Series (I926) IJJ at 14I; with Hungary (June 24,
1925) art. 9, U.S. Treaty Series No. 748, 58 L. ofN. Treaty Series (I926) I II at 117;
with Honduras (Dec. 7, I927) art. IJ, par. I, U.S. Treaty Series No. 764, 87 L. ofN.
Treaty Series (I929) 42I at 430; with Austria (June I9, I928) art. Io, par. I, U.S.
Treaty Series No. 838, 118 L. of N. Treaty Series (I9JI) 24I at 250; with Poland
(June IS, I9JI) art. II, par. r, U. S. Treaty Series No. 862, IJ9 L. of N. Treaty
Series (1933) 397 at 407; with Liberia (Aug. 8, I938) art. 17 par. r, U. S. Treaty
Series No. 956, 20I L. of N. Treaty Series (I940) 163; Great Britain with Germany
(Dec. 2, 1924) art. I6, par. I, 43 L. of N. Treaty Series (I926) 89 at 98, 119 British
and Foreign State Papers (I924) 369 at 374; South African Union with Germany
(Sept. I, I928) art. IS, par. I, 95 L. of N. Treaty Series (I929) 289 at 297, I28
British and Foreign State Papers (I928) Part I, 473 at 478. The German text of
both treaties translates "established" and "gevestigd" (Dutch) by "errichtet."
Thus, the British side would accept the continental principle and the German side
the British principle; but the German translation is incorrect, as 1 FRANKENSTEIN
484 n. I8J shows. U.S.S.R. with Italy (Feb. 7, I924) art 9· I20 British and Foreign
State Papers (I924) 659 at 662; with Germany (Oct, I2, I925) art. r6, par. I, 53
L. ofN. Treaty Series (I926) 85 at 97, 122 British and Foreign State Papers (I925)
707 at 7I4; with Norway (Dec. IS, I92S) art. 5, 47 L. of N. Treaty Series (1926)
9 at rs, I22 British and Foreign State Papers (1925) 992 at 994·
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pean formula, running for instance in the treaty of the
United States with Germany as follows:
"Limited liability and other corporations and associations,
whether or not for pecuniary profit, which have been or may
hereafter be organized in accordance with and under the laws,
National, State, or Provincial, of either High Contracting
Party and maintain a central office within the territories
thereof ... "
To the same effect, international arbitrations involving the
United States, 17 proposals of the Institute of International
Law (I89I, I929, I933)/ 8 of the subcommittee of experts
for the League of Nations19 ( I92 7 ), the Benelux-Draft,198
and treaties for avoiding double taxation 20 can be cited. Only
in the draft of the committee, reporting to the Diplomatic
Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners, in Paris, I929,
has the Anglo-American view been maintained by adding to
the usual formula that, in the case of countries to the laws
of which the concept of a seat of a company is unknown, the
condition established on this point will not be applicable.
Similarly, the principle of incorporation prevailed in the
Draft of the Seventh Hague Conference (I 9 5 I) with reservations in case the real seat of a company is outside its state
of incorporation.
Certain subtle divergences among these texts are negligible. They clarify the subject on one point which will be
•f United States with Peru (1869) Affaire Ruden et Cie. (partnership consisting
of Mr. Ruden, an American citizen, and Mr. J.P. Escobar, citizen of New Granada)
see LAPRADELLE-POLITIS, 2 Recueil des arbitrages internationaux (r856-1872) 589.
United States with Chile (1901), case of Henry Chauncey, societe en commandite
in Valparaiso, see MooRE, 3 Digest 802.
18 Annuaire 1929 II 147, Meeting in New York, 1929, proposed regulation, art. r.
1oa Benelux Draft, Art. 3 par. 3·
19 Art. I (Am. J. Int. Law 1928, Supp. 204) concerning the "nationality of
commercial corporations," including the personal law.
10 The British-Swiss Treaty against double taxation, of October 17, 1931, art. 3,
131 L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 245 considers a company as having domicil in
the forum, if the management and control of the business is in the forum. "Control"
has been explained in an exchange of notes (id. 264) to mean effective management
and the real center.
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examined immediately. None of them has taken the cases of
renvoi into consideration. (See infra p. 50.)
2.

Significance of the Principle

In fact, corporations usually have their central office in the
country where they obtain incorporation, but not necessarily
so, and in the United States often not. A corporation constituted in Delaware with headquarters in Amsterdam will be
considered subject to Dutch law on the whole European Continent, and therefore on principle as nonexistent. 20a The true
point of difference between the two systems is not that under
the one incorporation is sufficient, and in the other the situation of the main office would suffice to determine the personal
law. The statutes do not define the Continental system so
correctly as do the treaties providing that a corporation must
be organized or constituted in one of the two countries and
have its central office (seat, domicil) in the country where it is
constituted. The requirement of domicil is additional to that of
incorporation and does not by any means replace it. 20b Hence,
the Continental rule is no more than a variant of the common
law rule and could well be adopted in the treaties of any state.
zoa But see KoLLEWIJN, American-Dutch Private International Law (1955) 16.
zob There is a distinctive trend in recent statutes to restrict or to prohibit the

transfer of the seat out of the state of incorporation or to make a domestic seat
obligatory:
Austria: Law on Limited Liability Corporations (1906) § 5 par. 4·
Egypt: C. Com. art. 41.
France: Stock Corporation Law of 1867, art. 31 (as amended 1959, permits transfer under special treaty); unanimity of stockholders for transfer of seat: Law on
Limited Liability Corporations (1925) art. 3I sentence I.
Greece: Stock Corporation Law (1920) Art. 6; Law on Limited Liability Corporations (I955) Art. 6 § 2 (c).
Luxemburg: for stock corporations, Corporation Law of 1915, art. 67 par. 2
sentence 2; transfer of seat expressly authorized, however, for holding companies
with a share capital of at least I billion francs, Decree of Dec. 17, 1938, art. I9
par. 3·
Netherlands: Commercial Code, art. 36c par. 3·
Spain: Decree Law of July I7, I947, art. I; Law on Stock Corporations (1951)
art. 5; Law on Limited Liability Corporations (1953) art. 4 par. 1.
Sweden: Law on Stock Corporations (1944) art. 8 No.
Law on Economic
Associations of June I, I951, art. 6 No.3·
Tangier: C. Com. (I925) art. 135 par. I sentence 2. Cj. also MANN, "Zum Problem
der Staatsangehiirigkeit der juristischen Person," Festschrift M. Wolff (1952)
27I ff., 283.

s;
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While this essence of the rule has often been misunderstood,
especially in the English literature and by German writers too,
the policy behind the rule also has not always been appreciated.
The most important viewpoint from which to consider the
rule is that of a state that does not want an organization to
establish its principal office in its territory and yet derive its
existence and legal character21 from a foreign state. Thus, in
the oldest decision of the German Supreme Court on this
matter, a company incorporated in the state of Washington,
United States, for the purpose of exploiting Mexican mines,
but which was controlled by a board of directors in Hamburg,
Germany, was denied recognition as an American legal entity;
having failed to fulfill the German requirements for incorporation, it was treated as a German noncorporate association. 22
When a domestic company transfers its domicil to a foreign
country, it loses its personality. 23 Whatever the policy of the
country may be in regard to capital interests, cartels, minority
and small stockholders, plural votes, and the like, organizations established with headquarters in the country have to
comply. French lawyers particularly insist on the necessity
of preventing evasion of imperative requisites and prescriptions. In contrast to the recognition of the law of the incorporating state "without regard to the place of the activities
of an association" (Restatement§ I 52), the state of the central
office is considered the most vitally interested.
Then again, the state where incorporation is obtained, may
not want its law to be used for organizations intending to
maintain their real existence abroad. Switzerland once cancelled the registration of numerous French-controlled com21 Not only capacity, in contrast to formation and dissolution, as WEsTLAKEBENTWICH (ed. 6) 368 believe.
22
RG. (March 31, 1904) DJZ. 1904, 555, cj. infra p. 100. voN STEIGER, 67 ZBJV.
(1931) 307 reports the case of a joint stock company, incorporated in Kenya, East
Africa, under British law, but administered in Paris, France. In Kenya, there was
only a representation and the technical management. This corporation would be
recognized neither under the French nor any other Continental conflicts rule.
23
RG. (June 5, 1882) 7 RGZ. 68.
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panies, incorporated but only nominally established in Gencv:~.24 Belgian courts proceed likewise. 211
'{. Concept of Central Office
For a time, eminent French authors conceived the most
significant place for localizing a business corporation to be
the place at which it discharges its functions, viz., carries on
its manufacturing, trading, or other activities indicated in the
charter. Where the main part of such technical work is done
-the siege d'exploitation-there they regarded the corporation as centered. 26
This concept, in fact, is of some relevance for taxation and
certain other phases of the legal position of corporations. 27
With respect to conflicts law, however, this theory has been
generally rejected. Even though the Belgian Companies Law
has made the ''principal establishment" the test, a literal interpretation has been long since abandoned. 28 Also, in the systems
under which the center of exploitation suffices to subject a
company to the domestic law (infra pp. 47ff.), the seat of
an organization is identified with its chief executive office.
The office where the central management and control are
exercised is regarded as the brain of an enterprise. celt is there
that its personality manifests itself, for it is there that its
organs operate, directing its operations and controlling its
policy," thus Young reproduces the Continental conception. 29
24 Ad vices by the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police to the canton
of Geneva, see BuRCKHARDT, 3 Bundesrecht 1022 III.
26
See Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Feb. 26, 1923) Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. 676 § 5202.
26 Notably 2 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT §§ 1167ff.; THALLER, Annales de Droit
Commercial, 1890 II 257; WEISS, 2 Traite 48r.
To the same effect see the English case Keynsham Blue Lias Lime Co. v. Baker
(1863) 33 L. J. Exch. 41.
Contra: See as to France, ARMINJON, 2 Precis§ 188, as to England, YouNG 194·
27 However, in France jurisdiction for bankruptcy proceedings is taken at the
central office of the management, not at that of exploitation (advocated by
THALLER, Traite elementaire de droit commercial {ed. 7, 1925) § 1738 and others,
c_f. VALENsr, 8 Repert. 328). See on the question Cass. (req.) (July 31, 1905)
S.r9o6.1.270; id. (Nov. 26, 1906) S.1909.1•393•
28
Belgium: Consolidated Companies Laws, of 1873, art. 129; of 1935, art.
197; PouLLET § 225; Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. 682 § 5248.
29
YouNG 149.
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The legally important decision on commercial contracts is
commonly concentrated there. In addition, factories or premises may be dispersed in several countries and no main working place discernible, whereas every corporation is supposed
to have its headquarters as a single place. The law of this
place, therefore, is unanimously held decisive. 30
However, the place must be ascertained. Normally, stockholders and directors hold their regular meetings in the same
town, where also the head executives have their offices, books
and archives are kept, transactions with customers are negotiated, and the principal business is managed. But these activities may fail to be assembled. Where the management is
centered is then considered a question of fact-finding by an
evaluation of many circumstances. 81 As a last resort in the
prevailing opinion, the place where the directors usually meet
is the most important, as their decisions are of direct e:ffect,32
30 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Nov. 14, 19rr) Revue 1913, 178; Trib. com.
Gent (May 4, 1914) Clunet 1917, ro87; and (Feb. 26, 1923) cited by PouLLET
305 n. r; cj. DESMET and FREDERICQ, 35 Revue Dr. Int. Comp. (1958) 149ff.
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 217 No. 30.
France: Cass. (civ.) (June 20, r87o) S.r87o.1.373; (March 29, 1898) D.r899·1.595;
S.I90I.I.7o, Clunet 1898, 756; (July 6, 1914) Clunet 1916, 1296; (Dec. 24, 1928)
Gaz. Pal. 1929.1.124; see also HouPIN et BosvrEux, 3 Trait€: des societes (ed. F,
1935) § 2455·
Germany: BGB. § 24: "Unless it is otherwise provided, the place where the
administration of a corporation is carried on is deemed to be its seat." Same for
foundations BGB. § So and for jurisdiction ZPO. § !7·
Italy: Cass. (July 31, 1925) Foro Ita!. Rep. 1925, 313, "Competenza" Nos. 377,
378; Cass. (April 17, 1931) Foro Ita!. 193I.r.6o2. Under the impact of postwar
administrative divergencies, a double seat has been admitted, see lzRspr. 19451953 Nos. II3-II8.
Japan: See DE BECKER, Int. Priv. Law 59; but cj. infra p. 48.
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 14, 1904) 31 BGE. I 418, 471.
Draft Convention of the Seventh Hague Conference (1951) art. 2 par. 3·
Benelux-Draft, art. 3 par. 3·
31 In opposition to this method, 2 ARMINJON § 190 objects to conferring upon
the courts the power of discretionally determining the center of a company. However, Arminjon's own theory ("Nationalite des personnes morales," Revue 1902,
381; 2 Precis § 191) is obscure and seems not very different (see 2 Precis, ed. 2,
483 n. 2). The French doctrine is generally unstable because of the endless fear
ofjraude.
32
See PERCEROu, Note, D.r9ro.2.41; CuQ, Nationalite des societes (1921)
63; LEVEN, De Ia nationalite des societes (these Paris 1899) 58; HouPIN et
BosvrEux, 3 Traite des societes § 2155.
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while others hold that the general meetings of stockholders
are more significant, since they instruct the board. 88 Preferably
individual solutions should not be prejudiced by any such
rigid criteria. They need an examination of symptoms, similar to that used in America and England for determining
the "domicil" or "residence" of a corporation for purposes of
jurisdiction or taxation. 34 For example, the Cesena Sulphur
Co. was incorporated in England to exploit sulphur mines in
Sicily. The managing directors, the main books, the accounting and two-thirds of the stockholders were in Italy, but since
the meetings of the board of directors and the general stockholder meetings took place in London-not because of the
English incorporation-residence within the meaning of the
Income Tax Acts was held to be in England. 35
Conscious of the possible divergencies in determining the
place of central control, the Geneva subcommittee proposals
of r929leave the legal definition to the "municipal law under
which the company was formed and its seat established." 86
4· Real Existence of the Central Office
It may happen that the central establishment of an organization is actually situated in a country other than that designated by the constitutional documents. The act of incorporation
need not necessarily be void, for this reason alone, under the
law of either country. But it is common opinion that the personal law is conferred upon the organization only by the state
of the actual chief office: the siege social must be real, not
fictitious. 37 The indication of a central place in the charter or
33
C6digo Bustamante, arts. 18, 19; PILLET, Personnes Morales § 94; for Spain,
see TRiAs DE BES, Estudios 381. For location of a corporation within the state,
I BEALE 240.
8
' FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil of Corporations (1939) 248, 274.
85
Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson (1876) 1 Ex. D. 428.
as Am. J. Int. Law 1928, Supp. 204 art. 3 par. 1.
37 Recognized in all international resolutions cited supra sub (1), For the prevailing Italian doctrine see V. TEDESCHI, Del domicilio (1936) 350.
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by-laws furnishes but prima facie evidence. 38
This is also the distinct doctrine of the German courts and
leading writers89 in conflicts law, as well as with respect to tax
liability/0 although in other matters such as jurisdiction of
courts 41 and administrative agencies 42 the "seat" nominally indicated in the articles of incorporation may be determinative. 43
The French courts have strangely extended the scope of
this idea. They, too, naturally disregard a fictitious domicil
and look to the actual siege social. 44 For example, the "Boston
Blacking and Co.," constituted and established in East Cambridge, Massachusetts, operated from 1912 a branch in Montmagny, France, but in 1923 converted the branch into a
French societe anonyme, "Boston Blacking et Cie.," whereupon the mother corporation ceased to pay taxes imposed on
foreign business. The courts found nothing factually changed
in the carrying on of the business and declared the conversion
to be simulated, i.e., fictitious, the American corporation having remained the owner of the business as before. 45 But the
courts include the case where central office has been "fraudulently" pretended to exist abroad in order to "evade" the
88 Swiss BG. (July 22, 1SS9) IS BGE. 570 No. 79 which cannot be too easily
rebutted, BG. (May 9, 19SO) 76 BGE. I ISO, I62, S Schwz. Jahrb. (I9SI) 22I, 224;
CosTE-FLORET, I Revue generale de droit commercial (I93S) S77 at sS6.
18 RG. (June 29, I9II) 77 RGZ. I9; RGR. Kom. n. 4 before § 2I; §22 n. 4;
STAUDINGER-RIEZLER, I Kommentar § 24; WIELAND, 2 Handelsr. 79· Contra: a
small minority of writers who claim 99 RGZ. 2I7 as authority.
40 Tax Procedure (Reichsa!Jgabenordnung) §§ 72 No. 2, 73 par. S No. 2; see the
commentary by BECKER, Die Reichsabgabenordnung (ed. 7, I930) ISS § 2.
The Fiscal Convention between France and Germany, of Nov. 9, 1934, art. I3
adopted the French definition of the "siege" as the place where the legal, financial,
administrative, and technical management is centered in a permanent manner,
see MICHEL, Revue Crit. I937, 630.
u Germany: ZPO. § I7.
42 BGB. §§ 22, 23, 2S.
"For particulars, see the commentaries to § 24 of the BGB., and WIELAND,
I Handelsr. I72; 2 id. 78 n. 7·
"Cass. (req.) (Nov. 2I, ISS9) Clunet ISS9, Sso; for other decisions, see 2
ARMINJON § ISS; recently Cass. (req.) (July I7, I93S) S.I936.I.4I.
t6 Cass. (civ.) (June 29, I937) Clunet I93S, 67, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. § IOS.
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French law of incorporation,46 or in order to create "privileges
for certain shareholders." 47 In such instances, it is immaterial
whether the organization seriously means to have its seat
abroad. The "Moulin Rouge Attractions Inc., Ltd." was incorporated in London for the purpose of carrying on a famous
amusement place in Paris. It was established that there was
nothing in London except rented premises, while the entire
administration was in Paris and all negotiations for the promotion had been contracted and the capital raised in France.
The promoters and the first manager were punished for not
having complied with the formalities required for French
incorporation. 48 In other cases, associations have even been
treated as nonexistent. The courts conducting such investigations inquire into the reasonableness of foreign incorporation. In the case of a company organized to exploit mines in
Canada, having its administrative center in France, it was
held innocuous that the enterprise was incorporated abroad,
after a certain merger of companies, because this facilitated its
business. Also the fact that, instead of a company organized
under the laws of a Canadian province, an English type was
chosen, was approved on account of the interest in preferring
the more common British legislation. 49
In one form or another, the statement that the real, not
some nominal or artificial, domicil determines the applicable
law, occurs in many statutes and court decisions. 5° To unify the
formulation of the Continental principle, the subcommittee
48
Cass. (req.) (Dec. 22, 1896) S.1897·1.84, D. 1897·1,159, Clunet 1897, 364;
Cour Paris (March 27, 1907) Clunet 1907, 768; for other decisions see SURVILLE
722 n. 2; LIOEROPouLos and AuLAONON, 8 Repert. No. 97·
47
See LEREBOURS-PIOEONNIERE {ed. 3) 195 § 163.
48
Trib. corr. Seine (July 2, 1912) D. 1913.2.165, Clunet 1913, 1273•
49
Trib. com. Lille (May 21, 1908) D.1910.2.4I. In a similar way, central control
of a corporation as ground for the imposition of taxes must be "real"; a transfer
of the "si;ge social" to a colony is held genuine: Trib. Seine (July 6, 1935) Revue
Crit. 1936, 771, or fictitious: Cass. (req.) (July 17, 1935) Revue Crit. 1936, 767;
Trib. Seine (Dec. 22, 1938) Revue Crit. 1939, 269, affirmed by Cass. (civ.) (July
7, 1947) Revue Crit. 1949, 78; Cass. (civ.) (Apri125, 1950) Revue Crit. 1951, 291.
6 0 E.g., Denmark: see 6 Repert. 217.
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draft of the League of Nations for an international treaty on
commercial companies (I 929) provides, in article 3, that the
contracting parties are free "to regard a seat as fictitious and
artificial if its connection with the territory ... is fraudulent
and intended to evade imperative provisions of the applicable
law or if the real and effective· seat is not situated in the
country where the company has been formed." Yet the concession made thereby to the French doctrine of fraude is
questionable. While a "simulated" domicil is no domicil at
all, a "fraudulent seat" that is not simulated is real and serious. Whether an association incorporated in a country in which
its real headquarters but no other activity is located, is valid,
ought to be decided according to the law of this very country,
if the principle of central establishment obtains. All that the
"evaded" country may reasonably do, is to treat the corporation as foreign and react appropriately against its carrying
on business. The French doctrine of fraud, therefore, has
deserved criticism in theory as well as in practice, because it
introduces a high degree of insecurity into conflicts law. 111 In
the great majority of countries, the American view is shared
that "it is no fraud or evasion of the laws of a state for its
citizens, intending to act only in their own state to form themEgypt: Trib. Mixtes, see ARMINJON, Revue 1908, 772, 865; KEBEDGY, id. 1914,
396; App. Mixte d'Alexandrie, Clunet 1930, 767.
Japan: C. Com. (as amended 1949) art. 482.
Switzerland: Fed. Council (Jan. 20, 1875) BBl. 1876 II 2; Eidgen. Amt fiir das
Handelsregister (Nov. 4, 1928) 28 SJZ. 328, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 722.
But Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 233 allows holding companies with a purely
nominal office in the country to receive juristic personality; this is just one of the
tricks of this code to attract rich foreign holding companies.
Apparently dissenting, Yugoslavian C. Com. of 1937, art. 501 par. 1, see ErsNER,
1 Symmikta Streit (1939) 290.
61 ARMINJON, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1902) 408 and id. 1927, 393; BEI1'ZKE,
Jur. Personen 69; and especially TRAVERS, Recueil 1930 III 67, 70, 78. VAUGHAN
WILLIAMS and CHRussACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) 348 observe moreover: "It is
surely paradoxical that a country should impose its nationality by way of punishment for fraud." Quite so! But this is not a necessary incident of the law of the
central office, and the repudiation of the French theory of fraud does not "drive"
us "back" to the law of incorporation,
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selves into a corporation under the laws of another state." 52

III.
1.

ExcEPTIONS

To the Law of, Incorporation

While as a rule, for the purpose of the incorporation principle, the place where a corporation is intended to operate
lacks importance, there are exceptions well deserving notice.
One is the case where a state makes it possible for a corporation to be created with the power to do business exclusively
outside the state. Such corporations have been held devoid
of legal existence, because a state cannot "spawn corporations
and send them forth into other states to be nurtured and do
business there," when it will not allow them to operate within
its own boundaries. 53
By analogous reasoning, the privileges of interstate commerce have been safeguarded against misuse. A corporation
chartered in West Virginia but conducting all its contracting
and manufacturing operations in Illinois where also all its
property was located, was regarded as doing exclusively intrastate business. 54
The California courts have occasionally argued that, if a
corporation does all its business and has all its property in that
state, domestic law should be applied rather than that of the
state of creation, and they have assumed the situs of the stock
of a company to be in the forum for the purposes of an action
for issue of shares. 55
62

2 BEALE 775 § 167·4·
Land Grant R. & T. Co. v. Coffey County (1870) 6 Kan. 149, 153; see BALLANTINE, Corporations 854 n. 16; 2 BEALE § 167.4·
64 Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson (1922) 258 U. S. 290.
66 Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling & Dev. Co. (1909) 157 Cal. r6, 106 Pac.
98. That in analogous cases some courts are more inclined to take jurisdiction on
internal affairs of a corporation, contrary to the rule infra Chapter 20 n. 53, is
another fact.
The American Department of State may refrain from intervening for Americanincorporated companies, if all shareholders and the entire business are in the
country against which steps should be taken, see 2 HYDE 903·
63
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In this connection, we may mention also the usury cases in
which courts have refused to recognize an agreement that the
law of the corporation's domicil-of the state of incorporation
-should govern a contract, if its principal place of business
is in another state. 56
2.

To the Law of the Central Office

An I tali an commercial provision, 57 followed by some other
codes, 58 provided that a foreign-created business corporation
was subject to Italian law, if both its "seat" and its "principal
object" were in Italy. This restricted the significance of the
central office. Italian law seemed not to apply to a foreign
incorporated business enterprise even though the central administration was in Italy, unless the technical activity was
centered there. On the other hand, a corporation created in
Italy and having its control center there, was always regarded
as governed by Italian law, irrespective of the place of manufacturing or trading.
The Argentine Commercial Code, 59 followed by Nicara66 Stoddard v. Thomas (I9I5) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. I77 (loan by a corporation
actually doing business in the District of Columbia, the customer being a resident
of Pennsylvania, and the law of Virginia being referred to); Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co. (I929) 43 F. (2d) 724 (promise of credit in Maryland to a firm
in Pennsylvania, by a firm doing actual business in Baltimore (Md.), the law of
Delaware being agreed upon); U. S. Building and Loan Ass'n v. Lanzarotti (I929)
47 Ida. 287, 274 Pac. 630.
17 Italy: C. Com. of I882, art. 230 par. 4; VIVANTE, 2 Trattato di diritto commerciale § 820; DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 34I; FEoozzi 7I; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int.
Com. I58.
68 Portugal: C. Com. (I885) art. uo.
Rumania: C. Com. (I887) art. 239.
On Argentina's provisions framed on the basis of the Portuguese code, see
next note.
59 Argentina: C. Corn. art. 286; ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. I 54; Cam. 2a App.
Cordoba (Nov. I I, I938) 22 La Ley I26. The restrictive interpretation by ZEBALLos,
Clunet I9o6, 6I3 is overruled.
For example, the "Societe du Port de Rosario," subject matter of the decision
of the French Cass. (civ.) (July 9, I930) D.I931.1.I4, S.I931.124, would certainly
be held in Argentina to be a national company. It was created in France but
deployed all its activity as to works, exploitation, and revenues in the Argentine
port Rosario, according to a governmental concession. From the French point of
view, the Court of Cassation stated that the gold clause stipulated in the bonds

48 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

gua,60 probably the Mexican61 laws, the Rumanian and Italian
amended texts62 and finally the new Egyptian and Syrian
codes62a declare the internal law always applicable, if either
the head office (and the general meetings of the shareholders,
adds Argentina), or the principal establishment, or chief
object, is situated in the state. Thus, the principle is no longer
restrictive when it operates in favor of the law of the forum,
but it remains so in reference to foreign law.
A similar provision of the Japanese Commercial Code
(article 48 2) runs as follows:
"A company which establishes its principal office in Japan or
the chief object of which is to engage in commercial business
in Japan shall, even though formed in a foreign country, comply with the same provisions as a company formed in J apan." 63
This rule has been explained as intending "to forestall
any attempt to establish a fictitious permanent establishment
of the corporation was to be considered as an international contract, not subject
to the French currency laws, but did not declare the company to be Argentine, as
VoELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) at 45 n. 13 assumes.
80 Nicaragua: C. Com. art. 339·
Paraguay: C. Com. art. 286, all these textually following Argentina.
Panama: C. C. art. 82: "associations" having their principal object in Panama
are subject to the local law as to the form, validity, and registration of their acts of
association; C. Com. (1916) art. II.
Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) art. 359 (new 374); PERES, "Sociedades extranjeras",
25 Revista Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. (1936) so, thinks that the corresponding
article 359 of the former code refers to partnerships only and that foreign corporations with their principal establishment in Venezuela are only "domiciled" there.
81 See ScHuSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) at 376, quoting JoRGE VERA EsTANOE,
382.
62 Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 2505. What, furthermore, does the new art. 2509 C. C.
mean? It says: companies constituted in the territory of the state, even though the
object of their activity is abroad, are subject to Italian law. Are they recognized
without having their seat in the state, thus adding the principle of incorporation
to the other grounds for claiming domestic character? Art. 2328, AI. 2, in fact,
requires a stock corporation only to indicate its seat without mentioning that it
should be in the state.
Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 354·
82 a Egypt: C. C. (1948) art. II par. 2 sentence 2.
Syria: C. C. (1949) art. 12 par. 2 sentence 2.
ea Cj. YAMADA, 6 Repert. 540 No. 61.
Similarly, Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. 233.
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in a foreign country in order to evade the application of
Japanese laws." 64
Also the Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and
Turkey of I 930 in which the seat principle was adopted has
been corrected in the final protocol to the effect that foreign
companies concentrating their principal operations on Turkish
territory, must obtain "Turkish nationality" in order to do so. 65
For minor political reasons, finally, the German Civil Code
declares an exception to its principles, viz., it permits special
charters for associations domiciled abroad. 66 This has been
applied to German school, church, and relief organizations.
It is fully admitted in Germany that this provision pertains
to the municipal law rather than to conflicts law and that no
extraterritorial effect is expected. 67
The same should be assumed in regard to provisions of the
more recent Italian type which subject foreign-created corporations to all domestic rules for the only reason that their
center of exploitation is in the country. Such a rule, perhaps
justifiable in itself, lacks reciprocity. A state that regards a
corporation as domestic because it has its seat there, should
not characterize likewise as domestic one whose seat is abroad.
These pretensions recall the artful combinations of principles
that are used to extend the domain of territorial law to individuals.
While these unprincipled provisions are frequently confused with the imposition of domestic law upon foreign corporations carrying on business in the country, they seem to
have a deeper and more involved bearing. What conse84 I C. Com. of Japan Ann. 4I2 n. I, see Tokyo District Court (Sept. IO, I9I8)
id. n. 2.
85 Am. J. Int. Law I933, Supp. I09 art. I3.
88 BGB. § 23: see NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. I29 and in 2 Mitteilungen
dt. Ges. Volker R. (I9I8) I59; RuNDSTEIN, Report, 22 Am. J. Int. Law I928,
Supp. I86.
87 RAAPE I29, I32 VI.

so
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quences the Italian courts68 attach to the modified text of their
law are not yet known.
An exception would have to be stated also if the statement
of a few French writers were actually law, that a corporation
by its charter may fix its "seat" in a country in which it does
not have its central administration whenever serious interests
warrant this choice. 69 This, however, seems to refer, at most,
to some phases of administrative law.

IV.

RENVOI

Important modifications, not so much of principle as of its
results, follow from renvoi. The "Eskimo Pie Co." was incorporated in Delaware and, by American standards, recognized in Kentucky where the main establishment was
located. For this reason the German Reichsgericht, too,
recognized the incorporation. 70 We should assume that whenever incorporation and main office are situated in different
states both of which follow the principle of incorporation, the
legal personality is to be recognized in any country of the
opposite system, provided that renvoi is not rejected.
But the converse is true, too. If an anonymous company
is formed in France with control actually centered in Brazil,
French and Brazilian courts agree in applying Brazilian law
to the problems of the existence and capacity of the organization. Failure to create a company in Brazil causes nullity
or nonexistence in both countries. There is no reason why an
American court should insist on qualifying such company as
68 Failure to comply with the provisions of the old Commercial Code was not considered prejudicing recognition. See Cass. (July 13, 1936) Giur. Ita!. Rep. 1936,
889 Nos. 267-270; Foro Ita!. Rep. 1936, 1751 No. 556; App. Milano (May 7, 1937)
Giur. Ita!. 1938, 870 No. 352; App. Torino (Jan. 7, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936 I 397·
69 DEMOGUE, Note in 8.1908.2.177; PERCEROU, Note in D.1910.2.41 and in
Annales de Droit Commercial 1926, 5 n. 1; SuRV1LLE 724; Sows, Note, S.I933·2·49i
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 3) 195. Cf. KEsSLER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 766;
GuTZwiLLER, 12 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1933) 182; BEITZKE, Jur.
Personen 89.
70 RG. (June 3, 1927) II7 RGZ. 215; if. R.AAPE 131 § 6.
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a valid French entity. The principle of incorporation furnishes
the convenient answer, if it is considered that the incorporation has been ineffective in France and missing in Brazil.

v.

TRANSFER OF CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
TO ANoTHER CouNTRY

I.

Law of Central Control

The most critical aspect of the system based upon the
central management rather than upon the mere fact of incorporation, develops when it is desired to transfer the main
office from the state of incorporation to another state. 71 Such
happening logically should destroy the legal entity; at the
new place a new one would have to be built up. This, however,
makes necessary winding up of the corporation, difficult legal
operations and huge losses, taxes, and charges in both countries, so as to render the undertaking an arduous affair. For
the purpose of saving all that, may the charter be modified?
And may an incorporated association do so, without losing its
capacity or even being automatically dissolved?
These and kindred questions have been the topic of abundant controversy from the viewpoint of the country from
which the corporation emigrates. Prevailing French doctrine
allows the stockholders to decide in an extraordinary general
meeting by unanimous resolution to transfer the siege social
abroad, without dissolving the juristic person. 72 It is doubtful
71 For literature see WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 268; BLocH, 48 ibid.
(I952) 245; SALOMON, 83 W.P.N.R. (I952) 34lj PERROUD, Clunet 1926, 56I;
HAMEL, 2 Z.ausi.PR. (1928) rooz; BEITZKE, Jur. Personen § 19; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 88; SUss, Festschrift Lewald (1953) 603-613; LoussouARN 102-137; DE SMET
and FREDERICQ, 35 Revue Dr. Int. Camp. (1958) I52ff., RoDRIGUEZ RoBLES, Revista
Inst. Comp. No. ro/1958, p. 127 ff.; MEIER-HAvoz, in Schweizerische Beitrage
zum V Internat. Kongress fUr Rechtsvergleichung (I958) 63ff. On the controversy
respecting the effects of nationality, see CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 233 and
authors cited; Codigo Bustamante, art. 20, par. r.
72
Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 26, 1894) S.I895.LI33, Clunet 1895, II7; Cass. (req.)
(March 29, 1898) D.r899·1.595, S.I9or.r.69, Clunet 1898, 756; Trib. com. Seine
(May 15, 1925) Revue 1926, 27; PERROUD, id. 567; cj. LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE §
177. This view was confirmed by the Law on Limited Liability Corporations (1925)
art. 31 sentence r. CosTE-FLORET, "Le transfer du siege social," 1 Revue generale
de droit commercial (1938) 577, 590, asserts that a two-thirds majority suffices.
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whether a clause in the by-laws, which has become regular
in France, permitting the board of directors to change the
seat, is a valid delegation of power/8 particularly if the seat
should be transferred to a foreign country. To the opposite
effect, in the dominant German opinion a decision of the
corporate organs to transfer the seat to a foreign country,
automatically causes the dissolution and liquidation of the
corporation. 74 In Switzerland75 and elsewhere76 the problem
in unsolved. Recent statutes in France, Luxemburg, and Spain
have expressly prohibited change of nationality or domicil. 768
Some countries, on the other hand, into which an existing
foreign-constituted company wants to move have shown
readiness to receive it without change of personality. Some
decrees of Brazil have provided that an anonymous stock
company which transfers its seat to Brazil and obtains governmental authorization to carry on business is considered a
national. 77 In recent times, this method has been used by
states seeking to attract large holding companies. Normal
principles are set aside. Even Swiss legislation, generally a
73 For nullity, Cour Paris (Nov. '27, 1931) Gaz. Pal. 193'l.r.189 and CosTEFLORET, id. 591.
74 German RG. (June 5, r88z) 7 RGZ. 68, 70; RG. (June '29, 1923) 107 RGZ. 94;
STAUB-PINNER in 2 Staub 787 § 29'2. n. 20; FLECHTHEIM in 3 Diiringer-Hachenburg
I 283 § r82 n. 45· Mining corporations by transfer enter into liquidation, 88 RGZ.
53· Contra: Suss, Festschrift Lewald (1953) 6oJ-61J.
Austria: OGH. (Jan. 13, 1920) 4 Bull. lnst. Int. (1921) 89 n. 743·
Italy: ANziLOTTI I'l4; CAvAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. § 22.
75 See STAUFFER, 7 Gmiir art. 14 No. ro6; SIEGWART, in 5 Zurcher Kommentar
zum Schweiz. ZGB. Einleitung No. 365. However, the Decree on the Commercial
Register of June 7, 1937, art. 51, seems to admit such transfer.
76 E.g., Belgium: Novelles Belges, 3D. Com. No. 5214 denies the possibility of
transfer without destroying personality; in accord, DE SMET and FREDERICQ
(supra n. 71) p. 154· But most lawyers follow the French literature.
Greece: The law on Limited Liability Corporations (1955) permits change of
nationality by unanimous vote, Art. 38 § 3 (a); the Law on Stock Corporations
(1920) requires a vote of 6/r 5 of the capital, Arts. 31 (2), '29 (3).
76• France: Law on Stock Corporations (1867) art. JI, as amended 1959.
Luxemburg: for Stock corporations, Corporation Law of 1915, art. 67 par. 2
sentence 2; excepted are large holding companies.
Spain: Decree Law of July 17, 1947, art. 1.
Probably to the same effect the numerous provisions requiring a seat in the
state of incorporation, see supra n. zoa.
77 Brazil: Cj. BEVILAQUA 223; CARVALHO DE MENDON~A, 3 Trat. Dir. Com.
§ 624 (c). Companies authorized to do business in Brazil may transfer their seat to
Brazil according to Decree-Law No. 2627 of Sept. 26, 1940, art. 71.
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model of correctness in international relations, has allowed
foreign stock corporations to register as Swiss anonymous
stock companies with central offices there, on special authorization by the Federal Council under greatly facilitated conditions of incorporation. 78 The entity petitioning has to prove
that it is a legally constituted stock company under the law
of its foreign headquarters. 79 This means that it must have
existed and not have been dissolved at the time of its reincorporation and transfer of its domicil, notwithstanding the
fact that this may cause dissolution in the home state.
A number of small states went much further, making great
concessions as respects incorporation fees and current taxation.80
It would appear that if the personal law of the corporation
prohibits exportation of the management without dissolution
and winding up, or requires a unanimous decision or a governmental authorization (as Liechtenstein does for its own
corporations), consistency demands that these provisions
should be respected in other countries. 808 Yet, it seems that
nobody cares for such application of the personal law. A company, thus, may be dead in its former state and continue to
live in another state, although the same principle of the place
of central control governs in both states.
Special rules often obtain after the annexation of parts of
a country or its disintegration into several independent units.
After the first World War, several conventions between
Austria and the neighboring countries provided for transfer of
the seat without impairment of the identity of the company. 80b
78 Swiss Rev. Code of Obligations (final provisions) art. 14 par. I. Cj. SAUSERHALL, Le transfert des societes anonymes de l'etranger en Suisse (1938).
78 Same code, art. 14 par. 2.
80 E.g., Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 234: the seat may be transferred to Liechtenstein, on authorization by the court, without dissolution abroad and without
bringing business or administration into the country.
80• Courts following this principle at times come to different results, cj. Trlb.
comm. Bruxelles (Aug. Io, 1955) Jur. Com. Brux. 1956, 230 at 234; Swiss BG.
(Sept. IJ, 1957) 83 BGE II JI2 at 325; also App. Paris (Dec. 12, 1950) Clunet 1952,
1200; App. Torino (June 17, 1958) Rev. Dir. Internaz. 1958, 597, all decisions
concerning the same company.
.
sob Agreement between Austria and Czechoslovakia of August 2, 1920 (BGBI.
1920, p. 1733); Agreement between Austria and Yugoslavia of Feb. 24, 1923, and
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German courts developed the same rule for the transfer of
the domicil into the country even in cases where such a transfer
was prohibited at the existing domicil of the company in the
other territory. 80"
Finally, the occupation of various countries by the enemy
during the second World War has brought new necessities.
Noteworthy are the emergency decrees of the governments
in exile of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. 81 In
particular the Belgian decree-laws allowed a business company
to transfer its siege social to a foreign country without losing
its nationality; they further provided that such transfers may
be effected by a simple decision of the administrative organ
of the company, i.e., by a majority vote of a general meeting
of the stockholders or of the board of administration. 82 By
virtue of the first provision, the personal law of the company
is upheld and the company is treated by the Belgian courts
and authorities as a national. This obviates the requirement
that the central control should be exercised in Belgium. It is
not demanded that a new place of control be established at
any place of business abroad. Since, on the other hand, the
existence of an actual central office is of no importance in the
United States, a Belgian corporation or partnership having
taken refuge in this country, without being reincorporated,
is to be considered a foreign organization, subject to Belgian
April 5, 1924 (BGBI. 1923, p. 285, 761); Agreement between Austria and Italy of
July 16, 1923 (27 L. of N. Treaty Series 383).
soc RG. (June 29, 1923) 107 RGZ. 94 (Aisace-Lorraine); KG. (Feb. 7, 1924,
Sept. 9, 1924, April15, 1926) IPRspr. 1926/27, Nos. 22-24 (Danzig, Polish-Silesia).
In German interzonal law, a settled court practice has admitted seat transfers
from the Eastern zone even if, under the law at the Eastern domicil, the corporation
was prohibited to transfer its seat or had already ceased to exist, IzRspr. 1945-1953,
Nos. 574-585.
81 The dates are recorded by DoMKE, Trading with the Enemy in World War II
(1943) 172, cj. id. 345i HANNA, "Nationality and War Claims," 45 Col. L. Rev.
(1945) 301, 340.
82 Belgian Decree-Law of February 2, 1940, with the other decree-laws repealed
by art. 8 of the Decree-Law of February 19, 1942, Moniteur Beige (London,
March 31, 1942) 174, 182.
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law. Of course, a Belgian corporation whose domicil had been
moved to New York, by resolution of the board of directors
in June 1940, was considered entitled to sue in court as a
resident. 83
Contrary provisions of the charter or by-laws concerning
the domicil of the company were repealed, as provided also
in a Swiss emergency decree allowing juristic persons to
change domicil within the country. 84 The Dutch decree made
the transfer of domicil from the mother country to another
territory of the kingdom a matter of governmental decision. 811
2.

Law of Incorporation

Continental writers usually believe that at common law, in
a system based merely upon incorporation, no difficulty can
arise if the central office is removed from the country of
incorporation to another country. 86 English authors have
confirmed this view and seem to rejoice over this proof of
superiority. 87
Now, it is quite true that, since the place of the headquarters is immaterial, it may be transferred at will. The
Egyptian Delta Land & Investment Company, Limited, incorporated in London in I 904, could be from I 907 on "controlled, managed, directed, and carried on entirely in Cairo,''
released from its English liability for income tax88 without
11 Chemacid S. A. v. Ferrotar Corporation (D.C. S. D. N. Y. I943) SI F. Supp.
756; see also Rembours en lndustriebank N. V. v. First Nat'! Bank of Boston
(D. C. D. Mass.) C. C. H. War Law Service, Statutes, par. 9ISS. cited by HANNA,
supra n. 8I, at 342 n. 79· The Pamia [I943] I All E.R. 269; cf. Trib. Alexandria
(June II, I9SI) I Gazette Fiscale, Commerciale et lndustrielle (I950/5I) 4II, 418.
84 Swiss Federal Council (Oct. 30, I939) 55 Eidgenossische Gesetzessammlung
(I939) I30I. This decree has been replaced by an elaborate new decree of April I2,
I957, 73 idem (1957) 337·
u Decree of March 4, I942, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden,
No. CI6. Held invalid for transfer of seat effected in I950 from Indonesia, which
meanwhile had gained independence, to Surinam, N.V. Zuikerfabrick "Wono-Aseh"
v. Chase Nat'l Bank (I953) III F. Supp. 833, 842 f,
81 See e.g., GEILER, I2 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (I933) r8o.
87 VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (I933) at 346.
81 [1929] A.C.I. Attorney General v. The Jewish Colonization Ass'n (1900)
2 Q. B. ss6; [l90I] I K. B. 123, c. A. per Smith, M. R., at IJO: "The fact that
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losing its personality. This cannot be done under the principle
connecting a juristic person with a state by its place of control,
and the case certainly contrasts with that of the Tramways
d'Alexandrie, a stock company incorporated and domiciled
in Brussels whose annulment was sought in the Belgian courts
because more of its management was carried on in Egypt than
the by-laws justified; the existence of the company was only
saved by the argument in the lower tribunal that the stockholders had not unanimously decided to transfer the siege
social, and in the court of appeal by the reasoning that the
facts did not establish such transfer. 89
Where, however, it is desired to change the personal law,
for instance, in order to escape a feared revolutionary legislation, or to change "nationality," in order to establish the
right to diplomatic protection or to alter the basis for taxation
(otherwise than for English income tax in the opinion of
the House of Lords), Anglo-American conceptions do not
open any way for maintaining the entity and avoiding winding up. Since, by the old orthodox idea, a corporation can have
no legal existence outside the incorporating state, it "has its
domicil in the jurisdiction which created it, and as a consequence it has not a domicil anywhere else"; 90 "it cannot migrate to another sovereignty."91 In theory, there does not
even seem to exist any doubt that a corporation is unable to
change its personal law, or "quasi nationality," without winding up and new creation, although in practice ingenious ways
may be found to transfer an undertaking to a newly created
there was a council of administration which carried on the business of the company
outside of England does not render the company any less an English company
and subject to English law." Gasque v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1940]
2 K. B. So.
89 Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 8, 1925) and App. Bruxelles (January 13, 1928)
Jur. Com. Brux. 1928, 28 and 38.
90 Mr. Justice Holmes in Bergner & Engle Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus (1898) 172
Mass. 154, 158, 51 N. E. 531, 532; 1 Beale 228 § 41.1: "It can never acquire any
other domicil."
91 20 C. J. S. 12, Corporations § 1788 n. 24.
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92

foreign company. The question is entirely different from
that of change of nationality by a continued corporation in the
case where the territory of its domicil is ceded to or annexed
by another power. 93

VI.

THEORY oF CoNTROL

The two dominant theories determining the status of
corporations agree in disregarding any qualification of the
directors or members of the association as well as the places
where the capital funds are sought or supplied. 94 For example, where all members of a company founded in Chile
are United States citizens, the company is not regarded a
citizen for the purposes of federal jurisdiction on the ground
of diverse citizenship. 95 In the words of Mr. Justice Stone:
"For almost a century, in ascertaining whether there is the
requisite diversity of citizenship to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts, we have looked to the domicile of the corporation, not that of its individual stockholders, as controlling."96
Also in England before the first World War, it was a
commonplace that nationality of a company, whatever it may
92 In In re Aramayo Francke Mines, Ltd. [1917] r Ch. 451-C. A., Clunet 1919,
rr26, a mining company incorporated in England but carrying on business in
Bolivia, with a majority of Bolivian stockholders, attempted to avoid the English
war income taxes by a scheme described as follows: a new company was created in
Geneva, Switzerland, to which the assets and the undertaking were to be transferred
"upon the basis of an exchange of shares of equal values and the assumption by the
Swiss company of the liabilities and engagements of this company" (i.e., Aramayo),
see Cozens-Hardy, M. R., at 473, Warrington, L. J., at 475· The opinions were not
concerned with any problem other than the political danger of the company's
coming under Swiss control during the war.
FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil of Corporations (1939) 217-222,
231, 234 contends that a corporation under Anglo-American law can acquire
a domicil of choice in theory but not in law,-words which do not convey what
they should.
93 See MooRE, 3 Digest 804 § 485; TRAVERS, Recueil 1930 III ro6; see also
KAHN-FREUND in Annual Survey of English Law (1939) 374·
94 ARMINJON, 2 Precis §§ r85ff. and most European writers.
95 See cases in 35 C. J. S. 8r8 § 21 n. rr.
96 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. (1933) 288 U. S. 476. And see as to claims of
American corporations in claims agreements "for an unbroken history of one
hundred and forty years," the opinion of Professor Edwin M. Borchard of March r r,
1925, in Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, Final Report
of H. H. MARTIN (1941) 41.
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signify, is independent of the nationality of the participants. 97
The same attitude was emphasized by neutral nations during
the war of I9I4-I9I8, for instance by the government of
Brazil when declaring neutrality in I 9 I 5. 08
War seizures and restrictions. During the first World War,
however, English courts, headed by the House of Lords,99
defined enemy corporations by a new concept which soon was
emulated in the war legislation of many belligerent countries,
and finally was sanctioned in the provisions of the Peace
Treaties of I9I9 dealing with liquidation of enemy property.100 The essential element of the innovation was that a
corporation was considered to have enemy character, if it was
"controlled" by enemies, that is, was under the dominating
or prevailing influence of physical or juristic persons who
themselves were qualified as enemy aliens. The United
States stayed distinctly aloof from this encroachment upon
the traditional theory. 101
07 Usually based on Driefontein Cons. Gold Mines v. Janson, Ltd. (1900) 2 Q. B.
339, [1901] 2 K. B. 419, [1902] A. C. 484; Central India Mining Co. v. Societe
Coloniale Anversoise [1920] I K. B. 753, 762.
es Brazil: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Circular No. I of Feb. 22, 1915; cj.
CARVALHO DE MENDON9A, 4 Trat. Dir. Com. §§ 1513-14.
99 Continental Tyre Co. v. Daimler [1916) 2 A. C. 307, in matters of trading
with the enemy. The notions established in the decision were in reality new. The
Hamborn [1919] 2 A. C. 993 (extending the rule to a Dutch company and liability
to condemnation in prize). See PARRY, "The Trading with the Enemy Act and the
Definition of an Enemy," 4 Modern L. Rev. (1941) 161, 167; MENDELSSOHN
BARTHOLD¥, "Der Kriegsbegriff des Englischen Rechts," 8 Rheinische Z. f. Zivilund Prozessrecht 357; cf. GARNER, 1 International Law and the World War (1920)
217. It was much noticed, moreover, that the Lords spoke of the concept of enemy,
and not of that of nationality, see VAUGHAN Wll.LIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law
Q. Rev, (1933) 338.
100 Treaties of Versailles (with Germany) art. 297 (b); of St. Germain (with
Austria) art. 249 (b); ofNeuilly (with Bulgaria) art. 177; of Trianon (with Hungary)
art. 232 (b). Cf. R. FucHs, "Die Grundsatze des Versailler Vertrages iiber die
Liquidation und Beschlagnahme deutschen Privatvermogens im Auslande (1927)
in 6 LEsKE-LoEWENFELD II 90·
101 The Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. I 4II, § 2; in introducing the
Bill to Congress, the Attorney General of the United States said, "We have specifically abstained in the bill from attempting to go behind the corporate character."
Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller (1925) 266 U. S. 457; Hamburg-American Line
Terminal and Navigation Co. v. United States (1928) 277 U. S. 138. Mr. Justice
Reynolds stated that Congress definitely adopted the policy of disregarding stock
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Mixed arbitral tribunals. The courts instituted in conformity with the Peace Treaties had to apply the aforementioned
provisions based on the new control theory. They had, moreover, to deal judicially with prewar debts submitted to
clearing proceedings, of which each allied or associated power
could avail itself. Since England, France, and Italy each
elected this procedure in relation to Germany, prewar debts
and claims between English, French, and Italian nationals,
on the one hand, and German nationals, on the other, had to
be entered into the clearing (Versailles Treaty, article 296).
Moreover, prewar contracts between nationals of countries
which had been enemies formed the object of a special jurisdiction of the mixed arbitral tribunals (Versailles Treaty,
article 304).
With the usual confusion of problems, the attempt was
made to transfer the criterion of control to the application of
these two articles. It was a point of great practical importance.
Incidentally to the procedure of clearing, Germany was liable
as guarantor for prewar debts of a German company on a
fixed high exchange rate. It was contended that the guaranty
extended to an English incorporated company controlled by
Germans and liquidated by England. After an initial period
of divided opinions/ 02 the various mixed arbitral tribunals
commonly acknowledged that, under the peace provisions
not expressly resorting to the device of control, nationality was
to be construed in accordance with the familiar devices of inownership as a test of enemy character and permitted property of domestic corporations to be dealt with as non-enemy (at qo); Fritz Schulz Jr. Co_ v_ Raimes & Co.
(1917) roo N_ Y. Misc. 697, r66 N.Y. Supp. 567.
On the sharp rejection of the control theory in Switzerland see SAUSER-HALL
50 Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (1921) 237 n_ 4102 The Franco-German Mixed Arb_ Trib_ went to the most advanced applications of the "control" theory in the much discussed decisions, Societe du Chemin
de Fer de Damas-Hamah v. Cie. du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (Aug. 31, 1921) 1
Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 401, Clunet 1923, 595; Soc. An_ du Charbonnage FredericHenri v. Etat Allemand (Sept. 30, 1921) 1 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 422, Clunet
1923, 6oo; and other cases. See VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q.
Rev. (1933) 340.
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corporation or head office, without regard to the nationality
of the shareholders or directors. 103
Postwar controversy in France. The excitement stirred up
by this dispute and the memory of the war emergency law in
France, resulted in a tendency to adopt control as the general
criterion of "nationality," including for the purposes of choice
of law. A corporation should, in every respect, be ascribed to
the country whose nationals exercise preponderant influence
on the business administration. 104 Niboyet, the leader of this
movement, proposed an appropriate system. 105 When a committee of bondholders of a Rumanian corporation, in order
to sue the corporation in France, formed an association in
Paris in accordance with the French law of 1901 on associations, the Tribunal de la Seine held that the association could
not sue, because the members were not Frenchmen. This decision is recognized as absurd. 106
103 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Chamberlain & Hookham v. Solar Ziihlerwerke G. m. b. H. (Dec. 12, 1921) 1 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 722; Gebr. Adt. A. G.
v. Scottish Co-Op. Wholesale Soc. Ltd. (Nov. 30, 1927) 7 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes
473· Anglo-Bulgarian Mixed Arb. Trib., Dawson & Son v. Balkanische Handels- &
lndustrie-A. G. (October 10, 1923) 3 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 534; Anglo-Hungarian
Mixed Arb. Trib., Investment Registry, Ltd. v. United Ternes and Somogy County
Local Railways, Ltd. (Feb. 24, 1925) S Reueil trib. arb. mixtes 48-all adopting
the double criterion of constitution plus seat; the British agent in the second case
even urged the German seat, while the German agent stressed the center of economic
activities. Similarly, Germano-Belge Mixed Arb. Trib., Soc. de Transports Fluviaux
en Orient v. Soc. Imperiale Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (Dec. 10, 1929)
9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 664, Annual Digest 1929-30, 248 case 151. Belgo-German
Mixed Arb. Trib., La Suedoise Grammont v. Roller (October 16, 1923) 3 Recueil
trib. arb. mixtes 570. ltalo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Fratelli Giulini v. Etat
Allemand (April 29, 1924) 4 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes so6: for other cases see
VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, supra n. 99, 341, FELLER, 2 Z.ausl.off. R.
(1931) II 55·
104 App. Colmar (Oct. 29, 1925) S.1927.2.33 (on cautio iudicatum solui) and
(Feb. 28, 1923) Revue juridique d' Alsace et de Lorraine 1923, 438 (on valorization)
concerned matters of foreigners' condition, but were styled and cited in a general
way.
10 5 NIBOYET in many utterances, see especially Manuel No. 304 and Revue
Cri t. 1934, 114.
106
Trib. Seine (April 30, 1932) S.I9J2.2.I74 (as of April 20, 1932) Gaz. Pal.
1932.2.217; see criticism by STEFANI and ANDRIOLI, 2 Giur. Camp. DIP. (1933)
22 No. 10.

THE PERSONAL LAW

61

Once more, the administrative authorities and the courts
returned to the previous views. 107 As early as I926, the
French Minister of Justice stated that it was "now generally
assumed that the nationality of a company is determined by
the place of its true and effective center, viz., the place where
its administration is actually managed and centralized."108
The bilateral international treaties of establishment were
reassumed on the old footing.
These discussions, nevertheless, were not forgotten. With
the new war approaching, French measures of precaution
against foreign-domiciled corporations extended to a wide
range of foreign-controlled organizations domiciled in France.
Conflicts law was directly affected by a French decree of
April I 2, I 93 9, declaring that foreign associations with nonprofit purposes required recognition by decree, and that the
term, foreign, includes "groups presenting the characteristics
of an association that have their siege social abroad, or groups
having their center in France, are in fact directed by foreigners, or have either foreign managers or at least twentyfive per cent foreign members.m 09
With this exception, it can be stated that in the field of
conflicts law the control theory was completely rejected by
all countries. As a matter of fact, the theory has proven time
and again impracticable and unjust in reference to subsidiary
corporations and otherwise. 110 Even its discriminatory appli107 Cass. (req.) (May 12, 1931) S.1932.1.57, D.1936.1.121; cj. Revue Crit. 1934,
109; 1938, 340. Cass. (req.) (Jan. 9, 1940) Nouv. Revue 1940, 202: given under
public law, a partnership (being a legal person in France) constituted and having
its seat in France is of "French nationality," irrespective of the nationality of its
members.
1os Answer by the Garde du Sceaux, Journal Official of February 5, 1926, see
Clunet 1926, 534·
109 See SAVATIER, "Sur Ia condition des personnes morales en DIP. dans les
divers decrets-lois fran~ais de 1939," Revue Crit. 1939, 418.
no See SAUSER-HALL, Les Traites de Paix et les droits des neutres (1924) II7;
R. FucHs, op. cit. supra, n. roo and cited authors. See also VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and
CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) 347: "It is inconceivable that one country
should have the right to create a person which is to be a national of another country."

62 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

cation against enemy property has inspired many crude solutions, as for instance in the case of companies incorporated and
administered in neutral countries, which were forcibly liquidated in an Allied country to the detriment of the neutral
members. 111 The virtual agreement reached between the wars
in all formerly belligerent countries, is remarkable. During
the present conflagration, of course, practically all belligerent
countries have enlarged the concept of enemy for the purpose
of trading with the enemy prohibitions, freezing and sequestration of enemy assets, and in this connection have combined
all three theories of incorporation, seat, and control so that
each one of these criteria stigmatizes a corporation as enemy. 112
The peace treaties after World War II again, for purposes of
compensation of United Nations nationals, sanctioned the
theory of control. 112a In economic warfare, the economic connections cannot be disregarded.
Likewise, although not fitted for determining the personal
law, the theory of control could reasonably be employed so
as to entitle only French-dominated companies to enjoy
compensation for war damages in France. 118 It was a sign of
continued confusion that this decision was hailed by the advocates of the control theory as a "turning point" in the development of the concept of foreign incorporation. 114
Questionable, however, were decisions of the French Court
111 See against this encroachment the decision of the Swiss Federal Court (April
I, 1924) so BGE. II 51; Note, SAUSER-HALL, Clunet 1924, 785; Note, NIBOYET,
S.I925.I.225.
1 1! For the various methods used, see DoMKE, Trading with the Enemy in
World War II (1943) 120-144· Also, the United States now employ the control
test, Clark v. Ubersee Finanz-Korporation A. G. (1947) 332 U.S. 480, 42 Am. J.
Int. Law (1948) 470; Obersee Finanz-Korporation A.G., v. McGrath (1952) 343
U.S. 205; DoMKE, "The Control of Corporations," 3 Int. Law Q. (1950) 52-59·
ma Treaties with Italy, art. 748 (4b); Hungary, art. 26 (4b); Rumania, art. 24
(4b); Bulgaria, art. 23 (4b); Finland, art. 25, (4b); cj. Japan, art. 14 (a) (2) (I) (c).
113 Cass. (civ.) (July 25, 1933) D.19J6.z.r28; and again Cass. (civ.) (May 29,
1937) Clunet 1938, 89. Law of Oct. 28, I946, art. II par. 2 No. I.
114 DE GALLAIX, Nouv. Revue I936, 485, 498; and in International Law Association, Report 39th Conference I 936 (I 937) 65.
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of Cassation denying protection to so-called "commercial
property," i.e., the rights arising out of a long-time lease of
business premises under the Law of June 30, 1926, to French
firms controlled by the American corporations, Remington
and Singer. 1111
Finally, although diplomatic protection, with discretionary
consideration of all elements, may be granted to nationals
interested in a corporation,116 intervention on behalf of a corporation as being controlled by nationals is opposed by a
strong opinion. 117
In conclusion, the criterion of control is entirely inconvenient for determining the personal law, although it may
be suitable for discriminating in exceptional administrative
measures against certain groups of companies. But to advocate
this test generally for all purposes excepting conflicts law, as
the Peruvian Delegation has proposed to the Pan-American
Union, 118 is a very doubtful generalization.

VII.

RATIONALE

The characteristic of the Anglo-American principle has
appeared to consist in the recognition of the law of any state
of incorporation, whereas the opposing principle recognizes
the law only of that state where a corporation has been created
and is domiciled in fact. The conceptual difference between
the two systems would be somewhat lessened if the dogma
that the domicil is necessarily in the state of incorporation,
were to be taken seriously in Anglo-American law. Although
this idea has never been employed in selecting the personal
m App. Rennes (June 16, 1930) D.1931.2.9, Annual Digest I930, 2SI No. 153
(half concealing the name of the mother company which is, however, the Singer
Manufacturing Co. of Elizabeth Port, N. J.); Cass. (req.) (May I2, I93I) S.I932.
1.57, D. 1936.I.I2I. NIBOYET, 2 Traite 377 § 837 approves the latter decision.
110 See BoRCHARD, Annuaire I9JI, I 297-313; DE VrsscHER in Revue Dr. Int.
(Bruxelles) (I 936) 48 I.
117 Cf. as to Latin America, supra pp. 24-27.
111 Octava Conferencia, Lima I938, Diario de Sesiones, Projecto at p. 6I8 arts.
3-S· The motion was developed upon the Commission of Jurists, see id. I039·
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law, it does concern private international law that, by another
traditional rule, meetings of the members of a corporation
can be held only in the state of incorporation, a rule adopted
in the Restatement ( § 1 63), "unless otherwise provided by
the law of the state of incorporation." The New York Annotations to the Restatement recall the former rigid Ormsby
Rule,119 whereby neither shareholders nor directors were
allowed to make binding acts outside of the jurisdiction. It
would be no great step from this to a rule prescribing that
unless the "seat" is situated within the state, incorporation is refused. This is a natural feature of the continental
system/ 20 but would easily be reconciled with the AngloAmerican principles.
However, the contrast of principles is felt in three practical
differences:
(a) In the first instance, the common law principle leaves
the promoters of a corporation free to choose any country
for creating the legal person, and any other country for controlling the administration. The opinions evidently are radically divided on the desirability of this freedom, which is
refused in the Continental system. Before the first World
War, English business used the corporation law of the Isle
of Guernsey, which use was regarded so improper that it was
abolished by a clause of the Companies Act of 1929.121 In
this country Delaware for a time became a Mecca for corporations, more recently sharing its popularity with New York,
New Jersey, and certain other states. Delaware is still famous
for the elaborate care with which the law is currently kept in
line with newly occurring needs, and for the special experi119 Ormsby v. Vt. Copper Min. Co. (I874) 56 N. Y. 623. See also Stabler v.
ElDora Oil Co. (19IS) 27 Cal. App. 5I6, ISO Pac. 643; HENDERSON 189.
12o E.g., Germany: Aktiengesetz, Jan. 30, 1937 § 5·
Switzerland: See ScHNITZER, Handelsr. So.
Venezuela: C. Com. arts. 197, 207-208, as interpreted by CRAWFORD, I2 Tu!. L.
Rev. (I938) 212. See also supra n. 2oa.
121 Companies Act, 1929, s. 353, now 1948, s. 4I6, subjects those companies to
English law.
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ence of the judiciary. Boards of directors in Delaware companies find their interest in efficient management better safeguarded from interference by small groups of outsiders,
which does not necessarily mean undue disregard of various
minority interests. The opinions of the experts, however, are
strongly divided. There are a good many lawyers in this
country who think that a corporation should be created at the
place of its principal activity and not be entitled to seek out a
law thought more favorable with regard to powers, liabilities,
audits, or publicity. Also, in states having modern corporation
laws, such as Michigan, the opinion prevails that foreign
incorporation for domestic enterprises should be sought only
if special reasons make it advisable, such as exceptional needs
not satisfied by certain provisions on preferred stock. Considerations of taxation seem no longer to exercise a controlling
influence on the choice of the charter state. As mentioned
above, the tendency is even stronger to recognize a rival
claim of the state of the actual management to control all
intangibles and revenues. 122 The traditional principle, thus,
is weakened, and its competition with other ideas promotes
confusion.
No such doubts exist with regard to the competition of
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, and Panama in offering
lowest bids for holding companies. They, indeed, provoke
the thought of "corporation Renos."
(b) Second, the Continental principle makes it very difficult to transfer a corporation as an existing legal person to
another country. Since this weakness can easily be remedied
by legislation, the point is insufficient for a decisive criticism.
It is entirely impossible, on the other hand, to change the
personal law of a company incorporated in England or in the
United States.
(c) Third, the principle of incorporation causes puzzling
m Supra Chapter I8 p. 29.
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problems in the case where an association is incorporating in
several states. The original doctrine concerning the effect of
multiple incorporation was loaded with inconveniences/28
"defying the common understanding of the business
world." 124 Some improvement was effected by recognizing
that the legal person created and re-created is the same; the
corresponding conclusions were reached, for instance, that the
creation of shares is governed by the law of the first incorporation. 125 But a more radical reform would be desirable, and
in fact Henderson has urged that the law of the state of incorporation where the headquarters are situated be adopted
for all manifestations of an identical corporation. 126
This suggestion, fostering a link between the two principles, would seem highly significant. But thus far, the international situation is quite similar to that in regard to the
two great principles respecting status. Such eminent experts
as Young in England and Henderson in the United States
have regretted the common law principle as it stands; 127 more
recently the following words were exchanged in a meeting
of the International Law Association:

"Mr. Wyndham A. Bewes: The nationality of a company
registered in England is a fiction invented by English law,
the nationality itself to start with being a related fiction. If
you want to go to the realities of things, the existence of a
living company, you have to go to where that company is administered. I think our law is wrong and I should like to see
it changed.
"Mr. President: I thank Mr. Wyndham Bewes. It is one
of the very rare occasions upon which I have heard an eminent
English lawyer say that the law of England is wrong.m 28
118 FoLEY, "Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation and the Conflict of Laws,'
42 Harv. L. Rev. (1929) 516.
1U HENDERSON 193, cf, 69.
116 Restatement §§ 203, 205.
121 HENDERSON 191ff.
127 YouNG r6r, 167, 207; HENDERSON i!Jid.
128 International Law Association, Report of the 39th Conference 1936 (1937)85,
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Nevertheless, a growing minority of Continental writers
advocate just the Anglo-American principle! 129 The majority of lawyers on both sides seem perfectly satisfied with the
wisdom of their respective principles. 130
Again, international attempts at unification 131 have failed. 182
This was also the fate of the notable draft of a uniform state
law concerning foreign corporations (I 934) .13S
The simple measure suggested above of prescribing in the
local requirements for incorporation, that the central office
should be in the state, would leave the conflicts law intact and
could be followed by those states which have no ambition to
lU Denmark: BoRUM 176ff. France: PiLLET, Personnes Morales § 137; WEiss, 2
Traite 392.
Germany: I FRANKENSTEIN 459; GEILER in I2 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R.
(1933) I79 and in Diiringer-Hachenburg 5I; NusSBAUM, D. IPR. I85; ScHWANDT
in Landesreferate, Sonderheft, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (I932) 206; MANN, Festschrift M.
Wolff (1952) 282 f.
Italy: ANziLOTTI, 6 Rivista (19I2) 109, II3.
The Netherlands: SANDBERG, Nederl. Tijds. Int. R. 1957,362, 371; v.D. GRINTEN,
Naamloze Vennootschap 1957, 4I; DE WINTER, W.P.N.R. No. 4240; KoLLEWIJN,
American-Dutch Private Internat. Law (1955) 16 and Nederlandsch Juristenblad
I958, 876.
Switzerland: voN STEIGER, ZBJV. I931, 306 (but without such criticism in his
address, Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir internationales Recht No. 27, p. 28).
ScHNITZER 298; NIEDERER, "Kollisionsrechtliche Probleme der juristischen Person,"
in GuTZWILLER-NIEDERER, Beitrage zum Haager Internationalprivatrecht 195I,
p. I07 ff., I24·
no See the characteristic opposition of views, on the one hand, of D'AMELIO,
Clunet I9I7, I227, and on the other, of VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49
Law Q. Rev. (I933) 343, 347, 348 who accuse the "seat" principle of "inconceivable" pretension and "glaring inconsistencies."
ut See Report, RuNDSTEIN, Am. J. Int. Law I928, Supp. I87; LEPAULLE, De Ia
condition des societes etrangeres aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique (I923) 74; continental
material is reprinted by NIEDERER {supra n. I29) I76-I9Q.
us The Sixth Hague Conference (I928) found no time for the problem. The Draft
Convention of the Seventh Hague Conference (I95I) has not been ratified so
far; text of the Draft in Conference de Ia Haye de DIP, I95I, Actes (I952) 385,
English translation I Am. J. Comp. Law (I952) 277, German translation I7 Z.
ausl.PR. (I952) 270. ERNST WoLFF, "Personalstatut fUr Gesellschaften, Vereine
und Stiftungen," Festschrift M. Wolff (I952) 375-400; BATIFFOL, "La reconnaissance des personnes morales etrangeres a Ia septieme Conference de d.i.p. de Ia
Haye (195I)," Travaux du comite fran~ais de droit international prive I948-I952
(I953) p. I37-I47· The International Law Association has also debated the issue,
Reports of the 46th and 47th Conferences I954, 364ff., 1956, 3I9ff.
1" Uniform Foreign Corporation Act, in Handbook of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (I934) 286.

68 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS
create corporations for foreign consumption. There should be
no doubt in theory that this is the soundest solution. Likewise
in theory, it would seem obvious that the Continental conflicts principle is the true equivalent to the common law
principle with respect to individuals, and that this domiciliary
rule has as much to recommend it for corporations as it has
for individuals. In a federation, the nation-wide activities of
a private legal person should be supervised and guaranteed
by a federal organ. This is true for intrastate as well as
for interstate activity, but, as things stand, the states are
thoroughly disinclined to cede one of their last important
powers, and the corporations cannot afford to have their
vast bureaucratic duties increased by additional federal impositions. Thus, in this country, the main problem lies in
other considerations, the most important of which is con~
cerned with the right of doing business, which will be discussed at a later place in this book.

CHAPTER

20

The Scope of the Personal Law
of Corporations

T

HE personal law governs all matters relating to a
corporation's existence, its functions as defined by its
constitution, its organization, liabilities, and termination, as well as connected matters. 1 It accompanies the legal
entity from birth to death.
I.

Existence and Legal Character

The personal law determines whether there is a corporation. The forum will rely on this law for affirmation or
negation of its existence. 2 A perfected incorporation-in any
state, or in the state of central control-is recognized irrespective of facts that would be considered omissions or defects
in the process of incorporation and causes for dissolution
under the domestic law of the forum. 3 Conversely, an association not enjoying legal personality in the place of attempted
1 Formulations to the same effect: RG. (May 27, 19ro) 73 RGZ. 366, 367
(capacity of having and exercising rights, constitution, administration, contract
of association and its modifications); C6digo Bustamante, art. 248 (constitution,
function, and responsibility of the organs). Cj. the draft rules of the International
Company Law Committee of the International Law Association, Report of the
47th Conference 19s6, pp. 371 ff.
2 Restatement § ISS (I) and (2) implicitly.
England: Henriques v. General Privileged Dutch Co. (1728) Ld. Raym. IS32,
1 535; The National Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales (r825) r C. & P. 569.
United States: First Title and Securities Co. v. U. S. Gypsum Co. (I931) 2I r
Iowa 1019, 233 N. W. 137.
Examples:
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 29, I896) Pasicrisie r896.2.36s.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (July 2, I896) Clunet r899, S7S·
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 7, 1900) W. 7488; Rb. Rotterdam
(June S, 1913) W. 9S49; Rb. Amsterdam (May 29, 1914) W. 9683, and see
KosTERS 67S·
1 Restatement § ISS comment b.
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creation, is not considered anywhere an incorporated body;'

Illustration. The Committee of Underwriters of Hamburg
brought an action in Paris. The French Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff, a legal person under the law of Hamburg,
and not a stock corporation,11 was able to sue. 6
The requirements for validity of corporations established
in the state where a corporation is alleged to have been
created, must be fulfilled. It may be that an act of the
legislative or executive branch of the government is necessary
(Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland), as was universally
required in former times. 7 Ordinarily, however, general
statutes establish the conditions under which an association
may gain personality by creation through private persons
for private purposes. The provisions vary with respect to
every particular of the formalities, such as the documents
embodying the declaration of the promoters (articles, certificate or memorandum of association or incorporation, or
charter and by-laws, in Europe ordinarily one document,
the "statute") and the records and advertisements necessary
for public association. There is also diversity on the minimum
number of members needed, the subscriptions or payments
to be made, the verification of noncash contributions, and
similar matters. The law of incorporation controls which
provisions are conditions precedent and which mandatory,
and which kind of invalidity follows :M omission or mistake. 8
This law must be wholly satisfied. 9
• Restatement§ ISS comment b; Dickey v. Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. (1915
II9 Ark. 12, 173 S. W. 398; Sinnott v. Hanan (I9IS) 214 N.Y. 4S4, roB N. E. SsS.
1 Otherwise the court would have denied recognition on the ground discussed
infra, Chapter 22, pp. 131-141.
6 Cass. (civ.) (July 12, 1893) Clunet 1893, 1204.
1 App. Colmar (March 31, 1908) Clunet 1910, 613 (authorization required in
Luxemburg).
8 England: In rt The Imperial Anglo-German Bank (1872) 26 L. T. N. S. 229;
cf. YouNa 178 n. 4·
9 Restatement § ISS (2).
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Whether agreements by which the promoters engage
themselves to bring a corporation into existence form an
integral part of the proceedings needed for incorporation, is
determined by the personal law. If they are not so considered,
the law of contract governs. 10 Assuredly contracts concluded
between the promoters and the members of a finance or
guarantee syndicate or agreements between these persons and
the bankers are not covered by the personal law. 11
While the validity of the creating act is thus subjected to
the law of the incorporating state, it has been objected that,
unless it is validly constituted, a legal person cannot have a
personal law; to determine under this personal law whether
the constitution is valid, would mean a vicious circle.12 But
it is simply reasonable that the same law should govern the
acts by which an association assumes personality, acquires
capacity and an organization, as well as the discharge of its
functions. The overworked argument of a circulus inextricabilis
is once more deceptive.
Objections on the ground of public policy to technical particulars of the foreign requirements for incorporation are
very seldom raised. Examples may be found in jurisdictions
where one-man companies are abhorred. 13
In connection with this conception, it is an important and
universally settled rule that the subscribers (in the broadest
meaning) to the stock of a company are liable according to
the personal law of the corporation. 14 To support this rule,
1° RG. (March 4, 1930) IPRspr. 1931 No. II (Vorgriindungsuertrag), Swiss BG.,
35 BGE. II 231, 36 id. II 387.
11 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 464 n. I § 181, but the parties are presumed to have submitted their contract to that same law, cf. RG. (Oct. 29, 1938) 159 RGZ. 33, 45·
11 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) § 183.
18 Belgium: Cass. (Jan. 5, 191I) Revue pratique des societes (19II) 185; Revue
pratique du notariat (19II) 279 (a company cannot exist with only one member).
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (May 5 and u, 1916) W. 9978 and 10003.
u United States: Crofoot v. Thatcher (1899) 19 Utah 212, 57 Pac. 171; Trent
Import Co. v. Wheelwright (1912) II8 Md. 249, 84 Atl. 543 (illegal stock subscription); May v. Roberts (1930) 133 Ore. 643, 286 Pac. 546, 549; Collins v.
Morgan Grain Co. (1926) 16 F. (2d) 253, 255.
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it is usually argued in Europe that the subscribers tacitly
submit themselves to the law governing the future corporation.1~ This argument, in fact, covers also those subscriptions
which are not an essential prerequisite of the constitution.
In the United States, the same result, i.e., that the action
against the subscribers is determined by the law of the state
of incorporation, is reached by the construction that the
subscriber's offer is deemed to have been accepted by the
corporation as soon as formed. 16
For the formalities of the contract of association, if the
contract is executed in a state other than where its commercial
domicil is to be, i.e., where incorporation is to be sought, the
revised text of the Treaty of Montevideo refers to the law of
the place of contracting. 17 But this is true only to the extent
to which the law of the state of incorporation refers to the
local law by the rule locus regit actum.
2.

Capacity (Powers)

The main idea involved in this topic is simple enough to
be recorded at this juncture:
A corporation, if recognized, enjoys the powers conferred
upon it by its charter or by the legislation of the incorpoAustria: OGH. (Dec. 29, I930) I2 SZ. 956 No. 3I5, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (I932) 972
(Swiss law determines principal, interest, and time limitation).
France: Trib. com. Seine (May rr, I887) Clunet I889, 670 (Belgian law);
Trib. com. Seine (June 25, I89I) Clunet I893, 893 (Luxemburg law); Cour Paris
(Aug. 4, I 893) Clunet I 893, I 226 (the buyer of a foreign share cannot invoke the
French provision that shares must amount at least to 500 francs); Trib. com. Seine
(March 17, I896) Clunet I897, I043 (Belgian law determining prescription for
the subscriber).
.
Germany: OLG. Munchen (July I7, I928) IPRspr. I929 No. 23 (English law).
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (Dec. rr, I9I6) N. J. (I9I7) 8.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. I5, I9I5) 4I BGE. II 588 (Swiss law on rescission, based,
however, on a special argument).
16
Belgium: Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 3I, I907) Clunet 1908, 1231.
France: Trib. com. Seine (June I7, 1907) Clunet 1908, 170.
Germany: Common opinion, see KESSLER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 768 No·. r.
16
Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey (I876) Ir6 Mass. 471; for other cases see
WARREN, Cases on Corporations (1928) 175.
17
Draft of Treaty on Commercial Terrestial Law (I940) art. 26 § 2, cj. art. 7·
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rating state. This latter, the "general law" of the corporation,
cannot be disregarded, unless it intends to amplify or diminish
the powers of corporations or a class of them only within the
territory of the state. Exceptions may be raised to the powers
of a foreign corporation on the grounds of public policy, but
this should not be done without the strongest reasons.
The principle includes the ability of a corporation to have
rights and liabilities and to be heir or legatee/ 8 as well as the
capacity to exercise rights (capacity of enjoyment).
If consistency be observed, the personal law of the state of
incorporation governs the name or firm of the entity. 19 Thus
the German Reichsgericht protected an abbreviated name
"Kwatta" under Dutch law (according to the Paris Treaty
for the Protection of Commercial Property of r 8 8 3),20 and
the name "Eskimo Pie Co.," following the law of Delaware. 21
In the European opinion, there is no doubt that the scope
of this personal law embraces the right to sue and to be a
party to a law suit. 22 This is also one of the oldest rules of
18 See, for instance, Cour Paris (June 21, 1935) Clunet 1936, 884; Trib. com.
Seine (Nov. q, 1936) Clunet 1938, 307; Revue Crit. 1938, 57: Austrian law for
existence and capacity to be a legatee of the Society for the Assistance to Frenchmen in Austria.
19 France: App. Douai (Nov. r8, 1904) D.1905.2.175; Cass. (req.) (Dec. 26,
1905) D.I906.I.252.
Argentina: Cam. Fed. de Ia Cap. (June 16, 1944) 34 La Ley 1024.
2o RG. (Sept. 26, 1924) ro9 RGZ. 213.
21 RG. (June 3, 1927) II7 RGZ. 217.
n France: Cour Paris (July 2o, 1936) Clunet 1937, 516 with the instructive distinction that the foreign corporation may sue by virtue of its capacity under article
rs of the Civil Code, but that jurisdiction is given only within the limits defined
by French Code of Civ. Proc., art. 59·
Germany: STEIN-JoNAS-ScHONKE, ZPO §50 (ed. 1953) VI.
Italy: Former C. Com. (1882) arts. 230-232 have been considered to cover the
whole field of capacity to be a party and, by the prevailing opinion, even where a
foreign business corporation has failed to comply with the conditions for doing
business in the Kingdom. See below pp. 143ff., 147·
The Netherlands: Doctrine firmly settled by H.R. (March 23, 1866) W. 278r;
see also Hof den Bosch (May 26, 1891) W. 6129 (corporation in liquidation);
KosTERS 689; Rb. Dordrecht, (Jan. 12, 1927) W. rr625, 37 Z.int.It (1927) 447,
r VAN HAsSELT 327 (expressly declaring that reciprocity is not required for recognition); Rb. Haag (March 27, 1936) W. 1937, 665 (company constituted in Bern,
Switzerland); Hof den Bosch (Feb. 9, 1937) W. 1937, 992. There is, however, a
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England, going back to the cases of 1724 and 1825,28 and
certainly is the true rule in this country, despite Beale's
assertion that the whole problem of who may sue and be
sued is procedural. 24
In contrast to the capacity to be a party, the competence
of certain individuals to appear in court on behalf of a
corporation which is a party, may be influenced by the procedural law of the forum. This problem cannot be expounded
here. American courts seem accustomed to follow consistently
the lex fori.
What law determines the status of a corporation as a
merchant, important under most civil law legislations? Opinions are divided. The personal law is applied by logical
consequence in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, 25 and has been prescribed in an elaborate manner in
great controversy about foreign (French, Belgian) provisions denying the right
of a corporation to appear in its own name; the majority of decisions regard these
provisions procedural and therefore not applicable in the Dutch forum, see vAN
HASSELT 3·
Scotland: Edinburgh and Glasgow Bank v. Ewan (r8p) I4 Ct. Sess. (2nd. ser.)
547·
Sweden: MALMA!l, 7 Repert. I4I No. I49·
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. I6, I909) 35 BGE. II 458; App. Zurich (May 2, 1938)
38 Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. (I939) I90 n. 85: "capacity of being sued for attachment is a
branch of the capacity of being a party, and this is a branch of the capacity of
having rights," concerning a "curatorium of administration for the estate of the late
princes, H-0, etc."
18 Right to sue: Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques (I724) I Strange 612, aff'd
(I728) 2 Ld. Raym. I532, (I730) id. I535; The National Bank of St. Charles v.
De Bernales (I825) I c. & P. 569, Ry. & M. I9Q.
Liability to be sued: Newby v. Van Oppen and The Colt's Patent Firearms Mfg.
Co. (I872) 7 Q.B. 293.
14 3 BEALE § s88.I and 2. See infra pp. I43ff., I47·
26 Germany: M. WoLFF, IPR. I I3.
Italy: App. Roma (March 3, I932) Foro ltal. I932 I 1173; Cass. (April 29, 1933)
Foro Ita!. I933 I n6o; Cass. Roma (March 24, I938) Giur. Ita!. I938 I, I, 65I
(an Italian company for dealing with rural land in Argentina is commercial and
therefore subject to bankruptcy, though its activity is not considered commercial
under Argentine C. Com. art. 8). This decision is correct without regard to "qualification according to lex fori," as claimed by a note in Clunet I939, I85.
The Netherlands: Rb. Almelo (Oct. JO, I9QI) W. 7736.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 2; lnterlocal Priv. Law, art. 4 (center of enterprise).
Switzerland: VON STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. (I93I) 3I3; cf. CAVAGLIElli, Dir. Int. Com.
(I936) I6o-I73•
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26

the C6digo Bustamante. French courts and writers, however,
advocate the law of the forum. 27
By an exception universally adopted, the capacity of a
corporation to commit tort is governed by the law of the
place of the alleged tortious act, if the forum does not insist
on its own policy. 28
More detailed attention will be given below (Chapter 22)
to the problems arising when contracts exceeding the powers
either of the corporation or its representatives, are concluded
on behalf of a foreign corporation.
3· Internal Organization
The problems regarding the organization of the internal
life of the corporate body29 include in the first place acquisition and tertnination of membership. 30 In a fraternal benefit
organization, the charter and by-laws determine also who
is eligible to be a beneficiary. 31
Certificates. Membership may depend on the holding of
a certificate. Whether it does, and to what extent-whether
C6digo Bustamante, art. 248. See also 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT II 950 § 1127.
ARMINJON, 2 Precis (ed. 1) 384 § 179.
Similarly, NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 190, 194·
Mexico: C. Com. art. 3 (3).
Institute of International Law, 35 Annuaire (1929) II 164-167 seems to combine
both principles in a singular way.
u Restatement § 166 comment h.
France: Cass. (crim.) (Aug. 8, 1873) Clunet 1875, 22; Trih. corr, Seine (March
13, 1903) Clunet 1903, 8.31; id. Guly 27, 1910) Clunet 1911, 2.34·
Germany:OLG. NiirnhergGan. 4, 1934)IPRspr. 1934 No. 26; RAAPE 137; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 191 (n. 6) § 42; in other opinions: 2 ZITELMANN 129; ScHNITZER,
Handelsr. 115; hut Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 235 (3) requires the minimum
liability established by the law of the forum.
u Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (1883) 109 U. S. 527·
ao United States: Restatement § 182; Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co. (1917) 242
U. S. 394 as construed by CHE.\THAM, Cases 704.
France: Cour Paris (May 12, 1881) Clunet 1882, 317; Trih. com. Seine (May
28, 1896) Clunet 1896, 874.
Germany: RG. (May 25, 1928) JW. 1928, 2013; RG. (March 10, 1934) 88 Seuft'.
Arch. (1934) 193, IPRspr. 1934 No. 11; OLG. Celie (Nov. 11, 1951) IPRspr.
1950-51 No. 12h.
Switzerland: BG. (July 9, 1913) 39 BGE. II 426.
u See 2 BEALE 1212 n. r.
28

27
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for instance actual or potential membership rights are conferred upon any holder of a share certificate-is determined
by the law of the state of incorporation. If this state is one
in which the conception of the common law prevails, shares
are not transferable except by registration on the company's
books, and any certificates of stock issued have merely evidentiary value. This system has been maintained in many
existing American and Canadian statutes on stock transfer,
although these allow the companies incorporated in the state
to issue certificates that are indorsable in blank and transferable by delivery. Acquisition of the certificate as a tangible
thing (under the law applicable thereto) confers ownership
in the corporeal certificate and in addition conveys title to the
share of stock as between assignor and assignee, 82 but membership is acquired only by subsequent registration. Under
English law, however, and according to the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act (adopted or substantially equalled in all
states), registered certificates, indorsed in blank or accompanied by separate instrument of transfer or assignment,
bill of sale, et cetera, embody the rights of the certificate
owner to demand registration as the owner of membership
upon the books of the corporation. "Title to a certificate and
to the share represented thereby can be transferred only by
delivery of the instrument."33 The share, hence, may be said
to be materially, although not formally, merged with the
certificate. Finally, the prevailing Continental type reaches
the same goal by the complete merger of share and certificate
in bearer shares. 34
It follows that the certificate in all cases is transferred
according to the law governing tangible things, viz., as is
often asserted, by the law of the situs, but more precisely,
Williams v. Colonial Bank (I888) 38 Ch. D. 388; GoODRICH §§ I6o-I63 n. I25.
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § I, 6 U. L.A. (I922).
34 I BEALE§ I04.I; German RG. (MarchIo, I934) IPRspr. I934 No. II. Another
opinion seems to be expressed by M. WoLFF, IPR. ITS.
32

33
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by the law of the place where the certificate is delivered. 85
In contrast thereto, the personal law of the corporation determines, whether consent of other members, or that of the
corporation, or whether recording in the books, is required
to entitle the transferee to the rights of a shareholder as
against the corporation, its other members, the state, and
other third independent parties, to relieve the transferor
from liability to the corporation, and related questions. For
example, if the ownership of the certificate, embodying a
share of an English private limited company, according to
Swiss law is validly transferred to a Swiss bank, the rights
of the acquirer are nevertheless subject to the transfer restrictions of English law. 36
In an analogous way, in case of inheritance, the last personal law of the deceased will decide to whom the assets
devolve, but whether one who thus acquires shares holds
an effective title in relation to the corporation, is exclusively
determined by the law of charter. 37
Seizures. The application of the law of the corporation
to the transfer of shares includes seizures of all kinds. 88 In
the main, this has been recognized in all those cases where
shares or certificates have been confiscated. aaa In particular,
the Alien Property Custodians in this country,39 in Canada/ 0
35 United States: Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel
Corp. (I925) 267 u.s. 22; See Note, IS Cal. L. Rev. (I927) I4S, I49, ISO.
36 See voN STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. (I93I) 320.
37 The comment b to Restatement § I82 is probably in accord.
as RABEL, "Situs Problems in Enemy Property Measures," I I Law and Cont.
Prob. (I945) u8, I33· As an illustration, see:
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Sept. II, I922) W. I096o: certificates representing German shares in an English corporation were in England and on seizure
by the English trustee of enemy property transferred on the books. The Dutch
court recognized the seizure according to the applicable English law.
3Ba The same rule seems to apply to escheat of stock, Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey (I950) 34I U.S. 428.
39 Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktiengesellschaft (C. C. A. 2d I922) 283
Fed. 746; United Cigarette Machine Co. v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (C. C. A. 2d
1926) 12 F. (2d) 634.
4 0 Spitz v. Secretary of State of Canada [1939] 2 D. L. R. 546, Exch. C.
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and in South Africa41 have been upheld when they vested
in themselves enemy registered shares by mere notification
to the central office of the company, despite circulation of
the respective certificates in neutral countries, because the
company law involved was based on the common law principle. Under the same rule, after World War II, conflicting
claims to securities seized as enemy assets outside the state
of incorporation were settled in favor of the latter. 41 a On the
other hand, the perceptive analysis of the principles underlying the Uniform Stock Transfer Act as adopted in New
Jersey, by Judge Learned Hand, and in the Supreme Court
of the United States, by Mr. Justice Holmes, recognized
seizure by the English Public Trustee, of stock of the United
States Steel Corporation, indorsed in blank and deposited in
a bank in London for the account of German banks.42 The
holding of such a certificate rather than the registration upon
the books of the corporation procures membership. This, the
Disconto-Gesellschaft case, should have authority for courts
everywhere. By its recognition of the mobilization of the
membership embodied in the certificate, the decision relates
the problem to the use of financial markets and the importance
of commercial reliance, the very considerations that originated
the institution of certificates to bearer. One question only has
been intentionally left open by this and other cases: whether
the public policy of the state of incorporation overriding its
own stock transfer law, may abridge the rights of bona fide
holders of true bearer shares. Such an extension of war measures has not been excluded. However, thus far, no unequivocal
case in which bona fide neutral acquirers of bearer shares have
been divested, has occurred here or in England.
u Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co. v. Custodian of Enemy Property
(1923) S. A. L. R. App. D. 576.
ua Agreement between the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands relating
to the Resolution of Conflicting Claims to German Enemy Assets of Dec. 5, 1947,
18 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (1948) p. 6, art. 1.
41 Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp (1925) 267 U. S. 22.
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A similar classification is due to the rights and liabilities
pertaining to the members. 48 The Restatement enumerates
as subject to the law of incorporation:
The right of a shareholder to participate in the administration of the affairs of the corporation, in the division of
profits and in the distribution of assets on dissolution and his
rights on the issuance of new shares ( § I 83); the right to
vote, to receive dividends, etc. (comment a, ibid.) ; the right
to object to corporate activities (comment b, ibid.).
The question whether the trustee (for the purpose of voting) will be allowed to vote the shares(§ I84).
The existence and extent of the liability of a shareholder
for assessments or contribution to the corporation for the payment of debts of the corporation ( § I 85).
For illustration, a certificate issued by the National City
Bank of New York on "our American share" giving title
to shares of a European corporation, is governed, as regards
validity and content, by New York law, and with respect
to the deposit of the original European shares by the proper
law applicable thereto; but in all other respects the law of
the incorporating state controls. 44
Members are subject to assessments made in conformity
to the charter, by-laws, and statutory provisions of the law
of incorporation, "although they are not made parties to
the proceeding for levying it."45
43 United States: Hudson River Pulp Co. v. Warner (I <)CO) 99 Fed. I87, 39 U.S.
C. C. A. 452; O'Brien v. Chicago R. Co. (I 868) 53 Barb. (N.Y.) 568, 36 How. Pr. 24
(spurious stock); Ernest v. Elmira Municipal Improvement Co. (I898) 24 N. Y.
Misc. 583, 54 N. Y. 'Supp. u6 (right against unlawful issue of preferred stock);
Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American etc. Co. (I90J) I89 U. S. 221.
England: Spiller v. Turner (I897) I Ch. D. 9II, cf. YouNG I86.
Canada: Pickles v. China Mutual Ins. Co.; China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Smith
(I91J) 47 S.C. R. 429, Io D. L. R (I91J) 323, conf'ng, 46 N. S. R. 7, 3D. L. R. 766
(Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 1912).
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Jan. IJ, 1928) Jur. Com. Brux. I928, 42 (preferred
stock of a Belgian company is not valorized, according to Belgian I w).
Switzerland: BG. (April z, 1924) so BGE. II 57, 58.
"See FLECHTHEIM, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) II8.
"Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express Inc. (1941)
314 U. S. 20I, 207; Warner v. Delbridge & Cameron (1896) no Mich. 590, 68
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The same law of incorporation determines how directors
are nominated and what position they hold; how and at what
place the directors or committees shall meet; 46 all questions
of internal management; 47 the method of distribution of
profits and appropriation of earned surplus to reserves;
accounting; whether a corporation is permitted to acquire
its own stock/ 8 et cetera.
Matters of internal organization, however, are not only
reserved to the law of the charter, but regularly also to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the state of incorporation.
Jurisdiction. "The English court will not interfere in the
internal disputes of foreign corporations with domestic issues
as between the members" 49-a maxim not consistently respected. 50 In the United States, it has been declared that,
in the absence of an office for the transfer of shares, a foreign
corporation may not be sued for the issuance, transfer, or
cancellation of shares; 51 generally, courts exercise discretion
in assuming jurisdiction; it is a question of policy and
convenience, not of right. 52 It is thought, however, that
considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice point
to the court of the domicil of the corporation for settlement
N. W. 2.83: "Every person who deals with it (the foreign corporation) everywhere
and particularly one who becomes a member of the corporation, is bound to take
notice of the provisions which had been made in its charter, and subjects himself
to such laws o~ th,~ government of its situs as affect the powers and obligations
of the corporatiOn.
46 Restatement § I64.
47 San Remo Copper Min. Co. v. Moneuse (I9I2.) I49 App. Div. (N.Y.) 26, II3
N. Y. Supp. 509, reversing (I9II) I32. N.Y. Supp. 570.
48 Tolman v. New Mexico & Dakota Mica Co. (I885) 4 Dak. 4, 2.2 N. W. 505.
49 Sudlow v .. Dutch Rhenish R. Co. (I855) 2-I Beav. 43, per Romilly.
~ 0 DICEY, (ed. 5) Rule I39, n. d seems to indicate less consistency than in the
American courts, without such doubts DICEY (-M. MANN) rule 78 (2.), n. 50.
~ 1 Restatement §§ I92, I93; cj. Hopkins v. Great Western Fuse Co. (I94I)
343 Pa. 438, 22 At!. (2d) 717; Sternfeld v. Toxaway Tanning Co. (I942) 290 N. Y.
2.94, 49 N. E. (2d) I45·
~·Restatement, Scope Note to Topic 5, 279; Notes, I8 A. L. R. I376, 1383; 32
A. L. R. I353, I355i 29 Col. L. Rev. (I929) 968; 27 Mich. L. Rev. (I929) 336.
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of the Issues presented. 53 Analogous rules existing elsewhere
are in part even stricter and more comprehensive. 54
4· External Relations
The personal law of the corporation controls the rights
and liabilities of the corporation and of the members toward
third persons, such as creditors and debtors. 55 In particular,
it covers the powers of the corporation56 and the liability of
promoters, directors/ 68 advisory board/ 7 and shareholders. 58
For instance, where a British incorporated limited company
carried on business in California, in which state the constitution and the civil code of the time declared the shareholders
of a corporation liable for the debts of the corporation, the
English Court of Appeals correctly denied the action. 59
Liability of stockholders in the United States. In this
63 See Notes,JJ Col. L. Rev. (1933) 492; 89 A.L.R. 736; I7 Bast. U.L. Rev. (1937)
878. See the vigorous dissent of Fuld, J., in Long Park Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theaters Co. (1948) 297 N. Y. 174, !79· An exception has been mentioned
supra Chapter 19 n. 53·
64 E.g., Belgium: Law on Competence, of March 25, 1876, art. 44 gives exclusive
jurisdiction to the court at the place of the principal establishment, over disputes
between the administrators and members. The constitutional documents may
change this rule however. See Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. 349 § 2217.
France: C. Civ. Proc., art. 59, see comment by GLASSON, TrsSIER et MoREL, 2
Traite theorique et pratique de procedure civile (ed. 3, 1926) § 360.
Germany: ZPO. § 22, Aktiengesetz §§ 199 par. 3, 216 par. 4; Genossenschaftsgesetz § 51, Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung Gesetz § 75·
66 Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (r883) 109 U. S. 527; a person dealing
with a foreign corporation submits himself to the regulation of the foreign state
discharging the corporation from liability.
6 6 See discussion infra pp. 15Sff.
&6a However, in French bankruptcy of foreign company, liability of president and
administrators is determined by French law, App. Douai (Dec. 1, 1955) Revue
Crit. 1956, 490; App. Paris (Oct. 31, 1957) Revue Crit. 1958, 345·
67 Restatement § 187.
68 Restatement§§ 187, 190, cf. Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner (C. C. S.
D. Tex. rgo8) 163 Fed. 6os. On the special subject of limitation of the liability of
stockholders, see the notes in IIJ A. L. R. 510 and 143 A. L. R. 1442.
Personal liability of shareholders of a defectively incorporated Arkansas corporation under Arkansas law is not enforced in Tennessee because of its penal character, Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell (1953) 195 Tenn. 581, 261 S.W. (2d) 127;
Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., Inc., of Mississippi (1953) 208 F. (2d) 310,
reversing its former opinion, 206 F. (2d) 127.
England: General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou (1843) II M. & W. 877;
Bateman v. Service (P. C. 1881) 6 App. Cas. 386, per Sir R. Couch, 388.
Canada: Allen v. Standard Trust Co. (1920) 57 D. L. R. 105 (Man. App.); for
other cases see 3 JoHNSON 453·
19 Risdon I. & L. Works v. Furness [1906] 1 K. B. 49·
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country, however, the problem has been singularly confused.
The provisions of California just mentioned established
proportionate liability of stockholders to be applied also to
stockholders of foreign corporations,60 a unique and extravagant rule that fortunately was repealed in I 93 1.61 But
the not so infrequent provisions imposing some subsidiary
liability upon shareholders, such as in particular on those of
banking, guaranty, investment, insurance, or similar corporations62 have been extended to the members of organizations
of other states under qualified circumstances interesting to
1;~,
note.
(i) While the Supreme Court of the United States in
several cases has compelled state courts to give effect to the
statutory liability of members under the law of organization,68
it once approved a judgment declaring a stockholder subject
to the liability statute of the state whose resident he is. 64
Against this emphasis on the power of the domiciliary state,
it should be noted with all due respect that the accidental
domicil of an individual should not interfere with the structure of a capital organization recognized under our basic
principles for common interest. Otherwise, local liability
rules ought to be applied also when they are more favorable
to the stockholder than the rules governing the corporation.
In fact, when a citizen of New Jersey was sued on his
individual additional liability as a stockholder of a banking
corporation of Florida, the New Jersey court dismissed the
6

°Cal. Constitution, former § 3, art. XII; C. C., former § 322.

61

Cal. Stat. (1931) p. 444; C. C. §§ 322-325a; cj. BALLANTINE, Cal. Corp. Law,
4 § 3: "Thi"s form of liability was unique and operated as a deterrent to the investment of capital here."
'n E.g., see Kentucky: Rev. Stat. (1955) s. 287. 36o (banking); Maine: Rev.
Stat. (1954) c. 53 § 121.
83 Converse v. Hamilton (1912) 224 U. S. 243; Supreme Council of the Royal
Arcanum v. Green (1915) 237 U.S. 531; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918)
246 U. S. 357· Accordingly, Groesbeck v. Beaupre (1940) 307 Ill. App. 215, 30
N. E. (2d) 531.
14 Pinney v. Nelson (1901) 183 U. S. 144; followed by Restatement § 191 comment a.
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action with reference to a local statute. 611 A naive annotation
tried to justify this decision constitutionally by the argument
that the claim was not based on a judgment but on a statutory
liability. 66 These seem to be isolated aberrations.
(ii) Although the stockholder was not a resident and
the corporation was foreign, he was held subject to the
liability statute of the state where the corporation concluded
a contract. The courts assumed an agreement of the stockholder with the third party whereby he was deemed to have
submitted to the statute of the place of contracting, either
when the charter of the corporation expressly authorized
doing business in that state or even when the charter failed
to specify the states in which business may be conducted. 67
These fictitious constructions were aptly refuted in the case
of Thomas v. Matthiessen68 by the Federal Courts of New
York, Judge Ward of the Circuit Court of Appeals declaring
that under the theories rejected "corporate stock is liable to
become in this country an uncertain and even dangerous asset."
The Supreme Court, however, although approving of this
reasoning, found factually that the New York stockholders
of a New York corporation had agreed to liability under the
law of Arizona, because by the charter the corporation was
specially organized to do business in Arizona and California. 69
We may in fact, as explained before, set aside the case
66 Cochrane v. Morris (1931) 10 N. ]. Misc. 82, 157 At!. 652. The statute involved was held unconstitutional by the U. S. Supreme Court in Broderick v.
Rosner (1935) 294 U. S. 629, but is still on the books (N. J. Stat. Ann., 1937, s.

14:7-rr).
''57 N. ]. L.

J. (1934) 261.

See the' California cases cited in Restatement California Annotations § 191.
Other cases and argumentations on the same lines in Notes, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1910)
37, 12 Col. L. Rev. (1912) 450, 27 Harv. L. Rev. (1914) 575· This strange argument
has been shared by YouNG and by STEVENS 729 n. r82.
The Restatement § 191, trying to reduce the scope of the local law, still applies
it when "(b) the shareholder has personally taken part in doing the act or causing
it to be done, or (c) has notice that the corporation was formed to do business there."
' 1 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1909) 170 Fed. 362; (19rr) 192 Fed. 495·
67

It

(1913) 2J2 U. S. 221.
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where a business organization is intended to operate exclusively, or at least principally, in a state other than that
of incorporation; this, however, should be done, if at all,
only under some theory of evasion that is to be based, not
on the behavior or domicil of any particular stockholder, but
on the contrast between the corporate purposes and the selection of the state in which to incorporate. In Peck v. Noee, the
corporation was organized to do business in California only,
and its organizers and officers were California residents. 70
In this case, probably with stronger facts than in that of
Thomas v. Matthiessen, the local law might have had a
claim. 71 All other arguments against the exclusive application
of the law of the charter are evidently induced by mistaken
application of the conflicts rule that a principal is bound to
the construction given to his authority by the law of the
state where the agent acts upon it. In our case, no such
construction can alter the fact that the stockholders have
agreed only to a charter limiting their liability to their share
in the stock, and hence have given approval to business carried
on in whatever place, only at the risk of the corporation and
not otherwise. To reason as though individual stockholders or
all stockholders by allowing business abroad have waived the
limitation of their liability, is gratuitous.
On the other hand, the exclusive application of the law
of the charter is entirely desirable in the interest of certainty
and equity, even if more reliable expressions for exception
could be found than in the helpless formulation of the Restatement (supra note 67).
Borderline problems. Special attention will be given later
to the authority of the principal representatives of a corporation contracting with third persons. There is no doubt,
however, on principle that the personal law of the entity
70
71

Peck v. Noee (1908) 154 Cal. 351, 97 Pac. 865.
Cj. STUMBERG 373·
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controls. 72 Only the borderline between this and other conflicts rules causes some difficulties. In particular, the territorial
law of the country where a foreign corporation does business
is likely to claim consideration of its own rules. Application
of the law governing the contract may further complicate
the problem. Young in his excellent monograph, trying to
find a just delimitation, proposed that only those rules and
enactments which relate to the permanent character and constitution of a juristic person, or to the relations of its members inter se and toward the juristic person itself, should
be regarded as part of its personal law having extraterritorial
effect; no enactment made to protect the interests of third
parties should be included. 73 This is not a suitable proposition,
because the law of the incorporating state, too, generally has
rules protecting third parties which ought to be applied and
because the local law is also entitled to regulate business
conducted in its territory in respects not concerning the mterest of third parties but the public interest.

5. Modification and End
The law of the state of incorporation determines:
Alteration of the charter or by-laws, e.g., increase or
decrease of the capital stock; 74 annulment of the charter; 75 its
7 2 United States: 2 BEALE 758 § 165.r.
England: Banco de Bilbao v. Antonio Rey y Zardoya, K. B. (1937), "not published" in England, Clunet 1938, 6o2; aff'd, 2 All E. R. (1938]253-C. A.: revocation
of powers of employees under Spanish Constitution and C. Com. art. 21.
Br~zil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Sept. 2, 19o8) 107 0 Direito 215.
France: App. Douai (April 28, 1897) D.1899.2.195·
Germany: KG. (March 8, 1929) IPRspr. 1929 No. 21.
The Netherlands: H. R. (Jan. 12, 1933) W. 12626; charter of Belgian comptoir
determines agent's power to conclude a cartel with Dutch and German companies.
73 YouNG 185. If he says: "A state cannot exercise its legislative powers over
the subjects of other states, even to protect them," he adds a new "cannot" to
those well criticized by himself.
7 ' Austria: OGH. (Dec. 29, 1930) 12 Amtl. S. No. 315.
France: Trib. com. Seine (June 5, 1875) Clunet 1876,363.
Germany: RG. (May 27, 1910) 76 RGZ. 366, 20 Z.int.R. 408 (Dutch law applied,
art. 289 par. 3 of the German HGB. declared inapplicable).
76 See supra ns. 2ff.
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expiration by lapse of time; 76 transformation; Toa merger/6b
dissolution, 71 whether voluntary or forced/ 8 its method and
cause; 79 in states recognizing the extraterritorial effect of
foreign adjudications in bankruptcy,80 the effect of such
adjudication on the existence and representation of the corporation; 81 and its continuation after a certificate of dissolution for purposes of winding up or actions of debt. 82
If the state of incorporation does not provide for a suit in
the corporate name after dissolution, an American rule provides that where the corporation was doing business or had
property in another state, it may be kept alive by the statutes
of this latter state for the purpose of suing or being sued,
and that the effect on the winding up of the business or on
the property existing in that state will be recognized in third
states. 83 This rule deserves universal application, although on
the Continent statutes on dissolution generally do prescribe
continuation for the purpose and duration of winding up, if
78

Sturges v. Vanderbilt (1S7S) 73 N.Y. 3S4.
Portuguese Trib. Supr. (Nov. 30, 1956) 75 Rev. Trib. (1957) 73·
Nat!. Bank of Greece and Athens S.A. v. Metliss [1957]3 All E.R. 6oS (H.L.).
However, a retroactive discharge of contractual liabilities of the merged company is
disregarded if English law is proper law of the contract, Adams v. Nat!. Bank of
Greece and Athens S.A. [195S] 2 All E.R. 3 (Q.B.).
77 United States: Relfe v. Rundle (ISSo) 103 U.S. 222: right of appointed state
official against shareholder; approved for England by Dicey.
England: Banque lnternationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow
[1923]2 K. B. 6S2 at 691.
France: App. Chambery (Dec. t, tS66) S.1S67.2.1S2; App. Paris (June 15, 1937)
Clunet 1937, S12 {jurisdiction denied).
Germany: RG. (May 20, 1930) 129 RGZ. 9S; OLG. Frankfurt (Nov. 1, 1907) 16
ROLG. Ioo; OLG. Koln (June 20, 1913) Rhein. Arch. 119.
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam {April 22, 1910) W. 9159; (Jan. 26, 1923)
W. II054i Rb. Maastricht (June 25, 1931) W. 12366 {powers of liquidators).
Switzerland: 51 BGE. II 264, 14 Praxis 371; Bern, ZBJV. (1907) 555·
78 Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Bender Eregli v. Stinnes, 5 Recueil trib.
arb. mixtes 751.
79 Sinnott v. Hanan (1913) rs6 App. Div. (N.Y.) 323, 141 N.Y. Supp.
80 See NADELMANN, "The Recognition of American Arrangements Abroad,"
90 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1942) 7So, 7S9.
81 England: (As to movables) principle of Solomons v. Ross (1764) I H. BJ. 131
(n); see CHESHIRE 490•
Germany: RG. (Jan. 1937) 153 RGZ. 200, S Giur. Comp. DIP. (1942) 9·
81 Restatement § ISS comment c; O'Reilly, Skelly & Fogarty Co. v. Greene
(1S96) 40 N.Y. Supp. 36o, ajj'd, 41 N. Y. Supp. ros6; Sinnott v. Hanan (1915)
214 N. Y. 454, toS N. E. 858.
Germany: OLG. Frankfurt (Feb. 21, 1933) IPRspr. 1933 No. 4, applying § 105
n. 8 of the New York Stock Corporation Law.
81
Restatement § 158 comment d; Rodgers v. The Adriatic Fire Ins. Co. (1895)
St6; People v. Mercantile Credit Co. (1901) 65 App.
t48 N.Y. 34, 42 N. E.
Div. (N. Y.) 3o6, 309, 72 N. Y. Supp. 858.
78a
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the formal dissolution is not deferred until this moment.
Thus, where an English company had been dissolved without
satisfying the claim of a certain creditor who sued for payment out of German immovables recorded in the land
register in the name of the company, the German court found
it impossible directly to apply the English rules; it considered
the company as continuing for the purpose of the suit. 84 The
fiction, of course, does not refer to any business done after
the dissolution. 85 No such statute was available in the case
of Soviet nationalization, which will be mentioned below;
hence, the House of Lords had to decide whether a dissolved
Russian company could sue for debt in England, which was
granted by the narrow margin of three votes against two. 86
As a jurisdictional effect, it is generally held that the court
of the corporation's domicil has exclusive power to dissolve
as well as to annul the legal person. 87 Perfectly distinguishable is the jurisdiction exercised in any state where business is
carried on to wind up dissolved foreign corporations or partnerships. 88 In England, a technical doubt whether winding up
may follow dissolution in an order contrary to common law,
84 OLG. Frankfurt (Nov. r, 1907) r6 ROLG. roo. The Reichsgericht declared
that no such proceeding would be granted in the mere interest of the shareholders,
RG. (May 2o, 1930) 129 RGZ. 98, ro7. See German HGB. § 302.
86 Cour Paris (July 6, 1935) Clunet 1936, 916. This was disregarded in Gibbs
and Sons v. La Societe Industrielle et Commerciale des Metaux (1890) 25 Q. B. D.
399, criticized by YouNG r8r.
8& Russian & English Bank v. Baring Bros. & Co., Ltd. [1936] A. C. 405.
87 United States: Restatement New York Annotations § 157 n. 2; 2 BEALE 742
§ 157.2; Barclay v. Talman (1842) 4 Edw. Ch. 128.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 8, I9I2) Revue 1912, 402, cj. 2 ARMINJON (ed. r)
§ I83. Contra: PILLET, Personnes Morales § I72.
Belgium: Trib.Liege (July23, r89r) Clunet 1893, 1243; cj. 3 RoLIN§§ 1264,1284.
Switzerland: Bezirksgericht Horgen (Jan. 20, I956) 54 SJZ. (I958) 21.
88 England: WESTLAKE § 132; DrcEY 485; In re Comm. Bank of India (r868)
6 Eq. 517; In re Matheson Bros. Ltd. (r884) 27 Ch. D. 225; In re Commercial Bank
of South Australia (r886) 33 Ch. D. 173, 174; In re Mercantile Bank of Australia
(1892) 2 Ch. D. 204, Dairen Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Shiang Kee [I941] A. C.
373 (P. C.). See Companies Act, 1929, § 338 (I): this rule requires only a "place of
business," not an "established place of business" in England, Cohen, J., In re
Tovarishestvo Manufactur Liudvig-Rabenek [1944] I Ch. 404, 408. The corresponding s. 399 (5) (a) of the Companies Act, 1948, has been interpreted as requiring
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was resolved by an express provision of the Companies Law. 89
When in 1901 France dissolved all religious congregations
that had not obtained authorization, the Fathers of Chartreux
were correctly recognized in Switzerland as an association
because they had transferred their domicil and recreated
their legal form in other countries. 90 The Ft·bes des ecoles
chrhiennes should have been recognized also in France,
insofar as they had mother houses in other countries. 91 The
dissolved French congregations themselves could not be
recognized in any country except on the ground of public
policy; this seems not to have occurred. Also, the dissolution
of the Bank of Ethiopia by the Italian Government has been
recognized elsewhere. 92
Soviet nationalization. On a large scale, the problems of
dissolution and winding up have been discussed in the many
cases arising out of the Soviet Decree of December 14, 1917,
pronouncing the nationalization of Russian companies. 93 The
first impulse everywhere was to deny the Soviet Decree
recognition. This was done by some courts on the ground
that the Soviet Union had not received recognition by the
only the transacting of business in England, Banque des Marchands de Moscou v.
Kindersley [1951] Ch. 112, 125 (C. A.); In re Azoff-Don Commercial Bank [1954]
Ch. 316, 329.
United States: Lowe v. Pressed Metal Co. (1916) 91 Conn. 91, 99 At!. 1; N.Y.
Civil Practice Act, s. 977-b.
Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 36o (6).
89 Companies Act, 1929, s. 338 (2), now Companies Act, 1948, s. 400. This
provision does not, by itself, prescribe more stringent requirements for jurisdiction
of an English court than s. 399 (5) (a). See preceding note, Banque des Marchands
de Moscou v. Kindersley [1951] Ch. 112, 128 (C. A.).
90 Switzerland: 32 BGE. I 157; 39 BGE. II 651.
91 See PILLET, Personnes Morales § 293 against a decision of Trib. carr. Seine.
u Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori [1937] Ch. D. 513,
3 All E. R. 8, Clunet 1938, 105.
98 CoNNicK, 34 Yale L. J, (1925) 499, NEBOLSINE, "The Recovery of the Foreign
Assets of Nationalized Russian Corporations," 39 Yale L. J. (1930) 1130; GoELDLIN
DE TIEFENAU, L'existence a l'etranger des societes russes (1928); MAKARov, note
8 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1938) 177-185; SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN, Internationales
Konfiskations-und Enteignungsrecht (1952) Ch. 5, p. 105-131; M. MANN, "The
Dissolved Foreign Corporation," 18 Modern L. Rev. (1955) 8-32.
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government of the forum."' But in this country, Cardozo, J.,
in the New York Court of Appeals refuted this specious
argument at a time when the American Government had not
yet recognized the Soviet Government de jure. 95 This accords
with the decisions of the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland,
which had not recognized the Soviets until I 946. 96 Recognition
of a government has nothing to do with the existence of a
private person. Other courts held that the Soviet provisions
were not really meant to dissolve the corporation97 or to extend beyond Russian frontiers 98-both inexact assumptions. 99
Most appealing was the frank statement that the confiscatory
character of the decrees offended the public policy of the
forum. 100 Numerous French judgments up to 1928 declared
more precisely that, while the title validly passed within
94
United States: Fred S. James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (App. Div
N.Y. 1924) 203 N. Y. Supp. 232, 146 N. E. 369; Joint Stock Co. of Volgakama
etc. v. National City Bank {App. Div. N.Y. 1924) 206 N.Y. Supp. 476.
England: Russian Bank of Foreign Trade v. Excess Ins. Co. [1919] K. B. 39,
35 T. L. R. 42. The Eastern Carrying Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Benefits Life & Prop. Ins.
Co., Ltd. (1919) 35 T. L. R. 292.
96
Sokoloff v. Nat' I City Bank of New York (1924) 239 N.Y. 158, 165, 145 N. E.
917, 918; Note, CoNNICK, 34 Yale L. J. (1925) 499; cj. Lehman, ]., opinion in
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1934) 266 N. Y. 71, 109.
91
Switzerland: so BGE. II su; 51 id. II 263; 55 id. I 289, Clunet 1930, II64.
97 England: House of Lords in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v.
Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse [1925] A. C. 112; 40 T. L. R. 837, the first cast'
after the British recognition of the Soviet Government; followed by numerous
others, see WoRTLEY, 14 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1933) 4, 5·
Germany: KG. (March 31, 1925) JW. 1925, 1300, Clunet 1925, 1057.
88
England: Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co.
[1927] A. C. 95; The Jupiter [1927] P. 250, 253; Woronin, Luetscheg & Cheshire
v. Frederick Huth & Co. (K. B. 1928) Clunet 1928, 756, 758.
19 MAKAIWV, Precis 219; opinion of Schoendorf stated by the KG. (Oct. 25, 1927)
JW. 1928, 1232, IPRspr. 1928 No. 14.
10
°France: Trib. com. Marseilles (April 23, 1925) Clunet 1925, 391; App.
Bordeaux (Jan. 2, 1928) and Cour Paris (June 13, 1928) S.r928.2.16r; cf. NrnovET,
Clunet 1929, II 5; App. Aix (Dec. 23, 1925) Clunet 1926, 667.
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (March 9, 1933) W. 12589, VAN HAsSELT 335·
The former director was considered representative in view of the impossibility
of holding a general meeting of shareholders.
In Germany, this opinion could not be maintained, in view of the Treaty of
Rapallo of April r6, 1922, art. 2, whereby Germany recognized the Soviet legislation, see RG. (May 20, 1930) 129 RGZ. 98.
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Russia, it was contrary to French public policy, that by socialization the legal existence of the enterprises should be destroyed
within France. 101 This opinion was shared by the New York
courts and expressed as late as 1934. 102 On this basis, the
capacity of the nationalized corporation to appear in court was
affirmed, ~ provided that directors suing in the name of the
corporation showed authorization from its stockholders. 104
The matter has become obsolete, however, in this country,
inasmuch as the Soviet Government on the occasion of its
recognition de jure by the so-called Litvinoff agreement, has
assigned to the United States Government any claims it may
have had to property within the territory of the United
States. 105 The Court of Appeals of New York nevertheless
held a local branch of a Czarist Russian insurance company
existent, the strong state control over insurance business
warranting a distinct personality of the branch despite the
disappearance of the mother company. 106 But the Supreme
Court of the United States has overruled this construction
and all other objections to the extraterritorial effect of the
Soviet confiscatory decrees. 107 The theory of the Court, which
identifies governmental recognition of the Soviet Government
with binding recognition of the nationalization decrees, is a
10

101 Trib. com. Seine (Jan. r6, 1922) Clunet 1923, 539; (April 26, 1922) Clunet
1923, 933; (March 23, 1925) Clunet 1927, 352; (April 12, 1926) Clunet 1927, 357;
Trib. com. Seine (Oct. I, 1926) Clunet 1927, 359·
102 Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (1933) 262 N.Y. 220, 186
N. E. 679, Note, 33 Col. L. Rev. (1933) 750; Vladikavkazsky R. Co. v. New York
Trust Co. (1934) 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456, Note, 34 Col. L. Rev. (1934) 962.
See the survey by Lehman, J., opinion in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society (1934) 266 N. Y. 71 at ro6.
10
3 James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (1925) 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E.
369; Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925) 2II App. Div. 132, 207 N. Y.
Supp. 574·
104 Banque lnternationale v. Nat'! City Bank of New York (1929) 133 N. Y.
Misc. 527, 233 N. Y. Supp. 255.
105 See 28 Am. J. Int. Law (1934) Supp. 10; State of Russia v. Nat'! City Bank
of New York (1934) 69 F. (2d) 44·
106 Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. (1939) 280 N.Y.
286, 20 N. E. (2d) 758, ajj'd (1940) 309 U. S. 624.
1 0 7 U.S. v. Pink (1942) 315 U.S. 203.
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regrettable deviation from well-settled principles of international law. 108
In Europe, where litigation was more frequent, all objections finally vanished; the personal law has won full victory.
The power of a state to establish a legal person susceptible
of being recognized everywhere implies a power to terminate
it with extraterritorial effect. Hence, the courts accepted the
proposition that the Russian corporations had ended. 109
What then happens to the assets left by a former Russian
corporation in another country? Unanimously, the courts hold
that the confiscatory effect of the Soviet legislation cannot
reach assets situated abroad. One reason adduced is that such
confiscation violates a stringent policy of the forum. 110 A
more convincing argument regards the character of the fiscal
privilege claimed by the Soviet Government as necessarily
limited to the territory under its sovereignty.m While there
is some old divergence of opinion about the legal character of
a right of inheritance that a state ascribes to itself, the Soviet
State had evidently exercised the right of a state to occupy
108 BoRCHARD, "Extra-territorial Confiscations," 36 Am. J. Int. Law (I942)
275; JEssuP, "The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case," id. 282, 285; Note,
SI Yale L. J. (I942) 848; LAUTERPACHT, Annual Digest I938-I942 (I942) I4I, rso.
108 England: Lazard Bros. & Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd. [1932] I K. B. 6I7,
aff'd, House of Lords [1933] A. C. 289, Clunet 1934, 159; In re Russian Bank for
Foreign Trade [r933] I Ch. 745, Clunet 1934, 445·
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (July rr, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, r2r.
France: Cour Paris (June r3, I928) Revue 1929, 93; and (July 22, I929) Clunet
I929, I095 expressly reversing its stand of May 17, I927, Clunet I928, I3I. Cass.
(req.) (July 29, I929) D. H. I929, 457, Clunet I930, 68o Revue I93I, 342; Trib.
com. Seine (Jan. 20, I936) Revue Crit. I937, rr7; Trib. com. Seine (Jan. I 5, 1934)
Revue Crit. I935, 468 and Cour Paris (July rs, I93S) Revue Crit. I936, IS8 (bank
accounts necessarily stopped at the date of nationaJization).
Germany: KG. (Oct. 25, I927) JW. I928, 1232, IPRspr. I928 No. I4, and especially RG. (May 20, I930) 129 RGZ. 98, JW. I93I, I4I, IPRspr. I930 No. 9; RG.
(July rr, I934) JW. I934, 2845, IPRspr. I934 No. r2, Clunet I935, r64; 6 Giur.
Comp. DIP. § 245Poland: s. Ct. (Dec. 4, I929) Clunet I93I, no.
Switzerland: Despite nonrecognition of the Soviet Government, see supra n. ¢.
110 Swiss BG. (July I3, I925) SI BGE. II 259, 264; App. Paris (June I3, I928)
Clunet I929, I I9. See also MAKARov, Precis 220.
111 Hamilton v. Accessory Transit Co. (N. Y. I857) 26 Barb. 46; The Jupiter
[!927] P. I22, 25o.
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ownerless property (bona vacantia), a right internationally
confined to assets within the territory of the state. Whatever
the intention of the Soviet Government may have been,
another state is entitled, on its own soil, to deal with the
assets according to its own conceptions.
Generally, on the request of a nai.ional creditor or stockholder, an administrator was appointed by a competent
court. 112 Business managed by local agents of the defunct
corporations was liquidated. 118 In New York, branches of
Russian insurance companies have been liquidated under the
Insurance Law. 114
Are shareholders, however, able to join in a suit to continue
the former corporation? While this was held impossible in
Germany, 115 the device of a de facto company has been used
in France and Belgium,116 if there were common assets to be
administered in the country. 117 Officers of the former company
may be considered administrators. 118 The nationalized corporation is liable to be sued for the debts of the old firm at
least those to creditors who are nationals of the forum. 119
112
France: Cour Paris (Oct. 31, 1935) Clunet 1936, 337·
Germany: BGB. § 1913.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 26, 1929) 55 BGE. I 289, Clunet 1930, u64.
For England, recommended by WoRTLEY, 14 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1933) 8;
Latvia, Laws of April 17, 1925 and Sept. 16, 1927, and Poland, Decree-Law of
March 22, 1928, cj. Polish S. Ct. (Dec. 4, 1929) Clunet 1931, 770 expressly prescribed liquidation, while Estonia, Decree of Oct. 27, 1920 provided for compulsory
domestication of branches of Russian stock corporations.
113 Great Britain: Companies Act, 1929, § 338 (2); 1948, s.4oo.
United States: N. Y. Civil Practice Act, s.977-b.
114 Matter of People (Russian Reinsurance Co.) (1931) 255 N. Y. 415, 175
N. E. II4.
116
RG. (May 20, 1930), 129 RGZ. 98.
116
App. Bruxelles (July II, 1938) 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 273 No. 10934;
Trib. comm. Seine (June 29, I9J2) Clunet !934, 662; cj. BAUDOUIN, Contribution a
!'etude de Ia societe de fait (r93r).
117 In absence of such property, jurisdiction has been denied; see Cour Paris
(June 15, 1937) Clunet 1937, 812.
118
Trib. com. Seine (June 17, 1934) Clunet 1935, II7.
ug Cour Paris (March 29, 1938) Deutsche Bank v. Ass'n des Porteurs etc.,
Clunet 1938, ror7; id. (April 12, 1938) Deutsche Bank v. Banque lnternationale
de Petrograd, Nouv. Revue 1938, 617.
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Again, when uncertain situations are apt to arise, winding up
or bankruptcy (liquidation judiciaire) may be ordered at any
moment at the request of shareholders or creditors, respectively.120 In this case, any theory of universality being
excluded by the disappearance of the Russian legal entity,
every country conducts separate proceedings, although a
receiver may be appointed at a place where refugee directors
and shareholders control the business de facto. 121
After World War II, these principles have been followed
to determine the effects of the nationalizations in Eastern
Europe. 122 Under the special circumstances of German interzonal law, seat transfers to the Western zones secured identity
with and continuance of the company; 123 but even without
such indication of an intent to stay in business the existence
of a company was asserted if only some unexpropriated asset
of it was situated in Western Germany. 124

°

11 France: See the decisions of Trib. com. Seine of 1934 to 1936, reported in
Clunet 1935, 125; Revue Crit. 1935, 491; 1937, rr7. Assets distributed according to
French law, also to Russian stockholders, Cass. (March 2, 1955) Clunet I9S6, rso.
Belgium: Trib. com. Liege (March 25, 1938) 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 273
No. 10933: the company continues to function in Belgium but must be dissolved
at the request of any stockholder to satisfy first the non-Russian creditors, and after
them the non-Russian shareholders. Difficulties arising from the territorial limits
of liquidators appointed in France are illustrated in App. Bruxelles (July rr, 1938)
summarized in 41 Bull. lnst. Int. (1939) 273 No. 10934; Swedish H.D. (Oct. 19,
1945) I 5 a us!. PR. (1949/ so) 50I.
England: Even at the instance of foreign creditors, In re Azoff-Don Commercial
Bank [1954) Ch. 315, 333·
111 App. Bruxelles (July II, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 121.
111 United States: A/S Merilaid & Co. v. Chase National Bank (1947) 71 N.Y.S.
(2d) 377 (seat transfer of Estonian corporation to Sweden recognized); Talmon v.
Societatea Romana Tentru Industria de Bumbac (1954) 132 N.Y.S. (2d) 776
(liquidation of Rumanian company under N. Y: Civil Practice Act. s. 977-b).
Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (June 25, 1947) Clunet 1950, 864, 882 (liquidation of
Lithuanian company).
Austria: OGH. (July 9, 1948) 2r SZ. (1946/48) No. II4 (execution by Austrian
curator of Czech company); OGH. (May 31, 1951, June 3. 1953) 24 SZ. (1951)
No. 156, 26 sz. (1953) No. I45 (Austrian assets of Czechoslovakian, Yugoslavian
partnership liable for preconfiscatory debt as against Austrian creditor); LG. Wien
(March J, 1951) Clunet 1953, 164 (appointment of curator on request of shareholders of Hungarian corporation).
111 See IZRspr. 1945-53, Nos. 75-109; Cj. also supra ch. 19, n.Soa.
m OLG. Bamberg (Jan. 30, 1948) IZPspr. 1945-53 No. 75; OLG. Frankfurt
(Dec. 21, 1953) NJW. 1954, 644, IZRspr. 1945-53 No. 8Jb. cj. 5ER1CK, 20 Z. ausl.
PR. (1955) pp. 86ff.
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Unincorporated Business Organizations
I.
I.

METHOD oF LEGAL CoNsTRUCTION

The Old Antithesis

LINGING to the inherited simple contrast between
corporation and partnership, the literature for too
long a time was lost in speculation over the nature
of unincorporated organizations. The most significant dispute
concerned the ordinary mercantile partnership which very
clearly does not fit into the categories either of juristic persons
or of mere contracts of societas. A deep cleavage among the
European scholars was reflected in the split between the
French doctrine, followed widely in Latin countries and
influential in Louisiana/ which acknowledges mercantile2
collective societies as juristic persons, and the German theory
accepted in many other countries, which denies that an

C

1 Louisiana courts, more definitely than any others, have pronounced that a
partnership is a civil person: Smith v. McMicken (I848) 3 La. Ann. 3I9, 322;
Succession of Pilcher (I887) 39 La. Ann. 362, I So. 929; Newman v. Eldridge (I902)
I07 La. 3I5, 3I So. 688; Stothart v. William T. Hardie & Co. (I903) no La. 696,
34 So. 740. Particularly informative with respect to the liability of commercial
partnerships domiciled in Louisiana is Liverpool, Brazil & River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agar & Lelong (C. C. E. D. La. I882) I4 Fed. 6I5. Of course there
were limitations to this theory, see Drews v. Williams (I898) so La. Ann. 579,
23 So. 897. Although Louisiana did not adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, the old
sweeping definitions appear to have vanished.
2
The French doctrine distinguishes commercial (which are deemed to be recognized as juristic persons by C. C. art. 529) and civil societies (whose nature was in
controversy) but the distinction has become of minor importance, since the courts
have gradually recognized the legal personality also of the "civil" societies, and the
Law of August I, I893, art. 68 has subjected civil societies clothed in the form of
commercial companies to the commercial laws. See PLANIOL et RIPERT (et
LEPARGNEUR), II Traite Pratique 248 § 989. These enlargements have not been
followed in all countries adhering to the French type.
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offene Handelsgesellschaft is a legal unit. An analogous
debate divided American authors when the Uniform Partnership Act was drafted. On the one hand, the draft was attacked
on the ground that it made concessions to the legal unit
theory but did not acknowledge it completely,3 and, on the
other hand, it was claimed that the draft, while purporting
to adopt the aggregate theory, had in reality diluted it. 4 As
late as 1929, Warren even resented the language of the
Uniform Act which spoke of the partnership as "it" and as
having assets! 5
The Uniform Act, however, embodying the best practical
solution conforming to universal business conceptions,6 has
victoriously demonstrated that the dilemma was futile. The
result of the act coincides with the conclusion reached in
Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Argentina, and other
countries. The aggregate theory is the basis and certain
features of a corporation are avoided, but there is a name
or firm; assets, creditors, and debtors of the partnership
exist in a marked sense; enforcement of claims and bankruptcy are assured; and in an increasing number of jurisdictions the partnership may be sued and even may sue, although
methods and effects may slightly vary. 7
3 CRANE, "The Uniform Partnership Act, a Criticism," 28 Harv. L. Rev. (191 5)
762. See contra WM. DRAPER LEWIS, "The Uniform Partnership Act, a Reply to
Mr. Crane's Criticism," 29 Harv. L. Rev. (I9I6) I58, I59i again CRANE, "The
Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons," id. 838.
4 WARREN, Corporate Advantages 29, 293· In my opinion, this unfortunate work
of an eminent author has been properly censured by MAGILL, 30 Col. L. Rev. (1929)
144 and WHIPPLE, 39 Yale L. J. (I930) I44, but it seems still to exercise some
influence.
1 WARREN, Corporate Advantages 295.
•
8 See 7 Uniform Laws Annotated, and WRIGHTINGToN, The Law of Unincorporated Associations (I9I6) 144. The Act, in 1955, was in force in thirty-six states
including the most industrial regions.
7 Austria: Allg. HGB. art. III.
Germany: HGB. § 124 par. I.
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 697.
Poland: C. Com. (1934) § 81.
Switzerland: C. Obl. art. 559·
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In theoretical formulation of the common result, the
partnership is regarded not as an independent person, but
as a unit at every moment identical with the partners for the
time being; the partners in their specific conjunction and not
the general partners separately are the owners of the assets
and, potentially, parties to lawsuits. 8
Similar controversies have involved joint stock corporations, limited partnerships, and business trusts, despite their
high content of corporate elements.
2.

Gradation of Corporate Character

The European literature at long last has perceived the
multifarious gradations established by modern inventiveness
between the extremes of a mere contract of associates and a
complete legal person. 9 Indeed, it is a statement of sober
truth that a partnership is not a corporation. That the French
societe en nom collectif is generally termed a legal person,
has been criticized by the author of the French standard work
on juristic personality, because this type, too, is far from
embodying all features of a regular corporation. 10 But nothing
is gained on the other hand by ignoring in juristic construction
all those indicia of corporateness that make even ordinary
partnerships appear legal bodies to businessmen. The dispute
should find an end in Judge Learned Hand's suggestion
that the entity of the firm should be constantly recognized
and enforced in accordance with business usages and under8 See LEWIS, 29 Harv. L. Rev. (I9I5) I 58, and the "constant view of the Reichsgericht," as expressed in 46 RGZ. 4I; 65 id. 2I, 229; 86 id. 70; WIELAND, I Handelsr.
420 n. 61, 62I-628; STAUB-PINNER in I Staub § I05 n. 8. MuGEL, Olfene Handelsgesellschaft, in 5 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch at 466 has correctly argued
that there is no reason why the capacity of partnerships of being a party to a
lawsuit should not be construed analogously to its other capacities.
9
Final clarification was due in the first place to CARL WIELAND, I Handelsr.
(I92I) 396-434·
10
MicHouD, I Personnalite Morale §§ 68 and 72, 2 id. 328 n. I; see also LEHMANN, 74 Z. Handelsr. (I9I3) 465.
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standing; "like the concept of a corporation, it is for many
purposes a device of the utmost value in clarifying ideas
and in making easy the solution of legal relations."11
In this country, as a matter of fact, judges and draftsmen
perceived the truth earlier than in Europe. More than anything else the doctrine of de facto corporations demonstrated
that corporate functions can be exercised without a formally
independent personality. The doctrine of "disregarding
corporate nature" to obviate abuses was a complement thereto.
The continuous necessity of comparing the different institutions of the states was educational in preventing overestimation of the corporation label. "It is difficult to find what
peculiar powers or privileges can only be possessed by corporations or associations which must be regarded as incorporated
or personified."12 Indeed, entirely separate capacity is the
only essential attribute of a corporation. A common name,
common funds or ownership of property, continuity of existence unaffected by changes in the membership, transferable
shares, concentration of power in the management, limited
liability of members, capacity to sue and be sued, capacity
'to be declared bankrupt-these and other features of an
ordinary stock company may be more or less broadly combined in the structure of unincorporated bodies.
3. Purposes of Construction
It is a familiar and good method to analyze the corporate
elements in a foreign type of association for the purpose
of applying the corresponding domestic rules on corporations.
Such associations may be assimilated to domestic business
corporations from certain points of view and differentiated
11 /n re Samuels & Lesser (D. C. S. D. New York 1913) 207 Fed. 195, 198. An
excellent comparison between corporation and partnership with respect to their
changeable attributes is given in FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp. § 20.
12 BALLANTINE, Corporations I I § 4; to exactly the same effect, STEVENS,
Corporations § 5.
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"from others. 18 American courts are particularly well prepared
to inquire into the composition of an organization without
being influenced either by dogmatic preconceptions or mere
names of institutions. For instance, in a famous American
leading case, the Liverpool Insurance Company, an English
joint stock corporation, was subjected to taxation in Massachusetts as a foreign corporation. The Supreme Court of the
United States approved the constitutionality of this discrimination.14 It is a confusion, unfortunately still significant of a
part of the literature, that the Liverpool case has been contrasted with such cases as Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel
Co. v. Jones/ 5 in which a Pennsylvania limited partnership
was declared not to be a corporation, although it is a wellknown type of a near-corporation, definitely nearer to the
full-fledged type than an English joint stock corporation. 16
The explanation is very simple and by no means a secret.
The case dealt with access to the federal courts on the
ground of diverse citizenship, and there is a strong tendency
to limit this privilege as much as can be done consistently
with the earlier admission of corporations.
How the courts employ this approach, may be exemplified
by the treatment of common law trusts created under unequivocal laws and with ample corporate advantages in
Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Such
trust "is neither in fact nor in law a corporation." 17 Nevertheless, because of the many attributes of a corporation
possessed by this organization, it has been broughe 8 under
18 WIELAND, 1 Handelsr. 430: "Only concepts of relations enable us to understand a total thing composed of parts."
14 (r87o) ro Wall. 566.
16 (1900) 177 U. S. 449, cj. (1904) I9J U. S. 5J2.
16 This mistake of WARREN, Corporate Advantages 519, szo, seems to be not
yet eradicated.
H Burgoyne v. James (S. Ct. N. Y. 1935) rs6 Misc. 859, 282 N. Y. Supp. 18.
18 See Note, 34 Col. L. Rev. (1934) IS55·
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such statutes as Blue Sky laws/ 9 corporation tax laws/0 and
bankruptcy statutes. 21 It is quite consistent with the method
of evaluating the impact of corporate features on a given
problem, that the courts may doubt whether a statute requiring foreign corporations to obtain permission to do business,
apply to such foreign business trusts as are validly constituted
under their home laws. Filing has been declared unnecessary
in Missouri, Montana, and New York/2 but is required in
Kansas, Michigan, and Washington. 23 The more liberal solution seems to be influenced by the idea that a common law
trust is created by the mere volition of the organizers in the
declaration of trust rather than as a creature of a statute. Of
more persuasive force than this approach which stems from
the time of the fiction theory, is the argument that, in the
provisions on licensing, the New York legislature intentionally seems to have assimilated business trusts to partnerships
rather than to corporations. 24 The contrary solution, not
merely intended for fiscal interests, may well be justified
by the consideration that persons dealing in the state with
the trustees of a foreign business enterprise are at least as
much endangered as when dealing with foreign corporations.
18 Reilly v. Clyne (1925) 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35; cj. DuxBURY, "Business
Trusts and Blue Sky Laws," 8 Minn. L. Rev. (1924) 465.
20 Tide Water Pipe Co. v. State Board of Assessors (1895) 57 N. J. Law sr6,
31 Atl. 220 (partnership association of Pennsylvania) •
.UJn reAssociated Trust (D. C. D. Mass. 1914) 222 Fed. 1012.
12 Missouri: Manufacturers' Finance Trust v. Collins (1933) 227 Mo. App. rr2o.
ss s. w. (2d) 1004.
Montana: Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consolidated (1937) 104 Mont.
328, 67 Pac. (2d) 8rr.
New York: Burgoyne v. James (S. Ct. 1935) 156 Misc. 859, 282 N.Y. Supp. 18.
11 Kansas: Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins (1920) 107 Kan. 153, 190 Pac. 6o1;
Harris v. U.S. Mexico Oil Co. (1922) rro Kan. 532, 204 Pac. 754·
Michigan: Mich. Trust Co. v. Herpolsheimer (1932) 256 Mich. 589; cj. next note.
Washington: State v. Paine (1926) 137 Wash. s66, 24J Pac. 2, aff'd, IJ7 Wash.
572, 247 Pac. 476.
24 Both arguments have been used by Shientag, J., in Burgoyne v. James,
supra n. 22, at 13, 18.
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It fits this situation well that the United States Supreme
Court does not interfere with the freedom of states to treat
a foreign trust either way. With its approval, a business trust
of Massachusetts, whose trustees and shareholders were exempted from personal liability, after investigation of its
structure, was declared clothed with the ordinary functions
and attributes of a corporation and in Michigan subject to
the laws relating to foreign corporations doing business in
the state. 25
We shall meet more examples hereafter. Although conclusions reached may not always have been satisfactory, yet
the method is clear and unimpeachable. Occasions for the
courts to apply their method of putting the problem continue,
since statutes and judge-made rules for the most part are still
conceived as if corporations and partnerships were in contradictory opposition. The treatment of mixed types still
depends on a delicate balancing in accordance with the intentions underlying every one of the different statutory or
other rules. Also, the sparse texts directly referring to unincorporated organizations have presented some problems
of construction. At any rate, the courts recognize that their
task is to construe and adjust unspecified statutes that do
not squarely regulate the foreign hybrid organizations.
In this connection, attention may be drawn to the Uniform
Foreign Corporations Act, § r, which has proposed a broad
assimilation for the purpose of filing for doing business:
" 'Corporations' includes a corporation and all associations,
organizations, trusts, and joint stock companies having substantially the powers or privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships, under whatever term
or designation they may be elsewhere defined and known."
16

Hemphill v. Orloff (1928) 277 U. S. 537, 550.
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PERSONAL LAW

If, then, the courts have developed an assured method
of analyzing the mixed nature of business trusts, joint stock
corporations, partnerships of diverse kinds, labor unions, and
clubs, for the purpose of Blue Sky laws, federal revenue,
state taxation, and licensing statutes, is the same approach
not proper for the purpose of ascertaining the applicable
law?
It seems only logical to assume that all organizations enjoy
a personal law at least to the extent that corporate attributes
attach to them.
1.

Civil Law Doctrine

Need for a personal law. This problem has not been
exhaustively discussed in any country and not at all in this
country. European writers have, however, perceived that a
personal, ubiquitous law is as necessary to foreign unincorporated organizations, including partnerships, as to veritable
corporations. The status of any association ought to be determined consistently and permanently. 26 A careful Italian
decision declares that "the need of a unitary regulation of
commercial association ( societa) in their international relations requires respect for their original constitution." 27
An alternative solution would oe to allow each court to
determine under its domestic law the legal effects of a foreign
association. Sometimes writers and courts have been inclined
to apply the famous "characterization according to the lex
fori," to determine whether a foreign association should be
regarded as a legal person. But this is not a tenable proposition. As the Restatement well states in its conflicts rule
11 BAR in I EHRENBERG's Handb. 345; CARL WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.)
(1924) 279; HAYMANN in 75 Jherings Jahrb. 412.
27 App. Roma (March 8, 1932) Giur. Ita!. 1932 I 2, 225, 227, Foro Ita!. 1932
I 1173, aff'd, Cass. (Apri129, 1933) Foro Ita!. Mass. 1933, 319.
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on corporations :28 "Whether an association has been incorporated is determined by the law of the state in which an attempt
to incorporate has been made." This implies that an association, considered a corporation in the state of charter, is considered just that everywhere. Furthermore: "The effects
of an unsuccessful attempt to incorporate are governed by
the law of the state in which the attempt was made." This29
implies that a de facto corporation resulting from a defect
in the process of incorporation in the state of the charter, is
so recognized. 80 Is it possible in consistency to treat other
unincorporated associations by a conflicting criterion? If it
is understood, after all discussions, that the difference separating corporations, joint stock companies, and partnerships is
only gradual, how can the recognition of foreign-created
associations stop with corporations? A third solution has been
advocated by a few writers who persist in the error of not
distinguishing the problems of personal law and nationality,
especially enemy nationality; 81 they would determine the
personal law of an association according to the citizenship
of its members, a senseless and often impractical approach.
Laws and treaties. The general European doctrine attributes to associations and partnerships, irrespective of legal
personality, a personal law, determined by the same criterion
as in the case of corporations, i.e., in England, the place of
creation, and on the Continent, the "seat" or central office. 32
28

Restatement § I 55·
Or subsec. 3 of§ I 55 and special note to§ ISS drawing the same conclusion.
United States: See Annotation, 73 A. L. R. I2o2; 23 Am. Jur. 67 §56.
Belgium: App. Gent (April 2I, I876) Clunet I876, 305.
France: ARMINJON, Revue I908, 772, 825.
Italy: App. Roma (March 8, I932) supra n. 27.
81 FEDOZZI, Gli enti collettivi nel diritto internazionale privato (I897) 243;
CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 270. A similar old decision of the Swiss Fed. Trib.
(Nov. II, 1892) Clunet 1893, 640 is obsolete.
31 England: General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou (I843) II M. & W. 877;
Bank of Australasia v. Harding (I8So) 9 C. B. 661, cf. 2 BEALE 894 n. 3·
29

30
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This rule is expressed in recent enactments such as the Polish
statute on international private law, which extends its scope
to "juristic persons as well as all societies and associations," 33
the Code of Liechtenstein, 34 the C6digo Bustamante35 and
the new draft of the Montevideo Treaties. 36 Of particular
significance are the provisions of international draft proposals37 and bilateral treaties, such as the following:
"The expression 'companies of the High Contracting
Parties' shall, for the purposes of this Treaty, be interpreted in
Austria: WALKER 149.
Belgium: PoULLET § 209, 3eme regie: foreign associations put by their national
law in an intermediate status between the total absence of any juristic individuality
and the civil personification in proper sense will enjoy in Belgium the particular
status assigned them by their national legislation.
Germany: ROHG. (February 17, 1871) 2 ROHGE. 36; LEWALD §§ 53, 65;
and see the commentaries to Handelsgesetzbuch § ro6.
Italy: Bosco 173 (though not very clear).
The Netherlands: See 1 VAN HASSELT 315fT. including in "handelsvereeniging"
the "non-juristic persons."
Switzerland: voN STEIGER, Die Handelsgesellschaften im internationalem
Privatrecht, 67 ZBJV. (1931) at 312; contra BG. (March 5, 1957) 83 BGE. II 41 at
47 (party autonomy).
88 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art 1 No. 3·
3 4 Liechtenstein: P. G. R. arts. 676, 677.
36 Codigo Bustamante, art. 249·
36 Treaty on Civil Law, art. 4 par. 4 (sociedades civiles); on Commercial Law,
art. 8 (sociedades mercantiles). The actual text of r889 limits itself to juristic
persons, which concept in Argentina and Paraguay excludes partnerships, cf.
ARGANA, Report on the Commercial Draft of 1940, in Republica Argentina, Segundo
Congreso Sudamericano 225.
37 Institute of International Law, Draft 1929, art. 5, Annuaire 1929 II I39, r62.
Draft of Experts, League of Nations, art. 8, cj. Report RuNDSTEIN, Am. J. Int.
Law I928, Supp. 189, I9I. Seventh Conference of the Hague (I95I), Draft Convention on the recognition of foreign companies, art. 6.
Ambiguous: Draft of the Geneva Sub-committee on the treatment of foreigners,
Revue 1930, 236, 242, art. I6 § I: "Les societes par actions et autres societes commerciales, y compris les societes industrielles, les societes fihancieres, les compagnies
assurant les communications et les compagnies de transport, ayant leur siege ••• "
The draftsmen may have believed a partnership or a joint stock company necessarily to be a juristic person.
On the other hand, the treaties of the United States, e.g., with Poland (June IS,
I9JI) art. II, U.S. Treaty Series No. 862, IJ9 L. ofN. Treaty Series (I933) 397 at
407, mentioning "limited liability and other corporations and associations," seem
to refer exclusively to juristic persons, as also the original German version of art. 12,
Treaty U. S.-Germany (Dec. 8, I923) U. S. Treaty Series No. 725, 52 L. of N.
Treaty Series (1926) I33 at If! understands the analogous passage.
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the case of either High Contracting Party as relating to the
limited liability and other companies and associations (partnerships) formed for the purpose of commerce, finance, industry, transport or any other business, and carrying on business in the territories of that Party, provided that they have
been truly constituted in accordance with the laws in force
therein, etc." Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey, of
March 1, 1930,88 article 2.
"Limited liability and other companies, partnerships and
associations formed for the purpose of commerce, insurance,
finance, industry, transport or any other business and established in the territories of either Party shall, provided that
they have been duly constituted in accordance with the laws
in force in such territories, be entitled, in the territories of the
other, to exercise their rights and appear in the courts either as
plaintiffs or defendants, subject to the laws of such other
Party." Treaty between Great Britain and Germany, of Dec.
2, r 924, 89 article r 6, paragraph r.
Evidently to the same effect the formula included in article
ro, paragraph r, of the Treaty between Egypt and Turkey,
of April 7, 1937,40 enumerates: joint stock companies, including industrial, insurance, and transport companies which
have their headquarters (siege) in the territory, et cetera.
Conflict with domestic classification. The principle is obvious in the case where a partnership is considered an entity
short of legal personality in the countries both of creation
and of recognition. An American partnership is in fact recog38 Great Britain-Turkey (March I, I930) Io8 L. of N. Treaty Series (I930)
407 at 410, I32 British and Foreign State Papers (I930) 342.
39 Great Britain-Hungary (July 23, I926) art. IO par. I; 67 L. of N. Treaty
Series (I927) I83 at I89, I23 British and Foreign State Papers (I926) Part I 5I7 at
520 (partnerships and associations).
Great Britain-Germany (Dec. 2, 1924) art. I6 par. I, 43 L. of N. Treaty Series
(I926) 89 to 98, II9 British and Foreign State Papers (I924) 369 at 374, RGBl.
I925 II 777· Similarly, the German treaty with South Africa (Sept. I, I928) art.
IS, 95 L. of N. Treaty Series (I929) 289 at 297, I28 British and Foreign State
Papers (I928) Part I, 473 at 478; Finland, RGBl. I926 II 557; Italy, RGBl. I929
II IS; etc.
•o I9I L. of N. Treaty Series (I938) 95·
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nized in Germany with exactly the same degree of personality
and the same extent of personal liability of the partners as
in the state of creation. 41
The personal law applies likewise to a foreign partnership
that is not a legal person under its original law, also when
a similar domestic partnership is construed as a corporation.
For example, a partnership of the United States is to be
treated in Mexico as of the same nature it has in the United
States, different from Mexican partnerships which are corporations. A German partnership or association without legal
personality, an American partnership, or a de facto corporation should enjoy abroad its personal law, neither more nor
less than at home, particularly with respect to standing in
court. In the French courts, this thesis has been accepted42
against opposition erroneously characterizing as procedural
the French rule that only legal persons may appear in
court. 43 Exactly the same problem exists in this country and
will be discussed shortly.
The converse case of a partnership with the status of a
corporation in the state of its creation is covered by the
conflicts rule on corporations. The personal law prevails
over a different local characterization, although eager followers of the lex fori theory have opposed this result. 44 Thus,
if a French ''societe en nom collectif" claims in a German
41 Germany: RG. (Nov. 25, I895) 36 RGZ. 393 (English partnership); OLG. Kiel
(March 2I, I90I) I2 Z.int.R. 469 (Swedish cooperative); OLG. Hamburg (June 6,
I904) I4 Z.int.R. I6J (American partnership), I66, aff'd, RG. (Oct. 7, I904) IS
id. 293; OLG. Kassel (July JO, I909) Leipz. Z. I909, 954 (Swiss partnership);
OLG. Augsburg (Nov. 6, I917) 36 ROLG. IOS (Swiss limited partnership).
41 App. Douai (Dec. I, I88o) Clunet I882, JI7i Cour Paris (June 6, I9I2) Clunet
I9I4, I278 (English partnership).
41 See MicHouo, 2 Personnalite Morale 328 n. I, 345 n. I; 2 AaMINJON (ed. 2)
5'38; as against 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § II26.
' 4 RioAuo, IO Repert. 229 Nos. I9, 2I, 22 and in some respects MELCHIOR IJ8;
SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (I92I) 247. NussBAuM, D. IPR. 190,
deciding according to the usual theory of characterization under the lex fori. Also
BEJTZKE, Jur. Personen 62, II7 advocates the law of the forum, with wrong refer<nce to the decision of the German Supreme Finance Court, IPRspr. I9JI, Nos. IS
and r6, actually confirming the conflicts rule.
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court the rights of a legal person as enjoyed in France, it
is immaterial that common German opinion denies legal
personality to an "offene H andelsgesellschaft"; the legal
entity is recognized in conformity with French law. 45 A
partnership constituted by two British subjects in Czarist
Russia was a legal person under the local law; therefore
the liability of the partners to a German creditor was declared
dependent on the Russian law by the Anglo-German Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal. 46 Likewise, the Belgian law of October 25,
I 9 I 9 (article 8) allows foreign scientific associations to "exercise in Belgium ... the rights resulting from their national
law." The Swiss authorities recognized German private limited companies ( Gesellschaften mit beschriinkter H aftung) at
a time when Switzerland had not yet introduced this type/ 7
and now grant full acknowledgement to English stock companies, corporations sole and business trusts, all unknown
to Swiss internal law. 48
The following case of the Italian Supreme Court gives
another confirmation:
Illustration: Nizard v. Finanza. 49 Two brothers Nizard,
intending to form a partnership, established a firm in France
but omitted the prescribed publications. The resulting irregular or de facto partnership is considered a merely contractual relationship in France,5° while it would be an effective
corporation in Italy. 51 After the death of one of the brothers,
taxes were levied on certain assets situated in Italy and
46 Germany: LEWALD 48; GEILER, 12 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1933)
r86; M. WoLFF, IPR. IIS n. 2 and Priv. Int. Law 302.
48 Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Voith Maschinenfabrik und Giesserei v.
Thornton & Geiler, 8 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 300.
n Swiss Dept. of Justice (Nov. 25, 1898); Decision of the Federal Council
(June r6, 1902) BBl. 1902 IV 42.
48 SAUSER·HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (1921) 246.
Austria: OGH. (Feb. 26, 1952) 25 SZ. (1952) No. 48, Clunet 1953, 172 (a Liechtenstein trust can be entered into an Austrian commercial register).
u Italy: Cass. (April 29, 1933) Foro Ita!. 1933 I rr6o.
60
France: Cass. (req.) (Feb. 8, 1932) Clunet 1932, 961.
11 Italy: Cass. (Dec. 22, 1931) Foro Ita!. 1932 I 716, 936.
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brought into the societe. The legality of such taxation was
dependent, in the opinion of the courts, on the question
whether the assets were owned by the brothers in joint
tenancy or by the firm. The courts correctly resorted to the
personal law of the association and found it to be that of the
central office and principal place of business in France rather
than the law of the situs or the national law of the partners.
A learned French commentator on this case reveals his
perplexity, that the association has not been characterized
according to the lex fori as required in conflicts problems, but
consoles himself with thinking that the decision of the court
could be supported by reference to the law of aliens rather
than conflicts law. 52 Yet, the ascertainment of the personal
law of foreign organizations is by no means a problem of
"condition des hrangers'' but a part of regular conflicts law.
In a case where in the name of an intended stock corporation, during the period of preparation for its incorporation,
contracts were concluded with third parties, the German
Reichsgericht has applied the personal law of the future
corporation, since the main office was to be established in
Germany. Under this law, namely, the German law, the
promoters were considered to be an unincorporated association, and the agents were personally liable. 53 It would have
been more correct to ascribe to the promoting syndicate its
own personal law, with probably the same result. The principle ought to be the same as where a limited company was
intended, with the central offic~ being established in Bombay,
India, but because not registered there, considered a partnership according to Anglo-Indian law. 114
An exception made by the Belgian Supreme Court was
not a happy one. The court really did not doubt that the
u MAURY, Note in 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 23.
63 RG. (October 29, 1938) JW. 1939, IIo.
64 OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 21, 1932) Hans.GZ. 1932, B 266 No. 73, IPRspr. 1932
No. 14.
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capacity of the Societe des Droits d'Auteurs et Compositeurs
de Musique (sACEM) of Paris was subject to French law
but thought that article 1832 of the Civil Code, common to
France and Belgium, should receive the Belgian interpretation rather than the French so as to deny legal personality to
a societe civile/55 A strange view. The law presiding over the
creation of an association should be exactly applied without
interference of the municipal law, whether it grants more or
less autonomy. The mistake is instructive. Also common law
courts have not hesitated at times to apply their own special
construction to an association organized in another state under
common law; we shall encounter immediately such a deClSlon.

2.

American Law

(a) Quasi corporations. Apart from general partnerships,
it seems to me that, although no unequivocal commitment
to a formulated rule can be ascertained, practically the law
under which a limited partnership, a business trust, or a joint
stock corporation has been organized, clearly forms the law
determining the extent of its corporate advantages. The
above-mentioned examinations of business trust relations
have led to the clear conclusion that New York courts have
"fully recognized the status of a business trust" as reflected
in the decisions of the Massachusetts courts. 56 A Michigan
limited partnership association was thoroughly analyzed by
the Supreme Court of California, which found that under
the Michigan statute, the association had so many corporate
powers that it should be deemed a foreign corporation at
least for the purpose of the power to hold and convey real
66

Cass. Beige (November 12, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. No. 131. Contra:
i/Jid.
66
Burgoyne v. James (1935) 156 Misc. 859,282 N.Y. Supp. 18; Textile Properties
v. Whittall Ass. (1934) 157 Misc. Io8, 282 N. y; Supp. 17.
!LLCH,
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property in the firm name, 117 a power which was denied to
partnerships by California law. Where a limited partnership
was organized in Cuba under Spanish law to the effect that
a special partner was not personally liable with his separate
assets for firm debts, the New York Court of Appeals applied
Spanish law, although the contract sued upon was made in
New York on behalf of the firm. 58 This decision has been
incidentally approved in the Restatement59 and has several
parallels. 60 It was not even mentioned that the Cuban organization, which must have been a comandita simple, would
be construed as a legal person in Cuba itself. The case, therefore, has a broad scope. In a later case, a New York unincorporated stock company was found to be a legal entity
"for most, if not all practical purposes, capable in law of
acting and assuming legal obligations quite independent of
the shareholders," a "quasi-corporate entity," very unlike an
ordinary copartnership. 61 As a result, capacity for issuing
negotiable bonds was recognized. In Kansas, it has been held
that a common law trust domiciled in Oklahoma has legal
capacity to acquire a royalty interest in lands located in the
state, in assimilation to corporations endowed with this
power under the state constitution. 62 The status of an organization called "The Farmers Association of North Mississippi"
was analyzed according to the law of the state of Mississippi
where the members resided, and held not to constitute a
partnership. 63
57

Hill-Davis Co., Ltd. v. Atwell (I932) 2I5 Cal. 444, ro Pac. (2d) 463.
King v. Sarria (I877) 69 N. Y. 24, 25 Am. Rep. 128.
51 Restatement § 343 comment c.
68 Barrows v. Downs (IB?o) 9 R. I. 446, I I Am. Rep. 283: in a contract "con.
sidered as made in New York" by the general partner of a Havana partnership,
his authority to bind special partners is "regulated by the law of Cuba"; Lawrence
v. Batcheller (I88I) IJI Mass. 504, 509: "all persons doing business with limited
partnerships are presumed to take notice of the laws of the State in which they are
formed." See moreover cases infra ns. 82-86.
81 Hibbs v. Brown (I907) 190 N. Y. r67, 82 N. E. noS.
11 Fitch v. United Royalty Co. (1936) 143 Kan. 486, 55 Pac. (2d) 409·
83 Price v. Independent Oil Co. (1933) r68 Miss. 292, r 50 So. pr.
58
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It is true that some decisions seem to indicate opposite
tendencies. But they belong to two classes of special considerations.
One class seems to be represented by only one case. An
attempt had been made to form a business trust in Texas, the
members contracting that no stockholder should be personally
liable. By the law of Texas, the stipulation was invalid, and
a partnership resulted with personal liability of the members. The plaintiff brought an action in Iowa on a note issued
by the "trustees" of the association, against an Iowa resident
who had bought stock in the organization. The Iowa Supreme
Court surprisingly dismissed the action on the ground that
public policy required the application of Iowa law under
which the organization is considered an unincorporated joint
stock association. 64 The decision has been criticized on several
grounds. 65 It commits inversely the mistake made in the
California provisions which held a shareholder personally
liable under California law, contrary to the law of the charter.66 These applications of the lex fori vary the personal law
without any possible justification.
As this case seems to suggest, the controversies about the
nature of a common law trust have somewhat confused the
issue. In contrast to the courts of Massachusetts, other jurisdictions such as Kansas and Texas have considered that corporate advantages such as limited liability of stockholders or
the concentration of the power of management should not be
attributed to an organization otherwise than by statute or by
a distinct agreement in the individual contracts made by the
trustees with third persons. Writers once correctly relied on
the conflicting considerations for the support of their own
respective opinions, so long as the law was fluid. But when a
64
Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'! Bank v. Anderson (1933) 216 Iowa 988, 250
N. W. 214.
86
Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1934) 526.
66 Supra p. 82.
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doctrine has become stabilized by the court practice or statute,
it is a part of the general law of the state. 67 Massachusetts
law on the one hand, Texas law on the other, ought to be
recognized exactly as they are. There is no occasion for Iowa
or California to supply its own theory. That the established
judge-made law of Massachusetts, for instance, should not
have been able to work out a trust susceptible of being recognized in Kansas, whereas its subsequently enacted statute
should be given effect, is one of those apparently immortal
dogmas loved by some writers and too unreasonable to be
really adopted by any court.
Of another character, however, are cases in which it was
stressed that the association had acted under the color of a
corporation. A limited partnership of Pennsylvania filed an
application for doing business in New York, referring to
its "corporate seal" and indicating an agent for service of
process. The New York court, without entering into an examination as to what was the true status of the party under
the law of creation, upheld the service upon the New York
agent authorized by the application mentioned. The plaintiff
otherwise "would have been misled." This is an interesting
exception to be connected with territorial protection of third
persons. 68
A similar idea has been expressed in a California case. 69 An
organization, having vainly attempted to incorporate elsewhere, conducted business in.the state "in garb of a corporation inducing the transaction involved in the instant litigation." It was considered estopped to deny the legality of its
organization, and treated as a de facto corporation under the
87 Also in the field of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, primarily not in question
here, the traditional doctrine that judicial decisions are not a part of the public acts
protected by the clause seems to vanish; see MoRGAN, "Choice of Law Governing
Proof," sS Harv. L. Rev. (1944) 15J, 167 and n. J1.
68
Wolski v. Booth & Flinn, Ltd. (1916) 93 Misc. 651, 157 N.Y. Supp. 294.
69
Charles Ehrlich & Co. v. J. Ellis Slater Co. (1920) 183 Cal. 709, 192 Pac. 526.
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la.ws of California. On the other hand, the Iowa Supreme
Court permitted an Illinois de facto corporation to sue on the
ground that a domestic de facto corporation could do so, 10
instead of inquiring into the law of Illinois, 11 the state of
creation, as is normally/ 2 although not always, done. 18
Such cases remind us of the reverse side of recognition.
Reciprocal application of the personal law may cause some
concern where misrepresentation is to be feared. But this is
a general consideration needing separate and comprehensive
discussion in the future.
(b) Partnerships. The question is considerably more difficult with respect to partnerships, because the approach
implicitly accepted in the Restatement seems generally to be
in the mind of lawyers. It is this: partnership means the partners; whenever a contract is made on their behalf, the ordinary rules of agency apply and, since the power of an agent
to make his principal liable is said to depend on the law of
the place where the contract with the third party is made, it
is this law which governs the external situation of a partnership. In a few old decisions, the law of the place where a
partner contracts with a third party, clearly has been extended
to the problem of liability of other partners. 14 Some authors,
in fact, take it for granted that a partnership is devoid of a
personallaw. 15 Can it be, however, that one partner A, contracting in some jurisdiction on behalf of the partnership or
7 ° First Title & Securities Co. v. U. S. Gypsum Co. (1931) 211 Iowa 1019,
233 N. W. 137.
71
Note, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 634, 635.
72 Thus in Illinois: Hudson v. Green Hill Seminary (1885) 113 Ill. 618 (Indiana
de facto corporation); Concord Apartment House Co. v. Alaska Refrigerator Co.
(1898) 78 Ill. App. 682.
73 See Restatement New York Annotations §ISS.
74 Restatement § 345; Baldwin v. Gray (La. 1826) 4 Mart. N. S. 192, 16 Am.
Dec. 169; Ferguson v. Flower (La. 1826) 4 Mart. N. S. 312; Bank of Topeka v.
Eaton (1899) 95 Fed. 355; Alexandria A. & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Johnson (1900) 61
Kan. 417, 59 Pac. 1063.
75 See, for instance, CRANE, "Conflict of Laws under Partnership Acts," 66
U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1918) 310, 314.
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even of partners A, B, C, may make partner C liable beyond
the rules under which the partnership has been organized,
without any cause other than the local law regulating domestic
organizations? The confusion wrought is evident. The extent
of a power of attorney, under certain conditions (to be discussed in the next volume), is governed by the law of the
place where the agent acts. This rule may affect an obligation of the partnership. But what effect such an obligation has
on the liability of the various persons, inherent in the partnership, with their own assets is determinable by another law,
governing in reality the structure of the organization.
Indeed, it has been said that the liability of partners is
determined by the state of the domicil or origin of the partnership. 76 The cases speak of the place of origin, 77 the place
where the partners are domiciled,78 or where they carry on
their business. 79 None of these cases, it is true, clearly recognizes a constitutive law of the partnership. They rather argue,
more or less distinctly, on the basis of the conflicts rules concerning contracts. Likewise, the Restatement calls for the
law of the place where the partnership agreement is made to
determine the liability of a special limited partner. 80
Yet we have mentioned before tJ- case involving Cuban
special partners, decided in New York under Cuban limited
partnership law. Also, this choice of law allegedly rested on
the fact that the partnership agreement was made and performable in Cuba. Nevertheless, the court compared the prob76 Thus BuRDICK, Law of Partnership (ed. 3, 1917) 14 on the ground of Easton v.
George Wostenholm & Son (C. C. A. 9th 1905) 137 Fed. 524·
77 Cameron v. Orleans & Jefferson R. Co., Ltd. (1902) 108 La. 83, 101, 32 So.
208, 215.
78 Wilson v. Todhunter (1918) 137 Ark. So, 207 S. W. 221; Barker v. U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1917) 228 Mass. 421, 426, II7 N. E. 894, 896.
71 Barker v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1917) 228 Mass. 421, 426, II7
N. E. 894 at 896; First National Bank of Waverly v. Hall (1892) iSO Pa. 466,
24 At!. 66s.
80
§ 343 comment c; 2 BEALE II94 § 345-I.
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lem with the formation of a marriage relation and the acquisition of property in a foreign country. The difference from an
ordinary obligation contract was obviously felt.
All the analogies above discussed make the conclusion
inevitable that partnerships also may have a personal law.

3· Contacts
(a) Law of the seat. In civil law countries referring to the
law of the state of the "seat" as applicable to corporations,
it is the dominant opinion that the seat principle governs also
all other private associations. 81 Commercial partnerships are
included, since they have necessarily a head office, at which
they have to register. Noncommercial societies are included
if they have a seat. 82
The nationality and domicil of the partners, therefore,
are immaterial. A partnership domiciled abroad is foreign,
even though all partners be subjects of the forum, and is
domestic, even though all be foreigners.
(b) American quasi corporations. In American cases,
equally, it is not rare to find applied the law of the state
where an associated body has been organized. The cases
speak of "a common law trust domiciled in Oklahoma," 83 or
"determined by the law of Massachusetts where it is located,"84 "created in Massachusetts,"85 "a limited partnership
organized under the Act of Pennsylvania,"86 et cetera. It
81 WIELAND, I Handelsr. § 51 n. 18, and 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1924) 278,
279 n. 139; E. HEYMANN, 75 Jherings Jahrb. (1925) 413; LEWALD, 7 Repert. 319;
NussBAuM, D. IPR. 2o6; RuNDSTEIN, "Report on Draft of Experts," art. 8,
Am. J. Int. Law 1928, Supp. 189, 191; FRAGISTAS (Greece), 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936)
638. Contra: for the state of constitution, Inst. Dr. Int., Proposals, art. 5, see
Annuaire 1929 II 302.
82
GEILER in I Diiringer-Hachenburg 49 contends that, even if they have no
seat, the law under which the organization is made would apply.
88
Fitch v. United Royalty Co. (1936) 143 Kan. 486, 55 Pac. (2d) 409.
84
In reAssociated Trust (D. C. D. Mass. 1914) 222 Fed. 1012, 1013.
86 Bartley v. Andrews (1923) 202 N.Y. Supp. 227, 208 App. Div. 702.
86 Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones (1900) 177 U. S. 449·
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seems that the places of organizing and of domicil are not
distinguished in determining the applicable law; this would
be analogous to the treatment of incorporated bodies, where
the domicil is legally deemed to be in the state of incorporation.
(c) American general partnerships. The question is of
more serious significance with respect to partnerships. Since
these have not yet been recognized in the United States as
bearers of personal law, the courts have been uneasy in defining the law governing their structure. 87 Almost never has
the problem been squarely posited. The cases generally suppose a partnership carried on in the same state as that in
which is was constituted. 88 One case only is known in which a
partnership was formed in one state, Pennsylvania, and carried on in another, New York; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania regarded the partnership as governed by the law
of New York. 89 And this was on the ground that New York
was the place of performance. 90
This situation calls for clarification. Partnerships may
have to be construed under foreign laws. Within the United
States, many states have adopted the Uniform Partnership
Act and many have not. What 'Organizations are those made
"under the Act? " 91 In this case, any pretension that only
statutory law can bestow corporate attributes would be beside
the point; there is a statute.
See supra p. I I2.
King v. Sarria (I877} 69 N. Y. 24, 25 Am. Rep. I28; In re Hoyne (I922)
277 Fed. 668; Cutler v. Thomas (I852) 25 Vt. 73; Wilson v. Todhunter (I9I8)
IJ7 Ark. So, 207 S. W. 22r, cj. 47 C. J. 717, Partnership§ II?·
89 First National Bank of Waverly v. Hall (I892) ISO Pa. 466, 24 Atl. 665,
cf. supra n. 79·
90 2 BEALE II92 observes that the result would have been the same under the
lex loci contractus.
91 Cj. In re Hoyne (I922) 277 Fed. 668: whether a partnership was validly made
was determined under the Illinois Act, since the contract was executed and the
business conducted in Chicago.
s7
88
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What is in issue is the question, which contact should
prevail in case of divided local attachments: the place where
the contract of partnership is "consummated" or "launched,"
or the place where the carrying on of business is centered,
the domiciliary seat. The Continental doctrine leans on the
latter contact, and it may be said in its favor in the absence
of registration that third persons have a much better opportunity to know the location of the actual headquarters than
the place where a contract was once made. Common law
habits, contented with mere incorporation and not ascribing
importance to the principal management, are not concerned
with unincorporated organizations. On the other hand, difficulties in ascertaining the main business place may occur in
some rare cases or irregular companies,92 but not frequently
in any group of organizations. That a partnership cannot
have a domicil, 93 is an empty assertion. Of course, ordinary
partnerships in this country, as contrasted with limited partnerships, need not necessarily have any fixed business place
and have no duty of registration, which was one of the chief
reasons for excluding their construction as legal persons. 94 But
in practice there will be found few partnerships showing no
central office in their letterheads, and a great many of considerable, if not gigantic, proportions whose business is comparable to that of big corporations.

III.
1.

ScoPE oF PERSONAL LAw

General Aspects

It is not difficult to define the domain of the personal law
of quasi-corporations, whose distinctive elements are so prevalent in most de facto corporations, in the limited partnerNAVARRINI, Note, Foro Ita!. 1927 I 585.
This assertion of the Restatement § 41 cornment d has been challenged by
Restatement New York Annotations 23.
94
LEwis, 29 Harv. L. Rev. (1915) 158 at 167.
92

93
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ships of Pennsylvania or Michigan, and in the common law
trusts of Massachusetts or New York. The border line runs
exactly where the contractual features replace the corporate.
The question, for instance, whether a special partner in a
limited partnership, as an ordinary creditor, may request
satisfaction out of the partnership funds for loans or goods
sold, in competition with strangers, is closely connected with
the structure of the organization,9 G and hence, it ought to be
covered by the law governing such organization. But if an
unincorporated joint stock company is constituted in such a
way that it discontinues in case an associate dies or is adjudged
a bankrupt, and company debts are incurred after the death
of an associate, the legal problems arising should be referred
to the ordinary law of contracts; whether an associate paying
the debt has recourse for reimbursement from the executor,
may be determined by the law governing the preliminary
agreement or the contract of association, not by that of the
place of the company domicil.
The subject seems not to have found any attention thus
far and would deserve a special study.
2.

Partnership

The Continental doctrine extends its principle to all incidents of organization of mercantile partnerships. The law
of the place where a partnership has its head office, therefore
determines in particular the constitution of the partnership,
so as to render defects in its creation under the personal law
open to attack everywhere; 96 the distinction between property
of the partnership and separate property of the partners; 97
powers of the partnership98 including its capacity for being
96

Cj. WARREN, Corporate Advantages 319, J2J.
ee D1ENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. 287.
er App. Roma (March 8, 1932) supra p. 101 n. 27.
ea 36 RGZ. 354; OLG. Kassel, Leipz. Z. 19II, 6r6 n. 2; KoHLER, 74 Z.
Handelsr. 459·
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a party to a law suit; 99 transfer and seizure of the rights of
partners; 100 the authority of partners to obligate the partnership; 101 the liability of partners to third parties102 and whether
such liability is limited, joint, or joint and several.
The last application, concerning the conditions of the
partners' liability, is consistently followed by the courts of
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and other countries and
has been clearly adopted also in the English leading case of
General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou. 103 The court in
this case, however, distinguished two questions: ( 1 ) one
substantive, whether French law governing the partnership
imposed upon the defendant joint liability or no liability,
to which question the court was ready to apply the French
answer; and ( 2) one procedural, whether in the French
courts the defendant would have to be sued jointly with the
other shareholders of the company, which mode of procedure
was declared to be inapplicable in an English court. This
distinction was applied to objectionable use in this and particularly in a later case. 104 In the latter, the court declared bad
See infra p. 120.
On the French sequestration of the trade mark "Chartreuse" after dissolution of the Congregation ofChartreux, see citations by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 208 n. 1.
101 ROHG. (Feb. 17, 1871) 26 Seulf. Arch. No. 101 (speaking indiscriminately
of foreign-constituted general partnerships).
102
Germany: AG. Celie (May 31, 1876) 31 Seulf. Arch. No. 303 (debt of a
partnership in Lima, Peruvian law applied to the liability of a partner domiciled
in Germany); RG. (Jan. 2, 1920) Hans. RZ. 1920, 214 No. 35, affirming OLG.
Hamburg (May 27, 1919) id. 1920, 87 No. 9: partners domiciled in Bremen, of a
partnership domiciled in Texas, are liable to third parties, having contracted with
the firm, only in accordance with the law of Texas. This was distinguished from
the German law governing the contract itself; BGH. (Dec. 17, 1953) LindenmaierMohring, Nachschlagewerk des BGH., § 105 HGB. No.7· For other decisions see
LEwALo 54 § 65.
French-Hungarian Mixed Arb. Trib. (Feb. 27, 1929) Rothstein et Cie. v. Appel,
9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 105 (Austrian creditor of a French partnership). FrenchBulgarian Mixed Arb. Trib. (July 8, 1929) Melian v. Dilolf Freres, 9 Recueil trib.
arb. mixtes 287 (French creditor of a Rumanian partnership). In both cases it was
emphasized that in addition to the firm, each partner was liable jointly and severally.
103
(1843) II M. & W. 877; cf. CHESHIRE 664; and see supra n. 8.
104
Bullock v. Caird (1875) 10 Q. B. 276 apparently approved by LINDLEY,
Partnership (ed. IO, 1935) 255 (o), 718 (1); 3 BEALE § s88, 2, but see the criticism
by YouNG 179; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 240 § 224.
99

100
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the plea of the defendant partner of a firm domiciled in Scotland that the firm was distinct from the members and that a
judgment against the firm was a condition precedent to individual liability. But the character of a Scotch partnership as a
distinct person was notorious and since has been confirmed by
the Partnership Act of 1890.105 This should have been recognized in England with all its attendant effects on marshalling
the liabilities of company and members. The privilege of
being sued only after the principal debtor has been sued and
his assets exhausted (beneficium excussionis) is an incident
to liability of partners, as German courts confirm, 106 notwithstanding the opposed English view. 107
The law of the seat has been said also to include the reciprocal rights of the partners, with the proviso that this may
be changed by the intention of the parties. 108 But the Reichsgericht in a case of two German-domiciled partners carrying
on business in Portugal, had no hesitation in assuming that
application of German law was intended by the parties. 109 On
the other hand, by a distinct mistake in a draft of the Institute
of International Law, all incidents, including conditions of
constitution, relations among associates and toward third
parties, dissolution and liquidation, have been lumped together and subjected to the law of the seat by presumptive
intention of the parties. 110 It should be contended, instead,
§ 4 (2).
•
OLG. Dresden (Feb. 2, I9I6) 38 Sachs. Arch. 94; LEWALD 54; STEIN-JoNAS,
ZPO. §so VI.
107 In re Doetsch, Matheson v. Ludwig (I896) 2 Ch. D. 836; cj. Partnership Act,
I890, § 9, LINDLEY, Partnership (ed. Io, I935) 255 (o), 7I8 (I).
108 Germany: RG. (January 30, I889) 23 RGZ. 3I; Bay. ObLG. (May 26, I902)
3 Bay. ObLGZ. 446; LG. Karlsruhe (March I I, I909) I9 Z.int.R. 525, Clunet I9I0,
1256; RG. (May 22, I9II) Leipz.Z. I9II, 6I6; FicKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 470; GEILER in r Diiringer-Hachenburg 49·
m RG. (February 27, I93I) Hans.RGZ. 193I B 295 No. Ios. Perfectly in accord,
Bay. ObLG. (November 5, I92I) 27 Bay. ObLGZ. I87 No. 7I (partnership in Russia).
110
New York Meeting, Annuaire I929 II 302, art. S· As the discussion at I63ff.
shows, there was no real agreement; in addition, the enlarged role of party autonomy clashed in the proposal itself with the prejudice against party autonomy.
105
101

120

CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

that the personal law is independent of intentions of the
parties but does not cover the internal relations of associates
in any kind of partnership, because they are not characterized
by corporate features. They are entirely subjected to contractual conflicts rules, and it is only casually that the applicable law often coincides with that of the center of the business/11 or, for that matter, the place where the business
started.
The American partnership cases, due to their general attitude, cannot offer a direct contribution to this problem.
3· The Right to Be a Party
Following the principle of the personal law and at the
same time conceiving the right to be a plaintiff or defendant
as substantive, the Continental doctrine states that the law
of the principal business place determines this right. The prevailing theoretical approach is the same as in construing
rights and duties of partnerships in general; the members
in their particular joint relationship are the parties. 112 Accordingly, the members of an English partnership may sue
under the name of their firm on the Continent,118 because they
may do so according to English procedure, although in the
English conception the proceeding is more closely connected
with the individuals than on the Continent. By the same
token, a New York partnership has been held in Germany
incapable of being a party.114
111 To this effect, probably Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Samson v. Heilbrun
Oune 27, 1929) 9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 36: a partnership consisting of an English
and a German national, dissolved by art. 299 (a) of the Treaty of Versailles, is
subjected to Scottish Law with respect to the relations between the partners resulting from a dissolution not followed by agreement or winding up procedure.
112 See WIELAND, 1 Handelsr. 420 and n. 61.
113 France: App. Douai (Dec. 1, x88o) Clunet 1882, 317.
Germany: RG. (November 25, 1895) 36 RGZ. 393·
The Netherlands: Rb. Roermond (May 3, 1934) N. ]. (1935) '253· See 11 Z.ausl.
PR. (1937) 215 No. 93 (contra: No. 92 ibid.).
114 OLG. Hamburg (June 14, 1904) 9 ROLG. 25.
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In the United States, however, the problem presents
peculiar difficulties. The reasons are various, including the
doctrines that, at common law as contrasted with statute,
only legal entities may sue and be sued; that statutory authorizations to associations lacking personality are of procedural
character; and that common law courts refuse representative
actions in such situations. 115
These arguments imply that the state of creation has not
elevated these types to the rank of corporations in the meaning of the forum, although they are perfectly capable of suing
at home. The courts embark on a thorough analysis of the
status of the unincorporated associations according to the law
of the state where they have been organized, but the decision
finally depends on whether the specific mixture of corporate
and noncorporate elements justifies classifying the association
as a corporation in the sense of the forum.
Such reasoning evidently is grounded in traditional conceptions. It should be noticed, however, that the application
of these conceptions to foreign associations obscures their
legal structure and causes a great deal of unnecessary delay
and difficulty, 116 even though in some cases careful lawyers
may avoid these problems by adjusting matters to special
devices of the local procedure. The entire argument amounts
to a requirement that other states should not equip organizations in a manner different: from the forum. The very investigation into attributes other than the right to sue, in order
to ascertain the right to sue, shows how inadequately the
problem is handled. Joint stock companies established under
the statutes of New York, Pennsylvania, or Michigan are
"difficult to distinguish" from corporations. 117 Why must
116 STURGES, "Unincorporated Associations
(I924) 383-405.
us See STURGES (supra n. us) at 404·
117 BALLANTINE IS.

as Parties to Actions," 33 Yale L.

J.
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they be distinguished at any cost, for the purpose of denying
them the very right to sue that they have in their home
state?
Of course, the real theoretical trouble lies in the dogma
that the right to be a party is procedural. As in many other
respects, the development of American law requires a definite
departure from the overextended scope of procedural law.
In the meantime, we may draw some comfort from a recent
concurring vote of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have expressly dealt with unincorporated associations, but they did it under a congressional
authority confined to procedural matters. Therefore, it is the
official view of the United States Supreme Court that, as
Mr. Justice Frankfurter declares, suability of trade unions is
"in essence and principle a procedural matter." The federal
rule allows a trade union to be sued in its common name if
the local law allows this, a question possibly resolved by the
local procedural law. "But if such a procedural matter may
be cast in the form of a substantive issue for the determination
of status, it would at least in this case, be a question of the
substantive law of the District [the local law of the case at
bar J and not raise any substantive issue of federallaw." 118 In
other words, the law of a state may treat the problem as substantive, an incident of the personal law; this will be enough
for the federal court to recognize suability on its allegedly
procedural level.
It seems to follow that American courts, irrespective of
their own characterization, ought to apply the personal law
of foreign countries, including suability as an incident, and
consistency requires that this liberalism should extend to the
laws of sister states, endowing associations or partnerships
with the substantive right to sue or be sued.
118

Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union (1944) 65 S. Ct. 143.
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Occasionally, it has been noted that New York courts may
be liberal in entertaining suits against unincorporated associations, because they have a special procedure provided by their
statutes. 119 It should be replied that any procedure good for
citing a corporation is good to use against any nonincorporated group which has articles of organization implying
its suability under the applicable law.
Finally, if an action at law can be instituted against a
corporation, there is no reason other than the mere weight
of a tradition cancelled by economic necessity, to prevent a
similar action against any organization endowed with the
capacity of being sued by its personal law.

IV.

QuAsi NATIONALITY oF PARTNERSHIPs

How to apply the various rules affecting foreigners to unincorporated associations, particularly partnerships, again
depends on the infinitely differentiated purposes of these
rules. 120 Neither can partnerships be simply assimilated in all
respects to corporations, although they enjoy many benefits
of the latter and are now often included in the treaties protecting business organizations, nor are they entirely incapable
of being treated as entities.
There is no fixed rule including all matters such as security
for costs, jurisdiction, taxation, and the like, valid for all
countries. 121
On the other hand, nationality of partnerships in the
119

12

Note, 34 Col. L. Rev. (1934) I555. rss6.

°French Cass. (civ.) (July 25, 1933) Gaz. Pal. I933.2.502 states that although

a partnership is invested with the attributes of a legal unit in France, such concept
cannot be transferred without qualification to the domain of public law, and in
particular a partnership composed of foreigners may not claim compensation for
war damage according to the principles of private law. Other decisions had decided
the particular issue to the contrary, especially Cass. (req.) (July J7, 1930) Revue
1931, I 28.
1t1 For instance, Austria: Law on Jurisdiction (Jurisdictionsnorm) § 75 (ad.
ministrative seat), cj. WALKER 149·
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meaning of the peace treaties of I 9 I 9 dealing with the clearing of prewar debts should not have been denied. The AngloGerman Mixed Arbitral Tribunal held for dogmatic reasons
that an English or German partnership was not an English
or German national in the meaning of the Treaty provisions
concerning prewar debts. Hence, the nationality of the single
partners was decisive for their participation in claims and
debts, upon the application of the clearing and valorization
rules. 122 This theory was wrongly deduced from the overestimated fact that partnerships are not legal persons in
every and all respects, in disregard of the essential corporate
attributes they undoubtedly have and of the various purposes
for which they have always been considered connected with
the several countries. In fact, the view of the Tribunal was
entirely impractical. 123
Belgium: Cass. (Nov. 5, 1906) Clunet 1907, 8oS (center of operation, for tax
purposes).
France: 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 491 § 194·
Germany: Nationality has been ascribed to partnerships for the purposes ot
restricting the provisions of the HGB. to domestic partnerships, RG. (Feb. II,
1896) 36 RGZ. 172, 177; RG. in Leipz.Z. I9II, 6r6; the duty of advancing security
for the costs of a lawsuit, OLG. Hamburg, DJZ. 1900, 444; STEIN-}ONAs, I ZPO.
(ed. 5, 1934) § uo I I I c. (36 RGZ. 393, 396 is obsolete), cj. STAUB-PINNER in I
Staub 647 § IOS n. 45. for general jurisdiction (I3 OLG. 73). Cj. WIELAND, I Handelsr. 4I9 n. 57, 6I7-I9 §IS. On the other hand, a Venezuelan partnership is recognized as a juristic person, but the German partners are treated for tax purposes as
the members of a German partnership. Reichsfinanzhof (Feb. I2, I930) 27 Entsch.
(of this court) 73, and JW. I93I, I6o with critical note by RHEINSTROM.
Italy: Cass. (April 29, 1933) Foro Ita!. Mass. I933 IV 319: a French "irregular
company" treated for taxation as not being a unity according to French law.
Switzerland: ScHNITZER, Handelsr. 159.
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam Gune 24, 19I4) W. 1915, 9719, 3 (a unit for
jurisdiction); Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 19, 1924) W. II346 {a French partnership of
an English and a French national has to give security for costs in respect to the
English partner only, although it is held to be a legal unit in the French doctrine).
122
Fisher & Co. v. Biehn and Max (March 22, 1922) 3 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes
12, JW. 1922, u6r; Hardt Co. v. Stern (March 23, 1923) 3 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes
12, 2 Friedensrecht 72.
123
RABEL, JW. 1922, u62; HERM. lsAY, 3 Abhandlungen zum Friedensrecht
(1923) 25; id., Private Rechte und lnteressen im Friedensvertrag (ed. 3, 1923) 57;
R. FucHs, 3 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1922) 24 and in 6 LESKE-LOEWEN·
FE1D II roo; STAUB-PINNER in I Staub § 105 n. 9a.
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Recognition
I.

THEORIES OF RECOGNITION

1

I

N the nineteenth century two rival schools of thought
dominated the treatment of foreign corporations in private law. Young, in his admirable study of 1912, called
them the restrictive and the liberal theories. Perhaps they
may be better described as the theories of the territorial and
the extraterritorial or international effect of incorporation.
Scarcely noticed in the literature, before the present war a
third current gained influence, having nationalism as its distinctive impulse.
I.

The Territorial Theory

At one time, the idea generally prevailed that every state
had to decide arbitrarily what foreign corporations should
have legal personality within its own territory. This doctrine
limited the functions of legal persons by geographical boundanes.
In the famous words of Judge Taney:
"A company can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only
in the contemplation of the law, and by force of the law, and
where that law ceases to operate and is no longer obligatory
the company can have no existence. It must dwell in the place
of its creation and cannot migrate to another sovereignty."2
And Field,

J., declared:

"The Company being the mere creature of local law, can
1

For a survey in this country, see MAcHEM, "Corporate Personality,"
L. Rev. (19II) 253, 347·
2
Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pet. S. C. 519 at 588.
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have no existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty which
created it.''3
This doctrine has taken root in American thought, Professor James reminds me, as a result of the colonial English
companies. Nevertheless the doctrine sounds strange, when
constantly repeated 4 in the courts of the United States, the
country of the Bill of Rights, for it comes directly from
governmental absolutism and has been engendered by three
factors:
First, the tradition of police states required that legal
personality be conferred upon an association only by grant of
the sovereign. The prince, the state, created the legal entity.
This system of concession, authorization, charter (in the
original meaning), goes back to Julius Caesar and Augustus
who made the essential functions of corporations ( coire, convocari, co gi) dependent on permission by the Emperor or the
Senate. 5 The purpose was political precaution against subversive factions, and the system has remained a weapon of
suspicious and jealous rulers.
Second, discrimination against foreign corporations was
nourished by the fear not only of political disturbance but
also of foreign economic forces menacing domestic organizations by competition. Laurent, the principal European protagonist of this doctrine, was hostile to certain types of associations.
Third, Savigny and his followers constructed on this
background the doctrine of the artificial nature of corporations: Any personality not produced by nature had to be conferred by the lawmaking power and hence was tmagtnary,
fictitious, a mere creature of the law.
8

Paul v. Virginia (1868) 8 Wall. z68.
Even BALLANTINE, Corporations 843 makes no exception.
6 MITTEis, Romisches Privatrecht (1908) 399; RABEL, "Grundziige des riimischen
Privatrechts" in HoLTZENDORFF-KOHLER, I Enzyklopadie der Rechtswissenschaft
428; ScHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, Geschichte der juristischen Personen (1933).
4
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In a final conclusion from this apparently solid complex of
ideas, a corporation was thought necessary to be restricted
to the boundaries of the state and inexistent outside of it.
Such territorialism was defended in Europe by Mancini,
Laurent and his contemporaries, and in a late isolated stand,
1908, by Andre Weiss. 6 In this country, Taney's and Field's
dicta were made the basis of the Restatement in 1934/ although each part of the doctrine has been thoroughly refuted8 and entirely discarded by common opinion throughout
the world. To maintain the doomed theory in the face of
modern conditions, diverse auxiliary theories were invented,
such as the "theory of comity" whereby the state permits
foreign corporations to function in its territory, although not
bound to do so, and the agents' theory which pretends that a
foreign corporation despite inexistence in the state nevertheless acts and contracts through agents, that the legal person
dwells outside but its agents reside inside. These makeshift
constructions also were long since destroyed by the criticism
of scholars. 9 The real American law has nothing to do with
them. 10
8 LAURENT, 4 Principes 232, 285 § II9; 4 LAURENT 256, 293 §§ I30, I 54i RoLIN.
Principes § 27, 2 id. § 8o6. For decisions in various countries, see KosTERS 67I n. I,
7 2 BEALE§ r66.I: "The association can exist as a corporation only where that
law prevails which makes it such, that is, within the territorial limits of the state
of its charter; for the law of a ~ountry has no extra-territorial operation." DuDLEY
FIELD§ 545·
8 YouNG 41 and in 2J Law Q. Rev. (1907) ISI, 290j HENDERSON I63. Fortunately,
these truths have been remembered more recently: Note in 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
(1931) II 19, IIJ5-II38; LATTY, "International Standing in Court of Foreign
Corporations," 29 Mich. L. Rev. (1930) 28.
European leaders: I BAR § 104; LAINE, Clunet I893, 273; PILLET, Personnes
Morales 17-57; id., Principes §§ 73, 74; id., I Traite 336; MrcHouD, 2 Personnalite
Morale §§ 232ff.; 2 LYoN-CAEN et RENAULT § I09Ji I FIORE § 319; FEDOZZI,
Gli enti collettivi nel diritto internazionale privato (1897) I97-216 and II diritto
processuale civile internazionale (I905) 185-212; Lo MoNACo, Fi!angieri I885,
I, 379·
For more literature see KosTERS 672; GuTZWILLER I627; CHARLES DE VrsscHER,
Revue I9I3 at 193·
g YouNG 48; HENDERSON 36-49; see I BAR 302; PILLET in Melanges, Antoine
Pillet (I929) soo; RIGAUD, IO Repert. 226 No. II.
to See Note, 79 U. ofPa. L. Rev. (193I) III9, II38.

I

128

CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

Nevertheless, these ghosts from metaphysical spheres reappear in the Restatement and survive in the language of
the courts. More dangerous, a few derivatives are popular
such as the following: "A corporation cannot perform outside of the state by which it was created, acts which are strictly
corporate acts.'m In particular, meetings of stockholders in
matters of formal organization can be held only in the state
of incorporation. 12 Authority to an agent must be given in
this same state.13 A state has the right to "exclude" foreign
corporations from doing business, or to impose conditions on
them for doing business, at its pleasure. 14 Foreign corporations cannot have more rights than domestic corporations. 15
What life or value there is left in these sayings, we shall
have to discover.
2.

The International Theory

The system developed in the epoch of liberalism brings
corporations into a position analogous to that of individuals.
Created by the competent state, they need no particular recognition at all in other states. This theory has the background
of an even older history than that of the territorial theory.
Research in medieval law has discovered that before the time
of the princes who claimed sovereignty like Roman Caesars,
corporations were freely formed by the association of members. Also the collegia and sodalitates of the Roman Republic were autonomous creations. Moreover, Germanic as
well as Roman legal history has taught that the conception
of a corporation as a merely artificial being is utterly wrong.
11

Reichwald v. Com. Hotel Co. (1883) 1o6 III. 439·
Restatement § 163; BEALE, 5 Col. L. Rev. (1905) 255· Outmoded, see STEVENS
Corporations 482.
1a 2 BEALE 768 par. 2.
14 Restatement §§ 167, 168. On the reality of things, see HoLT, 89 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. (1941) 453·
16 See infra pp. I so££.
12
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For a time, the scholars of old Germanic law16 even popularized the idea that in complete antagonism to the allegedly
"Roman" fictitious legal person, the medieval associations
were living bodies, vigorously working in all public spheres
and of more economic, social, and political significance than
their individual members. This Germanistic approach left
lasting improvements in domestic laws, as for instance in
giving the principal representatives of corporations the role
or "organs" that embody the will of the corporate "body"
and are able to obligate the entity by contract and in tort. 17
But this theory also has been abandoned by better advised
scholars. From the historical point of view, the concept of the
"universitas," designed by the Roman jurists after the pattern
of the autonomous city (polis), has formed the eternal
model of an entity distinct from its members in its relations
to the outside world. The internal relation between a private
corporation and its members with respect to their participation in the common assets and debts varied even in the
ancient world. Thus, the antithesis of a "Roman" soulless
fictitious person and a Germanic living organism was highly
distorted. From the theoretical angle, present writers like to
say that individuals also take their legal status from the law,
hence there is no innate ground why organizations should
be discriminated against. In addition, the normal method of
bestowing personality upon associations is no longer granted
by special act but statutory determination of conditions precedent-in Europe called "normative conditions"-by complying with which private persons may create legal bodies.
While trade and industry have multiplied their associations and gained for them wide international admission, the
18 In the first place, OrTo GIERKE, Die Genossenschaftstheorie und die Deutsche
Rechtsprechung (I887) 5, 6o4.
17 See German BGB. § JI; Swiss C.C. art. 55: the will of a juristic person ia
expressed through its organs (not "organisms" as ScHICK translates).
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mightiest impulse, of course, has come from the immense
growth of capitalism. Industrialization favored and needed
concentration of means. Exchange of raw materials, industrial products, and skilled enterprise opened countries
to corporate ventures. In the height of the capitalistic era,
few nations wanted to hide behind Judge Taney's doctrine,
certainly not the United States.
It is of extraordinary interest that the liberal system was
declared in England as early as I 724 by leading cases which
still have authority. 18 Foreign companies have ever since
been accorded recognition as respects their personality, as
well as full freedom to do business in Great Britain. The
Canadian courts are well aware, despite their many contrary
statutes, that "at common law, a foreign corporation may
carry on business in a jurisdiction other than its own without
having special authority to do so.m 9
Elsewhere, this system was adopted in the course of the
nineteenth century. The commission of German states, which
drafted the General Commercial Code of I 862, found it
so obvious that the civil existence of foreign companies must
be recognized that no provision to this effect was considered
necessary. 20 But the right to do business was distinguished.
Unconditional recognition, at least in this meaning, has remained the nearly unchallenged principle for commercial
associations in most of Europe, and has been defended with
respect to all juristic persons by most of the literature. 21 Only
the French Republic has insisted in principle, despite the
French writers, on certain restrictions established under
Napoleon III, against foreign stock corporations.
11 Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques Van Moses (1724) 1 Strange 612; Henriv, General Privileged Dutch Co. (1728) 2 Ld. Raym. 1532, 92 Eng. Re. 494·
II C. P. R. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1890) 17 S. C. R. 151; Ontario
Wind Engine & Pump Co, v. Eldred (Sask. 1912) 2 W. W. R. 6o, 2 D. L. R. 270.
20 Protokolle 371, 42. Sitzung (quoted by WALKER 202).
qu~s

21 See also ARGANA, Report in Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano 223.
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3· Reactionary Trends
Developments between the two world wars have demonstrated once more that the problem of recognition of foreign
corporations is more intimately connected with economic
and political considerations than with abstract speculation.
From the beginning, the Soviet Union has been slow to recognize foreign legal persons. The National Socialist Law on
Stock Corporations of 1937 abolished free admittance of
foreign business associations to the carrying on of business,22
and the comment by a national socialist author revives Laurent's theory. 23 French and Latin-American laws and literature have shown much of the same spirit, perhaps not so
much aiming at restoring the territorial nature of incorporation, as endeavoring to strengthen the examination, supervision, and governmental domination of foreign enterprises.
Regulations to enforce control over the activities of immigrant
business go hand in hand with measures to close certain
branches to all foreigners and to enforce the practice of certain quotas of nationals on boards of directors and membership lists.
Nevertheless, except for Russia, the principle of unconditional recognition.has not lost its prevailing role. Notwithstanding conscious and unconscious exceptions, it may be
asserted that this principle prevails at this moment throughout the world. Language in both Americas sounding as if
recognition depended on authorization, often is not to be
taken literally. Even so, the picture is complicated, and the
practical effect of recognition is reduced or menaced by restrictions of many kinds.
It is convenient, therefore, to define first the concept of
recognition according to actual laws.
See infra p. 183.
Jur. Personen 7, 49, criticized by
(19J8) 71 5·
12

21 BEITZKE,

RAAPE,

5 Z. AK. Deutsches R.
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4· Concept of Recognition
If the liberal theory were carried through without exception, there would be no need for a notion other than that of
the personal law, since under this theory any foreign corporation created by the personal law exists within the forum.
The need arises only because in certain countries or for certain types of legal persons the personal law acquired abroad
is not held sufficient to support the existence of a corporation
within the forum. There is no evidence that any jurisdiction
would disregard the existence of a juristic person in the state
where it has been validly constituted according to the law
regarded as competent at the forum.
Recognition, consequently, signifies that the authorities
of a state affirm a foreign-created legal person as existent
for all purposes, applying the law considered to be the personal law.
Recognition does not mean the creation of a new person,
as would be the logical implication of the theory whereby a
corporation "can exist only in the country which makes it
such" and "the consent of another state cannot alter the
matter." 24 Under the influence of such imaginations, (I) recognition of an existing legal entity, ( 2) reincorporation, i.e.,
the constitution of a new personality, and finally, (3) "domestication," which lies in between, were easily confused. 25
By an effect felt up to our days, we still hear the contention
that recognition is dependent on a sort of naturalization. But
a sharp distinction is important. A compulsory requirement
of the latter character has correctly been called an unjustifiable trespass on the foreign competent law. 26
24

2 BEALE § I 66. I.
I FioRE § 320. On the distinction of "domestication" from the mere pursuit
of business, see 2 BEALE § I53·7· The German Reichsgericht (July u, I934) ]W.
1934, 2845, Clunet I935, I64, IPRspr. I934 No. I2 observed this distinction with
respect to an English certificate of registration.
28
CHARLES DE VIsSCHER, Revue I913 at I94, I95 and n. I.
26
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Of course, there is no rule of present international law obligating a state to recognize foreign-created juristic persons.27
There exists, however, theoretical agreement on the desirability of mutual liberality, expressed in numerous drafts to
multipartite treaties. 28
On the other hand, recognition does not necessarily include,
and in the great majority of countries does not include,
permission to have a place of business or an agent, or to do
business in the country. Moreover, various restrictions are
imposed. This, of course, deprives recognition of much of its
practical value. Yet recognition involves legal personality
only, not permission to engage in commercial or other activities.29 These two categories, although correctly contrasted,
have been inadequately termed by some Anglo-American
writers "civil capacity" and "functional capacity."30 With
more clarity, commentators on the recently repealed Italian
Commercial Code state that the poorly drafted sections therein, regulating the business of foreign mercantile organizations,
do not really "create the prerequisites of their legal constitution" but instead "presuppose their legal constitution under
the foreign law."31
What prerogatives usually flow from recognition as such
will have to be discussed more closely after a survey of the
systems adopted in tire present legislations.

II.

CoNDITIONS FOR RECOGNITION

Unconditional Recognition

1.

Under the system attaching international effect to the
I BAR 302; NIEMEYER, "Les Societes~de"commerce,"i.Recueil I924 III 40 n. I
See art. 6 of the Draft on the Treatment of Foreigners, 1929, Revue 1930
238; VERDRoss, 37 Recueil (1931) III 405; Seventh Hague Conference (r 95I)
Draft Convention on the recognition of foreign companies.
u PILLET, Personnes Morales § 13.
30
YouNG, 23 Law Q. Rev. (1907) I62; LATTY, 29 Mich. L. Rev. (1931) 34;
ScHUSTERh Tul. L. Rev. (1933) 345, 362 n. 86; 8 id. 570.
n Note,:Rivista 1912, 509.
27

28
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creation of a corporation, recognition in the practically restricted meaning, just defined, is obtained ipso jure, without
the need of any step, such as filing for registration, paying of
fees, or applying for a decree.
(a) For all organizations. This system, applied to all
corporations and other associations, is actually in force in
England,S2 and the United States,S3 as well as Brazil, 84
Greece, 85 the Netherlands,S6 Spain,S7 Switzerland,88 and
certain other countries. 39 It has also been adopted in the
Montevideo Treaties40 and in the C6digo Bustamante!1
The statutory Argentine rule is in controversy but the best
authorities indicate a system exactly parallel to that of the
United States, requiring authorization only for the carrying
on of business. 42 In Italy, the principle was for a long time
81 See supra n. I 8. A condition is that the government of the country of creation
s recognized by the British Government, see 5 HALSBURY's Laws of England (I932)
86o.
83 Restatement §§ Ipff. speaks of all incorporated associations, but as to unincorporated bodies see supra pp. I09 n. 59, II3 n. So.
84 Brazil: This theory has been prevailing in the opinion of the leading writers,
~ee CARVALHO DE MENDONC(A, 4 Trat. Dir. Com. § ISio, EsPINOLA, 6 Tratado 557,
and clearly adopted in Introd. Law (I942) art. II, cj. EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I775·
35 Greece: App. Athens (1937) No. 209I, 49 Themis 4o6, Clunet I938, goo; 2
STilEIT-VALLINDAS § 23; C. C. (1940) art. IO (the draft had required royal authorization).
38 The Netherlands: H. R. (March 23, 1866) W. 278I; KosTERS 672.
87 Spain: Arg. C. C. art. 28, cj. 27; C. Com. art. 15, cj. 21 last par.; see TRIAS DE
BEs 376 § 324. This includes associations, excepting certain classes such as religious
orders, since the Law of Associations of June 30, I887 does not distinguish domestic
from foreign associations.
38 Switzerland: BG. Uuly 12, 1934) 6o BGE. I 225; ScHNITZER, Handelsr. 81.
39 Austria: The Imperial Decree of Nov. 29, I86s, concerning "the admission of
foreign stock corporations and stock companies with limited partners to carrying
on business in Austria" has been explained in the prevailing opinion as not referring
to recognition, see WALKER 202. This construction was maintained in Czechoslovakia, see LAUFKE, 7 Repert. I86 Nos. 58, 59·
For the group of codes following the Spanish model, see Chapter 23 n. 31.
40 Supra p. 35·
41 C6digo Bustamante, art. 33; see, however, art. 32.
42 Argentina: C. Com. arts. 285-287; ZEBALLOS, Clunet 1906, 604-618; MACHADo,
1 Cod. Civ. Arg. 74; I WErss-ZEBALLos 414; RIVAROLA, 145 Revista Gen. Legis!.
y Jur. (Madrid 1924) 533, 539· More recently, opinions on the interpretation of
C. C. arts. 33, 34, as against art. 45 were sharply divided between ALcORTA, 2 Der.
Int. Priv. 34 and 3 Vxco § 83. The old liberal doctrine defended by Vico seems to

RECOGNITION

135

affirmed by the writers and rejected by the courts. 48 Finally,
the Supreme Court adhered to it in 1930 and 1931/4 and so
apparently does the new Civil Code. 45
In Belgium, unconditional recognition has been granted
by statute to foreign "commercial companies" only, but is
extended to all legal persons, public and private, by liberal
writers and by some courts/6 although other authorities continue to deny capacity, particularly to foreign nonprofit
associations when they bring actions. 47
(b) For trading associations. In a second system, the
principle applies only to trading corporations and other
commercial organizations, having a stable central place
abroad. Also some followers of the territorial theory, making
remain victorious. See App. Buenos Aires {April 20, I934) 46 Jur. Arg. I83, 187,
RoMERO DEL PRADo, Der. Int. Priv. 83; Note, Clunet I938, 838. Art. 45 of C. C.
thus, is understood to apply to authorization for business only. Law No. 8867, of
February 6, I9I2, is understood to mean that this authorization is not needed in case
of reciprocity. However, the practice is called "peu liberal/' in Clunet, loc. cit.
Paraguay: The liberal theory is adopted by BAEZ 47·
43 FEDOZZI 7I; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 24I; UDINA, Elementi § 79, referring
to C. C. (I86s) arts. 2 and 3; C. Com. (I882) art. 230.
44 Cass. (March II, I930) Rivista Dir. Priv. I93I, II, I6I. Note, SERENI in 8
Annuario Dir. Comp. III u; summary, I Annual Digest (I93I-1932) 278 No. 146.
Cass. (July 27, I9JI) Giur. Ita!. I932 I, I, I62, Rivist'lli93I, I8j.
•• Disp. Pre!. (1938) art. 6; id. (I942) art. I6 par. 2, states that the rule of par. I,
on principle granting foreign individuals the civil rights of nationals, applies also to
foreign legal persons. The final draft (art. 9) expressed the principle that they enjoy the same capacity as national juristic persons but not more than in the foreign
country. The Minister of Justice held it more prudent to say expressly that juristic
persons are treated like foreign individuals in order not to revive a former controversy. (Relazione SaLMI, I938, § 7). Evidently, in this line of thought, the law of
aliens and recognition of the personal law are identified. Soberly considered, however, the actual text limits itself to a somewhat problematic provision regarding
merely the law of aliens. Hence, it is understandable that AzZARITI-MARTINEZ, I
Diritto civile italiano secondo il nuovo codice (I940) 37I, raises the question whether
foreign legal persons may be considered existing and may exercise their civil rights
in Italy without being "recognized" by the Italian State. In his own opinion,
recognition is granted without a formal act.
48 Consolidated Companies Act I935, art. I96, corresponding to art. 128 of the
original text of 1873 and art. I71 of I9I3. See PouLLET §§ 200-203; Cass. (April 12,
r888) Pasicrisie I888.I.I86.
47 Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (May 4, I932) Clunet I933, 184 (a French association
of cheese manufacturers); Cass. (Nov. 12, 1935) 3 Giur. Camp. DIP. No. 131
(action by the French association of authors and composers, with strange arguments, see supra, Chapter 21, n. sr).
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an exception, consent to this result for the sake of advanced
international commerce. 48 Nonprofit associations encounter
more distrust.
Thus, in Germany foreign business corporations and partnerships have been recognized ipso jure from an early time 49
in what may be qualified as customary law. The same rule
obtains, e.g., in the Netherlands/0 Rumania, 51 Yugoslavia/2
Japan,113 and in the influential Civil Code of Chile54 whose
example has been followed in numerous special Latin-American laws on stock corporations. 55
In France, an analogous customary rule has been strongly
curtailed by an exceptional legislation concerning capital
stock corporations, so as to limit unconditional recognition to
business organizations on a personal basis: copartnership and
partnership en commandite. 56
Whether the Soviet Russian law recognizes in any way
foreign business organizations, as has been asserted, cannot
be ascertained. 57
48
RoLIN, 1 Principes 167 § 28, conveniently recalled by LATTY, 29 Mich. L.
Rev. (1931) 33·
49 ROHG. (April 28, 1871) 22 ROHGE. 147; and the constant decisions of the
Reichsgericht from 7 RGZ. 70. See 83 RGZ. 367.
50
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (June 5, 1913) W. 9549·
61 Rumania: C. Com. (1887) art. 237·
52 Yugoslavia: C. Com. (1937) § 502 par. I.
03 Japan: C. Com. art. 255, now 479· Although the Japanese Civil Code, art. 36
(1) speaks exclusively of commercial companies, art. 255 of the Commercial Code
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court (April 17, 1905) 1 C. Com. of Japan
Ann. 4o6 case 165, as not distinguishing whether a foreign company is a juristic
person or not.
54 See 3 V1co 40.
55 See especially Honduras: C. C. art. 57, cj. BIJON, 6 Repert. 443 No. 35; C. Com.
(1950) art. 2 par. 3·
Mexico: C. C. (1928) art. 2736, see ScHuSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) 348; Ley
General de Sociedades Mercantiles (1934) art. 250.
Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) arts. 359 (new 374) ff.; see GoLDSTONE, 17 Tul. L.
Rev. (1943) 587.
65 See 2 WEiss, Traite 484; 2 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT 914 § 1093.
57 MAKARov, Precis 229 apparently thinks that the special authorization required
by the laws of the USSR regards only the doing of business, but that unrecognized
foreign corporations may sue in Russia, upon claims arising abroad, only under
reciprocity.
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(c) For nonprofit corporations. Prevailing though somewhat uncertain French doctrine118 traditionally has regarded
foreign associations with purposes other than profit as ipso
jure existent, irrespective of reciprocity. Nor were exceptions
of public policy raised even when a foreign domiciled religious congregation, whose French department had been dissolved in I90I, brought actions in France. 59 However, among
others, the question remained unsettled whether foreign associations could do more than the modest acts permitted to
French associations not enjoying a declaration of "public utility." At present, these doubts are ended; a decree prior to the
war of 1939, which may be of temporary character, required
governmental authorization as a condition of recognition. 60
A German statutory provision, too, declares that associations pursuing noneconomic purposes need a decree of
recognition, 61 but the Reichsgericht has recently confirmed the
doctrine that such a decree is unnecessary except to validate
a contract concluded in Germany and also governed by German private law. 62 Apart from this case, such an association
is treated like a German ass~ciation without legal personality,
its agents acting in the country are personally liable,S8 and the
entity may also be sued. 64
68 See the opinions (very divergent on many points) of PILLET, Personnes Morales
§ 269; Hi:MARD, Theorie des nullites §§ 335-351; LEREBouRs-PIGEONNIERE § 185;
NIBOYET § 319 and contra, 2 Traite 463 § 814.
"Aix {Feb. 27, 1913) aff'd, Cass. (req.) (Nov. 24, 1914) D. I916.I.193; NEuMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. 136 and authors cited; 2 ARMINJON § 199. Similarly,
e.g., Italy: App. Milimo (Jan. 17, 1928) Clunet 1928, 1287.
so France: Decree of April 12, 1939, see supra Chapter 19 n. 109.
11 EG. BGB. art. 1o; a decree as envisaged in this section has very seldom been
requested. Only one case is known where an authorization was granted, that of the
German-Austrian Alpinist Association when it moved headquarters temporarily
to Innsbruck, Austria.
81 RG. (Oct. 29, 1938) 159 RGZ. 33 at 47, implicitly indorsing the opinion of
WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 225; Th. KIPP in BGB. Handausgabe FzscHERHENLE-TITZE (1932) note to EG. BGB. art. 10; RAAPE 161; M. WoLFF, IPR.
117 n. 14.
13 BGB. § 54 par. 2; EG. BGB. art. Io sent. 2.
•• In analogy to ZPO. § 50 sent. 2, § 735·
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There are, on the other hand, laws recognizing foreign
corporations of public interest more readily than commercial
companies. 65
(d) Foundations. With respect to foundations, whether
public or private, the contrast of theories has been solved by
a definite victory of the "liberal" doctrine. Even in France,
the rule has been adopted that no authorization is needed
for recognition of the legal existence and capacity of a private
foundation in accordance with the law of its foreign "seat."66
Of course, activities in pursuance of the constitutional documents are subject to particularly anxious control under the
territorial law. 67
(3) Partnerships. While partnerships are recognized unconditionally in many countries along with corporate business
associations, they are also treated in the same manner in
countries where barriers against stock corporations or against
nonprofit associations have been established, 68 with the possible exception of a few Latin-American countries. 69 Partnerships have never been subject to authorization, nor has
territoriality been claimed to affect their creation. The
doctrine regarding partnerships has been helped by the usual
exaggerated emphasis on their personal basis, but substantially it must have been important that economic dangers
65 See for instance Chile: Corte Suprema (August 10, 1936) 33 Rev. Der. Jur. y
Ciencias Soc. II, I, 449, 452, 470 recognizing the Junta Provincial de Beneficencia
de Sevilla, Spain, according to Spanish law, as testamentary heir of Chilean immovables; the court emphasizes that the Chilean legislature has not established
the requirements as for lucrative corporations.
88 NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. § I3; PiLLET, Personnes Morales § 306;
CHARLES DE VIsscHER, Revue I913, at 19I; CREMIEU, 8 Repert. 437 No. 52;
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § 185.
67 CHARLES DE VIsSCHER, id. at 206.
68 Hence even in France a Colombian partnership could obtain without formalities a judgment and, therefore, in Belgium an exequatur, Trib. Antwerp (June 27,
I936) Jur. Port Anvers I937, 56.
19 For Brazil see infra Chapter 23, p. 184 n. 54·
Mexico: C. C. art. 2736 speaks of authorization necessary for the "foreign associations and companies of civil character."
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from partnerships were not so feared as from big corporations.
Only one question has disturbed the simplicity of this
matter. As the distinction between mercantile and nontrading
or civil associations may be decisive, which law determines the
mercantile character? Is it the law of the forum/ 0 the personal
law (of the "seat" or creation), 71 or either of them? 72 The
Belgian solution accepting the last answer/3 is the best; if an
association serves commercial, industrial or financial purposes,
as defined at the forum, it should be recognized even though
it may be considered nontrading at home.
2.

Special Conditions for Recognition

(a) Authorization in case of reciprocity-France. 14 When
in the I 8 so's under the spell of Laurent's territorial theory
Belgian courts suddenly declared French stock companies
(socihes anonymes ), which played a large part in Belgian
economics, to be "inexistent" in Belgium and denied them
the right to sue, the French government protested. F\nally,
the two countries reciprocally recognized each other's governmental charters creating stock corporations. The French Law
of May 30, I 857, sanctioning this agreement, permitted the
French government to extend by decree the rights conferred
upon the Belgian companies to those of other countries. In
I 867, France, following the model of England, replaced the
method of special decrees creating individual corporations
70 Lex fori: I LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT§ 2II and 2 id. § II27; ARMINJON, Revue
Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I927) 368; NussBAUM, D. IPR. I9Q; ScHNITZER, Handelsr.
IJiff.
71 Personal law: AssER-RIVIER, Elements I9Q; STREIT, Z.int.R. (I896) J2I;
PILLET, Personnes Morales §§ I82, I92, 230; CAvAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. I72.
Undecided: Institute of Int. Law, Draft I929, art. 6, Annuaire I929 II 302.
72 See DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 293, 296.
73
PoULLET § 2IJ, and cases cited. To the same effect, Yugoslavia, C. Com.
(I9J7) § 500 par. 2.
7
• 2 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT §§ 909ff.
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by that of general statutes under which private persons
may create corporations, and Belgium (I 8 73), as well as
most other countries, followed suit. Nevertheless, France
maintained the system of stating by decree that a certain
foreign country observes reciprocity with France, and that
therefore stock corporations created in that country are to be
recognized. These decrees have reached a great number. 75 In
addition, many bipartite treaties grant mutual recognition
of corporations and are regarded as equivalent to decrees
stating reciprocity. Such treaties have been concluded among
others, with Great Britain, on April 30, I 862, and Canada,
on December IS, I922, while a decree was rendered with
respect to the United States on August 6, I882. The list of
nations so involved is long but not exhaustive. 76
The French system has been imitated in some other countries, in Greece in particular. 77 In Belgium78 and Italy/9 it
was soon abandoned. A devastating criticism was expressed
by the greatest French writer on commercial law, Charles
Lyon-Caen, 80 but has not been of any avail.
The position of an unauthorized foreign stock corporation
in France has been developed without consistency. A
corporation has no capacity to contract and may not sue
third parties but, if sued, is not allowed to defend on the
ground of its own irregularity,81 because domestic creditors
75 On controversies concerning the right of the most favored nation, see 2 LYONCAEN et RENAULT § II02.
7 ' See the list given by NIBOYET 371 n. 377 See CARABIBER, 6 Repert, 414 Nos. 42-44; MARIDAKis, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937)
II9. But the present Code is liberal, see supra n. 35·
78 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act, of May 18, 1873, art. 128.
79 Italy: C. Com. (1882) art. 230.
80 Reports ofz888 and 1891 to the Institute oflnt. Law, II Annuaire (z889-1891)
at 16o. Also NIBOYET, in this case, advocates the liberal principle of recognizing
foreign legal persons not doing business in the country, see 2 Traite 458 § 812.
81 HiMARD, Theorie des nullites §§ 342-345; 2 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT § IIo4;
THALLER, Traite § 771.
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should be protected. The incoherence of this system is increased by the consideration that the entity may function as a
de facto corporation under domestic law and in such quality
can engage in contracts and maintain branches, as well as be
subject to bankruptcy proceedings. 82
Other countries. Reciprocity has been required as the only
condition of recognition in Hungary83 and Czechoslovakia. 84
In Latin-American states, reciprocity has been a popular
requisite,S 5 but increasingly it has been found incompatible
with the principle that foreigners and foreign juristic persons
are assimilated to nationals. For this reason, Colombia cancelled the requisite of reciprocity in its Constitution of I 936.86
(b) Special authorization. It follows from the restricted
domain of unconditional recognition already mentioned that
all foreign nonprofit corporations need special authorization
for being able to avail themselves of their existence in
Belgium, France, Germany (with modifications), the Netherlands, Rumania, Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, Chile and most
other Latin-American countries, and Japan.
·
Also, private and public foundations need authorization
in some countries, and business corporations which are not
of a certain type may possibly need it in some jurisdictions.
In a few Latin-American countries, finally, it is claimed
that the personality of a foreign corporation is recognized
only when it is authorized by the government, and some
authors take this pretension seriously. 87 In these jurisdictions
PlLLET, I Traite § 740.
DE MAGYAili, Clunet I924, 595; anonymous, 6 Repert. 456 Nos. I8 !Jis, I9.
"On the basis of§ 33 of the Allg. BGB., see LAuFKE, 7 Repert. I87 No. 62.
8& Reciprocity is still required in other respects in Argentina, see infra p. I79·
88 See Tuuo ENRIQUE TAsc6N, Derecho Constitucional Colombiano (ed. 2, I939)
6o; if. with respect to individuals, CAICEDO 123 § 8I.
8 7 See Chapter 23 ns. 48/f.; and see as an example of certain laws, Honduras,
Law of Foreigners of I926, art. 4: foreign juristic persons enjoy the rights granted
them by the laws of the country of their domicil provided that they have been
recognized by the Executive Power.
82
83
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nonauthorized companies seem not to be allowed the minimum of rights which recognition usually confers. 88 Moreover,
there are countries where either authorization of the existence,
or the registration at an office, is said to be essential for the
recognition of any legal person. We shall encounter such
theories, mostly of a doubtful nature, with respect to several
Latin-American jurisdictions. Also, the Chinese authorities,
using their peculiar technique, have declared that "it is not
known" how a foreign juristic person having no business
place in China could be registered, and therefore that it is
"difficult to recognize its personality." 89

J. Treaties
The problem was much discussed for a time whether the
clause usual in bilateral treaties that the "subjects" of either
contracting power should enjoy treatment of the most favored
nation in matters of commerce, applied to the recognition of
the personality of corporations. 90 Therefore, treaties of amity
or commerce have included provisions expressly assuring the
reciprocal recognition of corporations and, sometimes, also
of associations. But the significance of these clauses is now
limited to countries denying recognition in the absence of a
treaty, factual reciprocity, or special authorization. 91
Among the other provisions, the clauses allowing isolated
acts of business or minor activities, and access to courts,
concern our present subject but scarcely alter the existing
situation.
See infra ns. IOI, I22.
2 Interpretations du Yuan Judiciaire en matiere civile (Le Droit Chinois
Moderne, No. 35· I940) I6 § 387, Interpr. No. I47I of April 3, I925.
90 See for the affirmative view, WEiss, 2 Traite 505 (with many references'.
Contra: 2 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT 924 § IIo2; PILLET, Personnes Morales I83,
I84 § I24.
91 On COdigo Bustamante, art. 32, see ScHUSTER, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (I934) S7I n. I4.
88
89
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III.
I.

EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION

Full Effect

In a few countries outstanding for their ·broad views and
cosmopolitan mentality, such as Great Britain, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, and Greece, recognition is traditionally
granted to any organization in the world legally created in
the state of its central office or, in the British case, in any
state. This recognition means in principle no less than the
permission to exercise the purposes of the charter. It is fair to
state that, although France reserves its general authorization
of foreign stock companies, this authorization, if given to the
companies of a certain country, includes the right of doing
business within the country. The principle is not inconsistent
with regulations such as the prescription of registration.
But this standard is not reached in most countries.
2.

Minimal Effect

In view of the manifold impositioRs and restrictions to
which in the majority of the territorial laws the activities
of foreign associations are subject, it is convenient to ask,
What position results from the mere fact of authorization,
independently of any other requisite?
There are two such rights guaranteed and generally
accorded in the international treaties. One is the capacity to
be a party to a suit, and the other the capacity to engage in
"isolated acts." Not without justification the first category
sometimes appears absorbed by the second, but it has to be
considered here separately in accordance with the more
common usage.
(a) Capacity to be a party. 92 Capacity to sue and to be sued
as a party to litigation in court has been regarded as a "natural
82 Cj. LATTY, "International Standing in Court of Foreign Corporations,"
Mich. L. Rev. (1930) 28.
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right" of a corporation/8 or as a means of realizing its rights,94
and as "indispensable to protect the personal status." 9 ~ The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the power
of a foreign corporation to bring proper suit in a state tribunal
is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 96 We may take it
as the by far prevailing view that foreign corporations are
considered capable of being a party not only in jurisdictions
where they are entitled to carry on business of a permanent
character, but also in those where they would need to comply
with some impositions if they were to do "business" but in
fact do not carry on any such business. 97 The situation is different, when a foreign corporation should have complied
with statutory requirements and in violation thereof has done
business in the state, but in many jurisdictions full capacity
2 KENT 284; STORY § s6s; LINDLEY, On Companies 1221 g; WALKER ISS.
YouNG 89.
96
THOMPSON § 7977·
98 Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Echange Corp. (1922) 262 U.S.
S44; Note, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) at II3S-II38.
97 England: WESTLAKE § 306; YouNG 179·
United States: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler (1814) 2
Gall. IoS; Bank ofU. S. v. Deveaux (1809) S Cranch 61, 78; HENDERSON 39-42.
Canada: Creamette Co. v. Famous Foods, Ltd. (1933) Ex. C. R. 200 (action for
infringement of trade mark).
Argentina: C. C. arts. 3S, 44, C. Com. art. 28s.
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Sept. 2, 1932) 24 Arch. Jud. 394 (action by Delaware
corporation to cancel defendant's commercial name). The cases are digested by
RoDRIGO 0CTAVIo, Dicionario Nos. I2S9 to 1269 and reviewed by KNIGHT, 7 Tul.
L. Rev. (1933) 210. Cj. CARVALHO DE MENDONtrA, 4 Trat. Dir. Com. 277; EsPINOLA,
6 Tratado S67 No. 6 and 8-C id. I77S·
Chile: In one opinion, see HERRERA REYEs, Sociedades An6nimas (I93S) 271 §
299·
Denmark: BoRuM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 217 No. 28.
The Netherlands: C. Civ. Proc. arts. 127, 768; Rb. Amsterdam (March 17, 1899)
W. 73SI, and (May 7, 1900) W. 7400, Clunet 1903, 9ZS.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 109.
Rumania: Cass. (June 8, 1937) No. 1428, Clunet 1938, 961.
Sweden: MALMAR, 7 Repert. 141 No. 149.
Switzerland: BG. (July 12, 1934) 6o BGE. I 220, 226; corporation of New York;
recognition exists ipso jure and implies the faculty of standing in court.
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, 1330/1914, art. 12.
Venezuela: Corte Federal y de Casaci6n (Aug. 4, 1934) Lahoud v. Colgate Palmolive Peet Co. (1937) Gaceta Oficial 114.079, cj. CRAWFORD, 12 Tul. L. Rev. (1938)
222.
DB
94
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granted even in this case. 98
Capacity for suing and being sued is so much the most
important incident of recognition and so frequently causes
international preoccupation, that provisions for securing it
appear in all bipartite and multipartite treaties or drafts
involving business associations.
Exceptions to this principle, however, discernible in numerous instances, deserve examination.
Sometimes an alleged exception is caused by confusion
between recognition and permission to do business, as only
recently in the Yugoslavian Commercial Code.99
IS

98 United States: Cooke, J., in Alpena Portland Cement Co. v. Jenkins and
Reynolds Co. (1910) 244 Ill. 354, 91 N. E. 480; McKee v. Stewart Land & Live
Stock Co. (1925) 28 Ariz. su, 238 Pac. 326; Mandel v. Swan Land & Cattle Co.
(1895) 154 Ill. 177, 40 N. E. 462.
Canada: Alberta: Companies Act, s. 149 (r) as construed in Lampson, Fraser &
Huth, Inc. v. Simpson [I9421 3 W. W. R. 238 (Alta.);
British Columbia: Charles H. Lilly Co. v. Johnston Fisheries Co. (1909] ro
W. L. R. 2: "The ordinary common law right to sue was not taken away or interfered with by the (Brit. Col. Companies) Act" (s. 143). Northwest Trading Co. v.
Northwest Trading Co. [C. A. 19201 I W. W. R. 353, aff'd [19201 3 W. W. R. 729
(action to compel defendant to change its name);
Ontario: Howe Machine Co. v. Walker (I877) 35 U. C. Q. B. 37 (C. A.);
Quebec: Ontario Marble Works, Ltd. v. Lepage Marble Works, Ltd. [1924] 31
Que. Pr. 217;
Saskatchewan: Bondholders Security Corp. v. Manville [193313 W. W. R. I, [19331
4 D. L. R. 699 (Sask. C. A.).
Austria: (Stock companies not having been permitted business): OGH (Oct. IO,
r888) 26 GIU. No. 12389; Gune 22, I932) 14 SZ. 425 No. IJ2; WALKER 204 n. II.
Belgium: Cass. Beige (Oct. 6, I904) Pasicrisie I904.1.362: French mutual insurance company in absence of the publications prescribed by art. I98 of Consolidated
Companies Act; App. Bruxelles (Feb. 8, I924) Revue Inst. Beige I925, 232; see
also Trib. Com. Liege (June 28, 1937) 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. (1939) Io § 8. Formerly
Cass. (March 7, 1895) Clunet I895, 876 had held the contrary opinion, but was
criticized.
Brazil: The question seems not to have been decided, although the decisions
referred to in the preceding note (see in particular Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 6, 1925)
83 Revista Dir. 326, EsPINOLA, I Pandectas Brasileiras, pt. 2, 28o) regularly held
that foreign business corporations have personality "independently of governmental authorization."
Chile: In one opinion, see HERRERA REYES, Sociedades An6nimas (I935) 27I
§ 299·
Italy: App. Torino (Jan. 7, 1936) Rivetta v. Rendley, Foro Ita!. I936 I 397
citing ample precedents.
Rumania: See NEGULEsco, Clunet I9Io, 55·
"Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 503, criticized by EISNER, I Symmikta Streit at 293·
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In other cases, a corporation has been declared nonexistent,
simply because it did not have a business place or do business
in the state and therefore omitted registration or filing for
license. Isolated language to this effect in the United States
has been noticed abroad 100 but must be considered inexact.
However, such a deviation from the general behavior of
courts has been observed in a few Latin-American jurisdictions, particularly on the part of the Mexican Federal TribunaJ.l01 Such restriction has been the object of a declaration
on juridical personality of foreign companies, opened for
signature by the Pan-American Union on June 25, 1936,
recently ratified by the United States, Chile, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, and
Venezuela. 102 It declares:
"Companies103 constituted in accordance with the laws of
one of the Contracting States, and which have their seats in
its territory, shall be able to exercise in the territories of the
other Contracting States, notwithstanding that they do not
have a permanent establishment, branch or agency in such
territories, any commercial activity which is not contrary to
the laws of such States and to enter all appearances in the
courts as plaintiffs or defendants, provided they comply with
the laws of the country in question."
The word "notwithstanding" directly refers to the men100
LoEB, Clunet 1922, 319, and BEITZKE, Jur. Personen 164 have cited Texas
Rev. Stat. 19II, 1318 (corresponding to art. 1536 Rev. Stat. 1934); Chapman v.
Hallwood Cash Register Co. (App. Texas 1903) 73 S. W. 969, but in this case the
corporation had an office in Dallas, Texas, and carried on business.
101
Mexico: See cases expertly commented by ScHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933)
341, 374, 8 id. 563 and more recently the decision in Amparo Molina (1935) 403
Seman. Jud. (1935) 1312; VoELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) 52, 66.
Furthermore, "personality" is denied in:
Bolivia: Law of Nov. 13, 1886, art. 4·
Panama: Law No. 32, of Feb. 26, 1927, art. 91.
102
Proclamation of the President of the United States, 55 Statutes at Large 1201;
the text of the Pan-American declaration has also been published in Hudson, 7 Int.
Legislation 355 No. 445·
103
Spanish sociedades, see supra p. 10. Chile, in its "understanding" in signing,
speaks of sociedades mercantiles.
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tioned case, namely, where the corporation has no business
ties with the country, although its solution would seem a
commonplace.
Finally, it occurs frequently within and without the United
States that a foreign corporation is not permitted to bring an
action, as one of the penalties for noncompliance with the
statutory requirements for doing intrastate business. 104 This is
comparable to the refusal by French courts of the right of suit
to foreign corporations not recognized through decree or treaty,
a refusal strongly disapproved in the French literature. 105
In connection with the Pan-American resolution mentioned
above, the United States has declared its "understanding" that
the companies "shall be permitted to sue or defend suits of any
kind without the requirement of registration or domestication." Certainly what was meant was "authorization" rather
than "domestication'! in the proper sense. Does the declaration
mean that the resolution extends to the case of unauthorized
business? This, in fact, was the significance of an analogous
resolution by the Institute of International Law as early as
106
I 89 I .
But another "understanding'' of the Chilean Delegation points to the contrary conception, and many states of this
country deny the right to sue to noncomplying corporations.
Also the recommendations of the Council of the League
of Nations of 1923 107 demanded the faculty to appear as
plaintiff or defendant only for such persons, firms and
companies as are permitted to be established, but the
International Chamber of Commerce, in its proposals to the
Universal Economic Conference in Geneva, 1927, desired to
secure the right of standing in court for all companies.
None of these statements refers to the other half of the
so-called capacity to sue and to be sued, viz., the capacity to
See infra Chapter 23, pp. 203ff.
See PILLET, 2 Traite §§ 745, 746.
10s II Annuaire (1889-1892) 171 arts. I and III.
101 League of Nations Document, C. 36. M. 21; 1929 II No.7·
104
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perform procedural acts. The distinction is more important
than in the case of individuals, because even in countries
applying the personal law to the procedural competence of
physical persons, organizations usually are subject to the local
law of procedure. This is particularly remarkable in the case
of noncorporate associations.
Illustration: An English partnership is capable, under the
English court rules, of being a party and, therefore, has the
right to sue in a German court. The plaintiff partnership
failed to send in particulars for registration under the English
Registration of Business Names Act, 1916, and thus lost
enforcement of its rights arising out of any contract. 108 But
this regards only the procedural disability of the firm; "the
capacity of being a party according to English law engenders
procedural capacity in Germany even though it is missing
under English law." LG. Berlin (December 13, 1929),
IPRspr. 1930 No. 20.
(b) Single acts. Regulations requiring foreign corporations
to register or to obtain a license generally apply only if the
business to be carried on reaches some degree of permanence,
allowing "single" or "isolated" acts unconditionally. 109 The
boundaries of the permitted zone vary a little, but ordinarily
activities such as taking orders from customers by letter, or
by traveling agents, 110 acquiring, 111 holding, 112 or administerLINDLEY, Partnership (ed. 10) I 59·
Cj. Restatement § I67 comment.
Argentina: C. Com. art. 285.
El Salvador: C. Com. art. 299·
For other Latin-American countries, see VoELKEL, I4 Tul. L. Rev. (I940) at 47
ns. 2I, 22; 55 n. 52.
110 United States: This frequent assumption follows the English distinction
made for purposes of jurisdiction and taxation in La Bourgogne [I899] P. r; [I899]
A. C. 43I; The Holstein (I9J6) ISS L. T. R. 466. See, for example, West Pub. Co.
v. Superior Court of San Francisco (Cal. I942) 128 Pac. (2d) 777: "mere solicitation of business, advertising or demonstrating products, listing of names of the
company in the telephone directory or the company having its name on the door
of an office or presence of a company official on personal business••.• "However,
continuous and systematic solicitation through years may constitute "doing busi108
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118

ing property, and other simple exercises of the corporate
capacity, are included.
In the United States, no comprehensive definition of doing
business exists, but approximate agreement obtains on certain
definite rules or principles which are "suggestive and illustrative rather than definitive," as the draftsmen of the Uniform
Foreign Corporation Act have stated. Their tentative definition:
"The term 'doing business' means the transaction by a
foreign corporation of some part of its business substantial and
continuous in character and not merely casual or occasional,"
has been supplemented by an enumeration of permitted
activities of a rather liberal extent. 114
On the other hand, there are certain outstanding cases in
which neither the constitutional freedom of interstate and
foreign commerce nor the usual statutory faculty of doing
single acts may be ri!lied on. Thus, intrastate business is
assumed to exist if a warehouse is maintained in the state,
ness," International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (1945) 326 U. S. 310, 319
Canada: Alberta: Foreign Companies Act, 3 Rev. Stat. 1922, 2019 s. 4 (3), repealed by Companies Act, 1929, s. 268: "The taking orders by travellers for goods,
wares or merchandise to be subsequently imported into Alberta to fill such orders,
or the buying or selling of such goods, wares or merchandise by correspondence if
the company has no resident agent or representative and no warehouse office or
place of business in Alberta ..• shall not be deemed to be carrying on business under
the meaning of this Act." Similarly, British Columbia: Rev. Stat. 1948, c. 58 s.
178, and Nova Scotia: Rev. Stat. 1954, c. 74, s. 39· But the Alberta provision was
narrowed: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1942, c. 240, s. 133 (b). Extremely narrow,
Manitoba: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1954, c. 43, s. 418.
Austria: OGH. (May JO, 1899) Amtl. S. No. 88, 10 Z.int.R. 76; (Feb. 5, 1929)
Rspr. 1929, 49 No. 70, cited by WALKER 204 n. 12.
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (May 25, 1927) 87 Revista Dir. 88 (sale of goods by an American business corporation not authorized to do business).
Rumania: Cass. (June 8, 1937) No. 1428; Clunet 1938, 961.
111 E.g., taking valid title to property in stock; after resale the buyer has a good
title: Crockin v. Boston Store of Fort Myers (Fla. 1940) 188 So. 853.
111 Austria: High Administrative Court (June 30, 1936) 65 J. Bl. 505.
113 YoUNG 91, citing 4 LAuRENT§ 137.
114
National Conference, Handbook 1934, 287,304 with a valuable table of cases.
But see the narrow minimum of activities that statutorily do not constitute a
doing of business, Texas Stat. Ann. (1934) art. 1529, as amended 1953.
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from which goods are shipped to customers in the state; 115 or
if a foreign corporation sells and, through its agent in the
state, installs machinery, 116 constructs highways, 117 supplies
concrete pipe for a sewer job, 118 or installs fixtures. 119 But
a transaction made by an agent in the state is likely not to
be regarded as doing business, if the authority of the agent
is limited to soliciting and transmitting applications. 120
In the Latin-American countries, the main criterion, as
will be seen, is the carrying on of a branch or agency in the
territory. 121 Bolivia, however, is said to deny even the minimum of tolerance to any nonregistered foreign company. 122
3· Is the Extent of Recognition Determined by Domestic
Law!
All particular solutions described above evince the simple
principle that the foreign personal law, if recognized, is
applied exactly as it is established by the state of creation. The
smooth operation of this principle is, however, jeopardized
by frequent broad references to the concepts and measures of
the law of the forum. Constitutions, statutes, and courts are
prone to declare that a foreign juristic person cannot have
more rights than domestic persons have.
In Europe this is an opinion of long standing, followed by
116 Where the goods are shipped from another state, the corporation is recognized
as engaged in interstate commerce, see Caldwell v. North Carolina (1903) r87
u.s. 622.
116
2 BEALE 843 § 179·15.
117 Amos D. Bridge's Sons, Inc. v. State of New York (1921) r88 App. Div. soo,
ajj'd, 231 N.Y. 532.
118 Loomis v. People's Construction Co. (1914) 2rr Fed. 453·
119 George M. Muller Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank of Dothan (r9r2) 176
Ala. 229, 57 So. 762.
120 Union Trust Co. of Md. v. Rodeman (1936) 220 Wis. 453, 264 N. W. soB
at 512.
111 See infra Chapter 23, I. Guatemala: C. Com. (1942) art. 416 shares in this
view. In addition, the C. C. (1933) art. 25, continuing former provisions, establishes
a series of duties for foreign companies and associations "habitually" carrying on
business in the Republic.
122 Bolivia: Law of Nov. 13, r886, art. 4i ARAoz, r Nuevo Digesto de Legislacion
Boliviana (1929) 24j VoELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) at s6.
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some eminent writers. 128 Michaud, the author of the French
standard work, regards it as a "principle generally accepted
that foreign corporations ought not to enjoy treatment more
favorable than the French corporations," which principle, in
fact, "constitutes an exception to the personal law." 124 If
German courts, in recognizing the existence and capacity of a
foreign business association, describe its status as similar to
that of a German stock corporation or a limited partnership, 12 ~>
they try only to make the personality of the enterprise clear.
In one case, however, a banking corporation of Tennessee was
refused recognition because it did not seem to conform to any
legal type of association at the forum-a decision without
authority. 126 Of English courts, it is only known that, not
accustomed to regard the monarchical state of England as a
person, they would not allow the King of Spain to sue as
personifying the Spanish ftscus, 121 but required that he should
act as a royal corporation sole, like the Crown of England128
or as a trustee for his subjects, or on his own behal£. 129 But
this intolerance pertained to the overextended procedural
concepts of British j udges. 130
Drafts of the Swiss Civil Code adopted the said doctrine
and granted corporations and establishments having foreign
headquarters civil personality only within the limits de111 MAMELOK 76; AssER-RlVIER, Elements 202; YouNG 92, 94; PouLLET in
Clunet 1904, 828 and in Manuel 238 § 217. See also PILLET, Personnes Morales
91 § 66.
124 MrcHouo, 2 Personnalite Morale 352 § 329.
125 See for instance, RG. (Dec. r6, 1913) 83 RGZ. 367; RG. Qune 3, 1927)
II7 RGZ. 215 at 217; RG. (Oct. 29, 1938) 159 RGZ. 33 at 46.
121
OLG. Hamburg Qune 23, 1903) 14 Z.int.R. 64, criticized by BEITZKE, Jur.
Petsonen 6o n. I6, expressly overruled by the same senate OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 22,
I904) 15 Z. int. Recht 320.
127 United States v. Wagner (I867) 2 L. R. Ch. 582 art. 593 per Cairns, J.; cj.
YoUNG I8o.
118 King of Spain v. Hullett & Widder (I833) 7 Bli. N. S. 359, I Cl. & F. 333·
m Hullett v. King of Spain (I828) 2 Bli. N. S. 3I, 28 R. R. 56.
uo YouNG 299. Contrary to this spirit, ScHMITTHOFF, (ed. I) 331 tries to apply
Dicey's proposition that a foreign status unknown to the English law is not·recoginzed, see, however, now ed. 3, p. 369.
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termined by Swiss law. 131 This idea was criticized and omitted
in the final text, but it has been incorporated in the Civil Code
of Liechtenstein132 and the Commercial Code of Yugoslavia.
The latter recognizes the capacity of foreign companies to no
greater extent than is granted to domestic companies of a
similar or kindred type, serving similar or kindred purposes.
Foreign types unknown to the internal law are subjected to
the provisions involving the next related domestic type. 133 If
the foreign type cannot be fitted into any of the domestic
categories, it is treated like an ordinary stock corporation. 134
The recent Civil Code of Peru135 joins this group, stating
that "the capacity of foreign juristic persons cannot be contrary to the public policy nor more extensive than that granted
to nationals," and, while the Latin-American statutes following the Spanish model regularly set forth the principle that
(recognized) foreign corporations enjoy the same private
rights as national individuals, 136 certain ones, such as the
Constitution of Venezuela of 1936 (art. 37), add that they
have in no case greater rights than nationals. The tentative
drafts of the Restatement (Nos. 1-3, § I7I) declared that:
"No power given to a foreign corporation by the law of
the state of incorporation can give it a right to do any act
which a corporation as such is not permitted to do by the
law of the state in which the act is done."
The final text has cancelled this statement, but comment b
of§ 165 says that:
"A state usually restricts the activities of a foreign corporation to the same extent to which it restricts the activities
of a domestic corporation."
131 Preliminary Draft (I900) art. 70; Draft of March 3, I90S, art. I748. See
criticism by SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (I92I) 246.
132
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. 23S par. 3·
133
Yugoslavian C. Com. of I937, § 502 par. 2, cj. EISNER, I Symmikta Streit
(I939) 292. The Japanese C. Com. art. 479 is similar.
134
Yugoslavia: C. Com.§ soo pars. 3, 4·
136
Peru: C. C. (I936) Tit. Pre!. art. IX par. 2.
131 Spain: C. Com. art. IS, see TRIAS DEBEs 68.
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In fact, most American jurisdictions have a clause in their
constitutions or statutes enouncing one of the following versions of the same idea: 137
(a) Any foreign corporation shall have the same rights
and privileges as are enjoyed by domestic corporations of the
same or similar character, 138 or
No foreign corporation shall have any greater rights or
privileges than those enjoyed by domestic corporations of a
similar character. 139
(b) No foreign corporation shall be allowed to transact
business in the state on more favorable conditions than are
prescribed by local law for similar domestic corporations. 140
(c) No foreign corporation may carry on any business
which a domestic corporation is prohibited from doing, 141 or
The exercise of which is either prohibited to domestic
corporations or against the public policy of the state,142 or
Foreign corporations must be organized for a purpose
for which local corporations may be organized. 143
(d) Many states have some slight variations, such as
combining the "same rights and privileges" clause with the
137 A survey as of the year I923 was made by the French writer LEPAULLE,
Condition des societes errangeres I6I, I64.
138
Arizona: Rev. Stat. (1955) § I0-4-84.
Idaho: Code (I947) § J0-5IO.
Louisiana: Rev. Stat. (I950) I2 § 203-A.
Mississippi: Code (1942) § 5341.
South Carolina: Code (I952) § 12-70I.
Texas: Rev. Stat. (1934) art. I5J2i Business Corporation Act, I9S5, art. 8.o2.
139 Montana: Constitution (r889) art. XV § rr; Rev. Code (1947) § I5-I708§ I 5-J7IO.
Oregon: Rev. Stat. (I953) § 57.660.
14° Arizona: Constitution (19I2) art. XIV § 5·
California: Constitution (I879) art. XII § I 5·
Kentucky: Constitution (I891) § 202.
Utah: Constitution (I895) art. XII § 6.
Washington: Constitution (I889) art. 12 § 7·
141 Maine: Rev. Stat. (I954) c. 53 § I29.
Maryland: Ann. Laws (I95I) art. 23 § 84 (a).
Ohio: Rev. Code (I953) § I703.I5.
Oklahoma: Constitution (I907) art. IX § 44·
Virginia: Constitution (I902) § I6J.
142 Georgia: Code (I933) § 22-1503.
141 Kansas: Statutes (I949) § I7-50J.
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clause that a foreign corporation cannot transact business forbidden to a domestic corporation, 144 or
(e) Foreign corporations are subject to all liabilities,
restrictions, and duties imposed on like domestic corporations
and have no other or greater powers. 145
The emphasis in these statutes is on the penalties and
restrictions rather than the powers and privileges.
What do all these rules mean? Do they affect the recognition of the foreign-created personality?
It would seem so in a few instances. Among European
cases, there are some that have already been considered and
refuted, such as the Dutch decision rejecting the legal personality of a French partnership because the law of the forum
knew only partnerships without full personality; 146 the court
failed to see that as the party was not a Dutch partnership,
Dutch law could not apply. The Appellate Court of Brussels
recognized a Dutch association for nonprofit purposes only
since a Belgian law shortly before had introduced similar associations; 147 this was not a convincing reason, as was noted,
since the same court denied legal existence in Belgium to a
French manufacturers' association, 148 although the analogous
"professional syndicates" had been instituted in Belgium.149
Because in Illinois domestic banks were forbidden to hold
stock in another bank corporation, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that a foreign bank corporation licensed to do
business was not authorized to purchase bank stock, purchase
144
1llinois: Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 § 157.103.
Michigan: Comp. Laws (1948) § 450.94, as amended 1951.
Missouri: Rev. Stat. (1949) § 351.575.
146 Arkansas: Constitution (1874) art. XII s. II.
Indiana: Ann. Stat. (1933) § 25-302.
Iowa: Code (1950) § 494·14·
New Mexico: Stat. Ann. (1953) § 51-10-r.
146
Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 19, 1924) 13 Bull. lnst. Int. (1925) 279 § 4225.
147
App. Bruxelles (June 9, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.2.157·
148
App. Bruxelles (May 4, 1932) Pasicrisie 1932.2.221.
149
DuBOIS-CLAVIER, Clunet 1933, 199.
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and transfer of the stock being uultra vires and void."1110 The
Court thus directly denied the corporate powers acquired in
another state. But, if ordinarily the theory of special powers
and the doctrine of illegality should be clearly separated,151
this is doubly needed where a legal prohibition is territorially
limited. The true solution was simply to extend the policy
of Illinois, viz., that no bank should hold stock in another
bank, to the branch of a foreign bank. On the same line, it was
declared public policy in Illinois that no corporation, whether
domestic or foreign, should engage in the business of buying
and selling real estate, although the statute seemed not to
envisage foreign corporations. 152 Unincorporated associations,
whether domestic or foreign, have been held excluded from
writing insurance in Idaho. 153 A foreign corporation, authorized in Michigan to do telegraph business was not granted
a concession for other, viz., telephone, business "for which
a domestic corporation could be formed," but the court saw
clearly that what the statute intended was to prohibit one
corporation from engaging in both kinds of business, and this
policy was decisive. 154
The obvious conclusion may be verified by counterproof.
Although in Illinois a corporation cannot be organized to do
different classes of insurance business, there is no implied
prohibition for a New York corporation 155 to do such multiform business in Illinois. Frequently, objections against the
purpose or the structure of a foreign corporation divergent
from domestic legislation, have been raised but rejected. A
corporation organized in another state solely for religious,
150

Golden v. Cervenka (1917) 278 Ill. 409 at 440, II6 N. E. 273 at 286.
CAilPENTEil, "Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discarded?" 33 Yale
L. J. (1924) 49, 68.
m Evans v. McKinney (1923) 308 Ill. roo, 139 N. E. 99· See for real estate
brokerage, Warren v. Interstate Realty Co. (rgr4) 192 Ill. App. 438.
163 Intermountain Lloyds v. Diefendorf (I9JI) 51 Ida. 304, 5 Pac. (2d) 730.
154 Amer. Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Secretary of State (rgog) 159 Mich.
rgs, 123 N. w. s6s.
165 People v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. (r8g4) 153 III. 25, 38 N. E. 752.
151
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missionary, educational, and charitable purposes was held
capable of acquiring and holding land in California without
complying with certain provisions of the California Civil
Code. 156 A Kansas corporation having its capital stock divided
into shares of no fixed nominal par value, was recognized in
Missouri,157 and a Delaware corporation, having a mixed
stock structure, was admitted in California,158 despite divergent domestic legislation. The New York courts have permitted an insolvent foreign corporation to make an assignment to creditors, prohibited to New York corporations/ 59
and so forth.
The reasonable intention of legislatures and courts is to
segregate within the territorial enacted law a portion embodying imperative public policy to be applied to all corporations,
whether foreign or domestic, doing business in the state. The
intention is not, however, to restrict recognition otherwise
than by the well-known provisions concerning the doing of
business. Only on this basis can the sanction of violations be
adequately determined.
Great help in avoiding harmful applications of the existent
incautious provisions has come from the popular statement
that the failure of a state to provide domestic corporations
with the same powers, or to authorize them to be formed for
the same purposes, is not presumed to exclude a foreign corporation from exercising activities according to its charter. 160 .
These observations suffice for the limited purpose of the
present inquiry, which is not concerned with the delicate
156

General Conference etc. v. Berkey (1909) 156 Cal. 466, 105 Pac. 41r.
State ex ref. Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan (1920) 282 Mo. 261, 221 S. W.
728, 732.
158
Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan (1926) 198 Cal. 618, 246 Pac.
796. The Constitution of Washington does not warrant exclusion of a foreign corporation because it is permitted to issue common stock of different classes not allowed
domestic corporations, Fibreboard Products v. Hinkle (1928) 147 Wash. ro.
159
Vanderpoel v. Gorman (1894) 140 N. Y. 563, 35 N. E. 932.
160
Stevens v. Pratt (r882) 101 Ill. 206, Stump v. Sturm (1918) 254 Fed. 535;
2 BEALE§ 167.33; FLETCHER, 17 Cyc. Corp.§ 8334 n. 45 and cases supra ns. I5I-153·
157
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question how far public policy goes or should go. Evidt:tttly
all doctrines and provisions forcing all foreign organizations
into a domestic mould, are ill-framed and would be quite
dangerous but for the good sense of judges throughout the
world. To ban or degrade foreign types of associations would
entirely deform the principle that the law of the ~...harter
governs. The progress of international intercourse which has
engineered the "liberal" theory of recognition, in turn, depends upon a liberal concept of recognition. Moreover, the
parties who organize an enterprise must choose its juristic
shape and adjust its structure in accordance with the types
offered by the local law and are unable to comply with every
idea of legislators in all parts of the globe. The.y should not,
in fairness, have to give thought to any law e:..:cept that of
creation, except perhaps that designed to govern the principal
place of business.
The retrogression would be worse, if these clauses m..der
consideration should mean that domestic corporations would
be protected against competition161 by other means than
taxation and licensing for business. This would largely exceed the scope of the famous reciprocity or "retaliatory"
clauses.
If the problem, instead, is confined to its proper domain,
internal law will be held to affect the original nature of a
foreign organization only on the ground of a vital public
policy, important enough to overcome the needs of trade or
spiritual and cultural interchange. The theory of comity
should at last lose its grip.
There is, however, a reverse side of the thesis that ''foreign
juristic persons enjoy the same private rights as those of the
same class" formed at the forum. De Becker believed it was
"the awkward result" of the Japanese rule, formulated in
161 This is the interpretation by LEPAULLE, supra n. 137, 164 who is apprehensive
of the sphere of discretion left to the administrative agencies.
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these terms, that foreign corporations may enjoy in Japan
rights which they cannot enjoy at home. 162 This is not the
meaning, of course. But it has likewise been observed in this
country that the domestic law of the state where activities are
exercised, increases the powers of a foreign corporation in
such matters as usury, taking land by devise, making preferential payments, and eminent domain. 163 Thus, the wellsettled rule that a state never concedes permission to a foreign
corporation to go beyond its charter164 would be overridden.
However, all such results may be explained, each one separately, in other ways. Regrettably, this matter exceeds the
scope of this treatise.
IV. THE PowERs OF THE CoRPORATION AND oF ITs AGENTs
There is no disagreement on the principle that the capacity
of a corporation and the authority of its principal representatives are primarily determined by its personal law.
1.

Powers of Corporation

Powers denied to a corporation by the law of incorporation
are denied it in any country. 165 American courts say, "Comity
does not add powers but only recognizes existing ones." Conflicts, however, are immediately presented by the fundamentally different conceptions of common and civil law in
construing corporate powers.
In modern civil law, capacity to have rights and powers
pertains to juristic persons in the same full extent as to individuals, excepting natural abilities such as capacity to marry
162

DE BECKER, Int. Priv. Law 62.
Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1225.
164
See next note.
166
Relfe v. Rundle (1 88o) 103 U.S. 222, 225; 2 BEALE § 165.1; PILLET, Personnes
Morales 1o5; RAAPE 136; TRiAs DE BEs 386. For instance, a foreign company in
liquidation has the limited capacity of the law of charter: App. Athens (1929)
Clunet I9JI, 494
163
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and to make a will, but including name, honor, and credit. 166
For the benefit of third persons dealing with corporations,
the laws usually freeze this full capacity into a "formal," i.e.,
an absolutely fixed sum of faculties, independent of the
purposes of incorporation and restrictions imposed through
charter or by-laws. Even though a juristic person ought not
to make certain transactions according to the constitutional
documents and resolutions of stockholder meetings, it can
yet do them with legal effect. Any transaction with third
persons, therefore, is valid, at least if there is no fraudulent
collusion between the agents and the third parties.
At common law, a juristic person has no more than the
special capacity conferred upon it by the act of creation in view
of its particular purposes. Whenever a corporation enters into
a transaction beyond the prescribed radius of its activity, it
acts ccultra vires," without power, and the act in principle is
legally inexistent as nobody's act. An English judge believed
this view self-evident and "not a mere canon of English
municipal law but a great and broad principle which must be
taken as part of any system of jurisprudence.m67 He allowed
a minority of stockholders in a Turkish railway corporation
to sue the directors with the demand to restrain them from
making payments ensuing from a majority vote in a general
meeting, the vote being ccultra vires of the majority." The
court thus not only interfered with the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation but applied an imagined Turkish law
similar to the English.
The French Conseil d'Etat has developed a somewhat
comparable doctrine of "specialty" (principe de specialite)
limiting the powers of public administrative boards that have
legal personality, in accordance with their specific purposes.
us UoiNA, Elementi No. 8o.
Quebec: C. C. art. 352, 358, 17; cf. 2 JoHNSON 177.
187 Pickering v. Stephenson (1872) 14 L. R. Eq. 322.
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But this doctrine is intended to foster good administration and
by no means to serve as a rule of private law or as a restriction
on capacity. 168
This contrast must be realized in applying the conflicts rule.
It follows that American or English courts should recognize
the formal, general powers of Belgian, Brazilian, French, and
other civil law corporations, and that courts in civil law
countries should note the limited, special powers of American
and British corporations. The latter effect is actually well
known in Europe. 169
All theories of special powers, however, involve manifest
dangers to third persons who act in good faith, and the more
so in extraterritorial operation. The basic principle of the
personal law in itself rightly disregards whether third persons
do or do not know the extent of corporate capacity. The
Supreme Court of the United States once arrived at this
result by the presumption or fiction that "every person who
deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself
to such laws of the foreign government affecting the powers
and obligations of the corporation with which he voluntarily
contracts as that government authorizes." 170 But the concealed
limitation to the "vires" inherent in the common law doctrine
of special powers, has caused inconveniences more acutely
felt in the United States than in England, because of the close
co-existence of so many states which are the common territory
of so many business corporations. Judicial inventiveness has
developed an abundance of remedies tempering the result and
particularly effective in case a corporation acts outside of its
See RIGAUD, IO Repert. 27I No. ISI.
Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, I893) Clunet I894, 9I6 (English memorandum
nf asr.ociation); approved in France by PILLET, Personnes Morales § I66; in Germany by M. WoLFF, IPR. I I 8 and others; in Switzerland by STEIGER, 67 ZBJV.
(IQJT) JI7; ScHNITZER 328.
·
1H Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (I88J) I09 U.S. 527·
168
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charter state. 171 Thus, the courts presume that a particular
contract entered into by a corporation is within its powers.
More important, many prohibitions are construed as applying
to corporate action only in the state of incorporation, e.g.,
statutory prohibitions against taking lands by will or general
assignment. 172 Such limitations present a hard task of interpretation, and no smooth formula has been found to designate
generally which parts of the charter, the by-laws, or the
general law "migrate with the corporation." 173 More adequate
relief is furnished by skillful drafting of charters and by-laws
covering every reasonably expected activity. Moreover, despite omission of required formalities or transgression of prescribed purposes, contracts are held valid on the ground of
assumed "general powers" of the corporation for the benefit
of other parties who act in good faith. In addition, fully
executed contracts are safe, and those executed by one party
are protected in most jurisdictions through the estoppel
doctrine. 174 What remains prevailingly unenforceable after
all, are only executory ultra vires contracts, and in some jurisdictions also those executed on one side, still with exceptions.
Where incorporation has been obtained in several states, the
corporation is not allowed to plead lack of power, if it possesses it in any one of these states. 175 Presumptions are in favor
1 71 Restatement§ 156 comment c; id. § r65 comment a; 2 BEALE 758 § r65. The
purpose of protecting third persons must be borne in mind. E.g., as the Nevada Act
of March 24, 1909 (Statutes of Nevada, 1908/1909, p. 251), gave priority to certain
claims against an insolvent banking corporation, the Ninth Circ. Ct. of Appeals in
Washington-Alaska Bank v. Dexter etc. Bank (1920) 263 Fed. 304 said that "depositors and others who dealt with the bank were not required to search the statute
of Nevada to ascertain what their rights were. They were entitled to rely upon the
laws of the territory where the bank was engaged in business."
7
1 2 2 BEALE 757-762; Restatement § 165 comment a; Note in 40 Col. L. Rev.
(1940) 12!!-121 5· Provisions against lending money in excess of a fixed rate are
likewise interpreted as territorial, but this regards illegal and not ultra vires transactions.
173 Cj. Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1218.
1 74 For a recent case of denial that defense by estoppel is barred by estoppel see
Pattison v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n (1935) 360 Ill. 616, 196 N. E. 882.
176 Mackay v. New York etc. R. Co. (1909) 82 Conn. 73,72 At!. 583.
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of general and unlimited capacity, although it is not presumed
that a foreign corporation of a particular type or class has
power not necessarily or usually possessed by corporations of
the kind in question. 176 There are even other ways to evade
the ultra 'Vires theory. 177
Well meaning and widely opportune though all these developments are, the "harsh and inflexible" doctrine of special
capacities has not been improved but broken; it survives in
incoherent fragments, involving differences in the various
courts as well as "confusion, uncertainty and injustice."178
Under these circumstances radical reforms have been
widely sought and in some states achieved in fact, partly on
the suggestion of the Uniform Business Corporation Act by
exempting most classes of cases from the doctrine; partly, as
in California, on the more adequate conception that corporations have general power although the actual authority of
the directors may remain bound to the specified purposes. 179
For all these reasons, a conflicts rule is needed even within
this country. It has been held in a single case by the Missouri
Supreme Court that the law of the place of contracting rather
than that of the place of performance determines whether or
not a corporation, when sued on a contract, is precluded from
setting up the defense of ultra wres. 180 The law of the state
of incorporation was disregarded. 181 This solution has been
I4a C. J. § 3943·
See 2 BEALE 762; KESSLER, S Z.ausl.PR. (1931) S38.
us CARPENTER, "Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?" 33 Yale
L. J. (1923) 49-68; STEVENS, "Ultra Vires," 4 Cin. L. Rev. (1930) 419, 439·
178 California: General Corp. Law, 1947, § 8o3; see the important comment by
BALLANTINE, "Drafting a Modern Corporation Law," 19 Cal. L. Rev. (1931)
46S, 473·
Illinois: Rev. Stat. (I9SS) c. 32 § IS7.8.
Michigan: Comp. Laws (I948) § 4SO.II,
Ohio: General Corp. Law, I9SS, § 1701.I3 (H).
Pennsylvania: Stat. (Purdon I936) tit. IS § 28S2-J02. On the powers of banks
see Note, IS Cin. L. Rev. (194I) Ios.
180 Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co. (I928) 3I9 Mo. 899, 8 S. W. (2d)
834, cert. denied, 278 U. S. 640.
181 GooDRICH 3IS § ro8; cj. 2 BEALE I2IS n. 9·
178

177
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generalized in the Restatemene 82 in the highly enigmatic
rule that "the effect of an act directed to be done by a foreign
corporation is governed by the law of the state where it is
done." If we give the rule the most reasonable construction,
the compass of the powers of a corporation is determined by
the law of the incorporating state, but the effect of an act
beyond such powers is determined by the local law. The
Missouri Court, however, reached its result quite as the
former Italian Commercial Code did/ 83 by simply applying
the law of the place of contracting to the capacity of legal
persons, although the personal law governs their existence.
The systems generally subjecting capacity to the personal
law, necessarily have to use other methods. The case was not
foreseen in the older provisions under which individuals incompetent by their personal laws, nevertheless are bound by
contracts concluded with third persons in the forum. A few
German and Swiss authors, opposed by others, however, have
advocated analogous application of these provisions to corporations, so that an ultra vires contract made by an American
corporation in Germany would be as valid as one concluded
by a German corporation with full powers. 184 This analogy
has been embodied in the recent codifications of Poland,
Liechtenstein, Yugoslavia, Rumania/ 85 and perhaps Italy. 186
Restatement § I66.
DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 3I3; id., 2 Prine. 287, 293; CAVAGLIER.I, Dir. Int.
Com. 249.
m WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. 225; KESSLER., 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 769; NussBAUM, D. IPR. I9I n. 6; RuHLAND, 45 Recueil (I933) III 446; M. WoLFF, IPR.
u8 n. I7; BEITZKE, Jur. Personen II8.
Contra: NEuMEYER., I Int. Verwaltungs R. I76; I FRANKENSTEIN 486; VON
STEIGER., 67 ZBJV. 253; ScHNITZER., Handelsr. II5; RAAPE I37·
11 6 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 3·
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. 235 par. 6.
Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 502 par. 2, cj. criticism by EisNER., I Symmikta Streit 292.
Rumania: C. Com. (I938) § 362.
ua Disp. Pre!. (I942) art. I7 par. 2, speaking of aliens, does not seem to refer
to both paragraphs of art. I6, but may be nevertheless so interpreted.
182
183
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This rule also refers capacity to the law of the place of
contracting, but only if this place is within the forum. In
addition, the outcome differs essentially from the American,
since the theory of ultra vires is abolished rather than mitigated for the purpose of recognition. It might be objected to
this radical result that foreign juristic persons are more easily
recognizable than foreign individuals and that persons dealing with any corporation may well be required to do their
best in inquiring into its nature and purposes. 187 However,
international commerce is interested in eliminating such costly
and delaying duties. Foreign courts may be excused when
they avoid both the unmitigated English and the entangled
American doctrines.
This has been strikingly confirmed by the Californian
reform of I 93 I. The defense of ultra vires has been abrogated
also in case of foreign corporations:
"This section shall extend to contracts and conveyances made
by foreign corporations in this state and to all conveyances
of real property situated in this state by foreign corporations." (Cal Code § 345, last paragraph) 1878
Similarly, the General Corporations Act of Michigan of
I 9 3 5, on the basis of the Uniform Business Act, excludes the
plea of ultra vires made of a foreign corporation against a
person not being a director, officer, or shareholder and not
having an actual knowledge of the ultra vires character of
the act. 188
Consistently with the suggestions made in other parts of
this work, the plea of ultra vires ought to be governed by the
law that governs the contract.
187 People v. Wiersema State Bank (1935) 361 Ill. 75, 197 N. E. 537 at the end;
RABEL, 3 Z.aus!.PR. (1929) 810.
187a Now Cal. General Corp. Law, 1947, § 803 (d).
188 Michigan: Camp. Laws (1948) § 450.11 par. 2; similar provisions in Georgia:
Code (1933) § 22-1505; Ohio: General Corp. Law, 1955, § 1701.I3 (H); Pennsylvania: 15 Purdon's Stat. § 2852-303 (C). The International Law Association has
proposed this system as a general rule. International Law Association, Report of
the 47th Conference 1956, p. 372 and comment p. 374ff.
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2.

Legal Restrictions on the Capacity of Corporations

It is natural that the capacity of corporations may be restricted, on one hand, by general statutes of the state of incorporation and, on the other, by the law governing the particular case-which formula is more exact than to refer to the
"territorial" law or that where "an act of the corporation is
done." A corporation may, for instance, take a legacy, only if it
has capacity under the laws both of the charter and of succession.189 Still other legislations may claim consideration, such
as that of the situs or that of the place of contracting, if different from the former two.
Two widespread examples of prohibitory provisions are
to be mentioned.
(a) Acquisitions by gift or will. The traditional mortmain
legislation of the I 8th and I 9th centuries was inspired by the
twofold consideration that a donor to church funds may deprive his family of their just inheritance, and that the continuous accumulation of wealth may dangerously increase the
secular might of the Church. In more recent times, reasons
of national economy have prevailed in fostering a policy to
prevent any long-lived juristic person from retaining possessions needed for the general welfare. Land in particular has
been regarded as an inestimable asset, limited in quantity,
which ought not to be monopolized by holders who usually
do not alienate their acquisitions.
In numerous countries, legal persons may not acquire
property by gift or other benevolence unless authorization
is obtained, if the value exceeds a certain amount or sometimes irrespective of the value/ 90 Since such a provision may
m 2 BEALE 971, 1036. That this rule underlies also English and German law
is shown by BRESLAUER, Private International Law of Succession (1937) 99· Cf. also
treaty provisions cited by DRoBNIG, 5 Am. J. Camp. Law (1956) 493 n. 55·
190
Belgium and France: C. C. art. 910 concerning associations, not stock corporations, see Cass. (Nov. 29, 1897) D.r898.r.1o8; (Oct. 29, 1894) D.1896.1.145·
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 17.
Spain: C. C. arts. 746, 748.
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be a part of the law of charter, or of the law governing the
donation, bequest, or devise, or of the lex situs,191 the task
of a court in selecting the applicable law may be difficult.
In France, it has been held that a foreign corporation claiming
any acquisition in France by donation or legacy ought to show
authorization according to its personallaw102 and, in addition,
French authorization, if it is not profit-seeking and a French
family is affected, article 910 of the French Civil Code
not being intended to protect a foreign family. 193 In the
United States, it is generally held, in agreement with the
prevailing rule elsewhere, that acquisitions by devise or bequest require the consent of both the charter state and that
determining succession upon death, that is, the state of situs
for immovables, or that of the last domicil for movables. 194
Statutes protecting the family of the donor against inconsiderate disinheritance, may leave doubts respecting the
law determining the family's composition. In New York,
it has been convincingly argued195 that it is the family conceived according to the law of the testator's domicil, that
is envisaged by the statute forbidding "any person having
a husband, wife, child, or parent, to devise or bequeath to
any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or
Portugal: C. C. art. 1781.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 86; cj. Prussia: Ausfiihrungsgesetz, art. 6; some
Swiss cantons, etc.
The Netherlands: Arts. 947 and I7I7 of the Dutch BW., treated by KosTERS
682, have been repealed by Law of Nov. 29, I935, par. 2.
1111
Cj. PILLET, Personnes Morales 90; LEWALD, Questions 68; I FRANKENSTEIN
486; WALKER I6o; PouLLET 239 § 2I8; RAAPE 638; BEITZKE, Jur. Personen ISI
§ 16.
192 Paris (June 2I, I935) D.I936.2.17.
193
Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 14, 1936) Clunet 1938, 307; contra: Note, Clunet I938,
309.
194
Christian Union v. Yount (I879) IOI U. S. 352. FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp.
§§ 8377, 8378. An authorization required by the Israel law of incorporation was
held unnecessary for a bequest of American realty, Reisig v. The Associated Jewish
Charities of Baltimore, (I943) 182 Md. 432, 40 Am. J. Int. Law (I946) 483.
m Chamberlain v. Chamberlain (I87I) 43 N.Y. 424, 433; BRESLAUER, "Conflict
of Laws in Restrictions on Freedom of Taxation," 27 Iowa L. Rev. (I941) 425,433
(adding distinctions).
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mtsstonary society, association or corporation ... more than
one half of his or her share...." 196
(b) Taking of land. Acquisition of land by corporations197
and, particularly in many Latin-American countries, acquisition by foreign states or public corporations/ 98 is not only
prohibited to corporations not licensed for doing business
in numerous states, but also is subject to special authorization,
without regard to consideration or value. Such restrictions
arise from mortmain policy, mistrust of foreigners in general,
or protection of certain districts for military reasons. Only
in the last two cases should the nationality of the members
be of importance.
With respect to the mortmain provisions commonly used
in the United States, the Restatemene 99 asserts that ordinarily
statutes relating to usury, receiving land by devise, and
assigning and transferring property, are interpreted as purely
local in their application and do not restrict the acquisitions
198

Then N.Y. Laws (I86o) c. 360 §I, now Decedent Estate Law,§ I7.
United States: Carroll v. East St. Louis (I873) 67 Ill. 568, I6 Am. Rep. 632;
Washington: Rev. Code (I95I) § 31 .04.120. For some older statutes, see FLETCHER,
I7 Cyc. Corp. § 8353 n. 38.
Belgium: PouLLET § 2I8.
England: Companies Act, I948, s. 14; Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act, I888.
Germany: See EG. BGB. art. 88 and commentaries.
Spain: Law of June 30, I887 against religious corporations.
For the Latin-American laws, see H. ZoRRAQUIN BEcu, EJ Problema del Extranjero en Ia reciente legislaci6n latino-americana (Buenos Aires I943) IOiff.; for the
official interpretation of the Mexican Constitution, art. 27, see WHELEss, Compendium of the Laws of Mexico (I938) 564ff.
On the doubtful law regarding nonregistered foreign companies in Argentina,
Chile and other countries, see VoELKEL, I4 Tul. L. Rev. (I940) at 62 n. 73·
Its Argentina: By analogy to Brazil, 2 VIco § 85.
Brazil: lntrod. C. C. art. 20; now lntrod. Law (I942) art. II §§ 2, 3 (on the
history of this legislation see EsPINOLA, 6 Tratado No. IOI).
Guatemala: Decree No. 2369, of May 9, 1940; Law on Foreigners of 1936,
arts. 20, 2I.
Mexico: Constitution (I9I7) art. 27 fr. II (restrictions on religious associations,
charitable and educational institutions); cj. Note, ScHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev.
(I933) 347·
Venezuela: Ley de Minas, of July 17, 1925, art. 30.
See for Europe, FEDOZZI 47·
lit Restatement § I65 comment a; 2 BEALE 762 § I65·3·
197
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of a corporation in other states. Thus, even a statute of the
charter state preventing corporations from taking land by
will, is not applied to taking land in another state. 200 There
is contrary authority, however. 201

3. Authority of Agents
One of the expedients for remedying the untenable theory
of territoriality was the fantastic idea that although a foreign
corporation cannot "exist" in the state, it can act therein
through agents. 202 This theory was taken seriously enough to
require that the authorization of an agent, being a corporate
act, must take place within the state of incorporation, and
that the corporation must be organized and the agent be
appointed prior to his acting. 203 These not even clever aberrations204 are unknown to other countries and alien to the law
practice of this country. Corporations are daily acting through
individuals without regard to geographical frontiers and,
where they act, they must exist.
Another distinction instead is essential. It is well known 205
that there are two classes of individuals serving as representatives of corporations. One is formed by the principal officers,
called directors in the British companies laws and termed
"organs" of the corporate body in modern codes, following
200 White v. Howard (1871) 38 Conn. 342; Cj. the Reisig case, supra n. 194.
England: Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King (1921) 37 T. L. R. 436, 445·
Ontario: McDiarmid v. Hughes (1888) 16 0. R. 570 has held that a Quebec
corporation is subject exclusively to the local law as to taking land.
201 Kerr v. Dougherty (188o) 79 N. Y. 327; Metropolitan Bank v. Godfrey
(186o) 23 III. 53I; other instances are cited by 2 BEALE 762, and see LORENZEN,
6 Repert. 369 No. 463; GooDRICH § r66 n. 32; HARPER, TA1NTOR, CARNAHAN, and
BROWN, Cases soB. n. 8.
202 Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pet. S.C. 519, 588-589; Ex parte Schollenberger (1877) 96 U.S. 369, at 377·
2oa 2 BEALE 768 § I66.3.
204 yOUNG 49•
2 05 FLETCHER, 2 Cyc. Corp. § 266. For the doctrine of OTTO GIERKE, see his
summary in I Deutsches Privatrecht (I895) 466, 469ff.; and in English, R. HuEBNER,
A History of Germanic Private Law (trans!. Philbrick) I4off. This theory has been
adopted in France; see MicHouo, I Personnalite Morale §§ 50-64 bis; 2 id. §§
187, I89.
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a result of Gierke's theory of "real personality." 206 The
other class is composed of ordinary employees. The offices
administered by the first group are created by the fundamental documents and form an integral part of the organization. These officers express the will and execute the potential
powers of the legal entity. All other individuals acting in
the name of a legal person do so by virtue of contractual
relationship only, as "mere agents" or "employees."
This classification is of significance also in conflicts law.
With respect to simple agents, either of a corporation or of
a partnership, no special conflicts rule is needed in addition
to the general rules concerning agents appointed by private
declarations. The most important of these latter rules predicates that the extent of an agent's authority is determined by
the law of the place where the agent acts upon his authority. 201
If the principal establishes a permanent place of business
in a foreign state, the law of this place has an even more
decisive claim to define the authority of the agents negotiating
at these places.
The powers of a corporation's principal functionaries,
however, are rooted in its constitution and are comparable
to the powers of the legal person itself. Such power is defined
for all individuals holding the same position and brought
to public knowledge through the articles of incorporation
or by-laws. Wherever a state of charter prescribes recording
of corporations in a register, it requires the individual
names of the officers to be included. Even in the absence
of such legal precaution, it has been firmly maintained that a
party dealing with the main officers of a foreign corporation
should inform himself about the extent of their allotted
powers. "Dealings with these companies are not like dealings
2os "Organs" or "constitutionally authorized representatives" as a term has
been used in the German BGB. § 31, Swiss C. C. art. 55, etc.
J07 See for first information, Restatement § 345; and as to English and comparative law, RABEL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 809, 818; BRESLAUER, so Jurid. Rev.
(1938) 282, 308,
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with other partnerships, and ... the partie-s dealing with
them are bound to read the statute and the deed of settlement," though they need not do more. 208 This has been the
true consideration underlying the common law doctrine regarding acts of directors exceeding their authority. It was the
same as that embodied in the solid doctrine of Continental
conflicts law, that the personal law of a corporation determines whether a director's contract is binding on the entity.
In this opinion, a third party dealing with an "organ" of a
foreign corporation is charged with notice of the existence and
extent of this representative's constitutional power. 209
For example, in the interest of all third parties, German
law gives the board of directors of a German Aktiengesellschaft a legally defined all-inclusive authority of the broadest
scope, charter restrictions upon their authority being regarded
as mere instructions without external effect. 210 In a German
nonprofit corporation,211 on the contrary, limitations on
the authority of directors, if publicly registered, restrict the
director's power to bind the entity. Under French law,
widely followed, administrators have exactly the authority
corresponding to the functions assigned to them by the
charter or, in the case of silence or insufficiency of the latter's
provisions, the normal scope of the enterprise. 212 Under the
conflicts rule referring to the personal law of the corporation,
all these domestic rules also govern abroad. Incidentally,
208 Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E. & B. 327; In re Hampshire
Land Co. (1896) 2 Ch. D. 743·
209 See in general, 2 ZITELMANN 207; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.Pr. (1929) 8xo; AssER and
STREIT, Annuaire 1929 I 700.
Germany: ROHG. (Feb. 17, 1871) 2 ROHGE. 36; RAAPE, IPR. 195.
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (March 9, 1933) W. 12589; Rb. Maastricht (June 25,
1931) W. 12366 (authority of liquidators).
210 HGB. § 235; Aktiengesetz § 74; Gesetz betreffend Gesellschaften mit
beschrankter Haftung, of April 20, 1892, § 37, 2.
211 BGB. §§ 30, 26 par. 2 (1).
112 2 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT § 819. In the Law of March 7, 1925, on Private
Companies with Limited Liability, art. 24, however, the German model, supra
n. 210, has been followed.
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it may be noted that an increasing number of German writers
have borrowed from the theory of special powers the idea
that a corporation should not be bound by the act of a director, exceeding the purposes of the corporation and recognizable as such by a third party. 213 This corresponds with
the result envisaged in this country by those scholars who
propose to grant corporations simply general powers, whereas
agents would remain limited by the powers and purposes
of corporation 214 and incapable of performing corporate acts
beyond this line. The formation of conflicts rules would
be strongly aided by such converging developments of the
actually contrasting municipal systems.
In the American discussions of conflicts law, the particular
position of the directors seems never to have been contemplated. The Restatement states that "the effect of an act
directed to be done by a foreign corporation" is governed
by the law of the state "where it is done" ( § I 66), and
the comment expressly applies this rule to the case where
"an agent of a corporation makes an agreement on behalf
of the corporation which he was directed to make"; "the
law of the state where the agreement is made determines
whether the corporation is bound thereby.... " While the
only added harmless example has no bearing on the question,
the provisions of the Restatement seem to result in the rule
that the authority of the board of directors, president, and
other officers is governed by the law of the state where the
contract with the third party is "made."
To understand the origin of this doctrine is easier than
to approve of it. So long as the constitutional documents
were the exclusively determinative expression of the au213 ORTMANN, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB. 99; VON TuHR, I Allgemeiner Teil des
Deutschen Biirgerlichen Rechts 527; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ § 82 sub I.
Objections or doubts: PLANCK-KNOKE, I Kommentar § 26 n. 4; MiiLLERERZBACH, Wohin fiihrt die Interessenjurisprudenz 96; and others.
21 4 BALLANTINE, Corporations 249 § 70.
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thority of directors, fairly consonant interpretation of their
provisions could be expected in all common law courts. With
uniform substantive law, no conflicts rule is needed. The
situation, however, has changed somewhat, even among the
sister states of the Union, as a result of statutory modifications of the formerly uniform rule, as well as through variations in court practice. For example, the old rule that the
president of a corporation has no privileged power except one
conferred expressly by the charter or by-laws, has been substantially modified in many jurisdictions, but not in all, and
the alterations are different enough to create an "Alabama
rule," an "Arizona rule," an "Arkansas rule," and so forth.
Should a Chicago court in the case of a New York corporation
contracting in Illinois follow its own "Illinois rule"? While
in interstate cases this difficulty may often be evaded by
assuming the contract to have been made at the office of
the officer representing the corporation, the problem presents
itself unequivocally where a corporation of the German
type enters into transactions by means of one of its directors
at a place in the United States. Should the president of such
a corporation be regarded as unauthorized, for the only
reason that a similar officer would be without authority under
the Arkansas or Illinois rule? Of course, he should not. An
American court would correctly argue that the general
statutes giving the director absolute powers are to be read
into the charter. But this means that the rules of the Restatement are sadly incomplete. The authority of a principal
officer is determined by the law of the charter. Exceptions
to the effect that authorization may be derived from the
law of the place where the officer acts, have to be carefully
considered in connection with agency rules in general. 215
215
According to the International Law Association's proposal, the liability of the
company for an unauthorized act of an organ is equated to an act beyond the
powers of the company (supra n. 188).
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Doing Business
I.

INTRODUCTION

r. Regulation of Foreign Corporations
u w H I L E the state has no authority to impose a
burden upon interstate commerce by taxation or
otherwise, nevertheless it has authority to provide
by legislation the terms and conditions upon which a foreign
corporation may engage in intrastate business within its territorial limits, or avail itself of the benefits of its laws and the
aid and protection of its courts in the enforcement of contracts
relating to such business.nl
This present American doctrine stands independently of
its derivation from the antiquated doctrine of "comity,"
whereby a state may arbitrarily admit or "exclude" the corporations of sister states, although this connection is still all
too vividly in the mind of many legislators and courts. In
principle, every state may impose conditions on the exercise
of activities in the state. 2 States are expected to hold these
conditions within reasonable limits but are not constitutionally
bound to do so in the case of intrastate commerce.
In this form, the principle is of universal significance. 8
However, the laws of the world display a variety of policies
ranging from the utmost liberalism to prohibitive exactions.
On the other hand, there is a common idea, more or less
instinctively felt, that the territorial state is entitled to
subject foreign organizations to visitation and regulation
1
Phillips Co. v. Everett (1919) 262 Fed. 341 at 343, citing Baltic Mining Co.
v. Massachusetts (1913) 231 U.S. 68, often quoted in cases.
2 See FLETCHER, 17 Cyc. Corp. § 8302.
3 Cj. NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. (1922) IJ9·

173

174 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

only when the latter have a definite contact with the territory, and that the state's interference may increase proportionately to the degree in which the foreign undertaking
merges in the life of the population.
Usually, the minimum contact required for controlling
a foreign corporation is either the fact of its reiterated "carrying on of business" in the country or its establishment of a
"place of business" or of an agency, terms distinguishable
as will be shown but overlapping to some extent. Thus,
filing for a license "to do business" in the United States
includes the indication of a principal place of business within
the state. 4 Further, in Latin-American countries when trading
within the national territory requires authorization, 5 usually
a local representative must be appointed. 6 Agencies in most
cases are probably supposed to be fixed at some place.
The case of a company having its principal establishment
of manufacture or trade in the state, although it is incorporated and domiciled in another jurisdiction, is regarded in
several systems mentioned earlier as requiring an outright
exception to the principle of personal law. 7 Other cases in
which intensified control, possibly reaching complete compulsory "domestication," is justifiable, are presented by the
outstanding public interest involved in such purposes as
banking, financing, insurance, communication, transportation,
and other public utilities.
Normally, however, impositions on the business of foreign
corporations should never go all the way to veritable "domestication" or reincorporation.
4

Restatement § 169 comment c No.3, and illustrations to § 167 Nos. 4 and II.
E.g., Bolivia: Decree of March 25, 1887, art. 5·
6 E.g., Bolivia: Law of Nov. 13, 1886, art. 4; Decree of March 25, 1887, art. 2.
Guatemala: C. C. (1933) art. 25, cj. 23 in the case of "habitual business."
7 Italy, Colombia, Nicaragua, Japan, Egypt and others, see supra pp. 46-48.
6
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Concept of Doing Business

The concept of carrying on business, as contrasted with
isolated acts, is discussed in the United States in regard to
three distinctive purposes: qualifying for license statuteswhich alone is in question here-jurisdiction, and taxation. 8
Definitions are at some variance but agree in the essential
point that a series of acts within the constitutional framework of the corporation must be performed or at least
initiated. 9 In the definition by the Uniform Foreign Corporations Act(§ 2, I), sanctioned by the American Bar Association in 1934 but not yet adopted in any state,
" ... the term 'doing business' means the transaction by a
foreign corporation of some part of its business substantial
and continuous in character and not merely casual or occasional."
"Doing business" may or may not be regulated in the
statutes of this country with the inclusion of charitable
corporations.
The English definition for the purposes of jurisdiction,
is simpler. In the words of Lord Herschell, "there is a
broad distinction between trading with a country and carrying
on a trade within a country." 10 An English lawyer has observed that statutes in the United States do not so limit their
field, "because the courts of the various states have employed
every pretext to assume jurisdiction over foreign corpo8 See Restatement, New York Annotations § 167 and CHEATHAM, Cases 924,
urging with IsAAcs, 25 Col. L. Rev. (1925) 1024, that the courts should watch
better than they usually did the different significances of the phrase "doing business."
9
This seems to be also the gist of the definition in comment a to Restatement
§ 167: "Doing business is doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby
realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single
act fer such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts."
10 Grainger v. Gough [18961 A. C. 325 at 335; La Bourgogne [18991 P. I; [18991
A. C. 431; cj. Saccharin Corp. v. Chemische Fabrik etc. Akt. [I9II1 2 K. B. 516.
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rations." 11 However this may be as to jurisdiction, American
policy in regulating foreign corporate business is in fact
less broad-minded than the English, although much more
so than that of most other nations.
More closely approaching the English than the American
concepts are the expressions "carrying on business" or a
"trade" in Germany (Geschaftsbetrieb, Gewerbebetrieb),
"direct exploitation of the object of the charter" in France,
and "functioning" in Brazil, "trading ( girar )" in Bolivia,
et cetera, terms likewise conceived for the purpose of required
governmental authorization. Business carried on with the
country in the absence of any establishment within it, in
theory, does not require a license in these countries.
3· Categories of Business Places
In Great Britain, registration is obligatory for foreign
companies having "established a place of business" in the
kingdom. This is a comprehensive term, 12 but it requires the
company to have some "local habitation of its own." The
term "succursale" of French and many other laws, although
often used in the narrower meaning of "branch," is prevailingly understood to include all places of business where transactions occur, even though the business may be directed in all
respects by the principal establishment. A careful Belgian
definition declares a "succursale" to be "any dependent establishment (office, bureau, agency, etc.), any accessory center of
commercial life, set up in a stable and regular course at a fixed
place, where a manager resides and permanently represents
11

FARNSWORTH, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1938) 183.
British Companies Act, 1948, s. 406; the above mentioned definition was given
tentatively by the Lord President in the Scotch case, Lord Advocate v. Huron and
Erie Loan & Savings Co. (Feb. 28, 19II) (19II) S. C. 612, 616; accord Cohen, J.,
in Tovarishestvo Manufactur Liudvig-Rabenek [1944] I Ch. 404, 408.
12
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the firm or legal person with authority to engage its liability
in contracts.ma
Another much narrower significance of "branch" (Zweigniederlassung) obtains in German, Austrian, and Swiss administrative rules. There, a branch office presupposes a
permanent establishment with separate organization and assets accountable, having the power to conclude transactions
independently, although subject to instructions by the central
management. 14 Sometimes it is required that the business
carried on be of the same kind as that of the head establishment, but on a smaller scale. 15 Hence impositions on branch
offices in these countries do not extend to "agencies" or
"representatives."
Aware of this proper sense of branch, the broad French
scope of succursale is reached in Spanish, Portuguese, and
Latin-American provisions by accumulating terms such as
"branches, agencies, and representatives of foreign corporations." The meaning is explained by the Colombian laws
that speak of "enterprise of a permanent character," 16 and
the new Italian text, "secondary seat with permanent
agency." 17 In fact, in Latin America, any permanent establishment regularly needs registration, if not authorization.
"Agents" in the language of commercial relations, as
distinguished from "representatives," have been described
as persons securing business and referring offers to the constituent company, and this meaning has been attributed to
13
App. Bruxelles (June 6, I929) Revue pratique des societes I929, No. 2972,
cited in Novelles Belges, 3D. Com. No. sz6I; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Feb. I, 1938)
Jur. Com. Brux. I938, 6r.
14
Germany: I4 ROHGE. 40I, I7 id. 3I3; 38 RGZ. 263, so id. 429.
Austria: OGH. in Ad!. Clem. I8oo, id. 2804.
Switzerland: 56 BGE. I 364; 6r BGE. I 303.
16
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. Io, I924) so BGE. II 507, sro, cj. WIELAND, 43
Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 242.
16 Colombia: Legislative Decree No. 2 of I9o6, art. I; Law No. 58 of 193I,
art. 22; Executive Decree No. 65 of I94r, art. r.
17 Italy: c. c. (1942) art. zso6.

178 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS
"agents" as used in the Latin-American laws. 18 The various
legislations may be divided on this point. However, the
multifarious duties connected with permanent establishments, seem to have no bearing on independent brokers or
distributors, intermediaries between an enterprise and its
customers. Nor do they apply to merchants dealing with a
foreign corporation on their own account and possibly working for several principals. Thus, these rules refer exclusively
to physical or juristic persons that enter into transactions,
or at least negotiate, on behalf of foreign corporations. This,
at least, is their natural construction and should be presumed,
if the contrary is not clearly intended. 19
Similarly, the personal law of the foreign corporation
has no application to subsidiaries or affiliates (French filiales,
German Tochtergesellschaften) i.e., autonomous corporations
or partnerships of any form, created under the territorial
law, though economically dependent and often politically
assimilated, to foreign, particularly enemy, organizations.
It follows incidentally that among the four main methods
open to business management for operating in a foreign
country, two do not enter into discussion in the following
survey, namely, carrying on foreign activities by an independent distributor and by a juridically independent foreign
subsidiary. We have to deal only with the two other procedures of submitting the entire corporation abroad to registration and other duties, or of having this done by a domesticcreated subsidiary, organized for the purpose of business
in the country. 20 Big American corporations most frequently
use the latter method.
ra See Regimen Juridico 32, 98.
Cj. NEuMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 143, 139 n. 5·
2 °For all four ways and their advantages and disadvantages, see the excellent
symposium, "Legal Problems Affecting American Corporations Doing Business
Abroad" (i.e., in Latin America) in 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) 550.
19
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SuRVEY oF SYSTEMS

Unconditional Admittance

Few countries accord freedom of trade to foreign-created
legal persons without authorization either for recognition
or for permitting the doing of business. England, however,
has upheld its old liberal principle/'ll as have also Switzerland22 and the Netherlands,23 joined in 1873 by Belgium. 24
Also Yugoslavia 25 and, in this hemisphere, Argentina, Paraguay,26 the Dominican Republic/7 El Salvador,28 and Venezuela29 have based their rules on this system, although the
first two countries require reciprocity of treatment. Hence,
the Swiss and Argentine governments have been able to
21

England: Companies Act, I94S, s. 406.
Switzerland: No impositions have been provided either by the Federation,
BG. (July 22, ISS7) Clunet IS93, 240, or by the Cantons, see WIELAND, 43 Z.
Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 225; SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (I92I) 228 at
237; BG. (July I2, I934) 6o BGE. I 225.
Hungary: Formerly classified similarly by DE MAGYARY, C!unet I924, 596.
21 The Netherlands: MoLENGRAAFF, "De Ia condition des societes etrangeres dans
les pays bas," in Clunet IS88, 6I9 at 623 (regretting this liberal attitude); KosTERS
6S6-6SS.
24 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act, of May IS, IS73, arts. I2S-IJo; text
of 1935, arts. 196-I99.
26 YuGOSLAVIA: C. Com. § 503 par. I; EISNER, I Symmikta Streit 293; see,
however, now EisNER, I7 Z. ausl. PR. (1952) at 25S; 20 id. I66.
21 Argentina and Paraguay: C. Com. art. 287, as modified and interpreted in
Argentina by Argentinian Law No. S867, of Feb. 6, I912, art. I, also applied to a
(Czechoslovakian) limited liability partnership, Cam. Com. de Ia Cap. (Feb. 12,
I926) 19 Jur. Arg. 78. Provisions concerning the required documentation are contained in the Decree of April 17, 1923, creating the "Inspecci6n General de J usticia,"
art. 7· That no other conditions than these exist, has been stated by Cam. Com.
de Ia Cap. en pleno (Sept. IS, 1940) 22 La Ley 537; C. Com. art. 287 is modified
thereby, see Cam Com. de Ia Cap. 2a (May 5, 1939) I4 La Ley 708. Hence, Argentina is not really devoted to the theory of authorization, not to speak of the compulsion to nationalization. On the liberal background see ZEBALLOs, C!unet 1906,
6o4, 611.
27 Dominican Republic: Sup. Corte de Justicia (Nov. I4, 1936) 316 B. J. (1936)
21

6oo.
El Salvador: C. Com. art. 299·
Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) art. 359 (new 374), 361 (new 376), nationalization
being only optional; art. 361, "pueden adquirir Ia nacionalidad venezolana."
18
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declare, without concluding a treaty, that stock companies
of one country after due registration can reciprocally carry
on business by agents in the other country. 80 But, registration
and publication are additional requisites, and in such countries
as Yugoslavia and Venezuela, formalities may impose grave
restrictions on the freedom granted in principle.
2.

Business Without a Permanent Place

Italy, Portugal, and Rumania, as well as modern Turkey,
apparently allow not merely isolated acts, but all transactions
short of establishing an agency in the country to be concluded
by a foreign company. 81
3· Business Under Domestic Law
The Spanish Commercial Code of 1 8 85 unconditionally
permits all business carried on either from outside or within
the country, but, if permanent centers, agencies, or branches
are established, all transactions made in the country are
subject to the provisions of the Code. This system was
initially followed in Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. 82 It is, in reality, an inadequate way of
meeting the problem, revealing its dangerous elements when,
nevertheless, requirements for doing business have been
ao BuRCKHARD, 3 Bundesrecht 1023, V.
Italy: C. Com. (I882) art. 230; C. C. (I942) art. 2so6; cj. CAVAGLIERI, Dir.
Int. Com. 27S·
Portugal: C. Com. arts Io9, cj. III.
Rumania: C. Com. (I938) arts. 3S6, 3S7i since 194S, the law certainly has been
altered.
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, I330/19I4, art. 12, see SALEM, 7 Repert. 2So No. I3S·
a2 Spain: C. Com. (I88s) art. IS; cj. 21.
Colombia: C. Com. art. I9.
Cuba: C. Com. art. IS; Constitution (I940) arts. I9, 272.
Honduras: C. Com. (1940) arts. 10, 286.
Mexico: Formerly C. Com. art. IS; now Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles,
of July 28, 1934, art. 2So; but see for the obstruction to this article by the courts,
supra p. 146 n. Ioi, the literature cited.
Nicaragua: C. Com. arts. 8 and 10.
Peru: C. Com. art. IS; Constitution (1933) art. 17.
31
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added,S8 or, on the other hand, the sweeping subjection to
domestic law has been extended still further. 84
4· Qualifying for Authorization
The continuously alleged power of the states of the
United States to "exclude" nondomestic corporations from
business is deemed to be restricted by certain provisions in
the Federal Constitution: the Commerce Clause, the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, the Equal Protection and the
Due Process Clauses,3 l> and also the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 36 If a regulation does not violate the Constitution,
its wisdom and equity cannot be challenged.87 But statutes
do not really exclude even alien corporations from business;
they only require "licensing," dependent on objective and
generally qualifying conditions. 38
A main characteristic of this system, too obvious even
to be noticed by American lawyers but a striking phenomenon
for Europeans/9 lies in the fact that the state statutes specify
the conditions for licensing closely enough to make supervision by the courts possible and decisive. That half of the
state statutes speak in imperative terms ("shall grant") while
the other provisions are permissive, practically makes no
difference. When the conditions provided by law are satisfied,
authorization is automatically granted. 40 Whether also non33 To illustrate, Colombia: Law No. 58 of 1931, art. 22 speaks of request for
"permit" by the newly created Superintendencia de Sociedades An6nimas, and
Decree No. 1984 of 1939, art. 4 emphasizes this request for a permit (called "special"
in art. 3).
Mexico: C. C. arts. 2736-2738 and Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, art.
251 contain only prescriptions of formalities, but the restrictions on foreign corporations carrying on business have been considerably increased.
a• Peru: Infra n. 131.
35 Restatement §§ 169-178; FLETCHER, 17 Cyc. Corp. VI B, 227, §§ 8386 ff.
sa HoLT, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1941) 452.
87 State ex rd. Tri-State Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Holm (1924) 160 Minn.
378, 2oo N. W. 296.
38 HoLT, id. 478.
8D See LEPAULLE, Condition des societes etrangeres (1923) 174ff., 233ff.
40 Answer to a questionnaire, sent out by Mr. Lepaulle, see id. 179.
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profit-seeking corporations need authorization is not well
settled in all states; many states seem to "exempt such corporations from regulation altogether or else provide for some
special method of regulation." 41 An express exemption from
the duty of registration is provided in some provinces of
Canada. 42
Licensing is not believed to raise difficulties in any state,
with the only exception that many states require that the name
be not susceptible of confusion with those of domestic corporations, these amounting in New York to some so,ooo. This
is a problem for companies of other states with an established
firm name.
In most Latin-American countries, governmental authorization is required for establishing an "agency" or "representation." Only occasionally, as in Colombia and Nicaragua,
the text of the statutes makes it clear that the permit for
establishing a permanent place of business is certain to be
granted on the filing of a request and fulfillment of the legal
conditions. 48 But the writer is enabled by a statement of Dr.
Phanor Eder, based on his experience, to note that in at
least half of the Latin-American republics governmental
authorization is always granted, if the constitutional documents of the corporation do not contain stipulations contrary
to the basic principles of the domestic law.
41 Policy in this respect is presumed by the draftsmen of the Uniform Foreign
Corporations Act, National Conference, Handbook 1934, 3o6.
For duty to comply, State ex rei. Griffith v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (I92S)
117 Kan. s64, 232 Pac. 2S4; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth (1924)
I3a Va. soo, 122 s. E. 122; General Conference v. Berkey (1909) rs6 Cal. 466, lOS
Pac. 411. Contra: Eaton v. Woman's Home Missionary Society (1914) 264 Ill. aa,
ros N. E. 746. See Note, 37 A. L. R. r2a3.
"Ontario: Extra Provincial Corporations Act, Rev. Stat. I9SO, c. 124 s. 2, class S·
Saskatchewan: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 19S3, c. 124 s. 190 (r).
Discretionary exemption in Alberta: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1942, c. 240 s.
'34 (3).
British Columbia: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1948, c. sa s. ra2 (s).
Cl Colombia: Acto Legislative Constitucional No. 1 of 1936, art. 6; C. Com. art.
19 read with Law No. sa of 1931, art. 22 and Executive Decree No. 6s of 1941.
Nicaragua: C. Com. (1916) art. ro.
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The text of the Hungarian Commercial Code followed the
same principle. 44

5. Discretionary Grant of Authorization
The liberality of the licensing system in this country is
perceived when contrasted with other legislations.
In various German states, foreign industrial and commercial enterprises have always required trade authorization
by the state authorities supervising industry and trade, except
where treaties accord reciprocity. 45 These disadvantages were
inspired by suspicions of foreign law more than foreign capital.
The recent German Corporation Law of 1937 superimposes
the necessity of governmental approbation/ 6 which may be
refused without giving reasons, and may be freely revoked. 47
This is a trend backward to the system prevailing in Austria
and some Eastern European legislations, which have simply
provided that every foreign business corporation shall be
subject to discretionary permission for doing business. 48
Most statutes of the Latin-American countries requiring
governmental authorization for the establishment of a perma44

Hungary: C. Com. arts. 210-217.
Reichsgewerbeordnung § 12 in combination with Prussian Law of June 29,
1914 (carrying on a nonambulatory business).
Bavaria: Law of February 6, 1868, art. 2 (carrying on business).
Saxony: Ordinance of Nov. 10, 1899, § S·
Wi.irttemberg: Executory Law to the BGB., art. 282. Cj. NEUMEYER, 2 Int.
Verwaltungs R. 142ff.
46 Aktiengesetz (1937) § 292 (stock companies); Einfi.ihrungsgesetz to this law,
§ 27 (limited partnerships, profit associations and co-operatives). On the state
agencies on which the authorization depends, see BE1TZKE, Clunet 1937, 1002.
47 BE1TZKE, Jur. Personen 166.
48 Austria: Formerly Imperial Order of Nov. 29, 1865, and Law of March 29,
1873, still valid in Czechoslovakia; now Aktiengesetz (1937) § 292 (stock companies).
Poland: Law of March 22, 1928, No. 383, on stock companies, art. 4 par. 6;
Order of Dec. 20, 1928, No. 919; on a more recent similar provision regarding
limited private companies, see 12 Z.ausi.PR. (1939) 867.
Rumania: C. Com. of 1887, arts. 238, 244; C. Com. of Nov. to, 1938, branches
and agencies may not be established unless reciprocity is guaranteed (art. 355);
in the case of joint stock companies and limited partnerships only after authorization by the government (art. 356).
In the East European countries, these provisions are today in effect superseded
by the wholesale nationalization and socialization of industry and commerce.
46

184 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS
nent business place are drafted in terms that possibly reserve
to the governments full power of granting or refusing. What
is the "public policy" to which corporate contracts and
documents ought not to be contrary in Mexico? 49 Precise
terms have been used for this purpose in the older Brazilian
prescription that foreign stock corporations and nonprofit
associations should file their charters and by-laws for "approbation," in order to enable them to function in Brazil
(funcionar no Brasil). 50 The actual provisions are that all
organizations pursuing purposes of collective interest, as
companies and foundations, follow the laws of the state
where they have been established but may not have branches,
agencies, or establishments before their constitutive acts have
been approved by the Brazilian Government. 51 In a decree
of I 89 1, it was prescribed that the government shall ascertain
"whether the company has a proper purpose and whether it
is to the advantage of the public; whether its creation is
opportune and its success probable; ... whether the capital
is adequate for the company purposes; ... whether the
provisions relating to administration, accounting, dividends,
reserve funds, operations, and obligations, protect the interests of the shareholders and of the public." 52 A recent
regulation more briefly provides that the Federal Government, in authorizing a stock corporation may establish "the
conditions that it shall deem convenient for the protection
of the national interests." 53 It is controversial whether partnerships lacking corporative articles of association, as they
are based only on a contract, are free from this burden. 54
49

Mexico: Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles (I934) art. 25I, fr. II.
Brazil: C. C. art. 20 § I, as amended by Decree No. 3725, of Jan. IS, I919;
Decree No. 434, of July 4, I89I, art. 47·
61 Brazil: Introductory Law (I942) art. II § I; Decree-Law No. 2627 (sobre as
sociedades por a~oes) of Sept. 26, I 940, art. 64.
62
Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, I89I, art. 52·
63
Decree-Law No. 2627, of Sept. 26, I940, art. 65 § r.
"BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. 162-164; on the full controversy see EsPINOLA, 6 Tratado
547·
60
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In Chile, the President of the Republic examines whether
the interests of the stockholders and of third persons are
protected/ 5 and a granted authorization may be revoked if
the President "for any reason" estimates that a stock company
does not offer the guarantees required for authorization. 56
6. Domestication
Domestication is a procedure whereby a corporation loses
its foreign character and becomes a domestic corporation.
Although none of the above-described methods should be
characterized as requiring the conversion of a foreign corporation into a domestic one, certain additional requirements,
which are to be mentioned below, may greatly contribute
to efface the distinction between authorization and domestication. Is it true, however, that some, if not most, of the
Latin-American states demand a veritable "nationalization"
as a condition precedent to permitting the carrying on of
business? There is a theory to this effect advocated by a few
Latin-American authors 57 and apparently supported by the
language of some statutes. Thus, Bolivia prescribes that
the company should solicit "its legal constitution"58 at the
Ministry of Industry; Brazil that it should submit its own
constitutional document for "approbation"; 59 and the Mexican Supreme Court insists on the idea that inscription in the
register is indispensable for giving a foreign company "life
in Mexico," such existence including the right to sue; 60 so
&5 Chile: c. Com. art. 468; Decree No. 1521, of May J, 19J8, arts. 47-49; DecreeLaw No. 251, of May 22, 1931, arts. 12off.; cj. on the requirements, HERRERA
REYES, Sociedades an6nimas (Santiago 1935) 272 § JOO.
66 Chile: Decree-Law No. 251, of May 22, 1931, art. 126, while the former Regulation No. JOJO, of December 22, 1920, art. 48 required an "important" reason.
67 Most outspoken, GIL BoRGES, Informe 1, reproduced also by the Peruvian
motion to the Eighth Pan-American Conference, Diario 616.
68 Bolivia: Decree of March 25, 1887, art. 5·
u Brazil: C. C. art. 20.
80 See cases of Amparo Zardafn and Amparo Palmolive, as discussed by ScHUSTER,
"The Judicial· Status of Non-Registered Foreign Corporations in Latin AmericaMexico," 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) 341 at 356ff., ns. So, 83, 86; 8 id. 563 and supra
Chapter 22 p. 146 n. 101.
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also the Civil Code of Peru requires foreign juristic persons
to register "in order to enjoy personality."61 Although these
expressions have an unfortunate connection with the problems both of standing in court by foreign corporations and
of their subjection to domestic laws,62 reasonably they cannot
mean the production of a new juristic personality by compliance with statutes prescribing authorization of doing business or registration. 68
The opposite theory would involve the queer proposition64
that a foreign corporation is recognized as a person so long
as it has not established an agency in the country but loses
its existence by establishing an agency, whether without
authorization, or even after obtaining an authorization, since
that would be granting a new personality. It would, then,
seem more consistent to abandon formally the idea of recognition ipso jure and all the hopes that it once embodied.
Domestication, as facultative and optional rather than the
exclusive way to obtain permission for doing business, is
much less harmful and may sometimes be a perfectly convenient method. American concerns have been advised to
create subsidiaries in this country, specially designed for
reincorporation in determined foreign countries. 65
Within the United States domestication is almost obsolete
and seems to exist only in Georgia. 66
u Peru: c. c. (1936) art. ross. Similarly, Bolivia: Law of Nov. I3, r886, art. 4·
To the same effect, as it seems, Panama: C. Com. arts. 296, 378; cj. EoER, IS Tul.
L. Rev. (r94r) S28, 532.
62 See supra p. 143; infra pp. 216-217 and 199-201.
63 See 2 RESTREPO-HERNANDEZ 92 § II9I: "La incorporaci6n no produce una
nueva persona juridica."
64 There was an older Italian opinion of this kind, developed by FIORE, and
refuted by DrENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 24S; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 26r, 262.
66 See the instructive information by CRAWFORD, II Tul. L. Rev. (1936) 59·
66 Georgia: Code (1936) § 22-r6or; cj. C. C. H., State Tax Guide Service 1214 §
20.021. A recent amendment to § 22-r6or has provided that the internal organization of a domesticated corporation and the relation between its stockholders
continue to be governed by the law of the "home state" (Acts 1952, n. 862). On
the quite different domestication for the purpose of taxation, see WuNSCHEL,
"Taxation-Business Situs of Credits-Domestication of Foreign Corporations,"
41 W.Va. L. Q. (1935) 412.
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7. Reciprocity
Reciprocity as a condition for license appears in a few
European countries,0 7 and underlies the "retaliatory" statutes
in the United States putting foreign corporations-especially
insurance companies-under the same restrictions and burdens as are imposed by the state of incorporation upon corporations of the enacting state, thus discriminating in favor
of domestic corporations. 68 Such provisions, recognized as
constitutional, 69 are more frequently applied to taxation but
have also been used to deny the benefit of the rule that the
corporation may maintain a suit after belated licensing. 70

III.

THE PosiTION OF PERMANENT EsTABLISHMENTS IN
CoNFLICTS LAw

r. Principle
It is a general doctrine that branch offices, whether in the
narrower or broader meaning of the word, have a double
nature influencing their treatment in conflicts law.
On the one hand, an establishment forms an organic part
of the entire enterprise and, therefore, participates in the
personal law of the main organization. To the extent that
nationality is ascribed to the legal body, the branch office
shares in this. 71
87 Austria: Allg. BGB. § 33 (formal, not material, reciprocity, requiring that
Austrians be treated like the citizens, not like the foreigners in Austria); Law on
Limited Partnerships (Ges.m.b. H. Gesetz) § 108.
Bulgaria: C. Com. art. 227 No. 7·
Denmark: Stock Corporation Law, No. I23, of April IS, I930, as amended, § 74·
France: Regulation concerning Insurance Companies, of Dec. 30, I938, art. I43
par. I (according to NIBOYET, 3 Traite 237 n. I).
Poland: Decree of Feb. 7, I9I9, art. 7·
Rumania: C. Com. (I938) art. 355·
68 See FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp. 456 § 846I n. 35·
89 FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp. 270 § 8399.
70 Wolf v. Lancaster (I903) 70 N. J. Law 20I, s6 Atl. I72i treated as a general
rule by 2 BEALE 856 n. 3·
71 Germany: RG. (May 2, I924) 108 RGZ. 265.
Hungary: S. Ct. (April 30, I930) Clunet I93I, I243·
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On the other hand, a branch joins in the life of the country
where it is established and, for this reason, to a large extent
must obey the territoriallaw. 72 For the purpose of this law,
it is often considered "domiciled" in the country of its location. 73 Transactions between the corporation and its branch
are of significance at least in tax and administrative law. 74
2.

Scope of the Personal Law

The personal law will regularly govern the internal organization of a branch office, as for instance the distribution
of powers and the administrative relations between the central
and the branch offices. 75
It determines traditionally the name or "firm" of the
branch, although convenient additions to the name may be
locally prescribed to show the kind of association or the
fact that the central management is foreign and where it
is situated. 76 Laws are divided on the question whether the
foreign-acquired name is to be protected when it is apt to
create confusion with a local corporation established before
the branch but after the foreign corporate name was made
72 Belgium-France, Convention concerning Conditions of Residence (Oct. 6,
1927) art. 7, 69 L. of N. Treaty Series (1927) 49 at 53, 127 British and Foreign
State Papers (I927) Part II 98 at 99·
73 See, for instance, Brazil, C. C. art. 35 pars. 3 and 4, as construed by EsPINOLA
8-C Tratado 1406, I781.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. 34 par. 2.
Venezuela: C. Com. arts. 359 (new 374), 360 (new 375).
74 Recognized in Cuba, Trib. Supr., decisions cited in 3 Jurisprudencia del Trib.
Supr. (I944) No. 2I65.
76 WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 271; Swiss Fed. Trib. (April 1, 1924)
BGE. II SI, 57 (with a point against French war measures) see supra Chapter 19,
p. 62 n. rr 1.
76 Switzerland: Rev. C. Obi., art. 952, last par.; Law of Dec. IS, I936, Eidgenossische Gesetzsammlung 1937. No. 13.
Denmark: Stock Corporation Law, No. I23, of April IS, I930, as amended, § 75·
Germany: HGB. § 20; Ges.m. b. H. Gesetz § 4; Genossenschaftgesetz § 3 par. 1;
Aktiengesetz § 4·
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 1044 par. r.
Poland: Stock Companies Order, of December 20, 1928, § 6.
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known abroad. 77 In a few jurisdictions, however, these rules
are set aside, the territorial rules claiming completely to
determine the branch name. 78
The personal law determines also the liability of the main
organization for obligations entered into by the branch, 79
as well as the termination of the branch through dissolution
of the main body. 80
That organization and internal government of the main
enterprise in deciding such incidents as the issue and purchase
by a corporation of shares of stock, modification of capital,
negotiability of share certificates issued out of the state,
are beyond the territorial legal domain, may be considered
as generally admitted. 81
Consistent Continental opinion holds in all these respects
the same principle to be applicable to branches of unincorporated organizations. 82 The importance of the individual
members for the structure of a partnership is appreciated.
Nevertheless the corporate attributes of a copartnership also
exercise their influence.

J. Territorial Law Governing According to General Conflicts
Rules
Natural circumstances justify conflicts rules referring to
the territorial laws in the following respects:
(a) In every case of a branch office or other permanent
77
Cj. German HGB. § IS par. 2; 42 Jahrb. KG. I6o; Liechtenstein: P. G. R. §
I044 par. 3·
78
Lay,s of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway on registration, § I6, criticized by
NEUMEYER., 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. I89, I93, but recommended by WIELAND, 43
Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 2I8, 237, cj. 244.
19
PILLET, Personnes Morales § I67.
80
See supra Chapter 20, p. 92.
81
Yet, BALLANTINE, Corporations § 293 and the same, Cal. Corp. Law 3I2 §
323, defines the scope of the territorial law in a broader way.
82
See, for instance, Yugoslavia, C. Com. (1937) §§ 104, I65, 504, 507; and in
general the citations supra pp. Iodf.
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representation of any foreign principal, it is universally agreed
that the authority enjoyed by the directors or agents, in
contracting with third persons in the country of the establishment, should be determined by the law of the place where
the authority is acted upon rather than where it has been
granted. A slight difference exists in that in the United States
the decisive place is regarded to be that of contracting83whatever this may mean practically-while in other countries
it is assumed to be the place of the establishment itself. 84
(b) It is likewise consonant with general considerations
of conflicts law that the manager of a branch office should
be personally liable to third persons either by collateral or
subsidiary liability whenever the law of the country so
provides. 848
(c) As a matter of course foreign organizations are subject
to the general local administrative provisions concerning
bookkeeping and accounting, publication of balance sheets,
inspection and information, 85 labor, taxation, and bankruptcy.86 This explains easily the often discussed rules that
the issue of shares or bonds within the state by a foreign
corporation is subject to the territorial provisions, and that
stock exchange regulations include the quotation of foreign
stocks. 87 In the United States, laws regulating the holding or
83 American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber Co. (19I7) 74 Fla. 130, 77 So. 168;
in accord, the proposal of the International Law Association, 47th Conference
Report 1956, p. 372 and comment p. 374ff.
84 Germany: RG. (Dec. 5, r896) 38 RGZ. 194; (April 3, 1902) 51 RGZ. 147;
(Jan. 14, 1910) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73; cj. HuPKA, Die Vollmacht (1900) 252.
Yugoslavia: C. Com. (1937) § 507.
8 "' The International Law Association's proposal (see preceding note) would
grant this personal liability only when the company is not bound under its law.
86 Getridge v. State Capital Co. (I933) I29 Cal. App. 86, r8 Pac. (2d) 375;
Winter v. Baldwin (1889) 89 Ala. 483, 7 So. 734·
C6digo Bustamante, art. 250.
Belgium: Cons:llidated Companies Act (1935) art. 198.
Denmark: Law of April IS, I930, as amended,§§ 76ff.
Germany: KoNIGE, Leipz. Z. 1914, 1417.
Italy: C. C. (I942) art. 2506.
Portugal: C. Com. art. II I.
88 E.g., France: Cass. (req.) (June I9, I9o8) Clunet I909, I094·
Yugoslavia:
Com. § soS, see EISNER, I Symmikta Streit 296.
87 2 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT § II4I.
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transfer of shares 88 and even a local prohibition of partnership
with other corporations 89 have been held applicable.
(d) Qualifications as a merchant, for the purposes of local
rules on registration, firm name, and accounting, is determined by the local law. 90 But when the "commercial" nature
of contracts, executed at the main office, is examined for
purposes of jurisdiction or other matters, the personal law
should be applied.
IV.

I.

STATUTORY IMPOSITIONS

Service of Process and Jurisdiction

Statutes regularly require foreign corporations and firms
desiring to do business, to indicate a fixed place of business
and an agent or a principal manager upon whom service of
process may be made. This certainly is a fair provision insofar
as litigation involves contracts, tort, taxation, or other duties
connected with the business conducted by the agency. It is
a corresponding good rule that the local courts should refrain
from taking jurisdiction beyond the affairs of the establishment91 "on a cause which arose wholly outside of the state." 92
But there is a tendency to extend further the authority of
See 2 BEALE 782 n. 3·
2 BEALE 782 n. 4·
9° France: 2 LYoN-CAEN et RENAULT § 1!27.
Germany: 36 RGZ. 394; OLG. Kassel, Leipz. Z. I909, 954; WIELAND, I Handelsr.
6I9 n. I8; STAUB-BONDI, in I Staub § 6 n. 3, § 33 n. 4; cf. § 22 n. 4 explaining that,
if the personal law agrees, the local German HGB. §§ 22, 30 permits the transfer
of a branch with its firm name to another person.
91 See, e.g., Italy: SERENI, Rivista I93I, 266.
Colombia: Legislative Decree No. 2 of I906, art. 2.
Costa Rica: Law No. IO, of Dec. 3, I929, art. I (3) (amending Corporation Law,
art. I5I) "for the decision of the judicial questions to which the transactions of
the branch give rise and in all matters concerning requisites of publicity, •.• "
Guatemala: C. C. (1933) art. 25 (2); Legislative Decree No. I370, of April I6,
1925, art. r.
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law (r889) art. 6.
92 Canada: Pearson (or Pearlman ?) v. Great West Life Assurance Co. (C. A.
I9r2) 2 w. w. R. 563, 4 D. L. R. 154.
88
88
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local agents to all matters inclusive of the causes of action
arising abroad.
In England, where no establishment of the foreign company exists but there is a representative, his authority to
receive a writ of summons without limitation extends to all
suits against the company, even though he may manage only
a share transfer office, 93 but it has been said that his authority
must be proved by the plaintiff, "which is difficult." 94
The American statutes prescribing the appointment of an
agent as a condition precedent to licensing, are divided. In
a distinct group, the authority of the required agent is
restricted to domestic matters either by an express clause95
or by implication. 96 Of the remaining statutes uncertain in
language, many more possibly may be claimed for this latter
93
94

The Madrid [1937] P. 40.
GuTTERIDGE, "Le Conflit des lois de competence judiciaire dans les actions
personnelles," 44 Recueil (I933) II, III at 129; cj. DICEY I78.
95 Kansas: Gen. Stat. (1949) § I7-SOI.
Nebraska: Rev. Stat. (I943) § 2I-I20I.
South Dakota: Code (I939) § I 1.2003 (6).
Washington: Laws I955, c. 143 s. r.
Wisconsin: Stat. (I9S3) §§ I8o.8or, I8o.82S (3).
96 Alabama: Code Ann. (I940) tit. IO § I92; Jefferson Island Salt Co. v. Longyear Co. (I923) 2IO Ala. 3S2, 98 So. r 19.
Idaho: Code (I947) § 3o-so2.
Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 2S-304; § 2S-306, as amended by L. I94I,
c. 226 § 8.
Iowa: Code (I9SO) § 494.2.
North Dakota: Rev. Code (I943) §§ IO-I7IO, IO-I733, IO-I734·
Rhode Island: Gen. Laws Ann., c. II6 § 6s as construed by cases.
South Carolina: Code (I9S2) § I2-703.
Tennessee: Code Ann. (I9SS) § 48-9I2.
97 Arkansas: Pope's Dig. Stat. (I947) § 64-I2or; American Ry. Express Co. v.
Rouw Co. (I927) I73 Ark. 8Io, 294 S. W. 401.
Arizona: Code Ann. (I955) § ro-48I (A).
Georgia: Code Ann. (1933) §§ 22-IS07, 22-rso9; Reeves v. Southern R. Co.
(r9o5) 49 S. E. 674.
Minnesota: Stat. (I94S) §§ 303.06, 303.13; Erving v. Chicago & Northwestern
R. Co. (I927) I7I Minn. 87, 214 N. W. I2.
New York: Gen. Corp. Law, § 2IO; Karius v. All States Freight, Inc. (I941)
176 Misc. ISS, 26 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 738,
Ohio: Rev, Code (I9S3) § I703.04,
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class; 97 only in few cases, has the agent's authority been
expressly extended to causes of action arising out of the
state. 97 a In case a foreign corporation has not appointed an
agent or the agent has disappeared or lost his authority, an
official of the state-the secretary of state, the auditor, et
cetera-is designated as attorney for the corporation with
authority to receive service of process either under a declaration to be made by the corporation or by a statutory provision.
The courts, under the guidance of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 98 have developed a system varying in the
states and apparently still fluid, which the draftsmen of the
Uniform Foreign Corporations Act refrained from reproducing in a section, because it would be enormously complicated.99 One of the particular doctrines is that service on an
appointed agent or the official designated as attorney, may be
effected in causes arising outside the state, where the corporation has appointed him to this effect, or is deemed to have
consented to his authority, especially in the case of a public
officer, by having filed for doing business on the ground of a
statute unequivocally conferring on him constructive authority, while the corporation is actually doing business at the
time suit is brought against it. 100
In a few jurisdictions, the right to sue a foreign corporation
doing business in the state for all causes of action is a privilege
of residents. Moreover, a practice has developed that carrying
on business in a state adds to the probability that the courts
97 • Maryland: Ann. Code (r9sr) c. 23 § 88.
Mississippi: Code Ann. (1942) § S34S·
98 Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co. (1917) 243 U. S.
93; Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co. (1921) 2S7 U. S.
213; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co. Inc. (1922) 2S7 U. S. SJ3;
Davis v. Farmers Co..op. Equity Co. (1923) 262 U.S. 312; Mich. Central R. Co. v.
Mix (1929) 278 U. S. 492; Canadian P. R. Co. v. Sullivan (C. C. A. rst 1942) 126
F. (2d) 433, cert. denied (1942) 316 U.S. 696.
99 National Conference, Handbook 1934, 32S; cj. Restatement§§ 90, 91.
10 Karius v. All States Freight, Inc. (1941) 176 Misc. ISS, 26 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
738; Erving v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. (1927) J7I Minn. 87, 214 N. W. 12.
Note on service of process upon designated state official, I4S A. L. R. (1943) 630.
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of the state will take jurisdiction in cases involving the internal affairs of the corporation where all parties to the
controversy are in the state. 101
In many other countries, as clearly laid down in the
Japanese Code 102 and particularly in Latin America, 103 jurisdiction is taken on a broad scale against foreign corporations
domiciled in any sense in the state. The parent corporation
may thus be exposed to heavy commitments even at home
when judgments of the territorial courts are accorded enforcement in the state of charter. 104 A wholesome reaction
sometimes appears under French influence. For instance, an
Argentine decision making a branch office in Buenos Aires
of a Liverpool shipping line liable for faulty performance
of an affreightment by the branch office of the same firm
in New York, has been severely criticised on the basis of the
French principle that a suit must refer to acts done or
obligations created in the jurisdiction of the branch or agency,
in order to avoid abusive actions against foreign firms. 105
2.

Registration

In the great majority of countries, though not in the
United States (which has not instituted any special index of
foreign corporations), business organizations are recorded in
special public registers. Foreign enterprises have in most states
1 01

2 BEALE 89I § I92-7 and cases cited.
Japan: C. Com. art. 479 par. 2, as construed by the Jap. S. Ct. (February IS,
I905), covers the whole of the company's business, and according to App. Tokyo
Guly 23, I92o) extends to matters arising abroad. See I C. Com. of Japan Ann.
(I93I) 405, 406.
103 Brazil: Decree-Law No. 2627, of Sept. 26, I940, art. 67: foreign stock corporations, licensed to do business, are required to have a permanent representative in
Brazil, subject to be sued and to receive initial service for the corporation, with full
powers to treat and to determine definitely, any matters. The meaning, however,
may be restricted to acts and operations on behalf of the company in the country;
art. 68 subjects only such operations to the laws of Brazil.
104 See CRAWFORD, "The Brazilian Business Corporation," II Tul. L. Rev.
(I936) at 63.
106 Argentina: Cam. Fed. de Ia Cap. (March I7, I94I) Praizos Hnos. v. Lamport
Holt Line, 75 Jur. Arg. 23I, criticized by DE LA VEGA, id. 232.
102
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to register any agency established in the territory. Germany
and Switzerland traditionally require only branch offices in the
narrow sense to be registered, a restriction that has been
criticised in the interest of the security of commerce. 107 Since
1908, England, which has no general register of commerce,
also has required foreign companies having any place of
business in the country to register. 108 Canadian provinces
have to some extent followed this method. 109
While in England there is a special register for foreign
companies, in other countries a problem is presented with
respect to the registration of foreign associations, in view
of the different registers and regulations for recording
domestic associations, such as stock corporations, limited
liability partnerships, and ordinary firms.
Generally, the provisions respecting domestic organizations
are applied by analogy; 110 the formalities of those in situations most similar to the foreign association are employed. 111
If there is no parallel, the Italian Code prescribes compliance
with the most exacting formalities, viz., those imposed on
stock corporations. 112 In Germany, it is prescribed policy
to require only documentation and facts that can be furnished
on the basis of the foreign law; 113 to reconcile both laws,
it has also been held that where the general law of the
incorporating state limits the liability of directors in a manner
1or WIELAND, 43 Z.Schweiz.R. 243/f.
1os Companies Act, 1948, s. 407.
109
Alberta: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1942, c. 24c, •· 134·
British Columbia: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1948, c. 58 s. 182.
Manitoba: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1954, c. 43 s. 419 (2).
Saskatchewan: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1953, c. 124 s. 190.
no Japan: C. Com. art. 485 par. 2.
1
"
Switzerland's Federal Council (June 16, 1902) discussed by STEIGER, 67
ZBJV. (1931) at 324.
2
"
Italy: C. Com. (1882) art. 230 par. 3; C. C. (1942) art. 2507.
Similarly, Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 358.
113 German HGB. § 13 par. 3; see also§ 201 par. 5; Aktiengesetz § 37· Cj. Denkschrift zum Entwurf eines HGB. (1888) 26; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R.
191 n. 5, 202.
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unknown to the law of the forum, these limitations must be
recorded to be available against a third party. 114
Some legislations, however, have imposed special heavy burdens of documentation upon foreign corporations, and worse,
registrars and courts sometimes exaggerate these requirements
so as to render compliance extremely cumbersome. 115
3. Publications
A number of statutes have prescribed the data to be given
in registration and in subsequent notifications regarding the
financial status of the association. 116 This is in line with the
recent strong increase of supervisory policy, tending to enlarge the control of the management by the state and the
public. But again, the impositions may go too far. Sometimes,
an inappropriate curiosity is displayed in inquiring into business done outside of the state. This is another reason for
big corporations with a worldwide radius of activity to form
subsidiaries with capital funds set apart for the purposes of
the branches. 117
4· Guarantees
In some countries, the creditors of the branch are protected
by such measures as deposits to secure future debts, or a
114

KG. (March 8, I929) IPRspr. I929 No. 2I; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. 8Io.
For example, complaint has been made by GRANT, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (I934) 557
against the requirements connected with the obligatory filing of a general power of
attorney in Mexico and Cuba; by EDER, IS Tul. L. Rev. (I94I) 520 at 534 with
respect to Panama.
An effort to remedy these difficulties has been initiated by a Pan-American
"Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of Attorney Which are to be Utilized Abroad,"
Washington, February I7, I940, signed by Bolivia, Brazil, Coloml:ia, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Panama, United States and Venezuela, and ratified by the United
States, Brazil and several other states. See 36 Am. J. Int. Law (I942) Supp. I93
and subsequent volumes. The Protocol includes powers executed in the name of a
juridical person (art. I s. 3).
116 See FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwi:irterbuch 469.
117 See CRAWFORD, "The Brazilian Business Corporation," 11 Tul. L. Rev. (I936)
59 at 63, and "The I940 Corporation Law of Brazil," I6 Tul. L. Rev. (I942) 228
a 237·
115
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certain part of the capital stock must be held in the country,
in Brazil at least two-thirds. 118 Again, establishment of a
legally independent affiliate is the usual answer.

5· Application of the Internal Law
As stated above, foreign business assoctatwns are quite
normally governed by the domestic administrative law with
regard to establishments, and by the domestic law of agency
as respects the extent of the authority enjoyed by the managers of the establishment. It agrees with the general principles that article 2 8 7 of the Argentine Commercial Code
subjects the company to the provisions of the Code as regards
the registration and publication of the articles of organization
and of the authority conferred upon their representatives
or agents. 119 On the other hand, the legitimate sphere of
domestic law is also observed in the Treaty of Montevideo
(art. 5), which limits the territorial prescriptions to "the exercise of the acts comprised in the objective of incorporation."
Only such restricted effect should be inferred when it is
required that a resident representative of the company must
possess a general power of attorney with full authority to
bind the company by his acts. 120 By an analogous reasoning,
if the Chilean law provides that not only must a foreign
stock company establish a special fund in Chile for the
fulfillment of its obligation in the country, but also that the
assets of the company are "affected by the Chilean laws,"
118
Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, 189I, art. 47 §I.
Rumania: C. Com. (I887) art. 245 is probably repealed; such measures have
been abolished in other countries, except for insurance and similar companies.
1111
To similar effect, Brazil: Decree-Law No. 2627, of Sept. 26, I940, art. 68
(but seen. I28).
Guatemala: C. C. (I933) art. 25 (4).
Portugal: C. Com. art. I rr.
120 Expressly Rumania: C. Com. (I938) art. 355 par. 2 sentence 3·
Costa Rica: Corporation Law, art. I5I, amended by Law No. Io, of Dec. 3, I929,
art. I (I).
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the latter provision reasonably is limited to the assets situated
in Chile. 121
In the United States, the Supreme Court has twice had
opportunity to deal with the attempt of Missouri to protect
resident holders of insurance policies against certain subsequent contracts modifying their policies. The court summarized the arguments of the Missouri court as follows:
"As foreign insurance companies have no right to come into
the State and there do business except as the· result of a
license from the State and as the State exacts as a condition
of a license that all foreign insurance companies shall be
subject to the laws of the State as if they were domestic
corporations, it follows that the limitations of the State law
resting upon domestic corporations also rest upon foreign
companies and therefore deprive them of any power which
a domestic company could not enjoy, thus rendering void
or inoperative any provision of their charter or condition in
policies issued by them or contracts made by them inconsistent
with the Missouri law." 122
This reasoning the Supreme Court rejected:
"And this argument we declared unsound since the 'proposition cannot be maintained without holding that because
a State has power to license a foreign insurance company to
do business within its borders and the authority to regulate
such business, therefore a State has power to regulate the
business of such company outside its borders and which would
otherwise be beyond the State's authority.... ' " 123
Some laws, however, extend their realm beyond any such
limits. They either establish imperative requirements respecting the structure of licensable organizations, or they seem
to subject transactions of licensed organizations to their law
of the forum without restriction.
121
To this effect, HERRERA REYEs, Sociedades An6nimas (Santiago 1935) 274
275, commenting on Decree-Law No. 251, of May 20, I931, art. 123 (c) and (d). '
122
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1913) 234 U.S. 149 at 163.
m New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357 at 376.
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In the first respect, some Latin-American laws employ
careless language in subjecting foreign corporations doing
business in the country to the internallaws. 124 The authorities
of many Latin-American republics, as an American writer
explains, show "great reluctance to allow qualification of a
foreign corporation which presents, in its charter or by-laws,
provisions in conflict with locallegislation."125 Thus, usually,
unlimited corporation life is forbidden. 126 Sometimes, some
higher proportions for subscription stock and paid-in stock
are prescribed, or a fixed percentage of the profits must be
allocated to a reserve fund, or the corporation may be dissolved if the capital structure is deteriorated over a fixed
percentage. 127
In the second respect, where a statute sweepingly declares
that the relations of the organization to third parties, or even
all commercial operations of the branch shall be subject
to the laws of the country, 128 the formula raises an issue. If
this includes the private law, 129 it may mean that the company
and a resident of the state in question are forbidden to conE.g., Colombia: Law No. s8 of 1931, art. 22 in fine.
GRANT, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) ss6 at ss8.
128 GRANT, supra n. I2S.
127 GRANT, supra n. I2S.
128 Spain: C. Com. art. IS, and its followers, supra p. r8o.
Denmark: Law on Stock Corporations of April rs, 1930, as amended, § 77·
Hungary: See GuNmscn, 4 Z. Osteurop R. (1937-38) 293, 29S·
Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, 1891, art. 47 applied the law of the forum to
all "relations, rights and duties between company, creditors, shareholders and every
person interested." Art. 68 of Decree-Law No. 2627, of Sept. 26, 1940 seems more
modest, see supra n. 119 and CRAWFORD, 16 Tul. L. Rev. (1942) 228 at 237 (last
lines), subjecting the companies to the laws and tribunals "as to the acts or operations practised in Brazil." But the Introductory Law of 1942, art. 11 § 1, declares
the companies having branches etc. in Brazil obligated to have their constitutive
acts approved by the government making themselves subject to the Brazilian
laws (ficando sujeitas lei brasileira). This law and EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado 1406,
1781, §§ roo, ror, emphasizing this text, fail to explain whether this subjection
extends to matters other than those of the Brazilian business places.
129 Probably it does not in Cuba, C. Com. art. IS ("mercantile operations within
Cuban territory") and similar provisions in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico,
supra n. 32.
124
126

a
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elude their contract in another state under the foreign law,
since some codes in fact seem to pretend that the parties may
not submit their contract made in the state to any other law.
Actually, extensive claims of lex fori are raised in several
Latin-American laws. Nevertheless, one would think, at
least, that the "laws" of the country imposed upon the
foreign corporation include this country's own conflicts rules.
Definitely objectionable are unqualified provisions such
as in the Turkish law, 130 that the company must "submit to
all laws and regulations of the country," in Peru that foreign
companies are subject, "without any restrictions to the laws
of the Republic," 131 or in Ecuador that this applies to all
questions arising in or outside of court. 132
On the usual requirements for licensing in this country
that the foreign corporation shall be subject to all the restrictions and duties imposed on similar domestic corporations
and shall have no other or greater rights, powers, or privileges, it would be repetitious to observe the exaggerations
contained in these clauses. 138
In quite a different connection, we have encountered the
provision introduced in the Codes of Liechtenstein and
Yugoslavia, declaring the permanent agency of a foreign
business association, inscribed in the register of commerce, to
be legally existent and capable of acting to the same extent
as a similar domestic corporation. 134 This provision grants
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, I330/I9I4, art. 13; cf. SALEM, 7 Repert. 250 No. I32.
Peru: Constitution (I933) art. I7.
Ecuador: Companies Law of Oct. 15, 1909, art. 7·
133 Supra pp. I 53ff. Special rules for particular classes of corporations may be
excepted. For foreign building and loan associations, Colorado, Stat. Ann. (Michie
1935) c. 25 § 42 anomalously provided that "all contracts made with citizens of this
state shall be deemed as made under Colorado laws." The provision has become
obsc.lete after the prohibition against foreign loan associations to do business in
Colorado (Laws I939, c. 78} and therefore has not been included in the Revised
Code of 1953. Similarly, South Carolina Code (I952) § I2-703, prescribes in general
terms: "Contracts with citizens deemed made in State."
tat Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 236 par. 4·
Yugoslavia: c. Com. § 503 par. s; see EISNER, I Symmikta Streit 296. Supra
Chapter 22, p. IS2.
13°
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security to third parties, particularly in th~ case of dissolution
of the mother corporation.
6. Special Purposes
Territorial law will reasonably take on a broader scope
when particular purposes call for intensified control, as in the
case of insurance, credit, railroad or other public transportation, or communication or similar business of public significance. Thus, in this country, the regulations regarding domestic corporations have largely been applied to foreign
organizations, in such fields as savings and building loans, and
full domestication, involving transformation into a domestic
corporate entity, has often been required in the case of railroad or generally public services. 135

v.

SANCTIONS OF TERRITORIAL IMPOSITIONS

If the duties imposed by the local law are violated, the
effect is naturally governed by this law itself, and each provision needs its own construction. However, certain effects
on contractual obligations, following the two requirements
of licensing and of registration are of peculiar significance.
I.

Failure to Obtain Authorization to Do Business

United States. The extensive discussion of the first question
in the United States, nourished by an abundance of statutes
and cases, has been summarized in a comprehensive note in
the Restatement ( § I 79). Nevertheless, the matter is too
confused to allow more than a survey of the most significant
136 United States: See Restatement § 169 comment d; FLETCHER, 17 Cyc. Corp.
§ 8386; 18 A. L. R. 124ff., 72 A. L. R. 105; 23 Am. Jur. §§ 121, 387; Regimen
Juridico 6-25, 73-92. For some comparative notes see E. R. SALEM, Clunet 1938,681.
For France: N1BOYET 374 No. 314, and for insurance companies, NIBOYET,
2 Traite 488 § § 829ff.
For Latin-American countries: C6digo Bustamante, art. 253; Cuba: CRAWFORD,
"Cuban Corporations," IO Tul. L. Rev. (1936) 568.
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phases. 136 In Williston's judgment, the decisions of the
courts, "do not seem generally based on very secure or sound
distinctions." 137 The texts of many statutes, particularly the
older ones, are of little avail, as they are fragmentary and
use such terms as "unlawful," "void," "voidable," "valid"
in an unreliable manner. Moreover, many statutes have been
changed in recent times, several repeatedly, so as to make
previous summaries and annotations antiquated.
The outstanding problem is that of the effect of a contract
concluded by a foreign corporation in the state without compliance with the statutory requirements for doing business.
Beale distinguishes only two classes of authorities, those holding the contract valid and those that hold it void. 138 This is
misleading, whereas, on the other hand, regard to all particularities of the various regulations has had the opposite defect
of obscuring all leading ideas. That there are, in effect, four
classes of statutes, may be gathered from the construction given
them by the state courts or from their apparent meaning.
It may be noted, at the outset, that there is a common
sanction of fine for noncompliance, appearing in the statutes
of most states.
(i) In a small group of states, noncompliance does not in
any way prejudice the rights and duties arising from a contract
concluded in the state. 139 The significance of this liberal attitude will be illuminated by the description of the other groups.
1 36 Valuable suggestions are contained in the classification by LoRENZEN, 6
Repert. 370, and in such decisions as Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Construction Co.
(I930) 211 Cal. 228, 295 Pac. I, followed in 75 A. L. R. 439 by a comprehensive
annotation. It is regrettable that all surveys are satisfied with indicating cases
almost without any regard to the current statutes which have very often been
changed (cj. the characteristic warning to the reader in I36 A. L. R. n6I, I in fine;
23 Am. Jur. (I933) 575 n. 20).
137 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5028 § I77I.
138 2 BEALE §§ I79-24-25.
139 Delaware: Rev. Code (I953) 8 § 349 (only a fine imposed).
Georgia: Code Ann. (Park I936) § 22-I5o6, in accord with Alston v. New York
C. P. Corp. (I927) 36 Ga. App. 777, I38 S. E. 270.
Kansas: Gen. Stat. (I949) § I7.50I and 1943 Supp.; Heart of America Ins. Agency
v. Wichita Cab and Transport Co. (1940) I5I Kan. 420,423, 99 Pac. (2d) 765,767.
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( ii) A larger class of statutes is exemplified by the New
York statute concerning other than "moneyed corporations,"
which has been construed by the highest court of New York
Kentucky: Rev. Stat. (1955) §§ '27I.OSS, 271·990; Williams v. Dearborn T. Co.
(1927) 218 Ky. 271; 291 S. W. 388, overruling Fruin v. Chatterson (1912) 146
Ky. 504, 143 S. W. 6.
Nebraska: Rev. Stat. (1943) § '21-1201, 1206, 1209, 1210 (misdemeanor to act
for noncomplying corporation, no denial of rights mentioned) superseding the law
avoiding the contract quoted in Henni v. Fidelity B. & L. Ass'n (1901) 6I Neb. 744,
86 N. W. 475·
North Caro!ina: Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie I943) § 55-118.
South Carolina: Code (1952) §§ 12-722, I'2-737 (only fines provided).
Washington: Rev. Code (1951) § '2J.S'2.o6o.
14 ° California: General Corp. Law, 1947, § 6801.
Colorado: Rev. Stat. (I953) §§ 31-IO-OJ, 31-10-05. (changing previous milder law).
Connecticut: Gen. Stat. (I949) § 525I.
District of Columbia: Business Corp. Act, I954, s. I I9.
Florida: Stat. Ann. (I9SI) § 6I3.04.
Idaho: Code (I947) §§ 30-504, 30-5os.
Illinois: Code (1955) c. 32 § I'2S, changing previous more rigid law quoted in
Automotive M. Co. v. AmericanS. M.P. Corp. (1924) 232 Ill. App. 532.
Indiana: Btrns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 25-3I4 (most statutes declare contracts not
void, see Ind. Ann. to the Restatement, § I79).
Iowa: Code (I950) § 494·9·
Louis"ana: Rev. Stat. (I950) 12 § 211; previously contracts were enforceable
under Alt No. 267 of I9I4, § 23, as amended by Act No. 120 of I920, § I. Federal
Schools v. Kuntz ( 193I) 16 La. App. 289, 134 So. II8.
Maine: Rev. Stat. (I954) c. 53 § I28.
Maryland: Flack's Code Ann. (I9SI) art. 23 § 87.
Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (1932) c. I8I § S·
Minnesota: Stat. (I945) § JOJ.'20.
Missouri: Rev. Stat. (I949) § 351.635·
Nevada: Camp. Laws (I9'29) §§ 1843, I848.
New Hampshire: Rev. Laws (I954) § 300:8.
New Mexico: Stat. (1953) § SI-IO-S; Niblack v. Seaberg Hotel (1938) 42 N. M.
281, 76 Pac. (2d) I I 56.
New York: Gen. Corp. Law, § 2I8 (see infra n. r66).
North Dakota: Rev. Code (I943) §§ I0-1709, IO-I7JS, IO-I737 (L. I937, c. 116
§ 2oa).
Ohio: Rev. Code (I9S3) § I70J.'29.
Oklahoma: Stat. (I9SI) I8 § I'20I.
Oregon: Rev. Stat. (I9S3) § 57·745·
Pennsylvania: IS Purdon's Stats. § 2852-IOI4.
Rhode Island: Gen. Laws Ann. (I938) c. II6 § 67.
Texas: Business Corp. Act, I955, art. 8.I8.
Vermont: Stat. (I947) § 5996.
Virginia: Code Ann. (I950) §§ IJ-2I8, IJ.I-II9, as amended by Laws 1956,
c. 4'28.
West Virginia: Code Ann. (Michie I943) § 309I; Ober v. Stephens (1903)
54 W.Va. 354. 46 S. E. I95·
Wisconsin: Stat. (1951) § 180.847.
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as establishing inability of the corporation to sue upon the
contract, as the only penalty for noncompliance. 141 The contract, therefore, deserves the term of "valid," despite the
fact that it is unenforceable by the corporation in the state
courts. Two important consequences have been drawn. First,
the party dealing with the corporation is bound to the contract
in a perfectly normal manner. He is unable to avoid the contract on other grounds than those of the ordinary law of
contracts; there is no failure of consideration on the part of
the corporation, until the corporation refuses performance. 142
Second, the corporation itself is able to sue on the contract
in the courts of other states and in the federal courts, except
those sitting in the state of noncompliance itsel£. 143 Before
abolishment, under the doctrine of Erie RR. Co. v. Tompkins
(1938) of the latter restriction on the statutory sanction, this
was the more significant, as no state has the power to exclude
by statute the right of a party to remove a suit to the federal
courts. 144
Under this approach, it may be asked: What extraterritorial effect will result from a judgment of the state of noncompliance, dismissing the action of a foreign corporation on
the ground of the failure to qualify? Although the problem
apparently never has been raised, 145 it would seem that such
judgment would not have the effect of res judicata.
141 See 2 BEALE 8SS quoting Gray, J., in Neuchatel Asphalte Co. v. Mayor
of New York (1898) ISS N. Y. 373, 49 N. E. 1043; cf. Fritts v. Palmer (1889)
132 U. S. 282.
142 See Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites (1912) 204 N.Y. 231, 234, 97 N.E.
S87; Alsing Co. v. New England Quartz & Spar Co. (1901) 66 App. Div. 473,
ajj'd, 174 N.Y. SJ6.
143 Angel v. Bullington (1947) 330 U.S. 183, 192; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.
(1949) 337 U.S. S3S, overruling Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America
(1912) 22S u. s. 489.
144 Restatement§ 171; Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (1922) 2S7 U. S. 529;
Strampe v. Minnesota Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. (1909) 109 Minn. 364, 123 N. W.
1083; Ann., 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 999; Ann. Cas. 1914A 706.
146 Incapacity to sue is generally considered a bar to come into court as contrasted with the elements of the cause of action which give the right to relief in
court. See 6 Cycl. of Fed. Procedure (ed. 2, 1943) 148 § 2100.
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(iii) A third group is characterized by much more severity.146 The corporation is deprived not only of the right to be
a party in the courts of the state in question but of its rights
under the contract. It follows, on the one hand, that the other
party is given in effect the option of suing on the contract or
cancelling it. On the other hand, the corporation is prevented
from suing in other than the state courts. For whether the
statute maintains or prohibits with annulling effect transactions of a nonqualifying corporation, it is recognized in the
sister states; hence, if the statute appears to treat the contract
as void or voidable, 147 other jurisdictions recognize its effect
accordingly.
While usually the contract is called "void" and might be
better denoted as "voidable" in these jurisdictions,148 yet
either term is inadequate.
(iv) Finally, there may be states in which the unlawful
contract is entirely "void," meaning that no action is granted
either party in any court. 149
148 Alabama: Code Ann. (1940) tit. ro § 191; Boddy v. Continental Inv. Co.
(1921) rS Ala. App. 65, 88 So. 294.
Arkansas: Stat. (1947) § 64-1202.
Michigan: Comp. Laws (1948) § 450.95; Hoskins v. Rochester S. & L. Ass'n
(1903) 133 Mich. 505, 95 N.W. 566.
South Dakota: Code Ann. (1939) § 11.2103.
Tennessee: (Doubtful whether the contract is not considered absolutely void,
seen. 121) Code Ann. (1955) § 48-9o8; Insurance Co. v. Kennedy (1896) 96 Tenn.
(12 Pick) 7II, 36 S. W. 709; Harris v. Columbia Water Co. (1901) roB Tenn.
(24 Pick) 245,67 S. W. 8II; Peck-Williamson Heating etc. Co. v. McKnight (1918)
140 Tenn. (13 Thomp.) 563, 205 S. W. 419; State Life Ins. Co. v. Dupre (1935)
19 Tenn. App. 301, 86 S. W. (2d) 894, 897.
Utah: Code Ann. (1953) § 16-8-5.
147 Allegheny Co. v. Allen (1903) 69 N.J. Law 270, 55 At!. 724; Hyde v. Goodnow
(1849) 3 N.Y. 266; Wood v. Cascade Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1894) 8 Wash. 427,
36 Pac. 267 (concerning the New York law on insurance companies) but cj. Restatement, New York Annotations 146.
148 See for Michigan, Bishop v. Hannan Real Estate Exchange (1934) 267 Mich.
575, 255 N. W. 599; see Martin Bros. v. Nettleton (1926) 138 Wash. 102, 244 Pac.
386 (dictum: the "penalty" by the statute of Oregon measures the remedy of the
individual who deals with the corporation not complying with the statute.)
149
Arizona: Code Ann. (1955) § 10-482, as construed in Eastlick v. Haywo:>d
(1928) 33 Ariz. 242, 263 Pac. 936: "It is probable that no action of a party dealing
with a foreign corporation which failed to comply ... , can give the transaction
validity."
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These "penalties," if radically executed, may cause considerable hardship. In most of the jurisdictions involved, this
has been well noticed, and important mitigations have been
introduced. Always, however, at least a few states insist on a
radical sanction. Thus, for instance, it is fair that a corporation
should be allowed to make contracts preliminary to starting
business, such as the purchase of equipment, supplies, and raw
materials, appointment of agents or acquisition of a business.
While a distinct trend to exempt such preparatory transactions
from the ban is developing, it is far from a complete victory. 150
The main relief for foreign corporations that have failed to
qualify, is furnished by the proviso, now widely prevailing,
that the corporation is prevented from suing only "until" it
complies with the requirements. Yet in a few states, belonging
to classes (ii) and (iii), this validating and retroactive effect
of compliance subsequent to the prohibited contract is expressly denied. 151 Generally contracts made outside the state
may be sued upon. 152 Yet the excellent Pennsy1vania Annotations to the Restatement think that the disability in this state
includes any contractual claim wherever it arose. 153 The courts
are inclined, moreover, to grant suits for injuries to property,
even though there is connection with unauthorized business,
as where the corporation has assigned goods to an agent for
Tennessee: Code (1955) § 48-908, as construed in Peck-Williamson Heating etc.
Co. v. McKnight (1918) 140 Tenn. (13 Thomp.) 563, 205 S. W. 419; State Life
Ins. Co. v. Dupre (1935) 19 Tenn. App. 301, 86 S. W. (2d) 894, 897. A long list of
cases given by 2 BEALE 86o n. 7 is antiquated.
150 See 23 Am. Jur. (1939) Foreign Corporations §§ 367, 368.
161 Arkansas: Stat. (1947) § 64-1202.
New York: Gen. Corp. Law,§ 218, cj. Restatement, New York Annotations §179.
Tennessee: See Cary-Lombard L. Co. v. Thomas (1893) 92 Tenn. 587,
22 S. W. 743·
In Idaho, Code (1947) § 30-506, belated filing was allowed only once within three
months after the provision came into force. Cj. WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § 1772 n. 2.
162 Leverett v. Garland (1921) 206 Ala. 556,90 So. 343; 2 BEALE Ss6 n. 4. 858 n. 5·
Expressly, District of Columbia: Business Corp. Act, 1954, § 119 (b) (action
by assignee).
163 Restatement, Pennsylvania Annotations 78 § 178.
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sale on commission; 154 but a few statutes deny claims sounding in tort as well as in contract. 155 It is also ordinarily, though
not without exception, assumed that claims may be based on
the ownership of property or possession, including acquisitions of title, not immediately connected with doing business.156
Obviously, therefore, prohibitions of "all court actions"157
ought to be understood with restrictions, although, in an
opinion of the Attorney General of Louisiana, "any action
in the courts of the state" is declared precluded, even to a
foreign corporation solely engaged in interstate business,
unless the corporation has qualified to do business and all
taxes due have been paid. 158
If we try, after all this, to ascertain the exact position of a
noncomplying corporation having wholly or partly performed
its own contractual obligations, when the other party refuses
performance and restitution, the situation seems to be as
follows:
If the contract is valid under the violated statute but the
corporation may not sue in the state courts for enforcement
of the other party's duty, it may, nevertheless, even in these
courts claim restitution on the ground of failure of consideration, with any of the normal remedies.
Where the contract is "void," we do not find any secure
doctrine. Only a handful of cases belonging to two or three
jurisdictions illustrate the situation.
Several Michigan decisions have the merit of establishing
154

See 2 BEALE 857; Note, 136 A. L. R. (1942) 1160.
Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (1933) § 25-314.
Utah: Code Ann. (1953) § 16-8-3.
166 See 2 BEALE 856 § 179.23; Restatement § 179 note; Note, 136 A. L. R.
(1942) u6o.
157
Maryland: Flack's Ann. Code (1939) art. 23 § 119.
North Dakota: Rev. Code (1943) § I0-1735·
158
Louisiana: Opinions of the Attorney General1936-38, 125.
155
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with clear foundation the right of a noncomplying corporation
to revindicate ownership of a movable which it has retained
unconditionally159 or under a conditional sale. 160 They recognize that, if a contract is void because the plaintiff had no
authorization, it does not follow that it must forfeit its property to the defendant. 161 This answers the argument, expressed for instance in Tennessee, that the Singer Manufacturing Co. could not be allowed to recover a machine sold
conditionally on default of the buyer in payment, because
"to allow it would be to enforce the contract ... and to put a
premium on its violation of law." 162 But a federal court in
Minnesota correctly adds that also an agreement of absolute
sale is equally void "so that there is no contract and the title
has never passed from the corporation to the buyer." 163
Hence, actions of detinue or replevin as well as trover for
conversion, 164 and cross bills at the suit of the other party are
available. Where a bill was brought to set aside foreclosure
proceedings and cancel a mortgage on the ground that the
defendant was a foreign corporation unlicensed in Michigan,
the bill was dismissed. The plaintiff could not equitably
rescind the contract and fail to tender the amount due. 165
In the New York case establishing the principle that the
contract is valid, Cullen, C. J., in a remarkable concurrent
opinion added that, even if the contract were considered void,
until a foreign corporation refuses to fulfill, the buyer would
169

Klatt v. Wayne C. Judge (1920) 212 Mich. 590.
Mojonnier Bros. v. Detroit Milling Co. (1925) 233 Mich. 312; cj. Tuttle,]., in
In re Rosenbloom (1922) 280 Fed. IJ9·
1 61 Rex Beach Pictures Co. v. Harry I. Garson Production (1920) 209 Mich.
692, 706.
162 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Draper (1899) IOJ Tenn. 262.
16s Dunlop v. Mercer (r9o7) 156 Fed. 545·
164 Lu-Mi-Nus Signs Co. v. Regent Theatre Co. (1930) 250 Mich. 535·
166 Windisch v. Mortgage Security Corp. of America (1931) 254 Mich. 492,
236 N. W. 88o.
160
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not be entitled to recover back the money paid under the
contract, good or bad. 166
In a Missouri case a cross bill for assumpsit for money had
and received was granted to an Arkansas corporation, to
recover a large sum advanced for lumber which the plaintiff
did not deliver. The federal court said:
"Every principle of justice and fair dealing requires that
it should pay back this money to defendant ..... One cannot
make a shield of a void contract to rob an associate." 167
Should this not be true when the corporation has furnished
material and work, and the compensation is refused? The
question has come up repeatedly in Alabama and has been
consistently negatived by rejecting any action of quasi-contract.168 The federal court, following the view of the Supreme
Court of Alabama, resumes the position:
"The fact that the statutory prohibition is directed against
the performance as well as the making of the contract is
convincing that no action can be maintained upon the implied
contract or upon a quantum meruit." 169
Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court itself, as early as 19 I
confessed:

I,

"Viewed solely from the standpoint of the individuals
concerned, the apparent result of this conclusion is, it must
166
Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites (I9I2), supra n. I4I, 204 N. Y. 23I,
at 237, 97 N. E. at 587.
The New York court constantly supports also the wholesome analogous doctrine
that failure to procure an occupational or business license, excepting an express
statutory provision, is not deemed to make a contract void. Denying recovery
would be "a ruling wholly out of proportion to the requirement of public policy."
John E. Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen et al. (I937) 276 N.Y. 274, I IN. E. (2d) 908;
cj. Annotation, n8 A. L. R. 646.
167
Lasswell Land & Lumber Co. v. Lee Wilson & Co. (C. C. A. 8th 19I6) 236
Fed. 322, cert. denied 242 U. S. 652.
168
Leading case, Dudley v. Collier (I888) 87 Ala. 43I, 6 So. 304; accord, Alabama
Western R. Co. v. Talley-Bates Construction Co. (I909) I62 Ala. 396, 402, 50 So.
341, and see the three following notes.
169
Thomas v. Birmingham Railway Light and Power Co. (1912) 195 Fed. 340.

210

CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

be conceded, abhorrent to the judicial conscience."170
The same court repeated this regret in refusing to enter into
examination of a case where a bank building had been furnished with marble trimmings and other fixtures and installations on disputed oral orders for changes. 171 This disregards
the fact that "implied contract" is only a manner of speech,
while the undue enrichment results from the invalidity of
the contract and not from the contract.
This radical view seems not to have been expressed in any
other jurisdiction, but neither is such an action known to have
been brought anywhere except in Alabama. 172 Could it be
that counsel are still unfamiliar with the remedies against
undue enrichment?
If in a state of class (ii), prohibiting the corporation from
suing but without invalidating the contract, the other party
elects to sue on the contract, the corporation has the right of
defense, which means that it may claim any right arising out
of the contract, but in some statutes even this is prohibited. 173
Finally, if the contract has been executed on both sides, invalidity may not be further claimed. 174
In a number of statutes it is stated that the directors, officers, or other persons acting on behalf of the corporation,
contrary to the licensing provisions, are personally liable,
17 0

American Amusement Co. v. East Lake Chutes Co. (I9I I) 174 Ala. 526,

56 So. 961 (improvement of an immovable).
171 George M. Muller Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank of Dothan (1912) 176
Ala. 229, 57 So. 762.
172 Amos Bridge's Sons, Inc. v. State of New York (1921) r88 App. Div. soo,
231 N.Y. 532, sometimes cited in this connection, rejects an action for damages for
delay having increased the costs of building a state street. The parties disputed
whose fault the delay was. In this case, at least, the work employer was not enriched
and the action could correctly be qualified as based on the contract.
173 Iowa: Code (1950) § 494·9 (2 Annotations 775 but see also 774 for notes on
the same case).
Nevada: Comp. Laws (1929) § 1843.
174 See 2 BEALE 862; FLETCHER 17 Cyc. Corp.§§ 8527, 8531, ns. 44, 45·
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if more than one, jointly and severally; in another group,
they are punishable as for a misdemeanor. 176 Most statutes are
silent on the point. It seems settled that whether or not the
contract is valid in regard to the corporation, the agents may
not be sued except where the statutes so provide. 177
Complicated situations arise, if contracts made lawfully in
one state are to be performed in another where the corporation
has not qualified for doing business. The Restatement has
attempted to reach a uniform solution. 178
On many problems, however, the courts are divided. In
particular, on the important topics of estoppel and recovery
of chattels sold on conditional sale, the prevailing liberal
trend encounters more substantial opposition.
Public policy was the ground of objection to the recognition
of a foreign statute in one Illinois case. The court held that
an Illinois corporation, contracting in another state in good
faith and partly executing the contract, had a good cause of
action in the forum and could not be turned away because the
action could not be maintained in the other state. 179
Other countries. In Austria it has been discussed whether
a foreign insurance company, not admitted to do business in
the country, may sue, 180 and the general question is doubtful
m Colorado: Rev. Stat. (1953) § 31-10-05.
Idaho: Code (1947) § 30-508.
Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (1932) c. 181 § 5·
Utah: Code Ann. (1953) § 16-8-5.
Virginia: Code Ann. (I950) §§ 13-2I8, I3.I-I I9 (as amended by Laws I956 c. 428).
Wyoming: Comp. Stat. (I945) § 44-202.
m See Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 25-3I4.
Iowa: Code (1950) § 494.I3.
Montana: Rev. Stat. (I947) § 15-I7o6.
177
See Karvalsky v. Becker (I94o) 2I7 Ind. 524, 29 N. E. (2d) 56o.
178 Restatement § r8o; cj. the divided cases of Restatement, Michigan Annotations § I So.
179
Hunter W. Finch & Co. v. Zenith Furnace Co. (I9Io) 245 Ill. 586 at 594,
92 N. E. 521 at 524, ajj'd, q6 Ill. App. 257.
180
Denied by OGH. (July 2, I903) GIU. NF. 2398, 13 Z.int.R. 463. Contra: the
Appeal Court, see WALKER 204; PISKO cited by WIELAND, 43 Z.Schweiz.R. (N. F.)
at 227 who seems to approve for all of Central Europe.
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whether persons not admitted by administrative license can
validly engage in contracts. 181 The liberal view has been
maintained in Czechoslovakia182 and Prussia. 188
The German law on stock corporations of 1937 prescribing
licensing of business seems not to impede either recognition
of the foreign corporation's personality or the efficacy of
contracts concluded without compliance. In all cases, the state
agencies may stop unauthorized carrying on of business. 184
A recent Syrian statute makes the enjoyment of legal personality contingent on the prescribed registry. 184a
In Latin-American jurisdictions, noncompliance is commonly stated as a ground for individual and collective liability
of the persons who conclude a contract on behalf of the corporation.185 Whether this is an indication that the company itself cannot be sued/ 86 seems doubtful. For in a few statutes it
is expressly declared that both may be sued. 187 On the right to
sue, the doubts seem to be analogous to those experienced in
the United States.
181

For invalidity OGH. (May 8, 1912) GIU. NF. 5910; (May 20, 1913) GIU. NF.

6453. Contra: OGH. (June 5, 1901) GIU. NF. 1449 and WALKER 206.
182 S. Ct. Nos. 2863, 3609, 582o, 6409, cited by LAUFKE, 7 Repert. 186 No. 59·
1 83 Prussia: Law of June 22, 1861, Preuss. Ges. Samml. 1861, 441 § 18 (1) has
sanctions in the law of January 17, 1845, Preuss. Ges. Samml. 1845, 41 at 75,
§§ 176, 177, 189 not including the nullity of transactions. More severe are the special
laws regarding insurance. In the case of a domestic insurance company doing
unauthorized business in another German state, voidness of the policy has been
recognized under§ 134 BGB. byOLG. Hamburg (May 23, 1907) Leipz.Z. 1908,249.
18 4 BE1TZKE, Jur. Personen 166.
184a Law on commercial companies and establishments founded abroad of
March 3, 1952, art. 6.
1 85 Expressly foreseen in Guatemala, C. C. (1933) art. 26; Legislative Decree
No. 1370, of April 16, 1925, art. 2.
186 Regimen Juridico 34ff., 1ooff.
1 87 The models were the Italian C. Com. art. 231, and the Portuguese C. Com.
art. II2.
Brazil: C. Com. art. 301 par. 3 (action against all members of a non-registered
company).
Chile: C. Com. art. 468 par. 2, followed by:
Ecuador: C. Com. art. 326.
Guatemala: C. Com. (1942) art. 418.
Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) art. 362 (new 377).
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Appraisal. The fact that a foreign corporation intrudes
into a jurisdiction without having obtained permission to
enter, should certainly not excuse it from any liability that it
would incurr if doing lawful business there. For this reason,
rules are wrong that deny all effect to transactions made in
the state. But, on the other hand, no better solution is reached
by giving an option to the other party either to enforce the
contract or to hide behind its invalidity. Such privilege will
naturally be exercised according to how the business venture
inherent in the contract turns out. But a legally riskless
gamble should not be included in a statutory provision intended to serve the public interest.
This one-sided justice, however, is much restricted in most
jurisdictions of the United States, inasmuch as the corporation
may sue on the contract by belatedly qualifying for doing
business. Also other restrictions to the provision denying the
right to sue have been recognized. Nevertheless, it happens
sometimes in this country and seemingly much more often
abroad that the other party may retain values received on
execution of the contract as pure enrichment. This principle is
of a rather doubtful morality. Noncompliance with general
statutory impositions should not grant other private parties
free speculation nor unearned gains. In addition, the deprivation of contractual rights, though not an unconstitutional
impairment, is essentially a punishment executed without the
guaranty of regular criminal investigation and judgment,
which, in contrast to normal penalties, is enforceable in third
states. 188 Moreover, when a case is on the border line between
188
See Allegheny Co. v. Allen (1903) 69 N.J. Law 270, 55 At!. 724. In a particular
case, the Supreme Court of Indiana has felt the necessity of justifying why it could
apply the statute of West Virginia making officers of a foreign, noncomplying
insurance company personally liable on the contract: "It is a penalty designed
primarily to provide a private remedy to a person injured by a wrongful act,"
Karvalsky v. Becker (r94o) 217 Ind. 524, 29 N. E. (2d) s6o. However, this could
not be said with respect to an unreciprocated suit of the third party. See furthermore, supra n. 147·
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"carrying on" business and "isolated" acts, 189 too much depends upon the answer when the validity of the contract is
also at stake.
The Uniform Foreign Corporations Act, in a comparatively moderate proposal, reduces all penalties for doing
unlawful business to fines supposed to be severe and a stay
of any action instituted by the corporation until license is
procured or a year has expired after the stay. 190 The commissioners were afraid that, if the foreign corporation had no
property in the jurisdiction, the fine could not be enforced.
But a successful suit would produce just the desired assets
in the state. Administrative regulations should consistently
refrain from interfering with private law and civil procedure.
Of course, in most foreign countries, acceptance of the principle of the draft would present an enormous progress.
2.

Failure to Register

Prevailingly, the provisions that prescribe registration of
foreign corporations have the same effect as those applying
to domestic corporations. Most have merely "declaratory"
effect, i.e., they are destined to make public the existence,
conditions, and purpose of recognized organizations. The
personality of foreign corporations, however, is not dependent
either on compliance with the duty of filing or on the favorable decision of the registrar. 191 Hence, in countries such
189 That in many cases this border line may be difficult to trace, is confirmed
by the considerations of the Bar Commissioners stating that "it must be borne in
mind that frequently the question as to whether or not a foreign corporation is
doing business in a state and thus as to whether or not it must secure a license,
is a question involving fine distinctions and one which is not so readily answerable.
A foreign corporation may, therefore, violate the act by doing business without a
license and yet be innocent of any willful intention to do wrong. For this reason
the provisions for penalty must be flexible." N a tiona! Conference of Commissioners,
Handbook 1934, 328.
190 /d. §§ 25-27 and comment 328-330.
19 1 HACHENBURG in 3 Diiringer-Hachenburg (1934) 553 n. 31.
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as England, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and
Switzerland,192 contracts concluded by an unregistered but
existing foreign company, whether domestic or foreign, are
valid. Penalties, of course, are pronounced; 193 the evidentiary
value of the company's books may be impaired, and the place
of business may be threatened by closure. 194 Third persons
who without fault ignore nonregistered facts are protected by
the more elaborate legislations. 195 The agents may be declared
collaterally liable for all debts incurred by them on behalf
of the company/ 96 although this is rejected in some countries,
since under this system the corporation itself is answerable. 197
In Italy the problem has been extensively discussed on the
basis of the Commercial Code of 1882, practically speaking,
with the result that the only effect of nonregistration of a foreign corporation, having an agency or succursal in the country,
was the liability, personal, joint and several, of the agents in
addition to that of the corporation. 198 In the case of a French
partnership, a juristic person, it was declared operating in Italy
de facto and the partners to be liable without restriction. 199
19 2 England: Companies Act, I948, s. 407.
Germany: HGB. § IS (implicit).
Switzerland: BG. (July 22, I887) Clunet I893, 240; WIELAND, 43 Z.Schweiz.R.
(N. F.) 27S n. I28.
Austria: OGH. (February s, I929) Clunet I930, 746.
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (MayS, I934) No. I3SII, IO Z.ausi.Pr. (I936) r69.
Yugoslavia: C. Com.§ 23r.
1 93 England: Companies Act, I948, s. 4I4.
Yugoslavia: C. Com. § SI2 par. 9·
1 94 Expressly so Japan: C. Com. art. 484. Cj. Guatemala: Legislative Decree
No. I370, of April I6, I92S, art. 2 (for failure to appoint a representative).
196 Germany: HGB. §IS, Aktiengesetz § 34·
1 96 For Latin America, see supra n. I87.
197 E.g., Czechoslovakia, S. Ct. (MayS, I934) supra n. I92.
198 Ita!. Cass. (June 8, I932) Foro Ita!. Mass. I932 III c. 43I; App. Torino
(January 7, I936) Foro Ita!. I936 I 397; DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 24S; BALLADOREPALLIERI in Riv. Dir. Com. I929 I 207; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 26I, 263, 279,
284. Now codified in C. C. (I942) art. 2so8.
Similarly, Rumania, C. Com. art. 247; Japan: C. Com. art. 48I par. 2.
199 App. Cagliari (January 17, I924) Riv. Dir. Com. I924 II 441.
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This system has also been adopted in Argentina and
Venezuela. 200
However some regulations are more severe. For instance,
in Belgium the sanctions applicable to domestic as well as to
those foreign corporations having a succursal or other business
place in the country, are differentiated in various cases, and
include the right by third parties to oppose being sued on
a contract if the constitutive documents or the yearly balance
are not published.201 Colombia declares void all acts executed
without complying with the prescribed formalities. 202 The
Japanese Commercial Code said that "a third person may
deny the existence" of a nonregistered branch office as he
may in the case of a nonregistered Japanese corporation. 203
There is, however, much ingenuity deployed in the various
laws. In Panama, for instance, the Commercial Code punishes
noncompliance with the duty of registration by a penalty in
money and the loss of the rights to exercise commercial
privileges and to file documents for evidence; the stock cor200 Argentina: C. Com. art. 288 states only the personal liability of the agents;
C. C. art. 36 declares authorized acts by agents of (any) corporation binding on
the corporation.
Followed by Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) art. 362 (new 377), cf. Goldstone, "The
Judicial Status of Non-Registered Foreign Corporations in Venezuela," I7 Tul. L.
Rev. (1943) 578; personal liability of the acting persons, no obstacle for actions on
contracts, no penalties.
201 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act 1873/1935, arts. 198 and rr; Cass.
(March 24, 1930) Clunet 1930, II I3 (the action of a foreign company not having
filed for publication of its acts is not "receivable.") Trib. com. Bruxelles (] une 27,
I936) Jur. Com. Brux. I939. ss; (February I, I938) id. I939, 6I; see FREDERICQ,
2 Principes (I930) 575; Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. No. 5283. App. Bruxelles
(May 3, I939) Jur. Port d'Anvers I94I, 30, 33, therefore, denied the right to sue
to the United States Shipping Merchant Fleet Corporation, although not to the
United States Government.
202 Colombia: Legislative Decree No. 2 of 1906, art. 6.
Ecuador: Companies Law of Oct. IS, I909, art. I4 for insurance companies in
addition to pecuniary penalty.
103 Japan: Formerly C. Com. art. 257. The defect, however, is cured by subsequent
registration, Japan, S. Ct. (April 27, I928) I C. Com. of Japan Ann. 410 case I67.
Under the recent amendment, only a judicial closure of the business office is
possible, C. Com. art. 484.
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poration law provides that nonregistered companies cannot
sue and also incur penalties up to 5,ooo dollars. 204
Finally, as has been seen earlier, registration is sometimes
considered a condition precedent to recognition of the company's personality or, if this exaggerated manner of speech is
avoided, to the lawfulness of business done in the state.
A similar variety of views obtains with regard to the
failure correctly to appoint a representative.

VI.
I.

TREATIES

Existing Treaties

The two Latin-American multipartite, and the numerous
bipartite treaties throughout the world, concerning establishment, commerce, or tax burdens, regularly provide for
reciprocal treatment of corporations in decoratively styled
clauses. However, the result is somewhat inadequate.
(a) Commercial clause. The usual clause guaranteeing the
carrying on of business runs substantially as in the Treaty
between the United States and Poland of I 9 3 I, declaring that
the right of corporations and associations of either Power to
establish themselves within its territories, establish branch offices, and fulfill their functions therein, shall depend upon and
be governed solely by the consent of such Party as expressed
in its national, state, or provincial laws and regulations. 205
(b) Special clauses. Essentially more substance is contained
in a unique clause of the Treaty between France and Germany
of I 934, prescribing that authorization for doing business
cannot be refused for the reasons of contravention against the
internal laws. 206
204 Panama: C. Com. (1916) art. 296; Stock Corporation Law No. 32, of Feb. 26,
1927, art. 91.
105 United States-Poland Treaty, of June 15, 1931, art. II, U.S. Treaty Series
No. 862, 139 L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 397 at 407.
106 Art. 2 par. 5, RGBI. 1934 II 423: The high contracting parties agree, however,
not to hinder by the means of foregoing authorization, the establishment of com-
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Another special clause in the Treaty between Germany
and the Soviet Union of 1925 states that an enterprise may
not be impeded in the regular course of its business by laws,
decrees, or other measures by authorities. 207
(c) Most-favored-nation clause. Such provisions are considered to extend to all countries enjoying the rights of the
most favored nation especially for the purposes of foreign
organizations of the kind in question. Thus, the privileges
conceded by Germany to France and Russia have been
recognized in Germany also in favor of the United States
on the ground of such a clause providing for reciprocity in
the treaty between the United States and Germany. 208
Whether the usual general stipulation guaranteeing the
right of the most favored nation, covers the treatment of legal
persons, is an old controversial problem. Prevailing opinion
denies it. 209 But more recently special clauses have been added
for this purpose. Thus, the United States has concluded
treaties with detailed stipulations declaring the right of most
favored nations as including the right to organize, control,
participate in limited liability and other corporations and
associations, for pecuniary profit or otherwise, or similarly to
the same effect. 210
panies exercising an activity generally permitted to companies of all other countries,
and not to revoke a once-granted authorization, except in case of violation of laws
and regulations of the country, and to refrain in addition from any denial or revocation exclusively grounded upon reasons of economical competition.
2o1 Art. 17, RGBI. 1926 II 1.
Also the Treaty between Canada and France, of May 12, 1933, art. 7 (Revue
Crit. 1937, 257) has been interpreted to the effect that Canadian companies for
maritime insurance or reinsurance do not need in France the individual authorization otherwise required, see NraoYET, 2 Traite 506.
208
Treaty of Dec. 8, 1923, art. 12, U. S. Treaty Series No. 725, 52 L. of N.
Treaty Series (1926) 133 at 141 RGBI. 1925 II 795, 8oo. BEITZKE, Clunet 1937, 1004.
209 See 1 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT 924 § rroz; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE :207
§ 191. See also E. SPRINGER, 27 Z.int.R. (1918) 314.
210 Treaties of the United States: with Austria (June 19, 1928) art. ro, U. S.
Treaty Series Nos. 838 and 839, 118 L. of N. Treaty Series (1931) 241 at 250;
with Germany (Dec. 8, 1923) art. 12, U. S. Treaty Series No. 725, 52 L. of N.
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(d) Clause of reciprocity. The traditional provision for
reciprocity of treatment has significance, for instance, in
Poland and Germany, while in most countries, as we have
seen, licensing is not dependent on reciprocity. Beyond that,
the clauses leave everything to the pleasure of the "laws and
regulations" of each state. Nevertheless, such clauses stand
unaltered in the Treaties of Montevideo 211 and Habana. 212
2.

Draft Proposals

Real progress has been sought through the efforts of
numerous international congresses and committees, from the
Paris Congress (I 8 80) on stock companies to the Draft of the
Experts of the League of Nations (I928) on juristic persons, 213 and the Draft on the recognition of foreign organizations of the Seventh Hague Conference (I951). But, from
one of the latter drafts, the preliminary draft of the Economic
Committee of the League of Nations on the treatment of
foreigners (I 92 9),214 it appears that an embarrassing struggle
is going on between this endeavor and the deference to "the
laws and regulations" of the territory in which activities are
exercised. The draft subjects the doing of business to preTreaty Series (1926) 133 at 141; with the Federal Republic of Germany (Oct. 29,
1954) art. 7, U.S. Treaty Series No. 3593;
with Turkish Republic (Oct. 28, 1931) art. r, U. S. Treaty Series No. 859, 138
L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 345 at 347;
with Poland (June IS, 1931) art. II, U.S. Treaty Series No. 862, 139 L. & N.
Treaty Series (1933) 397 at 407;
with Greece (Nov. 21, 1936) art. r, U. S. Treaty Series No. 930, 183 L. of N.
Treaty Series (1937) r69 at 170;
with El Salvador (Feb. 22, 1926) art. 13, U.S. Treaty Series No. 827, 134 L. ofN.
Treaty Series (1932) 207 at 209.
211 Treaty of Montevideo on International Commercial Terrestrial Law (1940)
art. 8 par. 2.
212 C6digo Bustamante, arts. 32-34·
213
See the history of recent efforts in Hudson, 7 Int. Legislation 355·
214
League of Nations Pub!., C.36.M.21.1929.II., p. r6; C.97·M.23.1930.Il.;
Revue 1930, 236. Cf. KuHN, Am. J. Int. Law 1930, 570. Opposition was raised
from several states, and the full conference of 47 states has not discussed the
committee draft.
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liminary and revocable authorization, with no remedy against
arbitrary refusal but the right of retaliation. But if authorization is once given, the proposal is that it should not be revoked
except for infringement of the laws and regulations of the
country.

VII.

CoNCLUSIONs

I. The view expressed in old as well as recent American
decisions as a natural conception that a state may exclude
corporations created in other states from doing business in
the forum, is just one of several theories of the past. For a
time, it was also widely believed that, by natural justice, the
toleration of foreign corporations depended on formally assured reciprocity of treatment. Some Latin-American authors
maintain that the theoretically equal position conceded to
foreigners implies their complete subjection to all domestic
laws. Such theories have been but a poor screen for economic
and social, if not mere power, policies. The requirement of
governmental authorization or treaty privilege has been
established either as a means for the government to bolster
its power of domination or bargaining, or in the belief that
national autarchy was needed, or that a firm protection of
the national resources and labor was necessary. On the other
hand, the theory of freely admitting foreign juristic persons
has derived from credence in the usefulness of the capitalistic
system and of the broadest exchange of goods and services.
The methods of thinking have alternated in the periods of
modern industrialism and have contended with each other in
most countries. It would seem, at last, that the real problem,
the contrast of interests, has made itself acutely felt, particularly in the historic relation between the highly equipped
corporations of the United States and Latin-American countries rich in raw materials and labor, but wanting capital and
skilled management. There may have occurred errors and
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abuses on both sides, and there exists also a natural opposition
of interests. But if we hear in this country the industrial
leaders profess that the times of colonial exploitation have
gone forever, that it is an American interest to raise foreign
wages and help foreign production and that investing
countries should send their capital as private capital rather
than as an arm of nationalized economic aggression, 215 the
clash of real interests would seem easily dissolvable.
2. We have found recognition of foreign corporations
made dependent in some jurisdictions on reciprocity, in others
on general or special authorization or on registration requiring sometimes very exacting documentation. The right to sue
in a state court is characteristically included in the effects thus
conditioned. (Chapter 22). Even though foreign organizations may be recognized with some effects, their permission
to do business, in a number of states, is granted only according
to the pleasure of the government. In not a few states, they
are subjected to an unlimited amount of domestic law, with
respect either to their constitution or to their affairs out of
the state, or to both. If the statutory requirements concerning
authorization of business or registration of the company's
place of business, its agents, balances, and often many other
items, are not observed, contracts made in the state may be
declared void, or the other party may enjoy the option, according to his advantage, of regarding the contract as valid or
invalid, and frequently the right to sue on the contract may be
denied to the company. (Chapter 23).
The harshness of legislative requirements in certain parts
of the world is surpassed by vexatious bureaucratic procedures,
abuses, and the necessity of personal connections, if not
bribery. Of one state, Panama, which might have been expected to understand the need of peaceful collaboration, an
215 See, for instance, ERic JoHNSTON, "America's World Chance," in Reader's
Digest, June 1945, 5·
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excellent author has recently collected a long list of difficulties
wantonly created for foreign corporations, such as the obscure
definition of business requiring registration, exaggerated requirements for registration of powers of the prescribed general agent and for the proof of corporate existence, potential
danger that nonregistered companies that have no business
place or habitual business are not allowed to sue in the courts,
taxation policies deliberately intended to close the country to
capital unless it submits to complete domination, and so
forth. 216
Some hostility, with uncertainty as to the law, has also
appeared in this country. A complaint of uncertainty has been
raised, for instance, with respect to the nature of the refusal
to allow suit, in the Pennsylvania Annotations to the Restatement. 217 A New Y ark attorney once wrote in Clunet's Journal
for the information of European readers that the difficulties
of security for costs, of standing in court, and of acquiring
immovables in New York made it inopportune for a foreign
corporation to do business there otherwise than by creating a
local affi.liate. 218
3· In view of the various circumstances of countries as
well as of corporate purposes, a uniform regulation may not
be possible or even desirable. However, an average pattern
of normal relations can well be envisaged. If a state has no
reason for intensified control such as is justified over public
utilities, finance and insurance enterprises, it should cooperate
with the world and limit its supervision to the really necessary
measures. Corporations created in one country, particularly
if their central management is also located there, should be
fully recognized, without petty obstacles, throughout the
world as persons capable of acting in transactions and law
216

EDER, IS Tul. L. Rev. (1941) SZI. With respect to powers of attorney, see

supra n.
217

us.

Restatement, Pennsylvania Annotations 77·
21s LoEB, Clunet rgro, g6.
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suits. Normative regulation may be imposed on the habitual
business of a foreign corporation rather than on the corporation itself. If qualifying to do business is made relatively
easy as in the United States, due to the professional services
of special companies for the filing of applications, and to the
moderate fees imposed by the states, this method of control
is not objectionable. Also, a foreign organization entering
the life of a national economy by deploying commercial or
industrial activities, has naturally to obey the local laws and
decrees destined to govern such activities. They include fiscal,
jurisdictional, and administrative laws, and above all the laws
concerning health, labor, and social security, but exclude the
legal provisions concerning the creation and internal organization of corporations. Nor should domestic private law without qualification be extended to all contracts made in the
state; what law governs these is to be determined by conflicts
rules following entirely different lines of policy.
Legitimate interests of a state are involved in safeguarding
the interests of its citizens dealing with foreign enterprises
that have an establishment in the state. It is a perfectly sound
policy to require that the legal capacity of a foreign organization permitted to carrry on business in the territory and its
locally pertinent economic situation be made recognizable to
the individuals coming in contact with it either as employees
or as third parties. Acts of publication for this purpose are
prescribed almost everywhere, sometimes not sufficiently but
more often with exaggeration. The proper effect of registration is well expressed in an Italian decision. Although a
foreign corporation may be dissolved by appropriate proceedings at its seat, this dissolution cannot be opposed to a
third party in the country, unless it has been publicized according to the domestic law. 219 But it is crude, almost barbaric
21 9 Cass. Ita!. (July
1752 Nos. 555-556.

IJ,

1936) Moulenet v. D'Amico, Foro Ita!. Rep. 1936,

224

CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

law, under any circumstances, to refuse foreign legal persons
access to the courts or to deny the validity of their contracts.
A borderline problem is raised by the statute of New
York imposing liability on the officers, directors, and stockholders of a foreign stock corporation transacting business in
the state, among other things, for unauthorized dividends
and unlawful loans to stockholders. 220 Not only is jurisdiction
taken, but the liability is authoritatively construed as an
offense against the New York prescriptions rather than
against those of the charter law. 221 This protection of creditors
exceeds the normal scope of domestic law as traced in the
Restatement. 222 It may be regarded, however, as a control
measure defendable in the biggest financial center of the world,
which would not be justifiable everywhere. 222 a Whether
rules in the interest of creditors extend to foreign corporations, such as those prohibiting purchase of their own stock
out of the capital, seems an unsettled question also in New
York. 223
That domestic share- or bond holders should be protected
by special measures, only because the company does business
in the state, goes certainly too far. Nor does acquisition of
securities by local investors need any particular legal favor.
German judges deciding on the registration of foreign com22 0 Stock Corporation Law of 1939, § II4, derived from the Law of 1890, c. 564
§ 6o, as added by L. of 1897, c. 384 § 4·
2 21 German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl (1915) 216 N. Y. 57, 109 N. E. 875.
222 Restatement, New York Annotations I 57 § I 88. The courts of New York
emphasize this exception to the law of the state of incorporation which is applied
whenever the statutes do not expressly extend their domain to foreign corporations.
Exceptions are provided in addition to § II4 of the Stock Corporation Law by
§ 222 of the General Corporation Law, but not with respect to §§ 71-73 of the Stock
Corporation Law; Bogardus v. Fitzpatrick (1931) 139 Misc. 533, 247 N. Y. Supp.
692; Armstrong v. Dyer and Hobby (1935) 268 N.Y. 671, 198 N. E. 551; Gonzales
v. Tuttman (1945) 59 F. Supp. 858, 862 (stockholders' liability to laborers, servants, and employees).
2 22• The general rule submitting such acts to the law of incorporation is enacted
in California: General Corp. Law, 1947, § 66o1; Oklahoma: Stat. (1951) § 202.
22a The question was left undecided in Hayman v. Morris (S. Ct., N. Y. County,
1942) 36 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 756.
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panies have conveniently investigated into the amount of
the capital stock and its sufficiency for a minimum standard
of trustworthiness for creditors, but have refrained from any
regard for the organization and the rights and interests of
shareholders. 224
Finally, no objection can be made to the exaction by certain
states of a reasonable compensation from foreign enterprises
which they admit, as an additional burden on capital profit
leaving the country. From this angle, discriminatory taxation
can be vindicated, while overtaxation in order to lower the
competitive strength of foreign capital is a measure of economic warfare rather than a policy of neighbors.
That these are the basic lines of a satisfactory compromise
must have been felt in many quarters. It is the more regrettable that not one of all the positive enactments is entirely
commendable, and that, to my knowledge, not much has been
done even in legal and economic science to develop the particulars. The elaboration of a comprehensive model statute
for foreign organizations would be a worthy object of international endeavor.
224

HACHENBURG in 3 Diiringer-Hachenburg (1934) § 201, ns. 40-46.

PART SEVEN

TORTS

In this part, the following books and articles will be cited in
abbreviated form:
Common law: Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws (I942);
Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 47 Law Q.
Rev. (I 9 3 I) 48 3, with comparative research; Goodrich, "Tort
Obligations and the Conflicts of Laws," 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
(I 924) I 9 (a chapter of his handbook) ; Stumberg, "Conflict of
Laws-Torts-Texas Decisions," 9 Texas L. Rev. (I 9 3 2) 2 I ; Cook,
"Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 35 Col. L. Rev. (I935)
202 and Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (I 942)
3 I I, mainly concerned with polemics.
Henri Mazeau, "Conflits de lois et competence internationale dans
le domaine de la responsabilite civile delictuelle et quasi-delictuelle,"
Revue Crit. I 934, 377; von Schelling, "Unerlaubte Handlungen,"
3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 854.
For comparative substantive law, see Rabel, "Die Grundziige des
Rechts der unerlaubten Handlungen," in Sonderheft, 6 Z.ausl.PR.
(I932) IO; ten articles on "Haftung" in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 43-I I 3; Titze, "Unerlaubte Handlungen," in 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 676.
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The Principle
I.
I.

THE MEANING oF ToRT

Delict and Quasi Delict

HE conflicts rules applicable to torts have been developed mostly with respect to delicts, viz., torts committed by fault, that is, intentionally or negligently. 1
The expression lex loci delicti commissi is still used to denote
the principle that refers to the law of the place where the
alleged tort occurs. However, in modern legislation, the separate position of liability quasi ex delicto--of ccquasi delicts''
-is practically abolished, 2 and accordingly by universal
understanding, this conflicts rule at present covers any
unlawful conduct without fault generating liability. 3

T

1 See, for instance, COdigo Bustamante, art. I68.
2 TnzE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 678/f.
In a part of the French literature, quasi-delit is understood to mean liability for
negligence, but such terms are ordinarily used to denote liability without fault,
as by PoLLOCK, Torts (ed. IJ) I7.
3 Restatement § 379 (c) comment f; Le Forest v. Tolman (I875) II7 Mass. I09;
Young v. Masci (1933) 289 U.S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599·
England: Walpole v. Can. Northern R. Co., Privy C. [1923] A. C. IIJ, I20.
Austria: GIU. NF. 7252 (automobile); 3469, 5219, cf. 3439 (railroad); 6SII
(fraud).
Belgium: PouLLET § JI7; Trib. Arion (July IJ, I904) Revue I905, 539 and
(July 20, I904) id. 543; Cass. (Feb. 2I, I907) and (Nov. 26, I908) Revue I909,
952, the latter decision also in Clunet I909, II78.
Czechoslovakia: Law of I948 on private international law, § 48.
Egypt: C. C. (I948) art. 2I par. I.
France: PILLET, 2 Traite § 549; WEiss, 4 Traite 4IS; NIBOYET 6I6 § 490; ARMINJON, 2 Precis 278.
Germany: RG. (June I4, I9IS) Leipz.Z. I9IS, I443 No. 16; RG. (Feb. 25, I904)
57 RGZ. I45; OLG. Karlsruhe (Oct. 28, I9JI) IPRspr. I932 No. 4I.
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (1942) art. 25 par. 2, and previously 3 FIORE § I2621f.; DIENA,
2 Prine. 266; CERETI, Obblig. 195; Cass. Torino (Dec. 19, 191 r) Riv. Dir. Com.
I912 II 177.
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law, § IS par. I.
Spain: LAsALA LLANAs 365.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. 20, I933) NJA. 1933, 364, see 7 Z.ausi.PR. (1933) 931.
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This liability is based on the idea that a person who conducts for his own benefit a business subjecting other persons
to possible loss, should bear the risk of the damage as a part
of his business costs. In the terms of the civil law doctrine/
it is a liability for risk (Gefalwdungshaftung, responsabilite
pour risque). Among the classes of persons frequently subject to such liability, we find the owners or keepers of animals,
vessels, railroads, motor vehicles, aircraft, houses, inns, laboratories, et cetera. Thus assimilated to delictual obligations,
obligations to pay damages irrespective of fault, when imposed by the state of the place where the act is done, are
enforced outside this state. In fact, the liability for risk,
whether based on the mere fact that the defendant has caused
the damage or on a presumption of his fault, cannot be reasonably subjected to a conflicts rule entirely different from that
selected for liability based on the proved fault of the defendant. The policies pursued in the national laws by all these
various tort rules are too closely related to permit divergent
determination of the applicable law.
The scope of the conflicts rule ought even to include in
addition certain liabilities without fault attending acts that,
although damaging to the interests of other persons, are
permitted on account of the superior interests of the actor,
acts, which, therefore, are termed lawful only in a formal or
restricted sense. 5 For instance, it is formally lawful to effect
an arrest or seizure on the mere probability of a claim, but the
claimant will be liable, if in a subsequent suit he is shown to
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. Io, I925) 5I BGE. II 327.
Syria: C.C. (I949) art. 22 par. I.
Benelux-Draft, art. IS.
4 Basic: JosEPH UNGER, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr (ed. 2, I893); id., Handeln
auf fremde Gefahr (I894); MATAJA, Das Recht des Schadenersatzes vom Standpunkt der Nationalokonomie (I888); for the modern literature see A. EHRENZWEIG,
Negligence without Fault (I9SI) and MutLER-ERZBACH, "Ersatz durch Gefiihrdungshaftung und Gefahrtragung," 106 Arch. Civ. Prax. (I9IO) 309.
For common law, see infra p. 274 n. 87.
6 TnzE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 68o; ENNECCERUS-KIPP-Wotn, Allg.
Teil § I99·
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have known or negligently failed to ascertain that his claim
did not exist or, as frequently enacted, even merely because he
had no actual claim. Here again liability is based on the idea
of acting at the actor's own peril, although the damaging
act is permitted by the law. Arrest and seizure have been
subjected, therefore, to the law of the court that grants them
provisionally. 6
It is true that the differences between the laws of the
various countries are greater with respect to liability for risk
than with respect to liability for intentional or negligent
harm. For a while in the past, radical tendencies swung to
extreme elimination of the principle of fault. A few recent
drafts and codes, including the Soviet Code, have conferred
on the victim of fortuitous damage a claim for indemnification
to an equitable extent, 1 and the Mexican Civil Code imposes
a presumption of fault on any person who:
Makes use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatus or substances dangerous in themselves, or in the velocity they
deploy, in their explosive or inflammable nature, in the
energy of the electric current conducted or for any other
analogous causes .... 8
At times, judges of more conservative jurisdictions may
hesitate to apply such a foreign extracontractual liability
based upon the mere fact of keeping a dog or carrying on an
industrial enterprise, owning a house, or granting a third
person the use of a car. 9 The way to overcome such doubts
has been shown in the following classical reasoning of Judge
Learned Hand:
6 Germany: RG. (Sept. 20, 1882} 7 RGZ. 378; 2 BAR 396.
Switzerland: App. Ziirich, II HE. 197, cited by 2 MElLI 96.
7 Soviet Russian Civil Code, art. 406; Hungarian Draft, C. C. (1914) § 1486;
id. (1928) § 1737; also the second draft of the German BGB. § 752 contained such
rule.
8 Mexico: C. C. (1928) art. 1913.
9 Characteristically, BARTIN, 2 Principes 41olf., 433, as late as 1932, tries to
explain the liabilities for risk as diverted liabilities for fault, and confesses embarrassment where his effort fails.
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"There is nothing inherent or antecedently necessary in
the conventional limitation of liability to such consequences as
may be anticipated by ordinary foresight, within which limits
the law of the state where the damage occurs concededly
controls. No such limitation existed in ancient times, and the
law is abandoning it in field after field; fault is by no means
an inevitable condition of liability. Provided that the result
be not too distasteful to the mores of the forum, we think
that the state where the damage occurs may impute liability to
one outside, if he be in fact the voluntary author of it.... " 10
Some statutory provisions, apparently or really, go even
farther, by subjecting all "extracontractual" claims to the
law of the place where the act in question has been done. 11
This would include all causes of action claimed to arise out
of formally and substantially lawful acts, such as, on the one
hand, the so-called quasi contracts-e.g., negotiorum gestio,
unjust enrichment, constructive trust-and on the other hand,
destruction of private property for public use, if connected with
the duty of compensation, and the like. All these cases must
be reserved for discussion separate from torts and contracts.
2.

Characterization of Tort

How do we determine the meaning of the term "tort"
in the conflicts rule referring "tort" to the law of the place
where the act alleged to be tortious has been done?
If the usual doctrine of characterization according to the
law of the forum is taken literally, an act done abroad cannot
support a claim for liability, except where it is an actionable
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp. (I934) 68 F. (2d) 942 at 944·
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. I I par. 3·
Egypt: C. C. (I948) art. 2I par. 1.
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (I942) art. 25 par. 2.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. II No. I.
Syria: C. C. (I949) art. 22 par. 2.
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law of I889, art. 38: place where
the licit or illicit act has been done.
Similarly, French writers: NIBOYET, 5 Traite Nos. I444-I447; BATIFFOL, Traite
Nos. 56I, 564; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE No. 253.
to

11
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tort also by the internal private law of the forum. This, in
fact, is the British, Japanese, and Chinese approach (soon to
be discussed), but it has been very decidedly rejected in all
other countries. Moreover, the extension of the conflicts rule
on tort so as to include foreign liabilities for risk is not compatible with this view.
To escape these obvious inconsistencies, the advocates of
the lex fori are prepared to recognize any foreign type of
liability that would be classified as tort if it were ordained
by the domestic statutes of the forum. 12 This idea has some
significance but in reality points to systematic problems
beyond the domain of the internal law.
In consideration of the impossible consequences of the lex
fori theory, the opposite theory of characterization according
to the law referred to, has had more followers in this special
field than generally. 13 In this view, the commonly used
conflicts rule refers to the law of the place where an act
is done to decide whether it is a tort, and no limitation is
added. The result would seem acceptable in most cases. But
no easy solution is afforded by this method where the positive
laws disagree in characterizing certain obligations, as the
duty to support illegitimate children or the liability for
breach of promise to marry, which are based on tort in one
country and on entirely different theories in others. In these
cases, it does not help to say that "the predominance of the
territorial law is justified only insofar as one is in the presence
of an obligation of tortious character." 14
Once more resorting to comparative law, we have to form
a category of tort broad enough to embrace all definitions
that may be given to the term on the basis of a conscientious
general system of law. Actually or virtually, this concept
underlies the thinking of lawyers, not only in civil law
u

RAAPE 208

and IPR. 535·

13 PouLLET

364;

u

Traite 313.

PILLET, 2

WALKER

523.
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countries but also in England and the United States.
We do not touch hereby, of course, the great controversy,
pending for a long time in the English literature, which
concerns the existence of a general liability that would overshadow the historical separate categories of tort, 15 such as
assault, trespass, conversion, nuisance, defamation, etc. However this problem may be solved, it has become common
ground that, by inductive generalization from the recognized separate types of peculiar tort liabilities, principles of
tort can be formulated. 16 This is quite enough to reach the
doctrinal state of German private law. Neither system
imposes by a general rule liability for all negligent conduct.
Nevertheless, the provisions given in the Civil Code for a
number of important types of tort serve as a subsidiary regulation for tort actions established in special laws, including
liabilities without fault. 17 The general rules of tort thus
achieved, though more compact, are comparable to what may
be called principles of tort in England, and still more so to
the American doctrine.
On the other hand, the French Civil Code has formulated
its famous principle of responsibility for fault-the product
of the European pandectistic practice and itself the model
of innumerable codes-in the broadest terms, too broad in
fact for the purpose of municipal law. Article 1382 of the
French Civil Code reads as follows:
Any act whatever done by a man, which causes damage to
another, obliges him by whose fault the damage was caused
to repair it.
This definition has been narrowed by common opinion as well
as in more modern reproductions in other countries such as
article 41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. The conduct
See G. W. WILLIAMs, "The Foundation of Tortious Liability," in 7 Cambr.
J. (I94I) III.
16 SEAVEY, "Principles of Tort," s6 Harv. L. Rev. (I943) 72.
17 67 RGZ. 144, cj. 122 RGZ. 326.
16

L.
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must not only be tainted by fault but unlawful. In the prevailing conception of modern continental lawyers, behavior
is unlawful if it is prohibited by the rules establishing general duties for the protection of individual interests or the
interests of the community. In this view, breach of contract,
at least by the debtor himself, is not "unlawful" in itself,
since it is the violation of a relation between two persons
rather than of a duty incumbent on every one. With this
supplement, the concept holds true as a basic definition of
tort in comparative consideration of any municipal system,
special types as established in the various laws being defined
by additional requirements.
The only concept of delict, useful on an international scale
to the prevailing conflicts rule, is identical. It is equally easy
to extend this concept of responsibility for risk. "Tort," thus,
in the meaning of the conflicts rule, is any unlawful invasion
of the interests of another person, causing damage or harm
to a person. The conflicts rule, of course, will predicate what
system of law shall determine these elements.
It is immaterial on what basis the law of the forum
establishes the protected sphere, whether as property, status,
or bodily integrity, and which unlawful invasions it recognizes
as ground for actions or injunctions.
It is submitted that in practice the courts apply this very
concept. 18

II.

THE PRINCIPLE

r. The Dominant Principle
The principle unanimously established by the canonists
and later the statutists since the 13th century19 and generally
adopted today is that the lex loci delicti commissi governs. 20
18 See RG. (March 12, 1906) JW. 1906, 297; 23 ROLG. 14 and RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.
PR. (1929) 755; NEuNER, Der Sinn 105.
uSee NEUMEYER, Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 138ff; 2 BAR us; 2 MELli 90.
20 Mr. Justice Holmes in Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby (1912) 222 U.S. 473, 477, and
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This predicates that the law of the place where an alleged
tortious act in the broad meaning described above has been
in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown (I914) 234 U. S. 542, 34 S. Ct. 955;
Walsh v. New York & New England R. Co. (I894) I6o Mass. S7I, 36 N. E. 584;
2 BEALE 1289; GooDRICH § 92; LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 325; Restatement §§ 378,
379, 38I, 383, 384, 385, 386, 390·
Austria: OGH. (Nov. 2, I9Io) I3 GIU. NF. 52I9; (July 2, I9I3) I6 GIU. NF.
No. 6511.
Belgium: Cass. (Feb. 2I, I907) Pasicrisie I907.1.I35; (Nov. 26, I908) id. I909.1.25.
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. I I par. 3·
Brazil: C. C., Introductory Law of I942, art. 9· See EsPINOLA, 8 Tratado 478;
TENORIO 339·
Czechoslovakia: Law of I948 on private international law, § 48.
Denmark: Trib. Marit. Copenhague (May 3I, I90S) Clunet I909, II84; Vestre
Landsret (May 8, I952) U.f. R. I952, 854, Clunet I954, 488, aff'd by S. Ct. (June
30, I954) U.f. R. I954, 772, 20 Z.ausl.PR. (I9SS) 509. BoRUM and MEYER, 6
Repert. 224 No. 8s.
Egypt: C. C. (I948) art. 2I.
France: Cass. (req.) (Feb. 24, I936) S.I936.I.I6I, Revue I936, 782; Cass. (civ.)
(May 25, I948) Revue Crit. 1949, 89, first formal confirmations of the rule (see
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1949, 9) which was certain; however, see Cass. (req.) (Feb.
IS, I905) S.I90S.I.2o9; Cass. (civ.) (May 16, 1888) S.I89I.I.S09.
French Morocco: Dahir of II-I3 August 19IJ, art. 16.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 12 (implicitly); formerly common practice, starting
from OLG. Miinchen (Dec. I, I829), I Seuff. Arch. No. IS3i see in particular ROHG.
(Jan. I9, I878) 23 ROHGE. I74i RG. (Sept. 23, I887) I9 RGZ. 382; and constant
practice.
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. 26.
Hungary: Curia, Nos. 7674 (of 1905), 90I6 (of I926); see ScHWARTZ, 40 Z.int.R.
206; SzASZY, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) I72i Curia, (Oct. 27, I937) S Z. Osteurop. R.
(I939) 396.
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (I942) art. 2S par. 2; the rule was recognized before, although
it was controversial whether it was included in art. 9 par. 2, Disp. Pre!. of I86S,
see FEoozzi 7S9i Cass. (July I9, I938) Foro Ita!. I938 I I2I6.
The Netherlands: Rb. Utrecht (Feb. 4, 1927) W. II67S, N.J. (I927) 99I; Rb.
Amsterdam (June 22, I93I) N. J. (I932) 32Si VAN HASSELT 305.
Norway: S. Ct. Christiania (Dec. IS, I905) Clunet 1907, 852.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. II.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674 (as to collisions); CuNHA GoNCALVEs, I Direito
CiviJ670.
Scotland: The rule seems certain, although the courts still have difficulties in
ascertaining their own jurisdiction. See Dalziel v. Coulthourst, Executors (I934)
s. c. s66.
Siam: Law on private international law of I939, § IS.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. 20, 1933) 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 93I; (Dec. 2, I93S) IO id.
(I936) 624.
Switzerland: 22 BGE. 486 and II7o; 35 id. II 480; 43 id. II 3IS; SI id. II 328;
66 id. II I67; 76 id. II IIO.
Syria: C. C. (1949) art. 22.
Montenegro: C. C. art. 793·
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law (I889) art. 38; (1940) art. 43·
C6digo Bustamante, arts. I67, I68.
Benelux-Draft, art. I8.
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done, determines whether, under what conditions, to what
extent, and with what consequences, this act constitutes a
cause of action.
2.

Lex Fori

Against the dominant rule, in the early half of the nineteenth century, Waechter and Savigny advanced the opinion
that tort problems should always be governed by the law
of the forum. 21 They both believed that the tort rules of the
various municipal laws were of such an ethical and imperative
nature that no country would ever apply the tort rule of
another country, especially when it does not consider the act
unlawful. This thesis, formed in too close relationship with
ideas current in penal law, has sometimes influenced courts in
England, 22 Spain/3 and elsewhere. 24 In Greece, it was repealed only by the Civil Code of I 940/ 5 and a recent French
writer has attempted to revive it. 26 Soviet Russia has no
fixed rule, but most writers seem to agree that application of
Soviet Russian law even to acts done abroad suits the spirit
of Soviet law. 27
Some East Asian statutes limit the tort liability arisen under
the law of the place of wrong to the standard of the lex fori. 278
WAECHTER, '2S Arch. Civ. Prax. (I842) 392; SAV1GNY (tr. Guthrie) '2I7 § 37I,
§ 374; their opinion was followed by some now obsolete German decisions:
9 Seuff. Arch. No. I, I I Seuff. Arch. No. 3; 2S Seuff. Arch. No. us; in partial
sympathy with the lex fori theory, RoLIN, I Principes §§ 363-36S.
22 See CHESHIRE'S (269) resume of the case of The Halley.
23 See the case history by LASALA LLANAS 36s, where he has difficulty in reaching
the dominant opinion.
24 France: Cass. (req.) (May 29, I894) S.1894·1.48I.
Italy: App. Milano (July 8, I92S) Rivista I926, us. Contra: DE SANcns, id.
I'27; FEDOZZI 7S8.
26 Greece: C. C. (18s6) art. 6; if. 2 STRE1T-VALLINDAS 26o; C. C. (1940) art. 26.
25 HENRY MAzEAUD, Revue Crit. I934, 377; PRUDHOMME, Clunet 1936, 626.
17 MAKARov, Precis 30S and authors cited. In interterritorial law, the law
of the place of wrong governs if one of the parties invokes it, Instruction of Plenum
No. XXXII of the Supreme Court of the USSR of Feb. 10, 193I, § 3 par. 2 (d),
English translation in GsovSK1, 2 Soviet Civil Law (I949) 13.
27 a China: Decree of Aug. S, 1918, art. '2S par. 2.
Japan: Law of 1898 on private international law, § I I par. 3·
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law, § IS par. 3·
11
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3· Rule of Similarity
The idea that a "foreign tort" could be sued on without
regard to the internal law of the forum has encountered opposition in the conception that in every case the foreign municipal
law should be substantially similar to the law of the forum.
American cases. This view has been held in a number of
American cases involving foreign death statutes. Such statutes
have been introduced in practically all jurisdictions in the
United States to abolish the common law rule that "actio
personalis moritur cum persona," that is, that an action for
injury to a person cannot be maintained after his death by the
deceased man's heirs. As the statutes vary in many details,
extraterritorial application is important. But originally they
were considered to create a new right on the ground of wrongful death rather than on that of a precedent tortious invasion
of the body, and were construed as penal statutes, inapplicable
in other states. It was a progressive step to apply them where
there were similar domestic statutes. 28 The entire peculiar
conception was forcefully refuted by the Court of Appeals
of New York in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York. 29
Although the rule was followed as late as in I 9 3 I and I 93 6
in Maryland/0 and has not yet been expressly overruled in
Texas, 31 American law as a whole may be claimed, at present,
28 GooDRICH, 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1924) 19, 28; HANCOCK, Torts 21-29; Texas
& P. R. Co. v. Richards (1887) 68 Texas 375, 4 S. W. 627 and other Texas cases.
See also STUMBERG, 9 Tex. L. Rev. (1931) at 29; furthermore, Wooden v. Western
New York and Pennsylvania R. Co. (1891) 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N. E. 1050, cj. STUMBERG, id. 163.
29 (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198; see also Powell v. Great Northern R. Co.
(1907) 102 Minn. 448, II3 N. W. 1017.
30 London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Balgowan S. S. Co. (1931) 161 Md. 145,
155 Ad. 334, 77 A. L. R. 1302; Davis v. Ruzicka (1936) 170 Md. II2. Cj. 155 F.
(2d) 67 n. 3·
31 El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth (Tex. 1923) 255 S. W. 159, declaring
Mexican law substantially dissimilar. No recent case has treated the law of a state
of the United States likewise. The theory has been confirmed despite art. 4678,
Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) in Wells v. Irwin (1942) 43 F. Supp. 212, 214. See STUMBERG,
9 Tex. L. Rev. (1931) 21, Texas Annotations to the Restatement (1936) § 384.
Conversely, a cause of action for tort after the death of the tortfeasor was recognized by the California Supreme Court between California residents in spite of the
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to agree with civil law in submitting injuries ending in death,
like all others, exclusively to the statute of the place of wrong. 32
British rules. A famous double rule is generally regarded
as governing tort problems in England, in a formula reproducing a passage of the opinion of Willes, J., in Phillips v.
Eyre:
"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England,
for a wrong alleged to have been committed abroad, two
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such
a character that it would have been actionable if committed
in England .... Secondly, the act must not have been
justifiable by the law of the place where it was done." 33
Independently of the meaning Willes, J., himself clothed in
these words, 34 they have become a rigid rule of secure, though
very unhappy, standing.
The second part of this rule has an old history. In its oldest
phase, this rule was intended to excuse a defendant who would
be liable to damages under English law- for seizure35 or
al:sence cf a "survival" statute in the law at the place of wrong, Grant v. McAuliffe
(I953) 41 Cal. (2d) 859, 264 P. (2d) 944· On another California case decided under
public policy, see infra pp. 249 f.
32
Restatement §§ 381-392. The contrary statement in II Am. Jur. 496 § I84
seems to be founded on antiquated cases.
33 (187o) Q. B. I at 27; Lord Macnaghten in Carr v. Fracis Times & Co. [1902]
A. C. 176, 182.
34 HESSEL E. YNTEMA suggests the possibility that "The celebrated two rules
are an effort to formulate-as the event has shown, an unhappy one-the theory
that 'a right of action', as well as the obligation, is 'the creature of the law of the
place and subordinate thereto.' The first rule might thus be regarded as an expression of the truism that the case must be one of which the court of suit will take
jurisdiction, a construction to which the immediately preceding observation, in
the opinion, instancing the local nature of actions for trespass to land, that English
courts do not undertake 'universal jurisdiction' over foreign transactions, lends
countenance. This supposes that Willes, J., did not intend to suggest that the lex
fori is the primary measure of the existence of either the 'obligation' or the 'right
of action.' In subsequent cases, the two rules have come to exercise an autonomous
and unwarranted fascination, eclipsing the more detailed analysis that formed their
context. Which, if so, would serve to remind us of the great dangers inherent in
formulae as a means of transmitting doctrine.'' Cf. YNTEMA, Book Review, 27
Can. Bar Rev. (1949) rr6 ff., 12I.
36
Blad's Case (1673) 3 Swan. 603, Blad v. Barnfield (I674) 3 Swan. 604.
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capture of a ship/6 detention, 37 or arrest 38 of a man - in
view of the lawfulness of such act in the instant case as done
under a foreign sovereign. Thus far, the English rule aims
at the same result as the prevailing rule that makes the local
law of the place of wrong alone decisive. However, by strange
complications the English judges arrived at the idea that the
law of the place of wrong controls only the "justifiability"
of the act. They did not ask whether it was a tort entailing
damages at the place. The case definitively causing this deviation from the world-rule was Machado v. Fontes. 39 A libel
published in Brazil injured the plaintiff. The defendant
seemed to raise in objection the absence of a civil action for
damages in the case of a libel under Brazilian law and requested inquiry into that law by a commission to be sent to
Brazil. The Court of Appeal reasoned in the following way:
A libel certainly was a criminal offense also in Brazil, hence
not "justifiable." Even if no action for damages ensued there,
it had to be granted according to English law. It should be
conceded that the judges felt strongly the inequity of dismissing the action, under such extraordinary circumstances. 40 It
has been suggested, therefore, that the court should have contented itself with an exceptional ruling on the basis of stringent
public policy; 41 this, in fact, would have prevented the crystallization of a rule that generally substitutes the law of the
forum for that of the place of wrong. However, the court and
its numerous critics would have done still better by examining
the assumption of the "unusual," 42 nay fantastic, legal situation ascribed to Brazilian law. There was a double ground for
not denying a civil action for damages on the ground of a
Dobree v. Napier (1836) 2 Bing. N.C. 781.
Regina v. Lesley (186o) Bell C. C. 220, 2JJ.
ss Carr v. Fracis Times & Co. [1902] A. C. 176.
39 [18971 2 Q.B. 2JI.
40 GuTTERIDGE, review of CHESHIRE, 55 Law Q. Rev. (1939) 131.
4 1 RoBERTSON, "The Choice of Law for Tort Liability in the Conflict of Laws",
4 Modern L. Rev. (1940) 27.
42 HANCOCK, Torts 17, 121.
36

37
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punishable act in Brazil. On the one hand, the general liability
for fault, embodied in the French Civil Code, article I382,
adopted in the Portuguese Civil Code of I867, articles 236I
and 2362, which now appears in the Brazilian Civil Code of
3
44
I 9 I 6/ was recognized in all drafts
and no doubt was a
living rule. On the other hand, the Penal Code of I 890,
conforming to another French rule, 45 stated a duty of indemnification, as an effect of every final criminal condemnation. 46
Thus, the feeling of the English courts would have been
shared by Brazilian lawyers. In this case, the helplessness of
the court in regard to foreign law was to be blamed on the
pleading, but it became consequential. In a later case in the
Privy Council, the difficulties of workmen's compensation in
Canadian provinces caused incidental argument to the effect
that an accidental injury to a worker was "justifiable" as it
was "neither actionable nor punishable," a manifest lapsus
linguae in a case where the Privy Council in fact dismissed a
claim that was not actionable by the lex loci actus. 47 Cheshire,
in demonstrating this, has concluded that the second part of
the rule in Phillips v. Eyre has been overruled and that the
act must be actionable (also) under the law of the place of
wrong. 48 The Scotch courts, in fact, have adopted the same
view when they refuse to award ((solatium" (satisfaction)
for mental anguish in cases of wrongful accidents on English
territory or vessels, despite the Scottish law. 49 The Canadian
Brazil: C. C. art. I 59 and for defamation, the special provision in art. I547·
See CARLOS AuousTo DE CARVALHO, Direito Civil Brasileiro Recompilado ou
Nova Consolida~iio das Leis Civis (Rio de Janeiro I899) 302 art. IOI4.
46 SeeM. S. AMos and F. P. WALTON, Introduction to French Law (I935) 2I5.
46 Penal Code, Decree No. 847, of Oct. II, I890, art. 69 (b), cj. BENTO DE FARIA,
Anota<;oes ao C6digo Penal do Brasil (ed. 4, I929) I6o; cf. art. 3I5 et seq.on "Calumnia e Injuria."
47 Walpole v. Canadian National R. Co. [I92I] 66 D. L. R. 127; [I923] A. C.
II3, 70 D. L. R. 20I.
4 8 CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 30Iff.; ScHMITTHoFF I6I.
49 Ld. Pres. Robertson in Kendrick v. Burnett (I897) 25 R. 82; law of the flag
applied, as interpreted by Lord Dundeen in Convery v. Lanarkshire Tramways
(I905) 8 F. II7; Naftalin v. London, Midland & Scottish R. Co. (I933) S.C. 259;
M'Elroy v. M'Allister [I949] S.C. IIo; See O'RroRDAN, "Choice of Law in Actions
43
44
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courts, however, follow the English rule and in constant
practice, before granting damages for a foreign act, state that
it is not justifiable where committed. 50
The "first rule" of Willes, J., has been developed in the
converse case of a defendant liable under the foreign law
who would not be liable under English law if the facts had occurred in England. This doctrine also rests mainly on one
decision, The Halley, r868/ 1 concerning the liability of a
shipowner for negligence of a compulsory pilot in Belgian
waters, a liability existing under Belgian but not under
English maritime law. A perfectly analogous case of compulsory pilotage was decided by the German Reichsgericht
in r89r to the same effect,52 both decisions being equally
overridden by later events. 53 Yet while the latter court referred to public policy as the basis of an exceptional objection
to the suit on the foreign tort, the Privy Council went to the
length of asserting the principle that an English court of
justice will not:
"Give a remedy in the shape of damages in respect of an act
which according to its own principles, imposes no liability on
the person from whom the damages are claimed." 54
Since then, the formula demands that the tort be "actionable
in England." 55
The double rule with its twofold implication approaches
unconditional application of the law of the forum, with a
ex Delicto under Scots Law," in 4 Modern L. Rev. (1941) 214.
Remarkably, a claim for damages barred by the statute of limitation at the
place of wrong (but not at the lex fori) and, therefore, justified, but not actionable
there, was rejected, M'Elroy v. M'Allister (19491 S. C. 110 and comment by
ScHMITTHOFF, 27 Can. Bar Rev. (1949) 816-826.
50
S. Ct. of Canada: O'Connor v. Wray [19301 S.C. R. 231, [193012 D. L. R. 899;
Howells v. Wilson (C. A. 1936) 69 Que. K. B. 32.
51
(r868) 2 L. R. P. C. 193.
62 RG. (July 9, 1892) 29 RGZ. 93· The analogy was first pointed out by LORENZEN,
47 Law Q. Rev. (1931) 498 ns. 57, 62.
sa Infra p. 276.
64 L. ]. Selwyn's dictum in The Halley at 204; repeated in Machado v. Fontes
[18971 2 Q. B. 231 by L. J. Lopes and L. J. Rigby.
ss 2 WHARTON 1096; GooDRICH 272.
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tempering proviso for the protection of a defendant whose
act was "justifiable" at the place where done. 56 This rule
is applied in Canada, far beyond the peculiar cases in which
it originated, so as to prevent enforcement of claims arising
not only in the United States but even in other Canadian
provinces, when the laws involved "differ slightly from their
own." 57 The Supreme Court of Canada has extended this unfortunate practice to Quebec, because in the Court's opinion
no sufficient authority was cited for a prevailing more generous rule. 5 8 A recent application has afforded a true counterpart to Machado v. Fontes, even better substantiated in its
facts. The Ontario Highway Traffic Act, 1937 (s. 27) makes
careless driving punishable but ( s. 4 7) denies civil relief to a
gratuitous passenger of the car causing the accident. On this
premise, the Canadian Supreme Court awarded damages to
the victim on the ground of the tort law of Quebec qua lex
fori, because the act was punishable, though not actionable
at the place of wrong. 59 A remedy against the rule has been
shown by the Supreme Court of Ontario. A gratuitous passenger injured in New York was granted relief according to
New York law, on the thesis that the Ontario statute of 1930
56 FALCONBRIDGE, 17 Can Bar Rev. (1939) 546, 549i r8 Can. Bar Rev. (1940)
308, 310. Even more definitely, M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 493, explains the double
rule as restricting the lex loci delicti "to the question: is the act that caused the
damage justifiable? All other questions must be answered by the (English) lex fori."
57 HANCOCK, Torts 89 n. ro.
58 O'Connor v. Wray [19301 S. C. R. 231, [19301 2 D. L. R. 899, as stated by
Duff, C. J., in Canadian NationalS. S. Co. v. Watson [1939l S. C. R. II, 13, [1939l
I D. L. R. 273, 274, I I Giur. Camp. DIP. (1954) 339, cf. FALCONBRIDGE, r8 Can.
Bar Rev. (1940) 308. Howells v. Wilson (C. A. 1936) 69 Que. K. B. 32; cj. 3 JoHNSON
357· Adde Lieff v. Palmer (1937) 63 Que K. B. 278, and next note.
59 McLean v. Pettigrew (1944) [19451 S. C. R. 62, [19451 2 D. L. R. 65, II Giur.
Comp. DIP. (1954) 342, affirming Pettigrew v. McLean (1942) 48 R. L. (N. S.)
400. See comment by FALCONBRIDGE [19451 2 D. L. R. 82, 23 Can. Bar Rev. (1945)
309. It is a curious case also inasmuch as the Court, through Tascherian, J., in a
learned exposition adopts the doctrine of French writers that there is no such
thing as a contra! de bienfaisance, which in this case would have given relief under
the law of Quebec, qua lex loci contractus. The French, in fact, do recognize a
liability for fault which could have been correctly used as quasi-contractual but
not as quasi-delictual ground for damages.
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which excludes such claim was devoid of extraterritorial application. 60
A somewhat analogous conflicts rule has been adopted in
the conflicts laws of Asian countries, 61 with the difference
that both laws are clearly based on the foreign tort law
and, by exception, exclude its application, if the act is "not
unlawful" under the domestic law of the court.
4· Harm Done in a Territory Not Belonging to Any Country
Apart from injuries occurring on board a vessel or aircraft, a topic to be discussed later, doubts have been expressed whether harm done in a territory without organized
government, would be more appropriately subjected to the
personal law of the alleged tortfeasor/ 2 or to the law of the
forum. 63 In those places of the Orient where the personal law
determines jurisdiction, liability of the subjects of these
powers 1s usually determined by their respective national
laws.

III.

LIMI1ATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE

Not so far-reaching as the emphasis laid on the law of
the forum in the British, Japanese, and Chinese rules, the
following exceptional rules have modified the main principle
to the benefit of the law of the forum.
Law Common to the Parties

I.

In Latin countries, there is a tendency with respect to

°Curley v. Clifford [1941] 2 D. L. R. 729, [1941] 0. W. N.

6

61

IS4·

China: Decree of August S, 1918, art. 'lS par. 1.
Egypt: C. C. (1948) art. 21 par. 'l.
Japan: Law of 1898 on private international law, art. II par. 2.
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law, § IS par. 2.
Syria: C. C. (1949) art. 22 par. 2.
In accord: I ZITELMANN 186, 187.
62 'l FRANKENSTEIN 371; RAAPE 217, III; M. WoLFE, IPR, (ed. 1) 103. Contra:
GIESE, 29 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (N. F.) (1937) 310, 341j and for Norway,
CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. S79 No. ISS·
63 England: FoOTE po.
France: 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 342, 348 §§ I'lO, 122.
Contra: 'l BAR I'll: "a precarious way out of embarrassment."

THE PRINCIPLE

245

contracts to apply to two parties having the same nationality
the law of their common country; it has sometimes found
expression in the field of torts. According to this opinion,
an act which is lawful under the lex loci, but unlawful under
the national law of the parties, is held to constitute a tort by
a court of the common country of the parties. 64 Some authors
have even gone so far as to advocate that the personal law
common to the parties should be applied also by the courts
of any other country where the case might come up for
decision. 65 Others have limited the national law to quasi
delicts. 66
The proposition has been defeated in France where it originated and is rejected in most countries. 67 It is certainly unreasonable in all those cases where private liability is closely
64 Belgium: Cass. (Nov. 26, I908) Pasicrisie I909.I.25, Clunet I909, II78, Revue
I909, 95I; cf. Ministere Public in Pasicrisie I909.1.27; RoLIN §§ 363ff.
France: Trib. civ. Strasbourg (Jan. 28, I929) Clunet I929, II3I·
Greece: App. Athens (I899) No. 885, Clunet I904, 450.
Italy: Cass. Torino (Dec. I9, I9I2) Revue I9I3, s86; App. Milano (July 8,
I925) Rivista I926, I25; 3 FIORE § I266.
Netherlands: BRAKEL 223; contra DuBBINK, De onrechtmatige Daad in het
Nederlandse lnternationaal Privaatrecht (I947) 29.
Switzerland: BG. (June IS, I9I7) 43 BGE. II 309, at 3I7, "as an ancillary
argument"!
65
WEiss, 4 Traite 4I7 n. I.
66 3 FIORE § I 266.
67 E.g., Austria: OGH., GIU. NF. 47 No. 52I9 (accident on an Austrian train
having passed the border into Bavaria, German law).
Belgium~ Cass. (May I7, I957) Pasicrisie I957· I. I II I, Clunet I958, ns8,
Revue Crit. I~58, 339; 8 ,LAuRENT 25.
..
. ,
France: CREMIEu, 5 Repert. 49I No. 2: out of questiOn.
Germany: RG. (June I4, I9IS) Leipz. Z. I915, I443 (automobile accident in
Austria, of parties domiciled in Germany, Austrian law); RAAPE, IPR. 535· (A
contrary view in 2 FRANKENSTEIN 375 is isolated.) Nevertheless, the National
Socialist Decree of December 7, I942, RGBI., Part I, 706 provided that all extracontractual damages between German citizens should be governed by German
law, wherever the act may be done. Recently advocated again by NEUHAus, Book
Review, I6 Z.ausi.PR. (I95I) 65I, 654; BINDER, "Zur Auflockerung des Deliktsstatuts," 20 Z.ausi.PR. (I955) 40I-499, 480, 485, 498.
Italy: Cass. Torino (Dec. I9, I9II) Riv. Dir. Com. I9I2 II I77; 3 FIORE §
1264 and in Clunet I900, 7I9; DESANCTIS, Rivista 1926, r28; FEDOZZI 758.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. 20, I933) NJA. I933, 364, see 7 Z.ausi.Pr. (I933) 93I;
(Dec. 2, I935) NJA. I935, 585, IO Z.ausl.PR. (I936) 624.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 30, I940) 66 BGE. II r65 (implicit); Cour Geneve
(Sept. 20, I957) Sem. Jud. I958, 555; ScHNITZER vol. I p. 133, vol. 2 p. 676, prefers
the law with which the case was most closely connected.
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connected with the local administrative and insurance policies.
These bind everyone in the territory, as expressed for instance in the International Convention on Motor Traffic
providing that the driver is bound to observe the laws and
regulations of the country where he travels. 68
This seems also to be the general attitude of common law
lawyers. It is true that once, in I 862, an English judge,
Wightman, in a dictum stated that in an action brought by
a British subject against a British subject the common law
should be applied if it was more favorable to the plaintiff
than the law of the place of wrong. 69 This proposition seems
never to have been followed in England70 and there are
numerous cases in the United States where it was not even
taken into consideration, although the facts of the case might
have invited its application. 71
However, in a group of cases involving foreign-committed
unfair competition, the German courts and writers have considered that common German nationality of both parties or
rather their common German domicil, should determine the
application of the more severe German law. 72 This specific
problem is to be discussed in connection with the complex of
violations of commercial property. 73
2.

Local Actions
In the common law jurisdictions of both the British Empire

68 Paris Convention on Motor Traffic of April 24, I926, art. 8, HuosoN, 3 Int.
Legislation at I865; Pan-American Convention, Washington, Oct. 6, I930, art. Io,
HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation at 790.
69 Scott v. Seymour (I862) I H. & C. 2I9, Ex. Ch.
70 However, Machado v. Fontes [I897] 2 Q.B. 23I, is regarded as a practical
application by CHESHIRE 274 and FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 820. Also MoRRIS,
"The Proper Law of a Tort," 64 Harv. L. Rev. (I950-5I) 88Iff., 885, advocates
the common personal law in certain situations.
71 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (I909) 2I3 u. s. 347, 29 s. Ct. 5I I;
Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby (I9I2) 222 U. S. 473, 32 S. Ct. I32; Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co. (I929) 252 N. Y. I27, I69 N. E. I I2; Alabama, Great Southern
R. Co. v. Carroll (I892) 97 Ala. I26, rr So. 803. An indication to the contrary in
Grant v. McAuliffe (I953) 4I Cal. (2d) 859, 867, 264 P. (2d) 944, 949·
72 I8 RGZ. 29; 55 id. I99, and others, see infra p. 297 n. I78.
73 Infra pp. 295 ff.

THE PRINCIPLE

247

and the United States, actions involving determination of
title to real estate are still regarded as "local actions," i.e.,
as actions which can only be pursued in the forum where the
land is situated and which are always to be decided in accordance with the law of that place. 74 Prevailing English and
American opinion has extended this rule to actions for trespass to land. 75 This historical residue of the English jurisdictional doctrine has shocking results amounting to outright denial of justice76 and has no counterpart anywhere
outside the common law countries.
3· Protection of Defendant Nationals of the Forum
While the English and Japanese rules that a claim for
tort must be actionable under the law of the forum result in
protection for every defendant, in Germany a special limitation upon the application of the law of the place of wrong
has been established in favor of defendants of German nationality alone. Article I 2 of the Introductory Law to the German
Civil Code provides expressly as follows:
"By reason of an unlawful act committed in a foreign
country, no greater claims can be enforced against a German
than those constituted by German law."
74 See KuHN, "Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law (I9I8),"
66 U. ofPa. L. Rev. (I9I8) JOI; WHEATON ,"Nature of Actions-Local and Transitory (I922)," I6 Ill. L. Rev. (I922) 456; WICKER, "The Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory Actions (I926)," 4 Tenn. L. Rev. (I926) 55·
76 Restatement §§6q,6I5; BritishSouthAfricaCo. v. CompanhiadeMo~ambique
[r893] A. C. 6o2; Livingston v. Jefferson (r8rr) rs Fed. Cas. 66o; Ellenwood v.
Marietta Chair Co. (r895) 158 U.S. ros, ISS. Ct. 771, recently joined by Arkansas:
Reasor Hill Corp. v. Harrison (I952) 220 Ark. 52I, 249 S. W. (2d) 994· Arizona
Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co. (I920) 236 Mass. 185, 128 N. E.
4· Contra: The Minnesota courts, Little v. Chicago etc. R. Co. (r896) 65 Minn. 48,
67 N. W. 846; Peyton v. Desmond (1904) 129 Fed. r; and New York Real Property
Law,§ 536.
In England, the principle is not applied if the tort claim is secured by a maritime
lien, The Tolten [1946] P. IJS, rr Giur. Comp. DIP. (1954) 149·
76 GooDRICH states that "the more reasonable view seems opposed to the selfimposed limitation of jurisdiction, which seems an archaic survival of outworn
rules of venue." (73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1924) 24-25; Handb. 27I); KuHN, supra n.
74, 301. LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 56 adduces a very impressive example.
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The interference of the local law is understood to involve
the existence of liability as well as the measure of damages.
Thus a defendant of German nationality is not condemned,
if under German private law he lacks capacity to commit
tort, or his act is deemed lawful, or the negligence of the
plaintiff was overwhelmingly superior, or the period of prescription has elapsed. 77 It suffices, however, that the award is
agreeable to German law under some other theory, such as
undue enrichment. 78 The application of article I 2 to the cases
has been proved very difficult. 79 For its nationalistic narrowness, the rule was widely criticized, 80 until in the recent dark
period it has found praise in Germany. 81
4· Public Policy as a General Limitation
The various rules discussed above protecting the law of
the forum in certain cases against the law of the place of
wrong, are specially formed expressions of the general
principle that reserves the public policy of the forum. This
safety valve for an "outraged feeling of justice"82 remains
available in addition. For example, in case a man was wrongfully killed, a European court that regarded him a subject
of the forum would certainly disregard the common law exRAAPE 2!1, VII, I; n8 RGZ. I4I; I29 RGZ. 385, 388.
RG. (Sept. 29, I927) II8 RGZ. I4I.
79 See the laborious discussion by RAAPE 209, 2I3 (a); WALKER 530.
80 2 ZITELMANN 505; KAHN, I Abhandl. 446; WALKER 534; NEUMEYER, IPR.
(ed. I) 32; LEwALD No. 326 in .fine; RAAPE 209, I, and IPR. 534, "the entire doctrine
repudiates the provision."
81 RuooLPH ScHMIDT, Ort der unerlaubten Handlung I93 enjoys "the protecting
effect of article I2 for Germans by helping the German (defendant) even though
he may hurt a foreigner, "and looks to EG. BGB. art. 30 (public policy) for further tight protection.
The provision has been copied in China, Int. Priv. Law, art. 25 par. 2, and in the
Brazilian Draft, art. 86, which contained more such nationalistic clauses (arts.
85-88), but does not appear in the Introductory Law of I942. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal (Sept. Io, I925) 51 BGE. II 327, 329, does not exclude application of the
law of the forum if it were more advantageous to the defendant!
82 NIBOYET 6I6; 2 WHARTON 1095 required a fundamental difference of policy.
77
78
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isting at an American place of wrong and not providing a
satisfactory remedy. 83
A former opinion which has been reflected in recent Italian
writings, has argued that an obligation to pay damages resting upon a penal statute of the forum possesses extraterritorial
effect at the forum as a unilateral special norm, applicable
despite a foreign locus delicti. 84 By far the prevailing doctrine
rejects this thesis sharply. But the C6digo Bustamante has
turned a seemingly related consideration even into a general
exception to the application of the lex loci delicti, punishable
deeds or omissions being subjected to the law containing
the penal statute; it is very difficult to understand the working
of this rule. 85
Fortunately, the known cases where courts in this country
and elsewhere have refused the application of foreign tort
law on the ground of an offended policy of the forum are
very few. 86 There are ethically grounded divergences, such as
those regarding the right of a spouse to damages from a person who has alienated the other spouse's affection. An Italian 87
and possibly a German 88 court would dismiss such an action
based on English or American law. The Swiss Federal Court,
83 App. Aix (Jan. 23, I899) IS Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 42 (collision on the high
seas); Germany: RAAPE 223. Similar isolated suggestions have been made for acts
deemed immoral at the forum (RuDOLF ScHMIDT, op. cit. supra n. 8I at I93) and
fraud or gross negligence (PouLLET § 3I9).
84 The Italian writings by MANZINI, CHIRON, and SERENI are discussed by
MIELE, 5 Giur. Camp. DIP. 84 n. 3·
86 C6digo Bustamante, art. I67: Those (obligations) arising from crimes or
offenses are subject to the same law as the crime or offense from which they arise;
art. I68: Those arising from actions or omissions involving guilt or negligence not
punishable by law shall be governed by the law of the place where the negligence
or guilt giving rise to them was incurred.
86 For the United States see HANCOCK, Torts 86: "quite unusual;" STUMBERG
I 98 collects only a few cases.
87 3 FIORE § I267.
88 RAAPE I98 advocates even in this case the enforcement of the foreign law.
H. and L. MAzEAuD, 3 Responsabilite civile (ed. 2, I934) § 2240, and EsMEIN in
6 Planiol et Ripert § 558, discard foreign rules that would not recognize legitimate
defenses; and adopting this suggestion for Belgium, PIRSON et DE VILLE, 2 Traite
de Ia responsabilite civile extra-contractuelle (1935) 320 § 407 propose to eliminate
foreign laws not making a person liable for fraud and grave fault. Where do such
laws exist?
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on the other hand, has upheld an action for disruption
of marriage, despite the contrary Danish domiciliary law of
the spouses, though basing the decision on an additional
Swiss place of wrong rather than on public policy. 89 Most
applications of public policy have been examples of the wellknown feeling of superiority. Thus, when a governess, who
had been gravely injured by the child of her employer in
Hawaii, sued for damages on the ground of parental liability,
adopted in the Hawaiian Islands as in all French-influenced
legislations, the Supreme Court of California in dismissing
the claim, revived the similarity doctrine and applied-in
1927-the harsh common law rule of the state, as if it were
a modeP 0 The Court seems to have felt as the Supreme Court
of the United States did considerably earlier in applying what it then regarded as the "true" common law rule,
namely, the antiquated fellow-servant doctrine under the
theory that it embodied the "general law"; for this reason,
the claim of a fireman against a railway under Ohio law
was defeated, in a case where the plaintiff had suffered injury
in an accident in Ohio due to the locomotive engineer's negligence. 91 The French Supreme Court once declined to give
effect to a bank monopoly in the territory of Monaco because of the freedom of commerce in France. 92 The courts,
including American and French, seem to have endeavored
more recently to avoid such "provincialism," as Cardozo
has termed it in a famous tort case. 93 We shall encounter,
89 BG. (June IS, 1917) 43 BGE. II 309, 317, cited with approval in Gordon v.
Parker (1949) 83 F. Supp. 40, 43, Clunet 1950, 258, alf'd 178 F. (2d) 888.
90
Hudson v. Von Hamm (1927) 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374; see the just
criticism in the Notes, 13 Cornell L. Q. (1928) 266, 26 Mich. L. Rev. (1928) 439·
• 1 Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh (1893) 149 U. S. 368. Chief Justice Fuller,
in his dissenting vote, said that the decision unreasonably enlarged the fellow
servant exemption of the employer.
92 App. Aix (Dec. 19, 1892) S.I893·2.201, aff'd, Cass. (req.) (May 29, 1894)
S.I894-1.481. Contra: NIBOYET 616 n. 3; BARTIN, 2 Principes 404.
93 LoucKs v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198.
See, for instance, the express denial of an objection drawn from public policy in
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however, a few borderline cases. 94 And occasionally courts
contrive the application of their own law by such devices as
finding at all costs a place of wrong within the forum. 95

5. Rationale
In some countries, the doctrine referring to the law of
the forum derived support from analogies with penal law,
under the continuing influence of Savigny. This lasted longer
in Latin America than elsewhere, but it has ended also
there. 96 Neither jurisdiction nor choice of law can be organized on the same lines for criminal offenses and private
tort obligations. Even where a court of criminal procedure
is authorized to award equitable damages in ancillary proceedings-the so-called procedure by adhesion-it has to
follow its own internal law.
Application of the law of the place of wrong has often
been based on the idea that a right to damages is vested in
the injured person by that law,97 or in the famous variant
of Mr. Justice Holmes, that the law of the place of the act
is the only source of the obligation on which the case depends.98 These attempted justifications merit the same reproach as the vested rights theory in generaJ.99
Loranger v. Nadeau (I932) 2I5 Cal. 362, 10 Pac. (2d) 63 (liability to a guest
passenger).
French Trib. Valenciennes (Dec. I9, I935) Revue Crit. I936, 468 (fraudulent
seduction, as opposed to status questions).
94
Infra Chapter 25, pp. 274-276.
96 E.g., Germany: ISO RGZ. 265, 27I on which see infra pp. 297 n. 179, 298,313

n. 39·

Italy: Cass. (April2, 1927) Foro Ita!. Mass, 1927 II 472, cited by MIELE, 5 Giur.
Comp. DIP. 84 n. 1.
96 See, for instance, 2 BAR u8; ALcORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 346; 3 VIco I37 § 159.
97 United States: BEALE, 3 Summary§§ 1-5, reproduced 3 BEALE 1968; Cardozo,
]., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (I918), supra n. 93, 224 N.Y. at
120; more cautious, GooDRICH 261.
98 Mr. Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican Nat'! R. Co. (1904) 194 U. S. 120,
126; in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 U.S. 542, 547· Similarly,
it is said in France that the law of the country is competent where the accident
as generating factor occurs; see CREMIEU, 5 Repert. 491 No. 6.
99 CooK, 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 202, Legal Bases 3II.
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European authors, continental and English, have been
more inclined to explain the rule upon grounds of policy. A
person owes obedience to the law of the country in which he
is actually present. It is that law under which he is living
at the time of the conduct complained of, and it is that law
alone which can claim to determine the legality or illegality
of his actions, 100 the law to whose standards he must elevate
his behavior. He who stays in a state is subject to the legal
order of that state, or, according to the old fiction, he "submits" himself to the state. 101 At the moment of the act, the
author and the victim of a wrong move in social surroundings
in which they may appreciate their risks and potential liabilities under the local law. The reasonable expectations of the
parties cannot be protected otherwise. 102
In recent years, however, this individualistic and educational theory has been partly replaced by the governmental
consideration of social policy that regards the law of torts
as a law of "social defense" and under which it appears that
the state where the injury occurs has a predominant interest
to protect the injured private interests and to determine the
legal effects of injury. The primary object of the law of
torts is to regulate the social order and prevent its infringement; the secondary concern is to compensate the victims of
violations of this order. The state cannot fulfill this duty
without including foreigners in its commands. 103
This line of thought leads back to the more solid part of
the ancient theory of territoriality. Every state has a legitiCHESHIRE 267.
As late as I933, Mr. Justice Brandeis in Young v. Masci (I933) 289 U. S.
253 applied this idea to a nonresident owner of a car who authorizes its use in the
state. See infra Chapter 25, p. 270 n. 72.
1 02 RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong," 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1945) 4, 17ff. Contra:
DRION, "De ratio voor Toepassing van vreemd recht in zake de onrechtmatige daad
in het buitenland," Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis I949, 3, 63, who holds the idea
of uniformity of decision for controlling.
1 03 See the various arguments of 8 LAURENT 24 § ro; RoLIN, I Principes 577;
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE §§ 252 and 294; BARTIN, 2 Principes 417; PouLLET § 3I7.
100
101
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mate interest, right, and duty to determine the licit or illicit
character and the effects of acts committed on its soil. 104
In this sense, the law of torts has been classified in France
under the heading of the "laws of public safety and police"
(lois de surete et de police), declared in article 3 of the
Civil Code to be imperative. 105 These laws do not present
"public policy" in contrast with a foreign applicable law, but,
as public law, are territorial by virtue of their normal force. 106
Each state is said to be in the best position to evaluate its local
conditions, as well as the habits and needs of its population. 107
Finally, the interests of the injured person are emphasized
when it is apparently felt that the natural place for the victim
to seek redress would be the place where his injury occurred,
and if he cannot sue in this jurisdiction, he should at least be
treated upon the basis of its law.
Some of these arguments may appear phrased too neatly
and open to one objection or another. But the principle of
the lex delicti commissi ought not to be deduced from a
single, all-embracing rationale of absolute validity. In searching the relatively most convenient local contact for an alleged
tort, it is reasonable and relatively simple to connect it with
the territory where it was committed. There remains, of
course, the additional task of determining the territory in
which a tort should be considered as having been committed,
and this choice has been unhappily influenced by individual
selection from the mentioned reasons for the lex loci delicti
commissi.
The advantages of the principle of the lex loci delicti commissi are strong enough to have secured to it an almost universal adherence. The English rule, on the other hand, al104 FEoozzr 759: It is logical that the law governing on the territory determines
the effects and consequences of its own violation; \VALKER 522; BARTIN, 2 Principes
387 § 330.
105 3 FIORE § 1263; NIBOYET § 490.
106 CREMIEu, 5 Repert. 493 No. 13.
101 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) § 120.
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though it has found favor with a solitary French author108
and indulgent consideration in this hemisphere, 109 has lost
ground in England itself. Cheshire recognizes fully the
"superior claim of the lex loci." Inasmuch as the English
rule requires actionability under the English law of the
forum, he tried to excuse this requirement as a clear-cut application of the principle of public policy, easy to be applied
because of its simplicity. 110 This is an exorbitant and harmful
kind of public policy, however, explained only, as Hancock
remarks, as a remainder from the time when the common
law jurisdictions "dimly perceived" the conflicts problem. 111
The consequences in the courts of Canada are deterrent examples.112 American and Continental lawyers alike claim
that a state which assumes to regulate conduct carried on upon
its soil ought to concede a corresponding power to all other
states. While a state may refuse to apply in its criminal courts
any criminal law other than its own, such an exaggerated extension of public policy in matters of private law contradicts
the very idea of conflict of laws.
108

VALERY 974 § 676.
RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong," I9 Tul. L. Rev. (I945) 4, 23; IJ U. of
Chi. L. Rev. (I945) III advocates it; FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 809 refutes it.
11 CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 302, abandoned in later editions.
111 HANcocK, Torts 88.
112 HANCOCK, Torts 89, supra n. 57·
109

°

CHAPTER

25

The Scope of the Principle
1.

The Law of Wrong Governs Capacity to Commit a Tore

HIS universal rule operates in Continental and English Courts as a considerable breach in the personal law,
while it conforms to the territorial doctrine maintained
in the United States subjecting transactions of various kinds
to the law of the place where the "act is done."

T

Illustration. An American youth of I 5 years, by driving
a car in Brazil, injures a person. In all courts, his responsibility is to be determined according to the Brazilian Civil
Code, article I s6, which is understood as rejecting liability
of persons under sixteen years. 2 A Brazilian boy of the same
age, acting in Venezuela, is capable according to his faculty
of discernment (Venezuelan Civil Code, article I I 86).
Equitable compensation for damage done by an irresponsible individual, now frequently provided after the pattern
of article 829 of the German Civil Code,S is naturally Included in the law of wrong. 4
1
Restatement §§ 379-381 (by implication).
Germany: RAAPE 197.
Italy: App. Firenze (Dec. 5, 1945) MoNITORE I946, 48 (invoking the local penal
and police law).
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 579 No. IS4·
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. rr No. 2.
Switzerland: BECK I37 n. 20. Contra: for the present law, 2 ScHNITZER 677 with
formalistic arguments.
Proposal of the International Law Association, Report of the 47th Conference
I956, p. 373, rule III (2).
2 J. M. DE CARVALHO SANTOS, 3 C6digo Civil Brasileiro Interpretado (ed. 3,
I942) 298; CLovrs BEVILAQUA, I C6digo Civil (ed. 6, 1940) 420.
3 The Belgian C. C. art. I386 bis, as amended by Law of April I6, I93S, formulates
the idea more correctly: the judge may hold a lunatic or abnormal person liable to
pay what he would be obligated to, if he had control of his acts.
4
However, HARTIN, 2 Principes 398 § 333 would follow French public policy in
the case of a French defendant.
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2.

Unlawfulness

Liability for tort, in contrast to other forms of liability
created by law, presupposes that the conduct causing the
harm be unlawful. This requirement has two phases regarding the type of interests invaded, and the circumstances of
the invasion.
(a) Illicit conduct. The various legislations determine differently the spheres within which private persons are protected and those left to free action by the other members of
the community. A fundamental cleavage exists between the
two great systems, of which one establishes separately shaped
torts and the other recognizes a general tort liability. The
first is represented by the common law as well as by the
Roman law and the German Civil Code, the second by the
French Civil Code and its numerous followers.
The primary question to be asked under the law of wrong
is, therefore, whether the facts complained of constitute forbidden conduct. In regard to omissions, which cannot be
tortious without violation of a general duty, it seems to be
recognized, conforming to principle, that the duty must be
imposed by the law of the place of wrong. 5 Thus, failure by
a locomotive driver to signal at a railway crossing, and failure
of an employer to guard dangerous machinery, are considered wrongful to the extent admitted by the law at the
place. 6 What the extracontractual duties of a bank are in paying a check, is determined by the locallaw. 7
(b) Authorized acts. An invasion of interests, not ordinarily allowed, may yet be lawful under particular circumstances constituting justification and excuse. The law of
wrong determines these exceptions to liability such as selfdefense, defense of other persons or of the interests of the
state, consent or assumption of risk by the injured person,
5 The question is, however, what place this is. See infra Chapter 26, p. 312.
• See Restatement § 384; HANCOCK, Torts ro7.
7 App. Paris (June 23, r899) Clunet r9or, I28.
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legislative, judicial, or executive acts, or authorization by the
state. 78
The Restatement (§ 382) mentions some of these defenses for the particular purpose of assigning them to the
law of the place of "acting" rather than to the law of the
place where the harm is done. At this juncture, it is important only that they are not governed by the law of the forum.
However, it should be noted that the existence and extent
of disciplinary rights of husbands, parents, guardians, teachers, and so forth are governed by none of these laws but
are subject to their proper conflicts rules. Whether, for example, a father may forcibly coerce his child or a husband
may open the letters of his wife, depends on the family law
applicable. As we have seen before, in American courts such
incidents are usually determined by the temporary common
residence of the parties, which may be, or may not be, identical with the place of wrong or the forum.
3· Causation and Fault
(a) Causation. There are not five or more meanings of
causation to deal with here, but only two, a logical and a
juridical denotation. Causal nexus, causation in its only
logical meaning, exists when the conduct complained of is
one of the antecedents in the sequence of events resulting
in the injury-a ccconditio sine qua non"-i.e., the harm
would not have happened if the act had not been done. Such
causal connection, although necessary for any liability, a
requirement sometimes neglected, 8 is not the only qualification of a juridically significant causation. The doctrines concerning its other elements vary. The Anglo-American doctrine of proximate causation, the German theory of "adequate
causation," and the French view halfway between the first
7• England: Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink (1946) [1947] K.B. I (C.A.), 41 Am.
Int. Law (1947) 948 (privileged document).
a Even PoLLOCK, Torts 123 fails to make these concepts clear.

J.

TORTS
two, have much in common, as they all seek to eliminate the
influence of extraordinary events on the reasonably foreseeable course of things. But they vary in details. 9 Also among
the jurisdictions of this country, certain differences exist, for
instance in regard to the scope of proximate effects. 10
The principle implies that all courts observe the rules of
the courts at the place of wrong.
(b) Fault. The law of wrong further determines, whether
fault is a condition of liability and, if so, whether it may be
ordinary negligence (culpa levis in Romanistic language) or
has to be gross negligence or wanton recklessness (culpa
lata) or some intermediary degree of culpability (culpa in
concreto) .11 A divergent standard used at the forum certainly does not involve public policy. 12
American courts, for instance, hold an automobile driver
liable to a guest passenger for injury suffered, as the law
of the wrong requires, either for nonobservance of ordinary
care and skill or only for gross negligence. 13 The law of
the forum is immaterial in this regard.
Mere questions of evidence respecting negligence, 14 of
course, are determinable by the law of the forum. Jury findings, moreover, may be uncontrollable to the extent to
which they follow a foreign view. 15
(c) Contributory negligence. The law of wrong governs
any behavior of the plaintiff influencing causation or avoidable consequences. This conduct, despite such expressions as
9A

comparative study has been undertaken in my I Recht des Warenkaufs 473ff.
Illustrations in Restatement § 383 and by HANCOCK, Torts 108.
11 Restatement § 379·
12 Expressly to this effect, in the case of a more severe standard for the forum:
L0ranger v. Nadeau (1932) 215 Cal. 362, IO Pac. (2d) 63; Eskovitz v. Berger (1936)
276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883.
13 See the collection of cases by HANCOCK, Torts 105. Against the usual superficial
assertions that degrees of fault are practically impossible, see Trueman, J. A., in
Knutson v. Rawn [1943] 2 D. L. R. 582.
1 4 For burden of proof and presumptions see infra 1o(b) pp. 283 ff.
15 HAMSHAW, Note, 4 Mo. L. Rev. (1939) at 305; cj. the informathe note by
HANCOCK, Torts § 33 on determination of facts by court or jury.
10
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contributory negligence, cannot be "fault" in the strict sense
of the word, which would require the existence and violation
of a duty toward another person. What the plaintiff may have
infringed, was a precept for his own benefit. But his conduct
is evaluated in analogy to the standards of the care due to
others. 16 The law of wrong is competent to define the effects: 17
whether plaintiff is barred from his action according to the
common law principle of contributory negligence, 18 whether
his action depends on somewhat more modern theories such
as that of "last clear chance," or the recovery of damages is
subject to a deduction proportionate to the plaintiff's contribution to the end result. 19

Illustrations: (i) A brakeman injured in the Province of
Quebec suing his employer in Vermont, was permitted recovery under the Quebec theory of comparative negligence,
although Vermont law shared in the common law doctrine
of contributory negligence. 20
(ii) The plaintiff's conduct having contributed to the
damage, done in a place where French law was in force, the
Reichsgericht applied the doctrine of the French courts of
balancing the actions of both parties, although the Reichsgericht itself had developed a different theory when the Code
Napoleon was in force in the Rhineland. 21

If under a statute a party is liable without fault, as a
railway may be in case of accident, this party's own claim for
damages suffered in such case will generally also be reduced
by reason of having contributed to its own damage by mere
causation. In any case, the law of wrong decides how to
estimate the factors of the damage.
Cj. 2 Restatement of the Law of Tort § 463.
n Restatement § 385.
1 8 The Canadian Supreme Court in Ottawa El. R. Co. v. Letang [1924] S. C. R.
470 applying Ontario law as that of the place of wrong dismissed the action, in
subordinating contributory negligence (wrongly) to the maxim "scienti non fit
injuria."
1g For cases, see STUMBERG r88 n. 25; HANCOCK, Torts III n. 6.
20 Morrisette v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (1904) 76 Vt. 267, 56 Ad. rro2.
21 RG. (March 12, 1906) JW. 1906, 297·
16
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Illustration. A street car of the plaintiff, a Swiss company,
collided on the territory of the Swiss Canton Basel with the
motor truck of the German defendant. The German courts
applied the Swiss law of March 28, 1905, on the liability of
railroads for risk, to judge the quasi liability of the plaintiff
street car company; assumed negligence of the defendant
under article 41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations; and
distributed the damages in the proportion of two-thirds to
one, according to article 44 of this Code. 22

In a singular American case, a wife was injured by a third
person in an accident for which her own husband was jointly
responsible. Her claim against the tortfeasor was made
dependent on the question whether her husband would
benefit by her recovery. This latter question was subjected
to the law of the place of wrong, 23 by exaggerating the usual
encroachment of this law on family relations.
Characterization. All these rules are substantive and susceptible of foreign application. This has been fully realized,
not only in cases where the laws of the place of wrong and
of the forum agreed in characterizing their rules on contributory or comparative negligence as substantive in all
respects, 24 but also where the rule of the forum was regarded
as "procedural for most purposes." 25 We may add that,
even if at the place of wrong concurrent fault of the plaintiff
is treated as a bar to his action under some procedural view,
the action has to be dismissed because this is the "law" to
which we are referred. This probably is true everywhere
without regard to the usual fallacies of "characterization."
22

OLG. Karlsruhe (Oct. 28, 1931) IPRspr. 1932 No. 41.
Traglio v. Harris (1940) 104 F. (2d) 439; Note, 127 A. L. R. 813.
24
Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co. (1929) 252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. I 12
(applying Ontario law); HANCOCK, Torts 120 n. 17.
25 Precourt v. Driscoll (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 At!. 525; Kingery v. Donnell
(1936) 222 Iowa 241, 246, 268 N. W. 617, 62o; Restatement §§ 385, 595 comment
a; RoBERTSON, Characterization 259.
23
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4· Proper Plaintiff
The lex loci delicti governs: 26
(a) Beneficiary of the tort claim. Thus, a Scotch court
dismissed an action of a woman seduced in London on the
ground that English common law gave the right of action
to her parents only. 27 In the United States, the death statute
of the state of wrong decides the beneficiaries on behalf of
whom representative action should be brought. 28
Suppose an American is negligently killed in Switzerland
by a German. The personal action does not disappear as
under common law, nor does any American death statute
apply, neither will the German rule govern, entitling the
relatives having a legal claim to be supported by the
deceased. Instead, all courts will apply the Swiss rule under
which all persons deprived of their support by the death may
sue for compensation. 29
Consistently, the Quebec court has applied the domiciliary
law of Massachusetts to the action of a husband for the loss
suffered by himself through the death of his wife. 30 Notably,
the Belgian Supreme Court applying the French law of workmen's compensation to a minor's death occurring in France,
has refused an exception of public policy against the French
provision granting the right to sue only to the relatives
living in France at the time of the accident. 81
On the other hand, it is correct for a court of a civil law
country to assume that the applicable statute of distribution
26 Sapone v. New York Central R. Co. (1927) 225 N.Y. Supp. 2rr, Clunet 1928,
795 criticized in procedural respects in Note, 37 Yale L. J. (1928) 666; WHARTON
1127; GooDRICH 298 § 104; LORENZEN, 47 Law Q. Rev. (1931) at 497; KuHN, 21
Recueil (1928) I at 263.
27 Ross v. Sinhjee (r89r) 29 Scot. L. R. 63.
2 8 HANCOCK, Torts 124; see ibid. his considered review of the cases dealing with
the interpretation of the statutes ordaining distribution of the damages in the same
proportions as personal property of a deceased intestate.
29 See Swiss Code Obi., art. 45 par. 3, if. German BGB. §§ 844 par. 2, 845.
30 Lister v. McAnulty [1943] Que. K. B. 184.
31 Belgium: Cass. (Feb. 21, 1907) Pasicrisie 1907.I.I35·
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determines who is the beneficiary after the death of an injured person having acquired an inheritable right against
a tortfeasor. Thus, where a domiciliary of New York had
suffered an automobile accident in France and died in New
York, and the surrogate's court of New York appointed an
executor, the French Court of Cassation recognized this
executor as a successor to be the right plaintiff to enforce the
tort action in France, whereas the court below had insisted
that according to the French law, being the lex loci delicti,
the heirs had to appear. 32 Evidently, the courts were not
aware of the American controversies regarding the application of death statutes. In any event, an American court should
recognize in this case that French law, including its conflicts
law, decided to whom the action belonged.
(b) Indirect harm. Whereas in many legislations, including the French, all persons injured by the tortious act are
entitled to claim damages, in others, particularly in German
law, only the person "directly harmed" may sue. If, for
instance, goods sold but not delivered are injured and the
title has not passed, the buyer may sue the tortfeasor under
French but not under German law. Which law governs depends on the place of wrong. The same is to be said with
respect to the Anglo-American rule that injury, not malicious
or fraudulent, inflicted upon a person does not give rise to
an action for damages by a third person suffering a loss in his
contractual right against the injured. 33
(c) Plaintiff in own name on behalf of the injured. The
question who may bring the suit on behalf of the party
entitled, in the opinion of Beale, is a procedural matter,34 but
this assertion conflicts with the prevailing practice of applying
32 Cass. (crim.) (June 4,
33 KENNY, 62 C.]. II2o

1941) Clunet 1940-45, II2.

§ JO. On the question of whether seller or buyer or both

may sue for tortious injury to the object of a sales contract, a complicated proposal
appears in the Final Draft No. I of a Revised Uniform Sales of Goods Act § 127.
34 Restatement § s88; 3 BEALE I60J.
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the death statutes35 governing the wrong. Whether a husband
may enforce the claim of his wife in his own name or a parent
in the name of his or her child is also determined in this
country by the law of wrong (see infra p. 265), whereas
abroad the law governing marital property36 applies.
5. Proper Defendant
(a) Co-obligors. Although a few authorities have applied
local procedural law to the question whether co-obligors must
be joined in an action, 37 it is the consistent and prevailing
opinion that the entire problem of determining the persons
to be sued pertains to the law of the place of wrong. This includes the questions whether several debtors are liable for
the whole damage jointly, or jointly and severally, or separately, each for the damage done by him, and whether the
action may, or must, be directed against the several debtors
jointly or separately. 38 Only the manner of bringing the suit
against such obligors pertains to the procedure of the forum. 39
(b) Claim against the insurer of the tortfeasor. The injured
person enjoys a direct action against the insurer of the tortfeasor, if, and only if the law of the place of tort gives it.
The French law imposing direct liability on the insurer40
necessarily applied in a case where an automobile accident
See HANCOCK, Torts r26ff.
Canada, Ontario: Lucas v. Coupal (1930) 66 0. L. R. I4I (suit by mother).
Germany: BGB § r38o; E. G. art. 15.
37 General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou (r843) II M. & W. 877, 152 Eng. Re.
ro6r; Fryklund v. Great Northern R. Co. (1907) ror Minn. 37, III N. W. 727;
3 BEALE r6o3.
38 Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co. (C. C. A. 8th 1931) 52 F. (2d) 364; HANCOCK,
Torts 109, n. r6, 132.
39
STUMBERG 245 n. 74•
4 °C. C. art. 2102 § 8, as amended by Law of May 28, 1913; Cass. (req.) (Feb. 24,
1936) Ocean Accident v. Dewinter, D.1936.r.49, S.r936.r.r6r, Revue 1937, 441.
The Appeal Court of Orleans (Dec. 2r, 1936) Nouv. Revue 1936, 751, simply
recognized the lex loci delicti, although it ascribed exclusive jurisdiction over the
Swiss insurer to the Swiss courts, under the then existing text of the French-Swiss
Convention of r869. On the various arguments in the lower courts, preceding
these decisions, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 595ff.
36
36
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occurred in France. It was needless for the French Court of
Cassation to stress the public interest involved. 41
The problem, however, has been regarded as more complicated in this country. On one hand, a statute imposing upon
an insurer direct responsibility to the injured third party has
been held binding with respect to all contracts made in the
state, irrespective of the place where an injury occurs. 42 On
the other hand, cases conflict on the question whether the direct
recourse provided by the state of the place of wrong may be
applied to a foreign insurer who has contracted outside the
state. 43 Although the refusal to apply the law of the place
of injury certainly should not be based on the ground that it
concerns only a remedy/ 4 both opinions have been supported
by policy considerations. 45 But it seems that when the insurance contract covers injuries committed by the insured party
in the state where the tort occurs, there is no valid reason why
41 See the criticism of Cass. (Feb. 24, 1936) supra n. 40, by BATIFFOL, Revue
1937, 441 and EsMEIN, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 86r. Conversely, the direct action was
denied when an accident between French parties took place abroad, Cass. (civ.)
(July 13, 1948) Revue Crit. 1949, 94·
But a Swiss writer, Eo. ScHMID, "Zur Frage der Rechtsanwendung bei Verkehrsunfiillen Schweizerischer Motorfahrzeugbesitzer im Ausland," 35 SJZ. 248, has
urged that the Swiss Law of 1932, art. 49, granting the injured person a direct suit
against the insurer should be applied in the case of Swiss insurance parties and a
German place of accident, while the Appeal Court of Zurich (Feb. 23, 1938) 38
Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. (1939) 356 No. 145, 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) No. 10753 conformed to the (German) law of the place of wrong; in accord, Cour Geneve (Sept. 20,
1957) Sem. Jud. 1958, SSS·
42 HANcocK, Torts 24o; Cormier v. Hudson (1933) 284. Mass. 231, 187 N. E. 625
(statute of the forum); Farrell v. Employers' Liability Assurance Co. (1933) 54
R.I. r8, r68 At!. 9II, Note, r8 Minn. L. Rev. (1933) 737 (implied).
43 Denying the liability: Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1927) 48 R. I. 433, 138
At!. r86; Martin v. Zurich General Accident Co. (C. C. A. rst 1936) 84 F. (2d) 6;
Lowery v. Zorn (C. A. La. 2d 1934) 157 So. 826, 831; McArthur v. Maryland
Casualty Co. (1939) 184 Miss. 663, r86 So. 305, overruling Burkett v. Globe
Indemnity Co. (1938) r82 Miss. 423, r8r So. 316; Ritterbusch v. Sexmith (1950)
256 Wise. 507,41 N. W. (2d) 6u with note in r6 A. L. R. (2d) 88r.
Allowing the recourse: Kertson v. Johnson (1932) 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329
(Law of Wisconsin applied in Minnesota); cf. HANCocK, Torts 241ff. A statute
granting the action in this case is constitutional, Watson v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., Ltd. (1954) 348 U.S. 66.
44
Thus McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1939) 184 Miss. 663, 186 So. 305.
Contra: HANCOCK, Torts 242.
46
Correct: Kertson v. Johnson (1932) 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329; but see
cases and discussion by HANCOCK, Torts 241 whose arguments for doubt I cannot
follow.
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the statute of the state of wrong should not be able to turn the
claim for damages directly against the insurer. 458 Nothing
more is done thereby than that the insurance claim is transferred, by operation of law, from the injurer to the injured,
instead of the longer way of recourse by assignment, which
may be voluntary or by way of garnishment. The insurance
company does not lose any advantage and cannot complain
about any mentionable extension of its liability. Any other
solution jeopardizes the efficacy of the law of the place
of wrong.
6. Influence of Family Relations
American courts extend the law of the place of wrong to
the problems: whether a married person may sue the other
spouse for tort suffered during the marriage/6 and even
whether a claim for injury may be brought after the parties
marry each other in another state/7 whether a claim belongs
to the injured wife 48 or to the husband 49 or to the community property; 50 whether a wife may avail herself of the
claim of her injured husband. 51
Nevertheless, when New York law prohibited litigation
between spouses, the Court of Appeals of New York extended the prohibition to domiciled spouses also in the case
of an injury committed in a state allowing such suits. 52 This
46a Collins v. American Automobile Ins. Co. of St. Louis (1956) 230 F. (2d) 4r6>
dismissed 352 U.S. 802.
46 Dawson v. Dawson (1931) 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414; Howard v. Howard (1931)
200 N.C. 574, rsS S. E. ror; Gray v. Gray (1934) 87 N.H. 82, 174 At!. soB; Darian
v. McGrath (Minn. 1943) roN. W. (2d) 403 (injury in Wisconsin, action against
husband would be allowed despite the contrary domiciliary law of the forum, hence
wife is granted relief against the car owner).
47 Buckeye v. Buckeye (1931) 203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 342 (law of Illinois contrary to the domiciliary law of Wisconsin). See Notes, 29 Mich. L. Rev. (1931)
937, 1072; 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 804; 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) II38; 31 Col.
L. Rev. (1931) 884; 6 Wis. L. Rev. (1931) 103.
48 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Humble (r9or) r8r U. S. 57·
49 Snashall v. Metropolitan etc. R. Co. (r890) 8 Mackey (D. C.) 399; see GooDRICH 328 n. I 8.
60 Justs v. Atchison etc. R. Co. (19ro) 12 Cal. App. 639, ro8 Pac. 328.
61 Usher v. West Jersey R. Co. (r889) 126 Pa. St. 2o6, 17 At!. 597·
62 Mertz v. Mertz (1936) 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597; Note, ro8 A. L. R.
I 126. Against the argument of the court that the common law prohibition of actions
between spouses belonged to procedure, see HANcocK, Torts 236.
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decision has been followed in some other jurisdictions. 53 The
action against the spouse or his insurer may thus fail due to
one or the other of both statutes involved. The New York
court has not allowed its own new policy of permitting the
suit, 54 to prevail against a foreign statute barring it. 55
However, the contrary approach, exclusively applying the
personal law that governs the marital relations, has increasingly found sympathy with American writers. 56 This is the
common view held in all the world. 5 7 In a recent case, 58 Judge
Learned Hand refused to give effect to the common law rule
governing tort in Florida, whereby a husband would be liable
for his wife's tort committed in Florida in his absence. Both
spouses were citizens of New York, and the various reasons
for exonerating this resident from vicarious liability may seem
debatable. 59 The Supreme Court of California determined the
immunity of parents against a tort action of their minor children according to the law of the family domicil. 598 The emphasis on the domiciliary law in these cases confirms the trend.
The Louisiana Court, however, abandoned its domiciliary
principle60 in favor of the prevailing approach in a recent case
where a wife, injured by the negligence of her husband in
Louisiana, sued the insurance company in Louisiana. The
defendant objected that under the law of Texas, the domicil
of the spouses, the claim belonged to the community property
63 Poling v. Poling (1935) II6 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 6o4; Kircher v. Kircher
(1939) 288 Mich. 669, 286 N. W. rzo; Kyle v. Kyle (1941) 210 Minn. 204, 297
N. W. 744 (no action despite the law of Wisconsin).
64 § 57 Domestic Relations Act, as amended by Laws 1937, c. 669 § r.
65
Coster v. Coster (1943) 289 N. Y. 438, 46 N. E. (2d) 509; Note, 146 A. L. R.
702, 705.
66 STUMBERG 206; CooK, Legal Bases 248, 345; HANCocK, Torts 236; RHEINSTEIN, 41 Mich. L. Rev. (1942) 83, 95 and 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) 199.
67
See Vol. I, (ed. 2, 1958) 324,607.
58
Siegmann v. Meyer (C. C. A. 2nd 1938) roo F. (zd) 367.
59 Particularly in extending the position taken by Justice Brandeis and Judge
Learned Hand in the case of an absentee-nonresident employer, on which see
below pp. 267 if. In other respects cj. Note, 52 Harv. L. Rev. (1939) 834; HANCOCK,
Torts 255.
59
• Emery v. Emery (1955) 45 Cal. (2d) 421 at 428, 289 P. (2d) 218 at 223.
60 Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (rgoo) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851.
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fund and only the husband was entitled to sue. The court
disregarded the law of the domicil preferred hitherto.
Instead, it stated that the right to sue would ordinarily be
subject to the law of the forum, but that suing the husband
is also concerned with a substantive problem governed by
the law of the place of wrong which therefore is also to be
consulted. 61 This approach is really untenable.
7. Vicarious Liability
(a) Principle. It may be stated as a universal principle,
though certain limitations are in discussion, that the law of the
place of wrong determines the liability of third persons who
are not tortfeasors, accomplices, instigators, or accessories.
This proviso should be noted. Vicarious liability is not in
question, if the third person is a tortfeasor himself. For instance, if the general concessionaire of an amusement park
has contracted with an independent manufacturer of fireworks
for a display, he may be sued for his own negligence, if he
did not take care that the premises were kept in a safe condition for the public invited by him. 62 He may incur vicarious
liability, however, if he is responsible under the applicable
law for the negligence of the independent contractor.
The liability involves such persons as masters of servants,
parents of minor children, custodians of juvenile or dangerous
persons, schoolmasters or artisans in respect to pupils and
apprentices, employers of independent contractors for risk
inherent to the work, or owners of vessels, as the various laws
may ordain their liabilities. 63 The English case of The Mary
Moxham is typical for the negative side of this principle.
6l Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc. (1942) 12 So. (2d) 253; Note, 18 Tul. L. Rev.
(1943) 319.
62 Sebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein (1900) 64 N.J. Law 624, 46 At!. 631.
Cf. in general, Restatement of Torts § 875 in connection with §§ 430-453.
63 United States: Restatement § 387; Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) 349·
Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, 1936) Jur. Port d'Anvers 1936, 197· See also
PouLLET (ed. 2) 398 § 318 (with some restrictions).
Germany: ROHG. (Jan. 19, 1878) 23 ROHGE. 174; RG. (Sept. 23, 1887) 19
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Negligent navigation in a Spanish harbor not constituting a
cause of liability of the vessel's owner according to Spanish
law, the court in England disregarded the English law which
would have made him responsible. 64 On the other hand, a
Michigan freight transport company using the services of a
truck owner by contract for hauling freight is held answerable
even in Michigan courts for negligence of the independent
contractor, in conformity with the law of the Ohio place
of accident, whereby a common carrier cannot delegate its
duties to ensure public safety. 65
(b) Persons out of state. Although the principle is firmly
established everywhere, except under the dual requirement
of English law, some doubts have arisen respecting the
propriety of the imposition of liability by the state of wrong
on a person, not a subject, who, according to the premises
of our topic, is innocent, though a cause of the tort. These
scruples have taken diverse shapes in this country and in
Europe. A small group of European writers and courts have
claimed that liability cannot be imposed on an innocent third
person except by the law which is considered his personal
law. 66 Otherwise, it has been argued, foreigners lacking any
connection with a state, might be involved, at the pleasure
of the state, in heavy obligations without being able to avoid
RGZ. 382; (July r, r896) 37 RGZ. r8r; (May 30, r9r9) RGZ. 96; BGH. (Dec. 2r,
I956) 23 BGHZ 65, 67. See for other cases LEWALD 267 No. 324 sub (4); RAAPE 226.
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 5, I9r4) W. 9753 (Englishmen damaged
by receipt with false signature issued in Germany by a bookkeeper beyond the course
of his employment in the service of a Dutch firm in Utrecht; § 83r of the German
BGB. applied); H. R. (March r8, I938) W. I939 No. 69 as commented by the Note
(MEIJERS) ibid.
Switzerland: 2 MEILI 94·
64 The Mary Moxham (C. A. r876) r P. D. ro7. Cj. RoBERTSON, "Law for Tort
Liability," 4 Modern L. Rev. (r94I) 35·
66 Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight Co. (r936) 276 Mich. 545, 268 N. W.
887. Restatement § 387 (c) illustration 3·
66 2 BAR I22; 2 ZrTELMANN 533i OLG. Hamburg (April 5, I89S) 6 Z.int.R. no
and (Nov. r2, r9o6) r4 ROLG. 39r; OLG. Karlsruhe (Dec. r8, I9I7) 20 Badische
Rechtspraxis 99 (cited by LEWALD 267).
Switzerland: BG. (April ro, r896) 22 BGE. 47r, 486. A particular opinion has
been suggested by BAR.TIN, 2 Principes 430 § 340: the law governing the contractual
relationship between master and servant. Contra: 2 MEILI 94·
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them. 67 Hence, a Swiss principal employing a traveling salesman, who injures someone in France by negligently handling
inflammable material, would be free from liability under
Swiss law, by proving that he has chosen and supervised his
agent with due care. 68 The prevailing approach allows no
such exemption, the commettant (master) being absolutely
liable for the fault of his prtfpose committed in the course of
the employment in France, according to French law. 69
In this country, in the same vein, two outstanding judges
have penetrated the problem from the angles either of the
constitutional requirement of due process or of a peculiar
requirement brought into the conflicts rule. In both cases the
question was whether the owner of a car, who had been out of
the state at all material times could be held liable for negligence of the driver on the ground of a statute at the place
where the accident occurred subjecting the owner to liability.
The first case was concerned with the New York statute
imposing absolute liability on the owner of a car, if the
negligent driver was "in the business of such owner or otherwise ... legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner." 70 The courts of
New Jersey, the domicil of the defendant owner, applied
the New York statute as lex loci delicti on the ground of the
owner's permission to take the car to the state of New York. 71
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the constitutionality of this choice of law. 72 Mr. Justice Brandeis,
in delivering the judgment, reviewed the various remedies
introduced in American jurisdictions to supplement the insufficient doctrine of principal and agent, among which, in
67

2 ZITELMANN 534·
Swiss Code Obi., art. 55·
French C. C. art. 1384, cf. AMos and WALTON, Introduction to French Law
(Oxford 1935) 259.
70 N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, §59·
71 Masci v. Young (1932) 109 N. J, Law 453, 162 At!. 623. Similarly, Kernan
v. Webb (1929) 50 R. I. 394, 148 At!. 186, 188.
72 Young v. Masci (1933) 289 U. S. 253.

68
69
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a few jurisdictions including New York, statutory liability
has been imposed on the mere basis of the owner's permission
or consent to drive the car into the state. This condition,
under any circumstances, secured such due process of law
as a nonresident could expect. For the defendant who lent
his car to the driver, "subjected himself to the legal consequences imposed by that state ... as fully as if he had stood
in the relation of master to servant." 73
This line of thought has been transposed into the conflict
of laws by the Federal Circuit Court of New York, in a
celebrated decision delivered by Judge Learned Hand, in
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corporation. 14 An automobile sales
corporation of Buffalo, New York, employed a sales agent,
Clemens, who took an automobile owned by the firm to
Ontario and there caused an accident, supposedly by negligence. The statute of Ontario, taken literally (and probably
in its intended meaning), made the owner of the car liable,
unless the car was without his consent in the possession of
another person. 75 Since Clemens might not have acted within
the scope of his employment, the problem was whether the
73 Mr. Justice Brandeis added that "A person who sets a means in movement
whereby injury is inflicted, makes himself liable, whether by responsible agent
or an irresponsible instrument." This is an unfortunate confusion of our case of
an innocent third person with the cases of tortfeasors acting by an intervening
person or by an instrument. On the other hand, 2 BEALE 1297 unnecessarily interprets this passage to the effect that someone who puts an instrument into the hand
of a tortfeasor without knowing that it is to be used in another state, should be
liable under this state's law.
74 Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp. (1934) 68 F. (2d) 942.
76 Two opinions of Canadian barristers on the construction of art. 41 (1), in
the Ontario Highway Traffic Amendment Act, 1930, submitted in Scheer v. Rockne
Motors, supra n. 74, contradicted each other.
No other case in point seems to have occurred. However, in the interpretation
of the majority in Thompson v. Bourchier [1933] 0. R. 525, [1933] 3 D. L. R.
II9, the intention of the legislature was to impose liability on the owner with
whose consent someone else has possession and control of the car. The court excluded the possibility for the owner to evade his liability by parting with the
possession and control and renting the car under an agreement whereby the other
person should comply with all duties of care. It would seem that the owner should
no more be exempted by an agreement not to drive the car into New York. This
broad construction of the statute agrees with the inferences by the New York
court (at p. 495) from two older Ontario decisions.
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Ontario statute, if understood in its more rigid meaning,
could be applied by the court in New York. The court denied
this: "The mere possession of the car did not suffice for
Ontario to reach the defendant," and held that, only "if the
defendant authorized Clemens to take the car into Ontario,
it (the defendant corporation) became liable to the extent
contemplated by the statute."
It is well to bear in mind that neither decision dwells on
the fact that the law of the place of injury was more severe
than that of the defendant's domicil or of another place.
If no vicarious liability arose at the place of wrong, none
would result from the law of the state in which no harm has
been done, whatever this law may predicate.
Finally, the Restatement has concluded the evolution by
a general rule ( § 3 8 7, comment a) :
"In order that the law of the state of wrong may apply
to create liability against the absentee defendant, he must in
some way have submitted himself to the law of that state.
It is sufficient if he has authorized or permitted another to
act for him in the state in which the other's conduct occurs
or where it takes effect .... For analogous situations involving
this problem see §§ 343 and 344" (referring to cases of
contracts made on the authority of a third person). 76
This "analogy" is a delicate point. The Anglo-American
doctrine of the master's liability for torts committed by his
servant has been established traditionally on the assumption
of an authority, but this assumption is fictitious and not really
observed. Whatever is within the scope of the employment
is covered by the liability, even though it may strictly run
against the express orders of the employer. 77 To refer to this
old fiction confuses our problem the more as contract and
tort are essentially different sources of obligation. Where a
76 Restatement, comment a to § 387. The black letter text itself is too vague
and obscure to be discussed here.
77 See WEIGERT, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 53·
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person grants a power of attorney to contract on his behalf
in another state, he fulfills an essential requirement for his
becoming a party to the contract; sending his agent to Rome,
he may be supposed to do as those in Rome do; it is reasonable, in this case, to argue that he has, in some sense, submitted himself to the law of the foreign state. The case of
apparent authority implied by the principal's conduct, is
"analogous." But regulations of traffic on highways and the
corresponding imposition of liabilities are in no sense dependent on the consent of private persons. Only the historical
connection of vicarious liability with the doctrine of master
and servant has induced an enlarged concept of "agency,"
broad enough to destroy its proper meaning. Judges Brandeis
and Learned Hand had still to break a path for the recognition of foreign liabilities beyond the acts of a servant committing a tort within the scope of his employment. Their
opinions have to be read in this historical connection and to
the affirmative effect. Judge Hand took care to express that
it did not matter whether the car owner knew the law of
Ontario and thus plainly accepted the risk of liability under
the Ontario statute. Not that he submitted himself to the
foreign law but that his conduct was a contributory cause
of the injury, was the basis of the New York judgment. It
may perhaps be asked why the mere fact of entrusting the car
to somebody else could not be equally regarded as sufficient.
In no case, however, is the problem concerned either with
agency proper, which requires a legal transaction on behalf
or on account of the principal, or with the proper concept of
instrumentality which presupposes that the third person
himself is a tortfeasor. The idea of the Restatement that a
state could not make any private person liable for a tort
committed on its own territory, unless this person submitted
himself to this state, is antiquated. The old and universal
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liability of the owners of vessels for collisions, irrespective
of their consent to anything, not to speak of the ancient
liabilities for slaves and cattle, should have been a warning.
A county court in Pennsylvania has correctly held that the
resident owner of a dog was absolutely liable for the dog's
biting a person thirty miles away in New Jersey, in accordance
with the New Jersey law and regardless of negligence required at the forum. 78 Moreover, the Restatement admits
that the law of the place of wrong decides whether an actor,
at the time of the injury/ 9 is acting within the scope of his
employment, 80 and whether an acting person is an independent contractor or a servant. 81 It would seem logical that the
same law should determine whether a car owner has permitted his wife to use the car; what the circumstances are under
which a car owner is deemed to permit his wife or son the use
of the car; and whether the permission of use must refer to
the particular state or only to foreign states in general, or
whether the simple abandonment of "possession" suffices (as
seemingly in the Ontario statute). If the foreign state's jurisdiction or law really depended upon a consent of the party, its
court would have to consult his domiciliary law respecting
the existence of this premise. Indeed, Zitelmann, who developed a line of thought similar to the two American
decisions,82 considered vicarious liability governed by the
personal law of the third person.
Reducing the overextended and oversimplified rule of
the Restatement again to the original thought, there remains
the constitutional limitation asserted by the Supreme Court,
and, as the result of the New York decision, a public policy
78
79

rich,
8°
81

82

Fischl v. Chubb (1937) 30 Pa. D. & C. 40; Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 738.
Followed, Venuto v. Robinson (C. C. A. Jrd 1941) uS F. (2d) 679, per Good.

J.

Illustrations 1 and 2 to Restatement § 387.
Illustration 3 to Restatement § 387.
2 ZITELMANN 541.
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disapproving of foreign liability for risk, unfair to an absentee.
But there are few, if any, foreign types of liability to be
feared. Nowhere is a car owner made liable without any
possibility of exemption. 83 There exists a broad risk liability
under a German law84 and a severe liability established by
the French Court of Cassation for any injury by an "inanimate thing'' (C.C. art. 1384) except when it is proved
that the injury was unavoidable or caused by concurrent fault
of the injured,S 5 yet in both cases not the car's owner as such
is liable but its "custodian" (Halter, gardien) i.e., a person
exercising all care, supervision, and factual disposition of the
vehicle. An American firm sending its car to Algiers to be
used there by an employee at his discretion would be liable
for the latter's negligent acts as master of a servant but not
because of the use of the "inanimate thing."
Thus, the case of the Ontario statute is rather infrequent.
Even in this case, it has been pointed out that liability for
transferring a dangerous object to another does not appear
extraordinary. 86 There is much to be said for this view.
Vicarious liability, in general, has often been conceived as
a special application of the doctrine that risk connected with
an enterprise should be borne by the person entertaining
the enterprise. Who has the profit should have the loss, on
the principle of acting at one's own peril-a classical principle of English law, lately recognized on the continent. 87 A
principal's liability for his servant has usually been justified
in this way, and so it may also be explained why an acquirer
of a house in France becomes immediately liable for purely
83

See RHEINSTEIN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 82 No. 2.
German Law of May 3, I909 on traffic of motor vehicles, as amended.
85 Cass. (civ.) (July 29, I924) BESSLERES, S.r924.I.32I, D.I925.r.5; Plenary
Decision of the United Chambers (Feb. IJ, 1930) D.I930.I.57·
86 GooDRICH 279 § 98.
87 WIGMORE, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History," 7 Harv. L. Rev.
(r894) 3I5, 383,441 at 454, and n. 4· On the various modern theories, see YouNG B.
SMITH, "Frolic and Detour," 23 Col. L. Rev. (I92J) 444, 453, 455·
UNGER, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr (1904) initiated an extensive literature.
44
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accidental injuries caused by a collapse of the house. 88 No
one will doubt that this liability extends to foreigners.
Applying the law governing the wrong to the accessory
liability of third persons affords, in the eyes of the German
Supreme Court, the additional advantage of consistency in
deciding, under one law, the obligations of both the tortfeasor
and his joint debtor in relation to the injured party. 89 Also
the assessment of indemnity and contribution between the
codebtors will be facilitated thereby, although, of course,
the internal recourse of one debtor against his faulty associate
is governed, according to its source, by the law governing
the employment contract, the bailment, the parental, or any
other underlying relation. 90
(c) Other effects of public policy. While the New York
Court has narrowed the application of a foreign tort law
for the sake of public policy, the Connecticut Court has enlarged the extraterritorial effect of a statute abnormally.
A statute in the latter state provides that "any person renting
or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall
be liable for any damage to any person or property caused
by the operation of such motor vehicle ...."The court applied
the provision to an injury occurring outside the state, by
the construction that the statute formed a part of every
contract. 91 Thus, by an unprecedented, broad statutory liability of the bailor to third party beneficiaries and its extraordinary extension to foreign injuries, the injured person
See the commentaries on French C. C. art. 1386.
German RG. (July I, 1896) 37 RGZ. 181; LEWALD 268; RAAPE 226.
90 BARTIN, 2 Principes 432.
But if no such relation between the tortfeasors exists, as frequently in traffic
accidents, contribution is governed by the law of the wrong, Charnock v. Taylor
(1943) 223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E. (2d) 9II; Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe (1951)
366 Pa. 322, 77 A. (2d) 319.
91 Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co. (1928) 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163.
Notes, 29 Col. L. Rev. (1929) 210; 42 Harv. L. Rev. (1929) 433; 27 Mich. L. Rev.
(1929) 462; 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1929) 410. The New York Statute has not been
applied to injuries in other states, Miranda v. Lo Curto (1928) 249 N. Y. 191,
163 N. E. 557·
88
89
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acquires a new and unexpected right. This decision has been
benevolently discussed by thoughtful writers under the supposition that a true and better justification of the statute
is that it may have been regarded as intended to induce renting companies to select their customers carefully. 92 But, if so,
why should not a dealer selling cars be subjected to a similar
educational policy? There does not seem to exist any urgent
reason for interfering with conflicts law by unusual local
policies.
The famous rejection of the foreign liabilities of a shipowner for the negligence of a compulsory pilot in The Halley
and by the Reichsgericht 93 have been ironically illuminated
by the English Pilotage Act of 1913, which introduced such
liability into the English law, and the Brussels Convention
of 1924 on the liability of owners of seagoing vessels, which
provided for liability in case of definitive international
arrangements.
8. Damages for Tort
At common law, the right to damages was regarded as
a remedy subject to the law of the forum, 94 with the questionable justification that it is a general right to recover such
damages as the court may choose to give. At present, however, excepting some doubts in England and express provisions in some East Asian countries94S, prevailing opinion,
STUMBERG 204/f.; HANCOCK 238,
Supra p. 242; see RoBERTSON, 4 Modern L. Rev. (1941) 33 n. 35·
94 England: See, for example, Baschet v. London Illustrated Standard Co.
(1900) r Ch. D. 73 (infringement of French copyright in France).
United States: MrNOR 488; Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'! Bank (1904)
127 Iowa 153, 98 N. W. 918, 102 N. W. 836, but evidently the court disapproved
of the Illinois liberal rule on credit damages, cj. RoBERTSON, Characterization 269;
for other cases see Note, What Law Governs the Measure of Damages? 14 Minn.
L. Rev. (1930) 665, 669 n. 17.
94
a China: Decree of Aug. 5, 1918, art. 25 par. 2.
Japan: Law of r898 on private international law, § II par. 3·
Siam: Law of 1939 on private international law, § 15 par. 3·
92
93
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abroad 95 as well as in this country,96 does not hesitate to
include the right to damages in the substance of the tort
obligation or, for that matter, of any obligation. Accordingly,
the law of the place of wrong governs the problem universally
and in all respects. As Holmes stated in a famous dictum, the
law of the place of the act, "only source" of the obligation
for tort, "determines not merely the existence of the obligation but equally determines its extent/' 97 or, without the
peculiar note reminiscent of the vested rights theory, "the
measure of damages for a tort is determined by the law of
the place of wrong." 98 The great weight of Anglo-American
authority supports this doctrine. 99
Thus the Minnesota court has awarded damages superior
to the amount recoverable under the law of the forum, for
wrongful death in an accident in Montana. 100 In Connecticut,
damages for a tort committed in New York have been regarded subject to New York law. 101 "Remoteness" of damages finds the same treatment. 102 In case a sailor has been
negligently killed in Dutch waters, a Belgian court awards
damages, estimating the circumstances and excluding funeral
expenses in accordance with Dutch law. 103 Damages for non95 BARTIN, 2 Principes 407 § 336.
Canada: Mr. Justice Duff in Livesley v. Horst [1924] S. C. R. 6o5, [1925] I
D. L. R. 159, construing Cope v. Doherty (1858) 2 De G. & J. 614,44 Eng. Re. II27;
cj. HANCOCK 123.
96 See SEDGWICK, I Measure of Damages (ed. 9) § 1373; WHARTON §§ 427a, 478c.
97 Slater v. Mexican Nat'! R. Co. (1904) 194 U. S. 120, 126.
98 Restatement §§ 4I2, 414, 415, 417, 419, 42I.
99 More recently, e.g., Rauton v. Pullman Co. (1937) 183 S.C. 495, 502; 191 S. E.
416, 419; Wynne v. McCarthy (C. C. A. roth 1938) 97 F. (2d) 964, 970 with references; Smyth Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (1942) 128 F. (2d) 697, 702
(by Goodrich, J., speaking of tort and contract); 2 BEALE § 412.2; GooDRICH
251 § 91; CHESHIRE 673, but see 674; HANCOCK, Torts IIJff.
100 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock (1894) 154 U.S. 190.
101
Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil (1925) 103 Conn. 390, 405, 130 At!.
794, 8oo.
102 See for England, CHESHIRE 673; RoBERTSON, Characterization 270.
103
Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, 1936) Jur. Port d'Anvers 1936, 197, 36 Revue Dor
1937, rs8.
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pecuniary loss, physical pain, and suffering, as well as for
mental anguish, are accorded when granted by the law of
the place of wrong, irrespective of the lex fori. 104
Influence of lex fori. But the last mentioned problem has
sometimes been treated in another way. Although such types
of damages as were not foreseen at the place of wrong will
be refused, recovery has also been denied in the converse
case where they were alien to the law of the forum. How
much does public policy interfere in this matter? Pure
penalties, certainly, may not be awarded on the ground of
a foreign law. 105 But a statute providing for recovery of
exemplary damages "is not a penallaw." 106 Nor are statutory
provisions that include pecuniary recovery, inestimable loss,
and compensation for injured feelings, in a lump sum ("penance," "satisfaction," "Busse" 107 ). An amount fixed in a
death statute for all cases represents "the legislature's approximate estimate of reasonable compensation" and is enforceable in other states. 108 On the ground of a railway or
automobile accident in France, damages for "tort moral"
104 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith (1909) 135 Ky. 462, 122 S. W. 8o6; Texas etc.
R. Co. v. Gross (1910) 6o Tex. Civ. App. 621, 128 S. W. II73; Davis v. Gant
(Civ. App. Texas 1922) 247 S. W. 576; Boyle v. Southern R. Co. (1go1) 36 N. Y.
Misc. 289, 73 N.Y. Supp. 465; Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France (1953)
209 F. (2d) 436, 438; BEALE § 421.1 p. 1339 n. 8; HANcocK II8 n. II, 120 n. 16.
Germany: OLG. Kalmar (April 29, 1913) 6 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil-und
Prozessrecht 137.
Scotland: Cf. supra p. 241. Naftalin v. London, Midland & Scottish R. Co.
(1933) s. c. 259; M'Elroy v. M'Ailister [19491 S.C. IIO (accidents in England, no
solatium, under Lord Campbell's Bill).
1 05 2 BEALE § 421.1.
106
Mr. Justice Brandeis in James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry
(1927) 273 U.S. rr9, citing Huntington v. Attrill (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 666.
107 Examples are the double and treble damages and fixed monetary penalties,
incorrectly refused extraterritorial application in various state decisions, see
HANCOCK, Torts rr8; Swiss Code Obi., art. 47, "reparation morale"; German
BGB. § 847 and special laws.
108
HANCOCK, Torts II9 and n. 13; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Nichols (1924) 264
u.s. 348.
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in accordance with French law have been awarded in Austria
and Germany. 109
It should be added that courts may easily find the
desired liberty of discretion under almost any rule of the
world. Modern legislations without provision for juries,
which follow the pattern of the Swiss Code of Obligations,110
leave the judge a broad margin in appreciating the damage
and equitably considering the reciprocal situation of the
parties. Even apparently unpliant rules are usually applied
in their own jurisdictions with considerable discretion.
The only serious restriction to the rule may result from
insufficient procedural machinery at the forum. However,
it may be questioned how rigidly the domestic procedure
ought to be conceived. The Supreme Court in a famous
case 111 has correctly stated that the Mexican law governing
the tort obligation would have granted the plantiffs an
annuity that could be judicially modified under circumstances,
while the law of Texas, the forum, provided a lump sum,
and that the court had to follow the conflicts principle and
hence not award a lump sum. Nevertheless, by the determination that the Texas court had no power to make and superintend a decree such as the Mexican law prescribes, and the
consequent dismissal of the suit, both the assumption of
jurisdiction and the conflicts rule were practically frustrated.
So long as courts must stumble over limitations on their
power and narrowly construed procedural rules, adjustment
10 9 Austria: OGH. (Nov. 2, 1910) GIU. NF. 5219.
Germany: OLG. Kolmar (April 29, 1913) 6 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil-und
Prozessrech t I 37.
Similarly, France: BARTIN, 2 Principes 409·
110 Swiss Code Obi., arts. 43, 44 par. 2.
Mexico: C6digo Penal, art. 31 par. I.
Thailand: C. C. art. 438 par. I.
China: C. C. art. 218.
111 Slater v. Mexican Nat'! R. Co. (1904) 194 U. S. 120
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of the machinery necessary for reciprocal application of laws
is severely impaired. Why should any American court not
be directed by its legislature to render decrees which Mexican
courts are able to issue and which are perfectly similar to
alimentary decrees familiar to this country? Under the constitutional conceptions of most other countries such doubts do
not even appear. Otherwise, the characterization of damages
as a problem of procedure, wrong as it is, would have a great
practical advantage!
How simply the problem can be internationally managed
is illustrated by the Warsaw Convention on International Air
Transport concerned with the converse case. In the carriage
of passengers, liability of the carrier is limited to the sum
of 125,000 francs. "Where in accordance with the law of
the court seised of the case, damages may be awarded in the
form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value
of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs." 112
9· Other Sanctions
Apart from damages, the effects of a tort may consist
in a declaratory judgment or exemplary damages, specific
restitution ("in integrum," "in natura"), and restraint from
continuance or repetition. A lively discussion in France has
been concerned with the interprovincial treatment of "astreinte," i.e., an order to pay a sum periodically so long as the
cause of damage continues or so often as the cause is reiterated.
Was this kind of judgment, developed in the French courts,
to be applied in the case of a tort committed in France
proper, by a court of Alsace-Lorraine where alongside of
French private law German civil procedure was in force?
The literature has recognized "astreinte" as substantive
112 Art. 22, r, HuDSoN, 5 Int. Legislation roo at r r2. The Hague Protocol of
Sept. 28, 1955, set the maximum amount at 250,000 francs. We may also point to
the treatment of damage in admiralty proceedings infra Chapter 27, p. 352.
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despite its origin in the courts and enabled the plaintiff to
elect this relief, in addition to direct enforcement provided
by the procedurallocallaw. 113
Also, all other forms of injunctive decrees or judgments
serve special purposes of the substantive right and should
be granted, on principle, on the basis of the law governing
tort. Thus, such specific reparation as recovery of an unlawfully opened letter, public revocation of a public libel, reemployment of a worker improperly dismissed, may be
decreed, unless the machinery of the forum is really unable
to accommodate itself to the task.
1 o.

Relation to Procedural Law

(a) In general. In the traditional view, conflicts law provides for the application of rules and standards of the state
considered most closely connected with the legal relations of
the parties; but by what steps and in what order of activities
the rights and duties thus created are to be enforced, is the
object of the procedural law of the forum. This apparently
simple distinction between "substance" and "procedure" has
more recently revealed its difficulties in incipient special investigations; it has been materially affected, on the other
hand, by a gradual reduction of the large scope assigned to
procedure in the Anglo-American courts. The Restatement
started with the orthodox principle, yet it seems to concede
considerable space to the application of foreign law, though
its statements, vague and contradictory, 114 testify to the
draftsmen's uneasiness. In fact, among the various problems
involving demarcation between foreign substantive law and
the procedure of the court seized of litigation, few are ripe
118

See the description of the controversy by

J.

DoNNEDIEU

DE

VABRES 589,

590.
114 Restatement §§ 584ff.; criticized by MoRGAN, "Choice of Law Governing
Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1945) 153ff.
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for solution, and not a few arguments of contemporary discussion are debatable. The well-justified tendency to enlarge
the domain of the applicable foreign law, indeed, should not
be exaggerated. One would think that an Anglo-Saxon institution such as the bipartition of judicial functions between
judge and jury is an exclusive concern of the forum. Despite
all the influence on the decision of cases exercised by jury
verdicts or by the different mentalities of learned judges and
laymen, 115 the modes of organizing matters of procedure
are a part of the administration of justice. Conflicts law does
not purport to counterbalance all the differences of countries
and courts. We have to be satisfied with presenting to the
court the requisites of the cause of action ("substance") and
the final request in the form most similar to that in a court
of the state referred to. A party seeking redress for a tort
or even defending in a state where the tort has not been
committed, must be content with the machinery and the
habits of the forum in finding the facts. Nobody could seriously insist on the privilege of having a jury decide his case,
despite any guarantee furnished at the locus delicti, if the
forum does not allow a jury in his case. Theoretically, the
two questions involved are rather simple and seem wellknown to the courts. The first question concerns the set of
facts forming the cause of action; this set is determined by
the law governing the tort. Thus, if the plaintiff's alleged
conduct, under the statutes and authorities of the foreign
place of wrong, constitutes contributory negligence barring
relief, the forum takes over the foreign qualification of this
conduct as a part of the applicable substantive law. 116 The
115 On this point, after a most interesting discussion of the cases, MoRGAN,
supra n. I I4, at I7I is hesitating. He believes in a balance of arguments and
refrains from advising the courts whether the forum should conform to the foreign
rules concerning the use of the jury.
116 Wieden v. Minneapolis, St. Paul etc. R. Co. (I930) I8I Minn. 235, 238;
232 N. W. ro9, IIo; Smith v. Brown (I939) 302 Mass. 432, 433, I9 N. E. (2d) 732,
733 and later decisions of the Massachusetts court, see MoRGAN, supra n. I q,
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second question, procedural under all theories, is that of
ascertaining the facts, and judging them according to the
foreign standard. It is naturally the law of the forum that
decides whether a jury is to be charged and how the verdict
is to be framed.
Of course, there are difficulties inherent in the distinction
between facts and law; they are enhanced by the subtle
shades of distinctions concerning verdicts in the courts of this
country. However, these difficulties would be considerably
aggravated by their transfer into conflicts law. Maintaining
the principle that the applicable law is that of the place of
wrong and that the ascertainment of the facts pertains to
the procedure of the court, including the intervention and
direction of a jury, the task of the forum will be facilitated
rather than involved.
(b) Burden of proof. At civil law, distribution of the
burden of proof, always understood as fixing the burden of
persuading the courts, is sharply distinguished from trying
of evidence, and is considered substantive law in every
regard. 117 Therefore, no one doubts that a rule, under which
a plaintiff suing a railway for injury is relieved from the
burden of showing the defendant's negligence, belongs to the
law governing the wrong. 118 This is the more readily acknowledged, as this lightening of the plaintiff's task is commonly
at 166. The decision in Pilgrim v. MacGibbon (1943) 313 Mass. 290, 47 N. E. (2d)
299 seems to apply the same principle, advocated here: the Nova Scotia law of the
place of the accident, including judicial decisions defining gross negligence in a
comparable case, determines whether a given set of facts does or does not constitute gross negligence, requisite of an action of a gratuitous passenger; the law of
procedure, however, determines whether there is sufficient evidence to take the
case to the jury on the question whether the defendant conformed to the standard.
Similarly, Gregory v. Maine Central R. Co. (1945) 317 Mass. 636, 59 N. E. (2d)
471, 159 A. L. R. 7I4.
117 RG. (April I7, I882) 6 RGZ. 4I3.
Switzerland: I6 BGE. 783, 790; 2o id. 496; 24 id. II 357, 390.
C6digo Bustamante, arts. 398, 401.
Benelux-Draft, art. 24 par. 2.
118 2 BAR 383; 2 ZITELMANN 253; DIENA, 2 Prine. 399i MEILI-MAMELOK, IPR.
403; I FRANKENSTEIN 363; NussBAuM, D.IPR. 413.
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felt to rest half way between the traditional liability for
negligence and the modern cases of absolute liability. It may
be construed either as a qualified liability for fault or as a
moderated liability for risk. 119 One of the most powerful
reasons for reforming the law of tort was the experience
that victims of business carried on by big and complexly
organized enterprises are unable to identify the source of
harm somewhere in the central or local machinery responsible
-an "emergency of evidence." 120 This difficulty may be
overcome by reversing the roles and presuming the negligence, without entirely eliminating the requirement of fault.
Not all "presumptions" have an analogous meaning, but
they are generally deemed to present rules modifying the
burden of proof. 121 Prima facie cases, however, are often
believed to pertain to the procedural field of evidence. But
this does not agree, for instance, with the universally settled
practice in maritime tort cases, that navigation contrary to
the local port or river regulations amounts to negligence by
an average experiential conclusion (prima facie case), so long
as the assumption of fault is not deprived of its empirical
value of counterproof. The evidence that the defendant
vessel has followed the wrong side of the road or shown
red instead of green lights, replacing until counterproof the
evidence of negligent navigation, reverses the burden of proof
for negligence, quite as a legal presumption de facto does; the
judge need not be convinced of the truth of negligence,
because this additional fact is supplied by experience. 122 Likewise, negligence is assumed from the breach of a statutory
duty, such as the obligation to clean the sidewalk, until a
us T1TZE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handwi:irterbuch 681.
"Beweisnotstand," AooLF ExNER, Der Begriff der hi:iheren Gewalt (vis major)
(1883) esp. 46,
121 See, e.g., VON TuHR, Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrechts (1924) 142.
122 RABEL, Der Prima Facie Beweis, in Festheft fiir Adolph Wach, 12 Rheinische
Zeitschrift fiir Zivil-und Prozessrecht 428; accord, HEINSHE1MER, 13 id. r.
120

so.
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more probable causal connection is shown by expert evidence.123 In a suit of a guest passenger injured in a territory
of German law, a French court even adopted the reduction
of proof resulting from the practice of the Reichsgericht,
which presumes prima facie that any unlawful bodily harm
is negligent! y done. 124
American law. American courts, in the wake of English
tradition, have long persisted in allocating all these matters
to the broad procedural field of evidence. 125 However, not
only are "conclusive presumptions" commonly said to be of
substantive nature/ 26 but a vigorous trend favors the same
characterization for other rules regulating the burden of
persuasion. 127 The matter evidently pertains to those slowly
shifting from informal preferences of judges hearing evidence
to tight rules of law for deciding cases. The New Hampshire
court has recognized as a part of the Vermont tort law the
rule that the plaintiff has to show his freedom from contributory negligence. 128 In other cases there may be doubt.
The Restatemene 29 seems to reflect this uncertainty. While
123 Dawson v. Murex, Ltd. [I942] I All E. R. 483, C. A.
Germany: RG., JW. I904, 408; I909, 687; I9rr, 980; I9I2, 390 and often since.
124 App. Colmar (May 29, I934) Clunet 1936, 626.
125
Philip L. Gregory v. Maine Central R. Co. (1945) 3I7 Mass. 636, 59 N. E.
(2d) 47I, 159 A. L. R. 7I4.
126
WIGMORE, Evidence (ed. 3) § 13S4, cf. §§ 2483-2491; Restatement § S9S
comment c.
127 See MAGUIRE and MoRGAN, "Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence,"
Harv. L. Rev. (1937) 9Io; HAMSHAW, "Conflict of Laws as to Presumptions and
Burden of Proof," 4 Mo. L. Rev. (1939) 299; HANCOCK, Torts 112, ISS· Rationes
dubitandi, however, have been developed by MoRGAN in his important article cited
supra n. 114, s8 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) at 190ff. On the difficulties wrought by (I) the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of I938, (2) the submission of the federal courts to
the conflicts law of the state where they sit, see UHL, Note in 37 Mich. L. Rev.
(1939) I249; MoRGAN, op. cit. at 17off.
128 Precourt v. Driscoll (I93I) 8S N.H. 28o, IS7 At!. 52s; accord: Fitzpatrick v.
lnt'l Railway Co. (I929) 2S2 N.Y. 127, I69 N. E. I I2, cj. KuHN, Camp. Com. 307;
Francis v. Humphrey (I939) 2S F. Supp. r. Cj. LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws
198 on the application of the Arkansas statutory presumption against railroad
companies.
129
Restatement § S9S and comment a; see also 3 BEALE §§ S9S·2, S9S·3; GoooRICH 238 § 84; STUMBERG 136; Note, 78 A. L. R. (I932) 883.
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it assigns "presumptions" to the law of the forum, it contrasts them with foreign requirements concerning proof of
freedom of fault, which are interpreted at the place of injury
"as a condition of the cause of action itself, or as affecting
the nature or amount of recovery." But the comment adds as
explanation, what in reality stands as a well-established
rule, 130 that foreign rules shifting the burden of proof should
be applied where "the remedial and substantive portions of
the foreign law are so bound together that the application
of the usual procedural rule of the forum would seriously
alter the effect of the operative facts under the law of the
appropriate foreign state." 131 This formula evidently is a
sign of the present transitory stage in recognizing the substantive nature of permanently fixed presumptions for the
purpose of conflicts law. Any rule including a presumption
fixing the burden of persuasion, should always be taken as
a part of the applicable law, 132 while no such rule can be
advocated with respect to other categories of presumptions. 133
(c) Conditions of bringing suit. If the wrongdoer in an
automobile accident in Florida has died, the administrator
of his estate may be sued in Tennessee despite the domestic
rule of this state allowing such suit only in case the wrongdoer has been previously sued in his lifetime. 134
In a similar way, provisions requiring service of notice
of the claim upon the defendant before suit for damages can
13 ° Central Vermont R. Co. v. White (I9IS) 238 U. S. 507; New Orleans etc.
R. Co. v. Harris (I9I8) 247 U. S. 367; Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves (I937)
89 F. (2d) 528, 530.
1 1
3 Restatement § 595 comment a.
132
But MoRGAN, supra n. I I4, 58 Harv. L. Rev. (I944) at I90, I93, professes
grave doubts. On the different meanings in which res ipsa loquitur is understood,
see PROSSER, "The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur," 20 Minn. L. Rev.

(I936) 241.
133 Approximately to the same effect, MoRGAN, supra n. I I4, at I93·
134
Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co. (I934) I68 Tenn. 49, 73 S. W.
(2d) 698.
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be brought, are applicable when part of the law of the place
of wrong, 135 irrespective of the law of the forum. 136
I I.

Relation to Contractual Obligations

(a) Distinction in the municipal laws. Tort and contract
form an antithesis, but historic connections between them still
persist, as in the English controversy whether an anticipatory
breach of contract may not be a tort, or in the French discussion whether a breach of contract produces an obligation
for damages under article I382 of the Civil Code, the
cornerstone of tort recovery. The general view of modern
legal science, however, precisely separates tortious and contractual obligations. Each source of obligation is characterized
by its own premises and effects. It may be that the facts of
a case create a claim in contract and another in tort. The
normal rule is that in such case both rights are at the disposal
of the injured party137 in some kind of concurrence. If a
tenant wantonly cuts the trees surrounding a rented cottage,
the landlord may sue him on the contract or for destructive
waste ( Aquilian culpa, in other laws). Of course, he cannot
request damages twice for the same loss. The concurrence
ua Sawyer v. El Paso & N. E. R. Co. (r9o8) 49 Tex. Civ. App. ro6, ro8 S. W
7r8; Husted v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (r9ro) 143 Mo. App. 623, 128 S. W. 282,
138 Contra: Arp v. Allis Chalmers Co. (1907) 130 Wis. 454, rro N. W. 386 under
the theory of a general statute of limitation.
137 England: PoLLOCK, Torts 426; WINFIELD, Text-book of the Law of Tort
(ed. 2, 1943) 717 § 191; SALMOND-STALLYBRAss, Torts 8. United States: PROSSER,
Torts 20 r ff.
France: Despite great confusion the practice tends to accumulate the benefits
for the plaintiffs, as in the case of carrier liability for personal injury, see the critical
review by JosSERAND, Les Transports (ed. 2, 1926) § 894 bis, ter. and the resume
by EsMEIN in 6 Plano! et RrPERT 683 § 493·
Germany: 88 RGZ. 317, 433; 89 id. 385; 90 id. 68, 4ro; 99 id. 103; 103 id. 263;
ro6 id. IJJ. The doctrine followed therein, with its exceptions (infra n. 149) was
initiated by FRANZ voN LrszT, Die Deliktsobligationen im System des Biirgerlichen
Gesetzbuchs (1898) !2-IS.
Italy: Cass. (April 27, 1937) Giur. Ita!. Mass. 1937, c. 395; App. Milano (Nov. 5,
1937) Giur. Ita!. 1938 I 2, 53; App. Bologna (April 20, 1938) Foro Ita!. Mass.
1938 No. 34·
Switzerland; 64 BGE. II 259; 67 id. II IJ6.
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is not "accumulative" in this sense. Sometimes, it is true,
there exists reluctance to admit concurrence. Thus, for instance, the Restatement of the Law of Torts, in a modern
view,138 recognizes a tort liability when a lessor of land fails
to make repairs that his contract calls for and the lessee is
bodily harmed thereby; but it denies that there is a contractual obligation for damages. 139 In a similar thought, the
same Restatement carefully states a tort liability for negligence in performing gratuitously promised services for the
safety of another person, evidently on the assumption that
when services are promised for consideration, the contractual
claim takes care of the damages and no tort action is given. 140
Such exclusion of rights should be confined to certain narrow
common law situations.141
Another difference of views concerns the nature of the
concurrence. At common law, from the times when the
plaintiff had to "waive the tort" for the purpose of suing
in assumpsit on a fictitious contract, there seems to exist a
strong tendency to think in terms of remedy rather than
of rights and to offer the plaintiff the remedies only for his
selection. Sometimes, the plaintiff's declaration of choice is
even said to be final. 142 In this country, the jurisdictions are
divided. At present, however, many courts allow the injured
to pursue both actions, 143 and this is the prevailing Continental doctrine. 144 Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to all
See HARPER, Torts § 103 n. 84.
§ 357·
140 § 325.
1H On the reluctance of a part of the American courts to recognize that the
modern liability of carriers for safe transportation may produce contractual as
well as tortious effects, see infra p. 291.
142
See PROSSER, Torts 1127 n. 12. Similar views occur in Latin America, e.g.,
CARVALHo SANTos, 3 C. C. Brasileiro, supra n. 2, 317 No.4·
143
See PROSSER, Torts 202 n. 85; WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § rp8.
144
Germany: 63 RGZ. 308; 87 id. 309; 88 id. 317; 88 id. 433; 89 id. 385; 90 id.
68, 410 etc.
Switzerland: 26 BGE. II ros; 35 id. II 424; 37 id. II ro; so id. II 378 su/J (2).
138
139
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advantages either remedy may afford him, as to facts to be
proved, defenses, joint liability of defendants, statutes of
limitation, extent of compensable material damage, reparation
of nonpecuniary damage, vicarious liability of third persons,
and so forth. In the United States, tort actions as a whole
are considered to be the more advantageous remedies, 145 while
they are usually less profitable in Germany. 146
A similar relation exists with respect to the parties involved. A passenger injured in a railway accident may sue
the railway company which sold him the ticket in contract,
as well as the company on whose tracks he suffers harm in
tort. 147 Or one plaintiff may sue the defendant for tort
damages, while another on the same facts claims a breach
of contract by the defendant. 148
On the other hand, if the law of contracts restricts the
extent of the promisor's duties, the French and German
doctrines definitely infer that he cannot be deemed liable
for more under tort law. Also, an English plaintiff is not
allowed to disregard any limitation of liability under the
contract by alleging a broader liability in tort. 149 For instance,
as a gratuitous deposit makes the bailee liable only for fraud
and gross negligence under French and German laws, 150 a
simple failure of ordinary care in the custody is not enough
to substantiate a tort action. The American courts that have
PRoSSER, Torts II23. A similar opinion prevails in France.
RABEL (supra p. 228) 26.
147 PoLLOCK, Torts 432.
148
PoLLOCK, id. 437·
149 England: SALMOND-STALLYBRASS, Torts 9, although not really supported
by the case of 1933 cited ibid. note (i).
France: Cass. (Jan. II, 1922) S.1924.1.105 and Note; JossERAND, Les transports
(ed. 2) 610 § 628: "La responsabilite contractuelle refoule Ia responsabilite delictuelle a laquelle elle vient se substituer, .•. du moins dans Ia mesure oil les rapports
(des parties contractantes) sont fixes par Ia convention."
Germany: RG. (June 20, 1916) 88 RGZ. 319, 320 as generally interpreted.
Switzerland: BG. (May 21, 1941) 67 BGE. II 132, 137.
15 0 French C. C. art. 1927; German BGB. § 690.
146

14&
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borrowed from Roman law a similar restriction of the bailee's
contractual liability, by the intermediary of Chief Justice
Holt's doctrine, 151 are likely to decide in the same manner
on the tort aspect in the absence of statute, on the theory that
the creditor has assumed the risk.
(b) Conflicts law. Obviously, on principle, conflicts law
ought to follow the described conceptions prevailing in the
modern municipal laws that tort and breach of contract
generate two independent and concurrent rights, also when
the supporting facts (excepting the existence of the contract)
are identical. 151 a The correctness of this proposition is even
more self-evident when the causes of action arise from a tort
committed in one jurisdiction and from the breach of a
contract governed by the law of another jurisdiction.152 In
further conformity with this general approach, the injured
may combine both actions, unless the court, following procedural rather than substantive considerations, restricts the
plaintiff to a choice between the causes of action.
The American cases, unfortunately, lack consistency, but
they seem to approach the same result. Apart from workmen's
compensation, to be discussed separately, 152a they are mainly
concerned with railway and carrier liability.
Injury inflicted on a passenger in a railway accident has
always been held sufficient as a possible ground of tort.
Several courts, however, following the lead of the New
York Court of Appeals, have awarded damages on the ground
that the plaintiff entered into a contract with the railway
161

257·

Coggs v. Bernard (1704) 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Re. 107; PROSSER, Torts

l61a The Czechoslovakian Law on private international law of 1948, s. 48, expressly excludes claims based on violation of a contractual obligation from the
conflict rule on torts. In accord 2 ScHNITZER (ed. 3) 598.
162 This argument has been pointed out by BART1N, 2 Principes § 335· For
Germany the obvious result has been briefly mentioned by M. WoLFF, IPR.
162a See vel. III, ch. 42, p. 402.
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whose ticket he bought. 153 Thus, the contract was a protection
to the plaintiff, in the New York court, in a case in which
the tort action was barred by statutory limitation at the place
of wrong/ 54 as also in a Texas case where the tort action was
frustrated by the plaintiff's failure to give notice of his claim
under the law of New Mexico, while the contractual claim
was independent of this failure according to the law of
Pennsylvania. 155
The contrary leading case of Pittsburgh Railway v. Grom156
contends that "the duty of the carrier to use proper care in
the transportation of the passenger is one imposed by law,
and the right of action grows out of the liability which the
law imposes rather than out of the contract of transportation."
The court construed this contract as evidenced by the ticket
which contained no express promise of care or to transport
the passenger in safety. We are, thus, in the continued presence of an ancient theory, which is evidently also connected
with the idea that the tort is exclusively committed at the
place where the injury occurs. 157 More advanced thinking
has realized that the ordinary carrier's liability at common
law also presupposes a contract of transportation, is implied
in the contract, has to be read into it. The modern development needs a clear vision of the contractual fundament of
accessory duties. It goes even farther, by acknowledging also
the contractual ties between the customer and ulterior carriers.
It is interesting to compare with both views the international conventions on carriage of goods, and more recently
also on transport of passengers, which support "actions arising
out of the transport contract" against the railway of dispatch
163 See HANcocK, Torts 192, 193. RoBERTSON, Characterization 182 seems to
advocate the same solution.
154 Dyke v. Erie R. Co. (1871) 45 N.Y. IIJ.
166 Sawyer v. El Paso etc. R. Co. (1go8) 49 Tex. Civ. App. 106, 108 S. W. 718.
166
Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Gram (19II) 142 Ky. 51, 133 s.
977·
157 Infra Chapter 26 pp. 302ff.
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or departure, respectively, the railway of destination, and
"the railway on which the cause of action arose.n1 58 The last
mentioned action, despite its possible connection with the
contract, is visibly based on tort.
An extreme variety of treatment appears in the cases concerned with misdelivery or delayed delivery of goods by
carriers or of messages by telegraph companies, dating from
the period before federal legislation regulated a large part
of such business. The courts have referred to the law of the
place of contracting, to that of performance, or to the law
of the place of wrong, which again has been found either
at the place where prompt and correct delivery should have
been made or at the place where the negligent acts were
done. 159 The Restatement does not even mention contractual
actions in this connection. The apparent inconsistency of the
courts may be explained in part by their desire to help the
plaintiff, because he lacks the benefit of the option that he
ought to have. In the telegram cases of Arkansas, Leflar has
demonstrated how this benevolence has been manifested
in a striking manner. In order to allow recovery under Arkansas law, which annulled clauses exempting the telegraph
company from liability, the Arkansas courts applied their
own law as the law of contract to outgoing messages and
as the law of the place of wrong when the delivery had to
be made in the state. 160
The liability of employers for injury suffered by their
employees, before the workmen's compensation legislation
came into force, was clearly determined. The employee had
m International Convention concerning the Transport of Goods by Rail, Rome,
Nov. 23, 1933, art. 42 § 3, 192 L. of N. Treaty Series 391, 443, HuosoN, 6 Int.
Legislation 527, 554·
International Convention concerning the Transport of Passengers and Luggage
by Rail, Rome, Nov. 23, 1933, art. 42 § 2, 192 L. of N. Treaty Series 329, 361.
HuosoN, id. s68, 582.
16 9 See HANCOCK., Torts 194-198 and resume 199·
uo LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 188 § 78.
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the choice between the law governing the employment contract and the tort action governed by the law of the place of
the accident. The courts maintained this liberal attitude in
regard to the fellow servant doctrine and its counterparts;
even if in the state whose law governed the employment
the common law doctrine still barred suits on the contract
as well as for the tort, the courts of this same state awarded
tort damages upon the foreign law of the place of tort. 161
Stipulations for exemption from liability. Agreements
"contracting out" or limiting the responsibility for tort, if
they are not covered by international agreement, ought to
follow appropriate conflicts principles concerning contracts.
In fact, in the United States the question whether future
personal injury claims can be reduced by agreement between
a passenger and a transportation enterprise, is usually treated
as a contract problem, although the claims themselves are
regarded as tort claims. 162
Thus, the law governing a contract clearly is competent
to answer the question whether a stipulation generally exempting the debtor from future liability is to be construed
as including his responsibility under the theory of tort. Under
the same rule, a waiver by which a debtor is released from
his existent obligation arising out of tort, must be judged
according to its own merits rather than to the law of the
place of wrong. But the main problem, of course, is that
concerning the permissibility of exemption clauses. This problem, commonly complicated in the courts by a rivalry between the law governing a contract and the public policy of
the forum, may entail more difficulties when the law of the
place of wrong prohibits an anticipatory renunciation of
181 For cases see HANcocK, Torts 207 n. 3·
162 Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc. (1935) 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N. E.
692; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724.
England: Jones v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 2 K. B. 730. Quebec:
C. P. R. v. Parent (1914) 24 Que. K. B. 193·
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responsibility for tortious negligence. Consistency and convenience require that the law governing the agreement should
prevail.
12.

Statutes of Limitation

In civil law countries the principle of the place of wrong
extends, as a matter of course, to those limitations upon the
time for bringing the action, that are regarded as a part of
the substantive law of the place of wrong. 163 The same ought
to be recognized in American law. 164
The well- known difficulties, however, existing in this country with respect to general statutes of limitation, classified
as procedural, make themselves felt in this matter. European
courts, nevertheless, no longer hesitate to apply English and
American limitations of this kind as a part of the English
or American tort law, although some courts prefer their own
periods of limitation if they are shorter than the foreign
one/ 65 Certain American statutes barring suits upon an
obligation barred by its proper law take the right way, provided they are not of the kind of the Wisconsin statute
declaring that a claim for personal injuries shall be barred
163 The problem has prevailingly been treated with respect to contracts, but is
general. See FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwi:irterbuch 386.
A problem of international procedural law concerning foreign torts has been
discussed in two German cases, OLG. Stettin (Dec. 5, 1929) JW. 1930, r882, IPRspr.
1930, No. 151, and OLG. Hamburg (Oct. r8, 1929) Hans. RGZ. 1930A 682, IPRspr.
1930, No. II5; tifj'd, RG. (July 8, 1930) 129 RGZ. 385, IPRspr. 1930 No. 156: An
action brought at the foreign place of tort interrupts the period of limitation at
the forum running for a German tortfeasor (significant under art. 12 of the German
EG. BGB.) only if the judgment of the foreign court would be recognized as binding
at the forum. Contra: correctly, NEuMEYER, JW. 1926, 374·
164 According to the usual formula, a statute extinguishing the plaintiff's right is
applicable. More appropriate rules appear in the frequent statutes against entertaining foreign suits barred by the applicable law. See Note, 75 A. L. R. 203;
HANcocK, Torts 136, 137.
The limitation of twelve months for tort actions arising from accidents, under
Lord Campbell's Act in England, has been applied, as the ground of action "entirely
arose in England," Goodman v. London R. Co. (1877) 14 Scot. L. Rep. (1877)

449,450,
1 65

Cj. Vol. I, (ed 2, 1958) 69ff.
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by the lex loci delicti "unless the person so injured shall,
at the time of the injury, have been a resident of this state.m 66
This, indeed, is an illogicaF 67 and narrow-minded public
policy.
The topic is too broad to be discussed at this juncture.
r 3. Industrial Property

(a) Territorial limitation of protected interests. Patents
are granted in every state for the territory of the state only.
Hence, the rights accorded by a patent cannot be violated
outside the state. 168 The same is true with respect to trademarks169 and designs, 170 barring the cases in which imitation
constitutes liability for unfair competition. The existing international unions and treaties in these matters intend to
assure these territorial limited rights to foreigners.
If, however, such a right is tortiously invaded in the territory where it is protected, a claim for damages on this ground
may well be brought in a foreign court having jurisdiction
over the defendant. 171
(b) Unfair competition. 171a Being of a different nature, liability arising from unfair competition is not bound to a certain
territory. The law of the jurisdiction in which the competi166 See 48 L. R. A. (r9oo) 639; 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) (r9o6) ro29; 51 id. (1914) 96;
L. R. A. 1915C, 976.
1 6 7 AILEs, "Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," 3I Mich. L. Rev.
(I933) 474, 50I.
168 German RG. (Oct. I5, I892) 30 RGZ. 52; WEISS, 4 Traite 502; HERM. !SAY,
Patentgesetz (ed. 6, 1932) 230.
169 United States: Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. (C.C.N.J. 1903) I22 Fed. I05
and (C.C.D.N.J. I9o7) 154 Fed. 867, 869.
France: PicHoT, 9 Repert. I2o No. III.
Germany: RG. (Sept. 20, 1927) u8 RGZ. 76 (against previous practice); (April
20, I928) JW. 1928, 1456; RG. (July I, I930) I29 RGZ. 385, IPRspr. (1930) No. 156.
Italy: DE SANCTIS, r8 Rivista (I926) I27, 132.
170 WEiss, 4 Traite 509.
171 RG. (July 8, 1930) 129 RGZ. 385, against former cases, see NusSBAUM, JW.
1931, 428; BGH (Oct. 2, I956) 22 BGHZ I (13).
171 • An excellent comparative survey in WENGLER, "Die Gesetze iiber unlauteren
Wettbewerb und das internationale Privatrecht," 19 Z.ausl.PR. (I954) 401-426,
English translation 4 Am.]. Comp. Law (I955) 167-188.
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tion occurs, governs the claim. When the Swiss Federal
Council submitted the draft of the Swiss Law of I 943 on
Unfair Competition to the parliament, it said: the law
applies according to the general principles of conflicts law,
that is, according to the law of the place where the wrong
is committed, as well as by analogy to arts.3ff. of the Penal
Code. If an act of unfair competition is committed in Switzerland, this law applies. Hence, it applies also in case the act
has effects not only on the Swiss market but also on a foreign
market; the Swiss and foreign competitors are equally entitled to sue. This solution conforms to the obligations assumed by Switzerland in the Convention of Paris, of March
172
20, 1883.
The case of unfair competition alleged to have been committed by the use of a trade-mark is of particular interest.
The practice of the federal courts in the United States has
been recently clarified. The courts have taken jurisdiction
and granted injunctions when a fraudulent scheme of unfair
competition was carried out in essential part in this country,
such as when upon a conspiracy undertaken in this country,
barrels were sent unmarked from American ports and then
marked abroad with the plaintiff's brand. 173 A complainant
protected by an American trade-mark is also granted relief
against a competitor who uses the mark in the United States
for export to another country in which the complainant is
likewise entitled to a trade-mark right against the respondent.174 But if in the foreign country the defendant
himself has the trade-mark right, the employment of the
mark which will be consummated in this foreign country is
172 MESSAGE, 1942, ad C III 3 p. 19, see 0. A. GERMANN, Concurrence de!oyale
(Ziirich 1945) 134.
173 Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. (C.C.D.N.J. 1907) 154 Fed. 867, afj'd
(C.C.A. 3d 1908) 162 Fed. 671; cert. denied 2!4 u. s. 51 5; similar, Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., Inc. (1952) 344 U.S. 28o.
174 Hecker H-0 Co. v. Holland Food Corp. (C.C.A. 2d 1929) 36 F. (2d) 767, as
commented on or rather corrected in Luft v. Zande, next note.
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not considered to constitute unfair competition. 175
The German Supreme Court, however, which had followed somewhat similar lines, 176 more recently favors the
application of its own domestic rules by multiple devices, on
the assumption that the German rules repressing unfair
maneuvers are particularly exacting. One principle held is
that a plaintiff, having his principal establishment in Germany, can sue under German law, because his suffering damage there has constituted the forum a place of wrong. 177 Later
decisions advance the idea that, if both parties are of German
nationality or domicil, they have to observe also in their
foreign activities the mutual duties flowing from honesty of
business as prescribed in the German law. 178 Finally, places
of wrong have been construed in Germany and Italy on
various theories. 179 The Dutch courts have resisted the temptation to adulterate the principle for any such reasons, 180 but
National Socialist writers made capital out of the nationalistic
elements of the Reichsgericht decisions. 181
m George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co. (C.C.A. :2d 1944) 14:2 F. (1d) 536,
540. On the difficulties of determining whether a federal court has to follow on this
subject state conflicts rules, see also Kerner, J., in Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co.
(1943) 133 F. (2d) 663, and the annotation by ScHOPFLOCHER, Conflict of laws
with respect to trademark infringement or unfair competition, including the area
of conflict between federal and state law, 148 A. L. R. 139.
176 See RG. (Junes, 1928) Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 1927/28, 491ff.; (March
31, 1931) JW. 1931, 1904.
177 Decisions from 18 RGZ. 28, 31 (r886) to ro8 RGZ. 9 (1923); see MELCHIOR,
5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 86. The contrary thesis by BAUMBACH, Unlauterer Wettbewerb
(ed. 2) 82 that this meant a trespass on foreign jurisdiction was approved by RG.
in 140 RGZ. 29 (next note), but the theory is repeated in the literature.
178 RG. (Feb. 2, 1933) 140 RGZ. 25, 29, approving a thesis of NussBAUM, D.IPR.
340; the RG. was understood in this sense by OLG. Koln in 150 RGZ. 265. Also
RG. (May 19, 1933) Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 1933, 446; (Jan. ro, 1936)
JW. 1936, 129; and other decisions followed this approach. Cj. 7 Giur. Comp.
DIP. Nos. 40, 41.
179 See RG. (Feb. 14, 1936) 150 RGZ. 265, BGH. (July 13, 1954) 14 BGHZ.
286, and Italian Cass. (April 2, 1927) Foro Ita!. Mass. 1927 II 472; infra Chapter
26, p. 313.
1 8o See KosTERS 794 and n. 2.
181 RuDOLF ScHMIDT, Ort der unerlaubten Handlung 183, 187 endorses all three
contradictory theories of the Reichsgericht and surpasses them. A previous writer
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Illustration. In a German case/ 81a P. and D., both firms in
Aachen, manufactured pins and needles of a certain kind and
exported them to the United States. The defendant firm
founded an American subsidiary corporation and advertised
its needles in this country as "entirelyAmerican," "a truly
American product," "buy American pins," and so forth, and
agitated for boycott against the plaintiff company. The court
considered that, if the defendant in Aachen participated in
the acts or used the American firm as an instrument in America, it would be subject to the German law, because German
merchants have to adjust their competition to this law even
abroad. But also, if the defendant merely tolerated or approved the conduct in question, it violated its duty in Germany
itself. Perhaps the authority of this case may be restricted to
the liability of a domestic firm for torts of its foreign subsidiary
companies. 182
These attempts to apply the law of the forum to foreign
happenings, as usual, confuse equitable considerations with
national peculiarities. What seems fair or unfair at a distant
place, may not seem so at the forum. How can a German
court judge foreign commerce by German standards? The
court would have done better by insisting on ascertaining
the American law on unfair competition, of which the published text of the decisions makes no mention. On the other
hand, to burden the defendant with additional duties not
owed by other merchants in the foreign market or to equip
a national competitor with additional weapons, is contrary
to the principles of economic equality. 183 The desirable pro(DANIELCIK, JW. I936, 26I4) proclaimed that acts done abroad are always subject
to German law if they infringe "the fealty among the fellows of the race" ("volksgenossische Treupflicht"). Schmidt declares this is not enough; German law should
be applied whenever a damage is felt in Germany. BEITZKE, Book Review on REu,
Anwendung fremden Recl!ts in 66 Kritische Vierteljahrschrift (1938/39) 4I4, 417,
has generalized the second of the theories above by suggesting that the nationality
principle should replace the law of the place of wrong.
ISla RG. (Feb. 14, 1936) ISO RGZ. 265.
1s2 Cj. RAAPE, IPR. (ed. 1) 327 n. I.
tsa DE SANCTIS, Rivista I926, at 134.
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motion of mercantile ethics should be pursued along the
international road promisingly initiated by the Union of
Paris. 184
This question whether merchants domiciled within the
forum are bound to the domestic rules in competing abroad,
has not yet been raised in American cases. 185 It was under
an essentially different aspect that certain famous decisions
examined the application of the Anti-Trust laws to foreign
business of American firms. In American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co./ 86 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Court of the United States, dismissed an action
by an American firm against an American competitor in the
banana trade, because the Sherman Act on which the action
was based, being primarily a penal statute, was not intended
to contemplate acts done in Panama and Costa Rica; the
Court, therefore, contented itself with the statement that
under the law of the place of acting, the acts of the defendant
were no torts at all. 187 In a later case, 188 the Supreme Court
granted relief by enjoining violations of the Sherman and
Wilson Acts, on the assumption that the defendants had
established a complete monopoly over the purchase and
commerce of sisal, a product of Yucatan, obtaining excessive
profits. The steps necessary to bring about these results were
deliberately taken by the defendants, and the action was held
to be based on "a contract, combination and conspiracy entered
into by parties within the United States and made effective
184 Treaty for the Protection of Commercial Property, of Paris I883, Bruxelles
I900, Washington I911, and The Hague I925 (revised London, I934) in force in
one of its phases almost throughout the world. Under article Io bis the states are
obligated to establish efficient protection against unfair competition.
185 This statement is supported by the discussion in the recent work, CALLMANN,
2 Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (I945) 1756-8.
186
(I909) 2IJ u. s. 347, 357·
1 8 7 The criticism of this case by HuNTING, "Extraterritorial Effect of The Sherman Act," 6 Ill. L. Rev. (I912) 34 is inconclusive.
188 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. (I927) 274 U.S. 268, 276. For other cases,
see CALLMANN, supra n. ISS, I754, I755·
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by acts done therein." Indeed, in the meantime between the
two cases, the danger of international monopolies, frequently
fostered by cartels/ 89 had been realized, and the potential
weapons offered by the anti-trust laws were used more
consciously. Such repression of monopolistic conspiracies is
intended to protect the domestic commerce rather than the
individual interests involved. The forum applies its public
law with its reflections in private spheres. This development
is fundamentally distinguishable from the idea of subjecting
competing domestic firms to a domestic standard of behavior
in foreign markets.
189 See MoLLOY, "Application of the Anti-Trust Laws to Extra-territorial Conspiracies," 49 Yale L. J. (1940) 1312. The recent extensive trend is illustratively
described by KRONSTEIN, "Neue amerikanische Lehren zum internationalen
Privatrecht im Lichte des amerikanisch-europaischen Kartellkonfliktes," Festschrift M. Wolff (1952) 225-246.

CHAPTER
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The Place of Wrongr
I.

SuRVEY oF SoLuTIONS

HE rule that problems of the law of torts are to be
decided in accordance with the law of the place of
wrong presupposes a determination of the place where
the wrong has been committed. The following illustrations
show some of the many situations in which this problem
presents difficulties.
Illustrations: (i) A letter containing defamatory statements about B, a person residing in Y, is mailed by A in
state X and received by C in state Z.
( ii) A in state X sends poison concealed in candy to B in
state Y. B takes the candy to state Z where he eats some of
it, falls ill in state M, and dies in state N.
(iii) A, standing in state X, fires a gun and lodges a bullet
in the body of B, who is standing in state Y.

T

I.

Theory of the Place of Injury (The American Rule)

Under the traditional American rule, the wrong is considered as being done where the injury takes place.
The Restatement has expressed this rule in the following
terms:
"Section 377· The place of wrong is in the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place."
1 RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong, A Study in the Method of Case Law," 19
Tul. L. Rev. (1944) 4, r6s; RunoLF ScHMIDT, Der Ort der unerlaubten Handlung
im internationalen Privatrecht in Festgabe fiir Heinrich Lehmann (1937) 175;
CowEN, "The Locus Delicti in English Private International Law," Brit. Year
Book Int. Law 1948, 394-398; A. EHR.ENZWEIG, "Der Tatort im amerikanischen
Kollisionsrecht der ausservertraglichen Schadensersatzanspriiche," r Festschrift
Rabel (r953) 655-683.
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Applying this rule to the illustrations stated above, we
are informed2 that the place of wrong is where the defamatory letter arrives, where the poisoned person falls ill, and
where the bullet meets the body. (That these answers are
not quite obvious is a separate point.)
Although this rule has met with some substantial criticism3
and is contrary to the prevailing opinion of European writers,
it thus far has commonly been taken as firmly established
and supported by an "almost unbroken line of authority." 4
While this is written, however, Max Rheinstein in a highly
suggestive study has undertaken to destroy the doctrine of the
Restatement and of the encyclopedias. His detailed historical
analysis of the cases results in the finding that the rule has
not been applied as ratio decidendi in all jurisdictions as
often as lip service has been paid to it, and that the formation
of the rule was unduly influenced by precedents regarding
the demarcation of ordinary jurisdiction from admiralty
cases, criminal cases, and cases dealing with local actions. 5
After this penetrating analysis, the traditional rule, applied
in a mechanical way for such a long time, will have to stand
the test of an examination according to standards of convenience. In the present writer's opinion, much is to be said
in its favor, but a few modifications seem to be suggested by
comparative considerations.
What idea actually supports the rule in the American
doctrine? Historically it may have originated in the field
of interstate transportation and communication, as a simple
device to identify the applicable law at the place where the
physical impact occurs. 6 This idea seems to conform well
to the old construction that a carrier's duty of care is not
2

3 STUMBERG 184.
Restatement, Note to§ 377·
Note, 133 A. L. R. 260. However, S. 1346 (b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
1946, determines liability of the United States "in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred;" cj. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union
Trust Co., 221 F. (2d) 62 at So, cert. den. as to this conflicts question, 350 U. S. 9II
(see 242 F. (2d) 930 n. 1).
5 RHEINSTEIN (supra n. r); see in particular at 171 on the political case of r8rr,
Livingston v. Jefferson.
6 This is a kind suggestion by YNTEMA.
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comprised in the contract of transportation without express
stipulation. 7 The view is exclusively focused on the time and
place of the actual harm. The theory of vested rights found
here an apparently suitable example. For advocates of this
theory, such as its last (we hope) defender, Beale, it was
natural that the injured person should acquire an indefeasible
right at the moment in which all elements of a tort action are
existent and hence the cause of action is born. While today
the vested rights doctrine may be regarded as moribund, the
conception still lingers in the mind of the courts that a tort
must be localized at the place where its last element is added
to the others, because then only a cause of action arises. An
unlawful and faulty act is not a tort until it creates an injury.
"It cannot be denied that negligence of duty unproductive
of damnifying results will not authorize or support a recovery."8
"Until all the elements are present a cause of action cannot
arise, and the tort is considered as transpiring as a whole in
that place where the combination becomes complete." 9
By an interesting though erroneous variant it has been
asserted that "the locality of the act is deemed at common
law to be the same as that of the damage." 10
2.

Theory of the Place of Acting (The Civil Law Rule)
The great majority of the European writers, 11 followed by

7

See supra Chapter 24 p. 288.
Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll (I892) 97 Ala. I26, II So. 803.
ScHERMERHORN, Tennessee Annotations to the Restatement § 377·
1
°Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R. Co. (I9I8) 78 N.H. 553,
I03 At!. 263.
11
Institut de Droit International (Munich, I883) 7 Annuaire (I885) I29, I 56;
2 BAR I2o; GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht 234; I ZITELMANN II2; 2 id. 480
(on ground of alleged public international law, but also the most elaborate writing
on the practical effects of the theories in question); WALKER 526; NEUMEYER, 2
Int. Verwaltungs R. 48; cj. RAAPE 203 and IPR. 536; 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 342 n. 2;
BARTIN, 2 Principes 4I6 (place of the "fait illicite generateur du prejudice";
CuNHA GomrALVEs, I Direito Civil 673. Contra, for place of injury, BATIFFOL,
Traite 6o7; NIBOYET, 5 Traite I5I; BALLADORE PALLIERI 253· Apparently also
Benelux-Draft, art. 18 par. 2.
8
9
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some courts, 12 and statutes12a define the place of wrong as that
where the allegedly tortious conduct was carried out by the
defendant. In the case of a commissive tort, this is the place
where the actor has engaged in the bodily movements resulting
in the damage. Under this approach, in our examples, defamation is committed where the letter is mailed, poisoning
where the candy is sent, and personal injury where the shooting person stands.
This literature objects to the law of the ccplace of effect"
that it is often difficult to ascertain, that effects may occur in
a plurality of states, and that they may obtain at a place by
accidental causation, to the surprise of the actor and possibly
also of the victim. It is considered unfair that conduct should
be subjected to a law the intervention of which could not be
foreseen. Stated positively, the argument is that the actor
is entitled to count on the laws of the state where he acts.
While he has to obey these laws, he should be protected
by them. The educational reasons of the laws that regulate
human behavior and distribute the pecuniary effect of a
damaging conduct are concerned with the acts or omissions
rather than the effects in individual cases.
3· Elective Concurrence of Claims (The Reichsgericht Rule)
The German Reichsgericht has combined the first two
theories. This court holds that a tort is committed in both
the place where the actor engages in his conduct and the place
where the effects of his conduct occur. The injured person
may choose to sue under one law or the other; in each case,
12
Australia: Koop v. Bebb (1951) 84 Commw. L. R. 629 (in action for wrongful
death where injury was inflicted in New South Wales but death occurred in Victoria,
tort was said to be committed in the former jurisdiction).
France: Trib. civ. Seine (May 27, r896) afj'd, Cour Paris (June 23, r899) Clunet
1901, !28.
Germany: RG. (April 24, r889) 44 Seuff. Arch. 257 No. r6r.
Italy: App. Milano (Sept. 19, r88r) Clunet r883, 73 (insertion of a libelous
article into a newspaper).
12
• Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, § 48.
Greece: C. C. art. 26.
United States: supra n. 4·
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the chosen law is applied in its entirety on the whole facts so
as to determine all requirements of the cause of action and its
effects. Hence, the victim is favored by being allowed to elect
the law most advantageous to his demand, but he is not permitted to cumulate the benefits flowing from more than one law. 13
The formula employed in constant practice was first established in a plenary decision of the Reichsgericht in 1909,
concerning the jurisdiction of the court at the locus delicti
commissi, but was soon extended to choice of law: "a place
of tort is assumed to be wherever an essential part of the tort
has been committed." 14
Applying this approach to the illustrative cases described
above, the defamation (i) may be localized where the letter
has been sent or where it was read/ 5 the poisoning (ii) where
the candy was sent, where it was received, and where it was
eaten; 16 and the shooting (iii) at both the places of acting
and wounding. In addition, also the places where the victim
died, and where dependent persons lost maintenance, are
eligible for the purpose of choice of law.
This view has been followed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal/7 and in a case of unfair competition (a field in which
also the most characteristic German actions developed) by
the Italian Supreme Court. 18
The arguments advanced by the Reichsgericht were precarious and easily criticized by the advocates of the place of
acting. Theoretical support has finally come forth. Neuner 19
13

RG. (Nov. 20, r888) 23 RGZ. 305; and constant practice. See MELCHIOR r68

n. 3·
14 RG. (Oct. r8, 1909) 72 RGZ. 41; RG. (Nov. 8, 1906) 62 Seuff. Arch. No. xso;
RG. (Jan. 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 1291, 1292; RG. (Feb. 14, 1936) rso RGZ. 265
16
Cj. 23 RGZ. 306.
16
Cj. RG., JW. r9oo, 477·
17 BG. (Nov. 6, 1896) 22 BGE. u64; (March 6, 1914) 40 BGE. I 8, 20 (sending
and arrival of a deceiving letter, in a criminal case but with general argument);
(May II, 1950) 76 BGE. II no.
18 Italy: Cass. (April 2, 1927) Foro Ita!. Rep. 1927 I 472 No. 51.
19 NEuNER, Der Sinn u6; see also ScHELLING, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 866; RAAPE
202ff.
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remarks that a person doing a part of the tortious acts in
the state, or acting from abroad but effecting an injury in the
state, sufficiently deserves to be subjected to the responsibility
established therein. A sound international distribution of the
administration of justice allows that several states may concur
in suppression of tort. If a state regards conduct as nontortious, it ought, nevertheless, to tolerate a different view in
another jurisdiction where a part of the facts occur.
The same doctrine has been applied in Germany and other
countries to criminaF0 and civil jurisdiction21 based on the
locus delicti commissi principle.
4· Mixed Solutions
(a) Influence of the law of the place of acting. TheRestatement contains a section seemingly inserted against Beale's
theoretical view/ 2 which expressly refers to the place of acting. Where a person is required by law or authorized by a
privilege, to act or not to act in a state, he will not be held
liable for the events resulting from his act in another state.
The comment borrows an illustration from the old English
case Regina v. Lesley 22• where a shipmaster was forced by
Chilean authorities to take a prisoner on board. The Restatement suggests that the legality of the detention by the shipmaster be determined according to the Chilean law, although
the man, by the effect of concurring circumstances, had to
stay on the ship during the entire voyage; all other requirements would be governed by the law of the flag (replacing
the law of the place of wrong).
The other illustrations speak of a health officer burning
20 I BEALE 317 ns. 3 and 4; RHEINSTEIN, supra n. I, I9 Tul. L. Rev. (I944) I96
(as to England and most American states); Italian Penal Code of I930, art. 6;
LILIENTHAL, Der Ort der begangenen Handlung, in Festgabe fur Georg Wilhelm
Wetzell, Marburg 1890; see also 72 RGZ. 43 footnote,
21
Germany: ZPO. § 32; RG. (Jan. Io, I936) JW. I936, I29I, I292.
22
§ 382. See RHEINSTEIN, 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) at Io.
2a (I86o) Bell C. C. 220.
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infected rags and a sheriff shooting a fleeing murderer, so
near the border that injuries result on the other side of
the frontier.
This rule has been regarded as an inadequate attempt to
narrow down the place of injury rule. 23 It may, however,
be questioned also from the contrary view, as going too far.
Commonly, the mistake is committed to treat on the same
footing cases where a tort is entirely done in one territory,
although effects occur elsewhere, and where the acting extends
to more than one territory. Certainly, there is justification
for recognizing that the arrest of a man, quite as much as
the seizure of an object, 24 is no tort if it is lawful under the
law of the place where the whole act has been done and
completed. Any effects happening in another jurisdiction
ought not to alter this postulate which, perhaps, may be
generalized into an important rule involving all acts completely done in one jurisdiction and alleged to violate the
"law": the "law" in question ought only to be that of the
place where the act is entirely performed. While this is a
necessary modification to any theory of the place of injury,
it is not exactly the place of corporal movement per se that
accounts for it; if the Restatement (illustrations 4 and 5)
declares that someone shooting in state X and hitting a person
standing in state Y enjoys privileges conferred by law X,
this is a very doubtful proposition. We shall have to discuss
below acts extending over several jurisdictions. Nor does the
evident equity of the postulate hold good for the entire field
of privileges and duties to act. Suppose, for instance, that the
Chilean law in reality did not empower the governor of the
province to give the order to the British shipmaster. Whether
the latter's erroneous belief that he had to obey excused him
RHE1NSTEIN, 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) at 13.
See, for instance, the Netherlands: App. Leeuwarden (Feb. 6, 1929) W. 12014,
VAN HASSELT 309.
23
24
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when he helped to deprive the plaintiff of his freedom need
not necessarily be, and probably should not be, determined
by the local (Chilean) law, by exception to the regularly
applicable law of the flag.
The inspiration received from Regina v. Lesley suggests
some connection with the English rule that the act must be
unjustifiable under the lex loci actus, although also actionable
at the English forum. However, all supporting English cases
deal with acts entirely done in a foreign country.
Indeed, in the Lesley case it was stated as a separate offense
that the continuing detention of the prisoner after the vessel
left the Chilean territorial water, constituted false imprisonment by application of the British law of the flag. Thus, there
was no aftereffect of the Chilean privilege on the high seas
to be condoned because of the Chilean law. Neither do these
decisions fortify the theory of the Restatement, nor is their
own theory explained by the provisions of the Restatement.
(b) Influence of the law of the place of effect. On the other
hand, a few writers who believe in the decisiveness of the
place of acting have made an exception in favor of the place
where the effects of a tort appear, when the acting person
either intends the effects in another state or recklessly does
not care where his acts take effect. 25
On another ground, Rheinstein has recently suggested that
while on principle the law of the place of acting should
govern, another state where the effects take place may, in
virtue of its public policy, adjudicate a claim according to
its own law of tort, provided that the actor could foresee that
it would cause harm in that other state. Third states would
not be, therefore, in a position to apply this latter law. 26
(c) Differentiated solutions. A remarkable suggestion was
25 HABICHT 95; RAAPE 206 (with restriction to cases involving the state frontier).
26 RHEINSTEIN, 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) at JI.
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made by Meili 27 in 1902 and regrettably fell into oblivion.
He knew the difficulty of finding a good formula for all cases
and advocated different rules for fixing the place of wrong
in the cases of seizures, press delicts, and defamations.

5. Differences of Policies
Another important contribution to our topic has been made
by pointing out that the law of torts has a threefold social
function and that the local contact of a tort depends upon the
function most emphasized. The three functions are said to be
the following:
"A primary purpose is to fix the standards of conduct of a
person so he can know what he may do and what he may not
do, and so that others can know what type of conduct to
expect from him. This purpose of delimiting tort liability
suggests that it is for the state where a person acts to determine whether his conduct and its consequences create liability.
"Another purpose ... is to fix the measure of protection to
which each person is entitled against his fellows. This purpose
suggests it is for the state where the damage is suffered to
determine whether the damage was wrongfully inflicted and
gave rise to a right of action in tort. The recent extension
of liability without fault with consequent emphasis on the
protection of the injured party rather than on the wrongfulness of any conduct involved may indicate this purpose
is the fundamental one in a wide part of the tort field." 28
Third, the purpose to give compensation is thought to lead
possibly to the state of the "injured person's domicil."
27 MEILI 96. Already 2 BAR 120 n. 9 recommended a special rule for the press,
pointing to the publication rather than the sending of articles. I would like to refer
also to the (unfortunately unelaborated) observation of FEoozzr 760: If it is true
that one who acts at a certain place must respect the provisions of the local law
and incurs a liability by committing an illicit act according to this local law, it is
no less true that, for determining the damages due to the victim of the illicit act,
the place where the harm has happened must be taken into consideration. On the
other hand, 2 ZITELMANN 478-480 has rejected Bar's suggestion as unfounded, and
this seems to be the general opinion.
28 CHEATHAM, Cases 424; the authors mention as a fourth purpose "civil penology" which may play an additional role.
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Except for this third approach, which no law has followed
and which does not appear to be commendable, these remarks
are thought-provoking.
Obviously, however, the bulk of the tort laws cannot be
neatly divided into two groups, one of which, by virtue of
a policy protecting private interests, would be appropriately
allocated to the American rule, while the other, devoted to
the prevention of undesirable conduct, would belong to the
place of acting theory. Most tort laws are supported by both
policies in an unascertainable mixture. Besides, if the same
type of tort were to be characterized separately in each state
according to a particular shade of policy, new difficulties
would top the old ones.
Nevertheless, it is quite true, there are types of tort such
as liabilities without fault which ought to be localized in a
specific manner. It will appear, however, that their particular
localization is not directly due to the policy and still less to
the interest of the state, but to the technical shape of the
obligation, although this, of course, is conditioned by both
policy and interest considerations. For example, a railroad
enterprise must commonly bear the damage done to passengers in an accident on its rails without the plaintiff's proof
that the management or the agents were at fault. The policy
supporting such statutes is as much intended to lay a great
part of the risk on the economically stronger party, as to adjust
the unequal procedural situation in litigating against a complicated big industrial enterprise or to discourage railroads
from negligent methods of operation. It is impossible to infer
from one part of this policy a device for localization and not
from the others. Yet, the purpose of the tort rule in which
the legislative considerations converge is sharply expressed
in the technical shape of an absolute or strict liability directly
established on the fact of the accident. This, indeed, ought to
be a strong reason for localizing this kind of tort. It is directly
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centered at one place through the very purpose of the legislator, brought to evidence by the structure of the specific tort.
It will be opportune, first to analyze the significance of
the various local contacts that may be produced by the several
elements of a tortious liability.

II.

THE PLACE OF AcTING

r. Preparatory Acts
As in penallaw, 29 preparatory acts are distinguishable from
the elements of the cause of action. Writing a defamatory
letter, loading a rifle, designing an imitated trade-mark, are
outside of the essential elements of defamation, killing, or
unfair competition, although they may constitute by themselves independent offenses in other categories under distinct
regulatory provisions, e.g., possession of dangerous weapons,
counterfeiting, industrial espionage, or make an accessory
liable in addition to the principal tortfeasor. Acts preparatory
to a tort do not characterize it and, hence, are unable to
localize a tort. Where, for instance, damages are sought for
an unfounded arrest, the place at which the defendant affixed
his signature to the power of attorney authorizing his lawyer
to file the petition for the arrest, is immaterial. 30
This simple truth refutes many Continental authors and a
few European decisions advocating the place where a letter
containing a libel or unfair competition has been written and
mailed. 30 a It is a different case where a defamatory letter has
been "published" according to Anglo-American conceptions,
29 Germany: EBERMAYER-LOBE-RosENBERG, Strafgesetzbuch (ed. 3, 1925) § 3
n. 12.
30 MElLI 96.
30 • Still more untenable is the assumption of a domestic place of acting in the
German decision BGH. (July 13, 1954) 14 BGHZ. 286: already the mailing of an
instruction by defendant in Cologne to its Belgian attorney requesting him to
warn plaintiff, a Belgian company, in Belgium of certain acts, constitutes more than
a preparatory act of unfair competition in Germany!
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by dictating it to a stenographer or delivering it to a translator
before posting.
2.

Acts and Omissions

(a) Omissive torts. Acting in the field of torts is ordinarily conceived as a physical movement, one of the muscles
or the nerves. Thus, the health officer burning infected rags,
in the previously mentioned example of the Restatement,
"acts" at the place of the burning. Correspondingly, omission, as an element of a tort species, is the failure to act by
bodily movement. On the basis of their theory referring to
the law of the place of acting, the European writers have
been embarrassed by the question, how to localize an omission.
They agree that an omission is committed where a duty to
act exists but disagree on the state entitled to impose
this duty. Is it the state where the alleged tortfeasor is
present at the time and, therefore, would be able to act
bodily? 31 Or where he is domiciled? 32 Or, after all, that of
the injury? 33 Or, does the criterion vary according to the
circumstances?
To support the third solution, the following example has
been discussed. 34 A resident of London, the owner of a house
situated in Vienna, is certainly liable for an injury to a passerby caused by a collapse of the building, according to the
Austrian statutory provision (deriving, like many others,
from the Roman cautio damni infecti). 35 The problem cannot
be determined by English law, which, by the way, produced
an analogous remedy only after this discussion in 1934.36
31

2 ZITELMANN 490•
2 FRANKENSTEIN 370.
WALKER 527.
34
WALKER 527; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 370; RAAPE 208.
36 Dig. Title 39, 2; Austrian Allg. BGB. § 1319 (as of r9r6); French C. C. art.
1386; German BGB. § 836.
36 Wilchick v. Marks and Silverstone [19341 2 K. B. 56, cf. IO Z.ausi.PR. (1936)
28o; WINFIELD, Text-Book of the Law of Tort (ed. 2, 1943) 5o6.
32
33
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This type of liability is unmistakably tied to the local situation
of the building, irrespective of the place where the owner
might have written an order for inspection or repair. The
problem, in fact, materialized in the Belgian courts. 87 A
Belgian company owned a building in Germany which it
failed to repair. A Belgian citizen was killed by its collapse.
The court applied the national law common to both parties,
in this case an evident mistake.
Similarly, the failure of a locomotive engineer to give
a warning signal at a distance of three hundred yards before
passing a street crossing, cannot be judged under any other
standards than those offered at the place of the crossing. A
state boundary running two hundred yards from the crossing
cannot alter the duty.
On the other hand, if a man advises a friend to go with
his family to a resort where infection by scarlet fever may
easily occur, his duty of warning him, if any, cannot be imposed by the state of the resort but that where the advice is
given. The negligent counsel, not the injury, in this case is
the only possible basis of liability.
(b) Accomplices. A seizure of goods was sought and accomplished in British India on a pretended claim that later
proved unfounded. Damages were asked in a suit against a
firm in Bremen, Germany, and awarded under the German
law, the construction being that this firm had caused the
seizure by incitement. 38 The German Reichsgericht likewise
declared a German company liable, under German law, for
unfair competition committed by its American subsidiary,
where the German company "caused or decisively influenced"
the conduct of its affiliate. 89 If, however, the tort committed
87 App. Bruxelles (Jan. 3, 1908) Clunet 1909, 241; Cass. Beige (Nov. 26, 1908)
Clunet 1909, II78.
38 OLG. Hamburg (Jan. r8, 1928) Hans. RGZ. 1928 A 431, IPRspr. 1928 No. 38.
89 RG. (Feb. 14, 1936) 150 RGZ. 265. The decision enumerates other facts leading
to a similar liability, which have been considered supra p. 298.
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by the chief actor was localized in India or the United States,
it seems evident that the liability of an accessory to the act
should be determined according to the same law.
3· Acting in Several States
Two groups of situations ought to be distinguished. 40
(a) Separate torts in several countries. The conduct of the
actor may be carried on in more states than one as in the
following illustrations:
(i) Defendant has inserted a libelous statement about the
plaintiff in twenty newspapers, each of which is published in
a different state;
(ii) Defendant, by carrying on propaganda in several
states, has induced a group of employers throughout these
states to lock out their employees;
(iii) Defendant has committed continued assault upon the
plaintiff while he and the plaintiff were crossing a state line
on a train.
A common characteristic of these cases is the plurality of
acts each of which creates a tort. By mere logic, every partial
activity is subject to its own localization. The results, however, under any ordinary method of localization, are inconvenient. Thus, under the place of injury theory, where a
libelous article was inserted in a newspaper published in
Hamburg, then a territory of Roman law, and circulated
in various other places, the Hanseatic Appeal Court applied
to each defamation its own local law/ 1 the damages being
assessed separately for each territory. The decision would be
the same under the prevailing approach in this country.
Objections to such unsound complications are obvious. 42
40 2 ZITELMANN

41

486.
OLG. Hamburg (June

II,

1897) Hans. GZ. 1898, Beibl. No. 146, cj.

LEWALD

263.
42 They are the same as in the case of a broadcast heard in several states, on
which see infra 4 sub (d), pp. 320 ff.
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Again, if the place of acting in its usual meaning should
be followed, each tort is characterized by the place where
a libelous statement has been dispatched to be published in
a newspaper or broadcast and, similarly in example (ii), by
that where the defendant has mailed his letters. This may
practically simplify localization, but mailing is in fact only
a preparatory act and, therefore, not characteristic at all of
the tort.
A more adequate approach ought to be found, abandoning
both contending theories.
(b) Single tort committed by partial acts in several states.
In the same .way as a criminal offense, an intentional tort
may be committed by several acts connected by one volition.
For example:
(iv) Firm A, for the purpose of competition with B, uses
an imitated trademark in state X, publishes untrue statements
concerning this trademark in Y, and sues B in a vexatious
suit for annulment of the latter's trademark in state Z. While
each of these acts may or may not present an independent
cause of action, they are normally made the subject of one
lawsuit for damages on the ground of unfair competition.
( v) A railway brakeman negligently couples two cars in
state X, and the train runs with the uncontrolled defect
through states Y and Z, finally derailing. Or, a truck affected
by engine trouble, due to the negligence of a garage employee of the owner firm, injures a person after passing a
state border. No cause of action can be found unless all the
elements of partial acting occurring in several states are added
together. Where is the tort "committed" for the purpose of
conflict law?
The only existing answer to this question by a legal text,
article twenty-eight of the International Convention on the
Transport of Passengers, in the case of death, injury, or delaying of passengers, refers oracularly to "the law of the state
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where the fact has occurred" 43-which fact, we do not learn.
From the basis of their place of acting theory, German
writers have discussed whether the place of acting should
be defined as where the "most efficient part" of the conduct
has been carried on; 44 or whether conduct carried on in several
states should never involve the actor in liability, unless it is
actionable in every one of such states. 45 While in the United
States the place of wrong is usually defined as the place where
the last part of the defendant's conduct is carried on, in
Europe the place of its first part also has been considered.
In this country, in fact, all places of acting are generally
disregarded. 46 In a rare attempt of justification,47 the Mississippi Court, deciding the case in illustration ( v), explained
that the railway company is present everywhere in its network
of lines, and any negligence committed is felt at the place
where the injury occurs. "The locality of the collision was
in Tennessee. It was there, if anywhere, that the company
was remiss in duty, for there is where its proper caution
should have been used." 48 If this means that the places of
negligent acts or failures to act may be unknown without
altering the liability under the law of the place of injury, it
is convincing. If, however, a definite cause has been proved,
as supposed in the example, it is difficult to see why the railway could not be sued also under the law of the state where
the fateful negligence was committed.
It is noteworthy that the same decision added with respect
to negligence by active conduct: "Physical force proceeding
43 Convention of Berne, of October 23, 1924, art. 28 § I; revised at Rome, on
Nov. 23, I933, see HuosoN, 6 Int. Legislation 568 at 579·
u NEUMEYER, IPR. 32; HABICHT 95·
45 Discussed and rejected by KAHN, 30 Jherings Jahrb. II9, I Abhandl. I20.
45 Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Foster (I882) 78 Tenn. 35I; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v.
Doyle (I883) 6o Miss. 977; Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. McMullen (I889) II7 Ind.
439, 20 N. E. 287; Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll (I892) 97 Ala. 126, II So. 8o3;
El Paso, etc. R. Co. v. McComas (Tex. Civ. App. I903) 72 S. W. 629.
47 The Carroll case repeats the usual argument of injuries commenced in one
state and completed in another.
48 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Doyle, supra n. 46.
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from this state and inflicting injury in another state might
give rise to an action in either state." Apparently, this court
would not entirely disapprove of the German practice granting a choice between the laws of all jurisdictions where faulty
conduct has occurred or harm is caused.
Among the suggestions contributed by the literature, the
proposition deserves attention that the most characteristic
part of the tortious activity should prevail in localizing the
tort. More appropriately, not just some part of the corporal
movements of the tortfeasor but the most characteristic
element of the entire cause of action should indicate which
is the decisive place and the law best qualified to govern.
4· Acting at a distance 49
(a) Means of acting in foreign jurisdictions. A person is
generally said to act where his bodily movements occur. But
how does such an approach conform to the epoch of telephone and radio? Half a century ago, the German Civil Code
had already assimilated an offer made by telephone to an
oral o:ffer. 50 The voice may be audible only to the person
addressed. Messengers were used in most remote antiquity,
and the Roman common law, thoroughly adverse to contracts
made by agents, i.e., acting by another free person, opposed
no obstacle to declarations sent by a "nuntius" or, in other
words, transmitted through a person as an instrument. A
third equivalent situation derives from the concepts of criminal law: a responsible person-"indirect actor"--commits
a wrong by compelling another person or inciting a child or
lunatic, to do the material act.
In addition to the obvious, though in conflicts matters
strangely neglected, application of these devices to tortious
u Considerations of this sort, to my knowledge, have been only expressed by
R.AAPE 204 and IPR. 538; KosTERS 794, on the spur of a decision of the Dutch
Hooge Raad, mentions acting by an instrument at a distant place.
60 BGB. § 147 par. I.
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conduct, it has become fully recognized that a legal person
may commit a tort by the act of its representative. 51 Although
vicarious liability has been incorrectly construed on the basis
of agency/ 2 it also shows a case of liability for unlawful acts
done by other persons.
Hence, the theory advocating the law of the place of
acting is entirely antiquated, if it stresses physical movements.
Not the locality where a person operates, but that to which
his operations are directed, is material. A person who slanders
another over the telephone does not commit defamation in
the telephone booth, but rather where the words are heard.
(b) Letters. Although some older European decisions have
favored the place where a letter is written and mailed, 53 the
constant practice of the Reichsgericht, 54 followed by courts
of other nations, 55 regards both the places where the letter is
sent and where it is received, as places of wrong. The latter
is often identical with that where the suit is brought and the
law of which is applied. In this country, the cases reach the
same result upon the theory that the injury, prevailingly a
defamation, is inflicted at the place of arrival and reception. 56
But that a sender acts through the mail as instrument until
51

Supra p. 128, cj. p. 74 n. 28.
Supra p. 272.
63 Bavaria: Oberappellationsgericht (March r6, 1847) 12 Blatter fur Rechtsanwendung in Bayern 287: an injurious letter was sent from a place under German
common law to a place of the Prussian Code; the injury is completed at the place
where the letter was written and mailed, since the sender was firmly convinced
that the letter would reach the addressee.
Switzerland: Cass. Zurich (March 16, 1912) 12 Bl.f.Zurch. Rspr. No. 71, 25
Z.int.R. 296.
64 RG. (Nov. 20, 1888) 23 RGZ. 305 (information about credit); (Dec. 21, 1900)
56 Seuff. Arch. 308 No. 175 (unfair competition); (Dec. 22, 1902) IJ Z.int.R. 171;
(Dec. 2, 1921) 22 Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 61 (unfair competition).
66 Switzerland: BG. (March 6, 1914) 40 BGE. I 8 (criminal deceit by letter);
(May II, 1950) 76 BGE. II IIO.
66
Restatement § 377 note 5; Haskell v. Bailey (1894) 25 U.S. App. 99, 63 Fed.
873; cj. HANCOCK, Torts 252 n. J.
Similarly, Scotland: Evans & Sons v. Stein & Co. (1904) Court of Sessions,
42 Scot. L. R. IOJ, Jurid. Rev. 1905, 402.
England: Bata v. Bata [1948] W.N. 366 (C.A.).
52
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the letter is delivered, is a construction familiar to the courts.
Consequently, with a slight difference, we may emphasize
the delivery rather than the reading of the letter and obtain
a rule based on a time and place more easily evidenced. This
is exactly what acting at a distance involves. 57
(c) Suppliers. Another important example is furnished by
the liability of suppliers to third persons without contractual
connection, so remarkably developed in this country from
Cardozo's famous decision in McPherson v. Buick. 58 In
Hunter v. Derby Foods, 59 fatally spoiled canned goods were
shipped to Ohio. The court applied the advanced law of
Ohio, the decisive place being where the victim ate and died
and not where the distributor shipped the food; the court
compared the case to shooting a firearm across the state line
or owning a vicious animal which strays over the state line.
However, in this case, the place was identical with that to
which the seller had shipped the food. Another case is particularly informative. To use the resume by Hancock: "In
Reed and Barton v. Maas, a coffee urn, which had been defectively constructed in Massachusetts by the defendant was
sold by him to a caterer in Wisconsin. The urn, while in
use by the caterer, spilled hot coffee upon the plaintiff in
Wisconsin. Wisconsin law was allowed to define the legal
position of the manufacturer-defendant." 60
Suppose the caterer had taken the urn to Alaska or Iran
or simply sold it to a colleague overseas. Would a customer
injured there have an action, too, according to the local laws
of these parts? The prevailing American form of the supplier's
liability requires an injury to such persons as the supplier
n Also CuNHA GoNCALVES, I Direito Civil 673, an advocate of the law of the
place of acting, teaches that defamation by a mailed letter is committed at the
place where it is handed to the addressee.
68 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (I9I6) 2I7 N.Y. 382, III N. E. I05o; PROSSER,
Torts 673 § 83.
69 (C. C. A. 2d I940) no F. (2d) 970; Note, I33 A. L. R. 26o.
80 (C. C. A. Jst I9,H) 73 F. (2d) 359; HANCOCK, Torts 254.
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would expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use61 and,
thus, may prevent surprising references in conflicts law. In
fact, the place to which the manufacturer or merchant ships
~he defective goods, marks the point where his responsible
acting ends for the purpose of choice of law.
Recently the English Court of Appeal considered the
sale by a New York corporation to an English distributor,
of a product for destroying vermin, the property passing in
New York. The American seller supposedly should have
given warning that purchasers should be given proper written
instructions respecting safe use of the product. When after
a subsale in England, a farmer suffered damage from the
product and obtained compensation from the buyer, an action
for recourse based on tortious negligence was set aside because
nothing had been done by the corporation in England. 62 This
would have been a correct decision only if the warning was
due to a person in New York itself.
(d) Broadcasts, newspapers, and the like. Mass communication by broadcast and newspapers present analogous problems. The Restatement declares that harm to the reputation
of a person is done at the place where the defamatory statement is communicated and, in case of a broadcast, where the
broadcast is heard by people conversant with the plaintiff's
good repute. 63 Evidently, if the broadcast is heard in many
states, the place of wrong may be multiplied. This seems the
more so, as "publication," a requirement of libel or slander,
is generally held to exist wherever the defamatory statement
is heard and understood by any third person. 64 A libelous
newspaper article causes injury at the place of the original
publication as well as at all places of circulation. 65 European
61 2
62

Restatement of the Law of Torts§ 395·
George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Corp. [1944)

K. B. 432.

Restatement § 377 note 5·
3 Restatement of the Law of Torts § 577;
66 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts § 58r.
63

61

HARPER,

Torts § 236.
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66

courts have decided on the same lines. The Reichsgericht
has argued that communication of a newspaper is analogous to
that by a letter; the paper is sent to other places as a letter
is sent. 67 But an English court, even with respect to assuming
jurisdiction "at the place where a tort has been committed,"
has conveniently added that an inconsiderable circulation of
a foreign newspaper in England may be negligible. 68
With this feeble correction, all theories converge in the
assumption of a multitude of places of wrong and in senselessly complicated procedural burdens on court and parties. osa
In a few recent American cases, however, the disadvantage
of such "checker-board jurisprudence," as Federal District
Judge Wyzanski of Massachusetts called it, has been keenly
felt. Asked for a decree to enjoin unfair competition by the
use of trade-marks, he excluded "writing opinions and entering decrees adapted with academic nicety to the vagaries of
forty-eight states." 69 Likewise, Judge Learned Hand, in the
Federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals, refused an injunction to safeguard the exclusive right of an orchestra conductor
to broadcast disks of his phonographic records publicly sold,
a right recognized only in Pennsylvania, while unauthorized
reproductions would be lawful in the other states. Any injunction or broadcasting under such circumstances was considered as going entirely too far, since it could not be confined to hearers in Pennsylvania. 70
What law, then, should be applied? Should it be the
lex fori, as was the principle adopted in the first-mentioned
case? 71 The facts of this case seem to warrant another theory
11

Germany: RG. (May 15, 1891) 27 RGZ. 418; RAAPE 205.
RG., supra n. 66, at 420, 4~11.
11 Kroch v. Le Petit Parisien [1937]1 All E. R. Tl5, C. A. The court, of course,
concedes that technically circulation in England has occurred, but uses its discretionary power to refuse an order for service out of the jurisdiction.
na Illustrative to the point of absurdity is Hartmann v. Time, Inc. (1947)
166 F. (2d) 127, cert. den. 334 U. S. 838.
11 National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co. (1942) 47 F. Supp. 499, 504.
7o RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman (1940) II4 F. {2d) 86.
11 This has been approved in the Note, 56 Harv. L Rev. (1943) 298, 303.
17
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to the same effect of applying the local law; the competition
was evidently centered in the state. When an action was
brought, in the same federal district court sitting in Massachusetts, to enjoin unfair competition committed by unlawfully reproducing horse-race charts in a newspaper, the
conflicts rule of the state court was supposed to be in favor
of the local law, for the reason that the defendants prepared
all their material, and the greater part of the competition
occurred, in Massachusetts. 72 In an older leading case discussed above on unfair competition committed by the use of
a brand which was protected as a trade-mark in the United
States but not in Germany, the American court took jurisdiction and applied federal law, because the fraudulent conspiracy to affix the brand in Germany on barrels to be sent
there, was conceived in the United States and the barrels
were manufactured and filled here and shipped from American
ports; 73 in fact, the most important part of the activities was
carried out within the jurisdiction. Of particular interest is
another case where the circuit court of appeals in Chicago
purposefully stressed the main charge to be the misappropriation of a business system, the essential of this wrong being
the manufacture and sale of certain plates in Illinois. The circumstance that no tort was committed until the plates were
actually used in a foreign state by customers, was declared
merely incidental to the main charge and immaterial for the
choice of law. 74 This consideration rather than the application
of the lex fori as such conforms to the most desirable rule. The
only practical and theoretically justified solution is furnished
by centering the tort in its most characteristic locality. In the
72 Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co. (D. C. D.
Mass. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 198, 203. The judge was the same as in the case supra n. 69.
73 Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. (C. C. D. N J. 1907) 154 Fed. 867, supra
Chapter 25 n. 173; see the comment in George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co.
(C. C. A. 2d 1944) 142 F. (2d) 536, 540.
74 Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co.
(C. C. A. 7th 1941) 124 F. (2d) 706, 709.
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case of periodicals this is clearly the publishing house/ 5 in that
of broadcasting, the office responsible for the radio transmission. A solution aside from conflict principles is found in
the Uniform Single Publications Act, 1952, endowing the
single-publication rule, according to which all publications of
a defamation in the state accepting the rule give rise only
to one cause of action, with extraterritorial effect. 75 a

III.
I.

THE PLACE OF INJURY

Injury and Damage

In view of the argument popular among European writers
that the place where a tort takes effect is a vague and uncertain concept and that such a place may be found all over
the world, it is opportune to note the elaborate concept prevailing in the American doctrine and formulated in the Restatement. 76 A tort is localized at the precise place in which
it is completed by "harm" to a person or tangible thing, or,
in a broader term, by "injury" inflicted on a protected interest.
More closely, it is the first invasion of the interest that
counts, the intrusion upon bodily integrity, a personal sphere,
a land or chattel. Damage may develop from there on in
various ways. The harm may increase or vanish, the losses
caused may vary and change by proximate or remote consequences, normal or extraordinary combinations of cause
and effect, intervening acts of the parties and of third parties.
Thus, once more, the antagonistic theories, referring to
the place of acting and that of injury, respectively, partly
agree. The events posterior to the injury do not produce
significant local connections. Only the Reichsgericht finds it
relevant that a person, bodily injlil ed in state X, mcurs
75

This has already been advocated by 2 BAR 120 n. 9; 2 MErLI 96.
The Act has been adopted in six states so far.
76 Out of insufficient knowledge, RuoOLF ScHMIDT, Der Ort etc., supra n. r,
at 184 invokes the American example as though it supported the application of
the law of the forum in case damage has been suffered there.
75a
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medical expenses in state Y, loses wages in Z, and leaves
dependents in states L and M. This plain exaggeration has
attracted most of the attacks that have been inadvisably
directed against the entire doctrine of the Reichsgericht.
The later American cases concerning railway accidents
consistently declare immaterial at what place the death of
the victim occurs; only the physical impact on the body
counts. 77 A drug wholesaler in St. Louis, Missouri, sent
ginger extract containing poisonous wood alcohol to a grocer
in Oklahoma, who himself drank a bottle, and after having
been removed to Missouri, died from the beverage. The
court applied the death statute of Oklahoma according to
principle. 78 Most other cases follow the same line. 79 A death
statute is not construed as intended to apply to persons dying
in the state, but to persons harmed there so as to succumb
subsequently to the injury. Another consideration is fairness
towards the wrongdoer, as his liability possibly would be
increased if another law could be substituted after the deed. 80
However, all this is only a confirmation of the result that,
in looking for the center of tort, we cannot find it in any
event subsequent to the harm done.
Strangely deviating, however, in a well-known case of a
passenger boat sinking on the high seas because of negligent
navigation, it has been held that a passenger drowning in
the ocean was not injured on the vessel but on the high
seas and that therefore no action lay against the French
company under the French death statute, whereas the general
77 Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1899) 93 Fed. 26o; Crane v. Chicago, etc.
R. Co. (1908) 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222; Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1914)
244 Pa. 255, 90 Ad. 558. See moreover the cases cited by HANCOCK 255 n. 12.
78 Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co. (1910) q6 Mo. App. 246, 130 S. W. 430.
Another case involving a drug is Moore v. Pywell (1907) 29 App. D. C. 312, 9
L. R. A. (N.S.) 1078 (infra n. 97).
79 See the Annotations to the Restatement § 377, for instance, those of Maryland
and Minnesota.
so See HANcocK, "Choice of Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases," 5 U. of
Toronto L. J. (1943) 133, 138.

THE PLACE OF WRONG

325

maritime law gave no action for death. 81 But even if it had
been proved that he jumped overboard to save himself, the
injury would have occurred on the vessel. The court required
death as the "substance of the injury," instead of regarding
death as a mere effect of the injury, a confusion that was
frequent in the early construction of death statutes. But if
the court had simply applied the French law, which is clear
on the point, it would have correctly decided on the theory
that the harm was done on the vessel when a passenger was
forced to leave it, and that the place of his ensuing death
was immaterial. 82 The true rule has been expressed in an
analogous case: "The crucial test is, where was the tortious
act committed, not where were the damages consummated,
... although the final injury be completed elsewhere." 83
Also, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has recognized that, in
a suit for seduction of a married woman, the place where
the husband suffered mental anguish is immaterial. 84
A right of privacy is invaded where the "plaintiff's name
and X-ray picture first became public property." 85 A libelous
letter to be sent to Switzerland produces an injury to the
addressee as soon as it is given to a translator. 86
Deceit. However, how can such ulterior damage be excluded from the process of localization when the tort, such
as fraud or unfair competition, consists in the invasion of
pecuniary interests? As the writers who attack the Reichsgericht doctrine emphasize, in such a case the injured interest
is not located at one place only. The assets of the plaintiff
may be dispersed over the whole earth. "Is the plaintiff's
81

Rundell v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1900) roo Fed. 655.
See the correct statement by the Supreme Court on the French law: La
Bourgogne (1908) 210 U.S. 95, 138.
8 3 Lindstrom v. International Navigation Co. (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1902) II7
Fed. I7J.
84 BG. (June 15, I9I7) 43 BGE. II 309, 3I6 sub 2.
85 Banks v. King Features Syndicate (D. C. S. D. N. Y. I939) 30 F. Supp. 352.
so Kiene v. Ruff (ISH) I Iowa 482, 486.
82
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estate situated wherever there are assets, or is it at his domicil,
following the maxim, res ossibus inhaerent?"81
The remarkable solution suggested by the Restatement88
seems to furnish the answer. It concentrates the cause of action
for fraud in the place "where the loss is sustained, not where
fraudulent representations are made." Beale reached this
proposition by construing the case Keeler v. Ley 89 as distinguishing the place where the defendant induced the
plaintiff to sell his land from the place where he conveyed
it/0 the latter constituting the situs of the tort. The authority
is doubtful, 91 but Beale's interpretation is consistent. The
most characteristic fact, indeed, is that the plaintiff was
swindled out of his property. Raape by an argument ad
absurdum against the Reichsgericht, rhetorically asks where
the effect of the tort should be placed when a plaintiff domiciled in Berlin loses a law suit at a court in Lyons, France,
against a Spanish firm, because of perjury of the defendant
who was a witness. 92 The Restaters would probably not
hesitate to reply that the injury occurred in Lyons, while
all ensuing damages in Spain or Germany would have no
influence on localization. It was the mistake of the ReichsRAAPE 20J.
Restatement § 377 note 4· This section has been applied, by analogy, by
CALLMAN, 2 Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (1945) 1749 § 100.2 (a), to cases
of trade-mark infringement: the wrong would take place "not where the deceptive
labels are affixed to the goods or where the goods are wrapped in the misleading
packages, but where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the deceived customer buys
the defendant's product in the belief that he is buying the plaintiff's." But this is
only the place where the deceit of the customer occurs and neither that of the
trade-mark infringement nor of unfair competition, cj. supra Chapter 25, pp. 295
n. 169, 296.
89 Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co. (1931) 49 F. (2d) 872; (1933) 65 F. (2d) 499·
On the basis of the Restatement, however, Judge Goodrich, in Smyth Sales v.
Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (1942) 128 F. (2d) 697, 699 states that in the instant
case the sale of plaintiff's business for an inadequate consideration was the loss
caused by the deceit, and applies the law of the state where the contract of sale
has been executed.
90 2 BEALE 128].
91 RHE1NSTEIN, supra n. I, 178.
92 See RAAPE 203.
87
88
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gericht to treat injury and damage on the same footing,
a view that seems to be abandoned in the latest phases of
dealing with unfair competition. 93
2.

Injury and Acting

The efforts of the American doctrine to localize the tort
have another interesting side. Bodily harm is deemed to be
suffered where "the harmful force takes effect upon the
body," as when a bullet enters the body. 94 A tort against
a piece of land is committed at its situs and against a chattel
at the place where it is situated at the moment of the impact. 95
These commendable solutions will in many cases be indistinguishable from the result of a theory of acting at a distance.
A slight divergence between these two theories would
occur if poisoning were located (following Beale) "where
the deleterious substance takes effect (that is, the poisoned
person falls ill) and not where it is administered." 96 This
solution, apparently devoid of any case authority, is inconsistent with the principle and highly impractical, nobody
being able to state exactly at which moment an already
poisoned man falls "ill." But the court in the Darks case,
mentioned above, 97 directly declined to apply the law of the
place where the shipment arrived, namely at the business
place of the grocer in Missouri, and applied the law of
Oklahoma where the addressee drank from the bottle. The
court there followed the traditional rule in express contrast
to what we may call the law of the place of distant acting.
Damage by aircraft. Where damage is done to a person
or property on the surface of the earth by or from an aircraft
93

140 RGZ. 25; see supra p. 297 and RAAPE, IPR 537·
Restatement § 377 Note I.
95 I d. note 3·
96 I d. note 2; 2 BEALE 1288 cites Moore v. Pywell, supra n. 78, but this case; is
anything but clear.
n Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co. (1910) 146 Mo. App. 246, IJO S. W. 430;
supra n 78.
u
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in Bight over the territory of a state, such as by crash landing,
falling or thrown objects, including jettison, the place of
wrong, if any, cannot be conveniently located except on the
territory of the injury done. 98
IV. THE STRUCTURE oF ToRTs
I.

Liability Without Proof of Fault

(a) Absolute liability. In a number of states, the statutory liability of a railway company to a person injured by
an accident on its lines is based on the mere fact of carrying
on a dangerous activity. That the train has a collision or a
derailment then suffices to constitute the cause of action.
Whether such a statute intends to protect injured persons
rather than to impose on the railroads the necessity of establishing the safest system of equipment, organization, and
personnel, is an academic question. Important for localizing
the tort is the juridical isolation of the facts composing the
cause of action from the human acts and omissions that
caused the mishap. Through the technical structure of these
torts, the obligation is rendered more independent of its
cause, more "abstract," than is an obligation written in a
negotiable instrument and thereby separated from its source.
The accident alone characterizes the facts of the claim; the
harmful conduct vanishes from the picture. For this reason,
absolute liability cannot be claimed under any statute other
than that of the state where the injurious accident happens.
There is no serious reason, however, why the injured perGs The national laws, enacted in the 192o's, have been so different as to menace
reciprocal application by considerations of public policy, see ScERNI 365. The
unification reached by the Rome Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, of May 29,
1933, HuosoN, 6 Int. Legislation 334 No. 329, was a necessary step, but left important matters to conflicts, and has been ratified only by five states (Revue fran~aise
de Droit Aerien 1947, I8J). On October 7, 1952 an improved version of this Convention was signed (Revue franc;aise de Droit Aerien 1952, 423).
Brazil: Code on Air Navigation of June 8, 1938, art. 6.
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son should not be entitled to request damages under another
law for negligence, if this and its place are proved. It should
be considered that laws establishing liability without fault
very often limit the extent of recovery in contrast with the
ordinary tort actions not so limited. In addition to wellknown American statutes embodying a similar system, international examples of the modern technique are furnished
by the Bern Convention on the Transport of Goods by
Rail, whereby the carrier irrespective of fault has to bear
a limited responsibility for loss and delay while he has to pay
full indemnity for fraud or gross negligence,99 and the Rome
Convention of 1933 and 1952, granting any person injured
without his own fault on the surface of a territory by a flying
aircraft a limited amount of damage by virtue of the mere
fact that "the damage exists and that it was caused by the
aircraft," and sets the limit aside, if the damage was caused
by gross negligence or wilful misconduct. 100
(b) Strict liability. Between pure liability for fault and
absolute liability for damage, modern statutes have adhered
to middle systems of varied degrees of requirements. Even
at common law there are instances involving the handling of
dangerous substances, where the defendant must prove that
no commercially practicable precaution was omitted. 101 Such
rigid liability, just as the very frequent type of statutory inversion of the burden of proof of negligence, is distinguishable from absolute liability which admits no excuse or only
that of act of God, but practically reaches the same result
in the great majority of cases. Accordingly, a suit against
an innkeeper, a railroad company, a car owner, a laboratory,
99 Text of 1924, art. 36, MARTENS, Recueil, serie 3, vol. 19 at 505; text of 1933.
art. 36 (HuDSON, 6 Int. Legislation at 552).
10 ° Convention of 1933, arts. 2, 8 and 14 (a), HuDsoN, 6 Int. Legislation at 336,
338, 340; Convention of 1952 (supra n. 98) arts. 6, 9 and 12 (1).
1o1 See Owners of the Steamship Pass of Ballater v. Cardiff Channel Dry Docks
& Pontoon Co., Ltd. [1942] 2 All E. R. 79·
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allowed to be based on a rebuttable presumption of negligence, needs to be supported by the statutes of the place of
mJury.
Whether the statutes of this place should be applied only
to railroads operating in the state, as the New Hampshire
court has asserted in a case as famous as unsatisfactory in
principle/02 may well be questioned. Sparks from a locomotive on the Quebec side of a frontier river set an international bridge spanning the river aflame. The court divided
the bridge into separate halves, eliminating the Canadian
law (which would govern under the theory of the place of
acting) with regard to the American half, but also decided
not to apply the New Hampshire statute as not including
Canadian railways. Such a restrictive construction of statutes
seems inconsistent with the theory of the place of injury.
2.

Neighborhood Relations

(a) Flood. As illustrating the problems arising through
vicinity of immovables separated by a state boundary, the
case of Caldwell v. Gore 103 deserves attention. The defendant
as a landowner in Louisiana, according to the local law, 104
owed the upper owners an absolute "servitude" (better expressed, a legal burden) of drainage. Contrary to this legal
duty, he built a dam across a shallow depression through
which water found a natural drain, and thereby flooded the
land of the plaintiff situated upriver in Arkansas. As the law
of Arkansas105 permitted the establishment of a dam, unless
unnecessary damage was caused to a neighbor, the petition
for removing the dam was good under Louisiana and bad
under Arkansas law. The Supreme Court of Louisiana,
' 02

Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R. Co. (1918) 78 N. H.

553, 103 At!. 263.
103

(1932) I7S La. sor, 143 So. 387, 144 So. rsr.
Louisiana Rev. C. C. art. 66o.
Morrow v. Merrick (1923) 157 Ark. 6r8, 249 S. W. 369; Burel v. Hutson
(r924) r6s Ark. ru, 263 S. W. 57·
1of
105
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applying its own statute, condemned the defendant. Various
annotators disagree: whether the problem was one of property, in which case the decision would be a proper application of the lex situs; 106 or one relating to tort, justifying
the application of the law of the place of injury, that is,
Arkansas; 107 or whether Arkansas law should govern as the
lex situs of the dominant piece of land; 108 or the lex fori
should apply. 109 The following approach is suggested.
Among the landowners of the state, the Louisiana statute
declared the building of the dam unlawful. A contravention
would support an action for restitution of enjoyment and
damages for the obstruction, an action seemingly based on
the law of real ownership, after the model of the Roman
actio confessoria, without resorting to tort principles. 110 But
even where the action for damages is construed as a tort
action, as in most modern systems, the solution depends on
the existence of a limitation to the ownership of the servient
estate, which naturally is governed by the lex situs of this
latter. 111 Hence the only problem for the court should have
been whether the statutes gave rights also to landowners outside the state. This could have been reasonably denied in view
of the lack of reciprocity by the neighboring states. Foreseeing such cases, Bar denied the limitation on ownership under
the law of a state by which a reciprocal limitation would not
be recognized. 112 But the Louisiana court chose the most
liberal construction and thereby left no room for consulting
the law of the damaged immovable. The place of acting
106

Note, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) 269.
Note, 32 Col. L. Rev. (1932) 1426.
Note, 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1933) 466.
109 RoBERTSON, Characterization 228 n. 24.
110 Cj. French C. C. art. 64o; Vidrine v. Guillory (1925) 3 La. App. 462; see also
6 La. Dig. (1918) Servitudes 692 §§ 25, 26.
111 Restatement§ 231; 2 ZITELMANN 317, 328if. requires that both laws involved
establish the limitation.
112 I BAR 629 n. 14; 2 id. II4 n. I.
10 7
108
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alone was decisive. Hence, in the converse case, a Louisiana
landowner injured by changes in Arkansas land has no
actionable cause, the defendant's act being lawful.
(b) Mine damage. In an old case, 113 the Reichsgericht
dealt with a mine situation in Brunswick. As an effect of
digging a gallery shaft, the water sources of an adjacent area
in the territory of the Prussian Mining Law were dried up.
The two laws established different periods of limitation for
the action for damages. The court reversed a decision applying the Prussian Mining Law and held that the acts complained of were accomplished exclusively in Brunswick, under
whose law the mine was operated, and did not go beyond this
territory, even though damage affected land in another jurisdiction. This decision has been regarded as contradicting the
Reichsgericht rule that allows the injured to base his claim
on the law of the place of injury, 114 but the situation is
special. Mine laws are strictly territorial, not intended to be
applied to foreign mines or soil. They decide the lawful or
unlawful nature of acts as well as the liability for risk. This
seems to be the right decision for any country.
3· Fault
In contrast with liability per se, the tort action supported
by the evidence of a faulty act has the possible double local
contact of the act and the injury, if not several more provided
by partial acts leading to the injury.
(a) Intentional acts. An actor who intends to inflict the
injury (dolus directus) or foresees the harmful effect as
possible and approves of it in case it should occur (dolus
indirectus), manifestly deserves to have his act treated as
tortious under both the law of the place where the act is
113 RG. (Feb. 6, 1889) 44 Seuff. Arch. 257; followed by OLG. Koln (April 21
1914) Leipz. Z. 1914, II40: damage by a Dutch mine to a Prussian building.

tu RAAPE 203,

but see
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intended to have effect as well as at the place where it
reaches its effect. The law under which he physically acts will
ordinarily cover no more than an ineffective part of the facts.
(b) Negligence. If the injury is not intended, but the act
is intended to reach another territory, such as a letter, a newspaper, a broadcast, a shipping of goods, the result should be
judged according to the law of that territory. Doubts are
possible when a negligent person does not, and particularly
when he cannot, reasonably foresee that his behavior will
have harmful consequences in other jurisdictions. However,
apart from the conflicts rules on tort, it should be considered
that in any modern municipal tort law the court does not
assume negligence unless a prudent person in the situation of
the acting person would regard the injury-not the damage115
-as lying within the normally possible consequences of the
act. Time and place are an essential part of the circumstances
to be envisaged in this hypothetical judgment.
V.

CoNCLUSION

The number of jurisdictions with which the facts of a tort
may be locally connected, much extended in the opinion of
German courts, is considerably reduced if we eliminate on one
hand all preparatory acts, such as, in the case of defamation,
the writing and dispatching of letters and bodily movements
designed to affect objects at another place and, on the other
hand, the effects of a completed injury, such as, in the case
of personal harm, death and pecuniary losses. Choice of law,
consequently, is limited to the contacts realized by:
(a) The completion of tortious acts;
(b) Injury, i.e., the invasion of interests.
The traditional American rule following the latter local
115 See RABEL, I Das Recht des Warenkaufs 504, against GooDHART, Essays in
Jurisprudence and the Common Law (1931) IIJIF.
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connection is essentially nearer to this view than any other
present conflicts law. The two places indicated, in fact, are
in most cases identical.
Considering, however, that these places are different in
significant cases, it would seem desirable to stress one or the
other local connection according to the characteristics of the
various liabilities. We have found that tort claims based on
the right of vicinity or on mining law ought to be determined
by the law of the place where the physical act is done. This
represents a group of liabilities based on local restrictions to
the freedom of acting. On the other hand, absolute and rigid
liabilities for damages should be exclusively governed by the
law of the place where the injury has been suffered. This
does not exclude, in addition, giving an injured person an
option between the liability for risk at the place of the injury and a liability for negligence otherwise localized and
correspondingly governed.
Indeed, as a general rule, intentional torts and negligence
are subjected most conveniently to the law of the place where
tortious acting at a distance is completed, even when an
injury ensues only at another place. The defect of an automobile or of a machine originating in a factory in state X may
be the object of a tort action based on the fault committed
in X, but such negligence cannot properly be said to have
been committed in state Y, if it causes harm there. Nevertheless, the injury in Y may raise an action on the ground
of mere risk under the law of Y.
Numerous groups of torts, however, need special localizations, according to their most characteristic territorial connections. Thus, fraud has been aptly localized by the Restaters
at the place where the deceived person delivers his assets.
Torts committed by press or radio should be governed by
the law of the publishing house or the broadcasting office
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directing the transmission. Unfair competition by misappropriation has been correctly held to be subject to the law of the
state in which the most essential part of the wrongful behavior
takes place.
Giving paramount importance to the place of "injury,"
we cannot reach in all cases the same results as through this
individualizing method. Moreover, the American theory has
necessitated in the Restatement a separate treatment of the
question of lawfulness. Exceptions of this kind will be easily
avoided, when the governing law is selected more carefully
and, under this law, the local contacts of the particular case
are duly evaluated for judging the guilt of a defendant
acting in the province of a foreign law.
More individual answers to single problems would be
desirable. The courts presumably would more readily follow
rules appropriate to particular situations than a radical change
which, in this country, does not seem warranted.

CHAPTER
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Maritime and Aeronautic Torts'
I.
I.

SuRVEY oF PRINCIPLEs

"General Maritime Law"

E

'NGLAND. English courts until I 862 applied the
ordinary British rules of navigation to collisions of
any ships occuring in British waters or involving
two British ships on the high seas. They followed somewhat
different rules of seamanship if a collision took place between a British and a foreign, or two foreign ships, on the
high seas. The latter rules were assumed to be common to
seamen of all nations, a "general maritime law," though administered in special form in England. 2 The duality of
"British" and "general maritime" rules was abolished by
the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act of I 862 providing that all ships, British and foreign, should be judged
by British law with reference to the rule of the road and
the extent of the owner's liability. 8 Since then, the English
statutory law is the expression of the "general" law of maritime torts. 4
1 The abundant literature on collision-French abordage, German Schijjszusammenstoss, Italian urto di navi, Portuguese abalroarao----{:ontains many contribu-

tions to conflicts law, of which the most useful at present are the following: MARSDEN, The Law of Collisions at Sea (ed. 9 by Gibb, 1934) Ch. IX, 209-224; (Anonymous) Abordage maritime, 1 Repert. (1929) 38; FRITZ FisCHER, Der Schiffszusammenstoss im Deutschen Int. Priv. R. (Diss. Hamburg 1937); MARIO ScERNI, II
Diritto Int. Priv. Maritima (ed. Aeronautico 1936) 299-308.
Conflicts problems with respect to air navigation have been studied by FERNAND
DE VIsscHER, "Les concours de lois en matiere de droit aerien," 48 Recueil (1934)
II 279· "Largely conjectural rules" for English conflicts law have been suggested
by McNAIR in Winfield, Text-Book of the Law of Tort (ed. 2, 1943) 197. Recently,
DE PLANTA, Principes de droit international prive applicables aux actes accomplis
et aux faits commis a bard d'un aeronef (1955); HoNIG, The Legal Status of Aircraft (1956) p. 98-136.
2
The Dumfries (1857) Swab. 63, n5.
3
25 & 27 Viet., c. 63, ss. 54 and 57·
4 Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation
Co. (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 521, 537 per Brett, L.J.; The Belgenland (1885) 114 U. S.
355. 366.
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The persistent conception of a general maritime law represents a survival of the ancient idea that the law merchant,
of which the maritime law is a branch, was uniform throughout the civilized world, different interpretations by different
courts notwithstanding. It is significant that this idea has
survived the breaking up of the former unity of the Christian
world for a longer time in the English speaking countries
than in the narrow horizons of Continental Europe, where
reminiscences are found only in famous old texts. 11 N evertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States has made it
very clear that "the general maritime law is in force in this
country, or in any other, so far only as it has been adopted
by the laws or usages thereof." 6 But the rules of navigation
on the high seas found a new and broad unification when the
experiences of British seafaring were used throughout the
world in laws and treaties after the British model, and
the international conferences were reflected in the British
enactments.
Insofar as there remain differences, English courts apply
British rules. The chief principle is said to consist in the
duty of navigating vessels so as not to cause damage to the
life and property of others. 7 With respect to the obligations
of the shipowner, his liability under English law for the
negligence of master or crew is considered mandatory, whatever a foreign law of the flag may ordain. 8 Moreover, in all
cases of collision either in British waters or on the high seas,
the limit of the owner's responsibility is regarded as determined by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 503. Thus,
it has been held that the owners of a British ship in collision
6

See LYoN-CAEN in Clunet 1882, 6oo; DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. 425, I; WEsT§ 202 (a),

LAKE

6 Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1888) 129 U. S.
397. 444·
7 Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (1864) 15 C. B. N.S. 759,779 per Willies, J.
8 The Leon (1881) 6 P.D. 148 per Sir R. Phillimore.
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with a foreign ship on the high seas were liable only to
the limited extent prescribed by the statutory English law,
and that international law was not violated, since the owners
of any foreign vessel, too, in a similar case are entitled to
the benefit of the Act. 9 The British rule concerning the
division of loss by collision is applied to all vessels everywhere.
United States. The doctrine of general maritime law has
been adopted in the federal courts exercising admiralty
jurisdiction in this country, especially in cases of collisions
between any vessels on the high seas. Also limitation of
liability prescribed in acts of Congress is regarded as a part
of the "general maritime law as administered by the admiralty courts of the United States." 11 And in a proceeding
for such limitation, the speed a vessel has been allowed to
run in a fog is determined "by international usage as understood and applied in the forum." 12 On the reason for preferring this part of the American law to any other law, in
the case of The Scotland (I 88 I) Mr. Justice Bradley
alluded to the situation on the high seas "where the law
of no particular state has exclusive force, when two ships of
different nationality collide,"13 but in I9I4 Mr. Justice
Holmes speaking for the Supreme Court shifted the emphasis to public policy as laid down in the federal statutes. 14
Modern writers in England/ 5 as well as in the United
States/ 6 soberly state that "there is no such law" as a general
8

The Amalia (r864) Br. & Lush. r5r, r Moo. P.C.Cas. (N.S.) 471.
This is true for Admiralty as well as the common law jurisdiction, MARSDEN
:uS ad. n. (e).
11
The Scotland (r88r) ro5 U.S. 24, r9; The Titanic (I914) 233 U.S. 718, cj. 2
BEALE I33I.
12
La Bourgogne (r9o8) 210 U.S. 95, rr6, 140.
13 I05 u.s. at 29.
14
233 U.S. at 733·
16 Lushington, J., in The Milford (r858) Swab. 362, I66 Eng. Re. rr67; WESTLAKE 276; CHESHIRE 285.
16
2 BEALE 133I; HANCOCK 259 n. J. See also the criticism by DrENA, 3 Dir.
Com. Int. 424 § 28r; CRouvils, I Repert. 42 Nos. 12, 13.
10
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maritime law and that, all things considered, it is but another
name for the lex fori, although it has grown out of a worldwide traffic and a millennia! history. In the United States
its scope has been somewhat narrowed.
Collision is the historic prototype of a tort committed on
the water. That the same problematic general maritime law
should govern other torts also, seems to have been implied
in an English leading case where a submarine cable (before
the International Cable Convention and the Submarine Telegraph Act, I 8 85) was injured at the bottom of the sea by
anchor of a navigating ship. 17 Dicey and Cheshire advocated
this solution. 18
2.

Modern Principles

The International Maritime Congress held in Antwerp in
8 85 approved the following conflicts rules on collision of
ships:
Collisions in ports and internal waters should be governed
by the lex loci, for both formalities (such as demurrers, time
limitations, prescription) and substantive rules, irrespective
of the nationality of the vessels. 19
The master of a ship suffering from a collision on the
high seas may preserve its rights by observing the form and
time prescribed (for protest or action) either by the law of his
flag, or that of the flag of the offending ship, or that of the
first: port of refuge.
In the case of collision on the high seas, each ship is liable
within the limits of the law of its flag, without being entitled
to more than this law grants. 20
I

Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (I864) IS C. B. N. S. 759·
DicEY 97I; CHESHIRE z86; approved by WINFIELD, Text-Book on the Law
of Tort (ed. z, I943) I96.
19
DICEY 973·
20
I Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 427.
17

18
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These rules have been fully adopted in the Codes of
Portugal and Bulgaria. 21 The first rule has been accepted
everywhere in civil law countries with the exception that
certain courts have applied the law of the forum to the formal
requisites of actions.
On the high seas, the basic rule in civil law countries is
in favor of the law of the flag whenever a tort can be localized
on a vessel. In the case of collisions between two vessels of
different flags, some courts have earnestly tried to find such
a localization and have become resigned to the law of the
forum only when it seemed inevitable, because the two laws
involved appeared equally competent to govern and could
not be meaningfully combined.
Entirely isolated, the Soviet Maritime Law of 1929 prescribes the application of the domestic law to all collisions
wherever occuring. 22

II.

22

UNIFICATION OF SuBSTANTIVE LAws a

Collision. The municipal law on collisions on the high seas
has been internationally unified in important aspects by the
"International Convention for the Unification of certain
Rules concerning Collision" of Brussels (September 23,
I9I0). 23 In I95I, the following countries were members:
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Dominions and
Colonies, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland,
21 Portugal: C. Com. art. 674.
Bulgaria: C. Marit. of Jan. 6, I908, art. 189.
22 Soviet Russia: Law of June I4, I929, art. 4 (d); see FREUND, 95 Zeitschrift
fiir das gesamte Handelsrecht (I930) Beilage 70
22 • Texts are collected by GIANNINI, Le Convenzioni lnternazionali di Diritto
Marittimo (ed. 2, I952).
23 MARTENS, Recueil, 3rd Series, VII, 7rr; cj. RrPERT, 3 Droit Marit. (ed. 4)
§ 206J.
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Portugal, Rumania, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay,
Yugoslavia.
Also bilateral treaties are in force between numerous
countries.
The Convention, however, does not apply to collisions
involving vessels of nonparticipant states, 24 including the
United States which signed but did not ratify the Convention; does not deal with state ships; 25 and is restricted to
the case where at least one vessel is plying on the high seas. 26
The national laws remain for the time in force also with
respect to liability for compulsory pilots27 and the scope and
effects of contractual or legal provisions limiting the liability
of shipowners to persons on board. 28 In all these respects,
there exist conflicts problems, but they often are mitigated
by the strong influence of the Convention on recent legislation. Recently signed Conventions on civil and penal
jurisdiction in cases of collision supplement the unification of
substantive law. 288
Navigation. On the other hand, the navigation rules have
followed a vigorous trend of unification. International regu24 Art. I2 par. 2 (I). But France, Belgium and Italy enacted the convention as
domestic law, cj. RIPERT, 3 Droit Maritime (ed. 4) § 2066.
16 Art. II. As to these, a special Convention was concluded, see infra n. 44·
16 Art. r.
17
Art. 5·
28 Art. 4 par. 4· See also the reservation in art. 7 par. 3· But see the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners
of Seagoing Vessels, signed on August 25, I924; HuosoN, 2 International Legislation 1332.
284 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to
Civil Jurisdiction in the Field of Collision and International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules relating to Penal Jurisdiction in the Field of Collision
and other Events of Navigation, both signed in Brussels on May Io, I952; see
GIANNINI (supra n. 22a) 503, 506. But even this convention granting alternative
jurisdiction at several places will not prevent burdens on the shipowner caused by
separate claims of different creditor groups in various jurisdictions, insofar as the
shipowner's limited liability is thought to be governed by the lex fori; illustrative
is the case adduced by KNAUTH, "Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law," 49 Col. L. Rev. (I949) I, 3 and cj. Black Diamond Steamship Corp.
v. Robert Stewart & Sons, Ltd. (I949) 336 U.S. 386
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lations of 1897, 1905, and 1927, largely adopting the experiences of Great Britain, have succeeded in attaining a high
degree of uniformity. 29
Aerial law. Parallel to the endeavors of the Comite
Maritime, the Comite International Technique d'Experts
Juridiques Aeriens ( CITEJA) has succeeded in obtaining
a few very useful, though fragmentary, conventions. The
conventions of Warsaw, October 12, 1929, on transport, 30
in which the United States participates, and of Rome, May
29, 1933 and October 7, 1952, on damage done to third
parties on the surface of the earth, 31 unify a part of the liability
problems. But the remaining conflicts are even more important and less well worked out than the traditional maritime questions. The Warsaw Convention itself simply
envisages the application of the lex fori to the treatment of
contributory negligence, the possibility of paying periodical
amounts of damages, the concept of gross negligence, and
other problems. 82

III. ToRTS DoNE WITHIN A STATE TERRITORY
I.

Torts in Territorial Waters

The territory of a state, according to the predominant
opinion, includes in addition to ports, rivers, and channels,
At present, see in particular Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
II, to the Convention of London, May 31, 1929, on Safety of Life, HuosoN,
4 Int. Legislation 2825; and the British Merchant Shipping (Safety and Load Line
Conventions} Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 9 Sched. I.
3 ° Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International Air
Transport, HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation roo, U.S. Treaty Series No. 876. Hague
Protocol of Amendment of September 28, 1955 (MANKIEwicz, "Hague Protocol to
Amend the Warsaw Convention," 5 Am. J. Comp. Law (1956) 78-97).
Great Britain: Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5., c. 36.
31 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Damages Caused
by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, HuosoN, 6 Int. Legislation 334·
Convention of October 7, 1952 (Revue fran~aise de Droit Aerien 1952, 423).
2
3 Arts. 21, 22, 25, 28, 29.
29

Ann~x
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"a belt of sea," 33 the coastal seas of a certain mileage.
(a) Rule. The universally settled rule calls for the application of the law of the state to which the waters belong. 84
In England, this rule is not unequivocally settled with respect
to foreign waters, but seems now to prevail over the doctrine
of "general maritime law."85

Illustration. After the English Pilotage Act, 1913, came
into force, in which the liability of a shipowner for fault of
a compulsory pilot was recognized (and no longer considered
to be against public policy, as it was deemed to be in The
H alley 36 ) , a suit was dismissed in the case of a foreign
pilot whom the ship was compelled to take on but for
whose fault the shipowner was not responsible under the
local law.
The territorial law governs the wrongs committed on
board a vessel, 38 as well as those inflicted through faulty
navigation,39 and has its particular and oldest application
in cases of collisions of ships in territorial waters. 40
33 Articles provisionally approved at the Hague Conference on International
Law, 1930, see Am. J. Int. Law. I930, Supp 239.
34
United States: Smith v. Condry (I843) I How. 28; The Albert Dumois (I900)
I77 U.S. 240; Restatement § 404. See citations infra n. 40.
35 This has been concluded from the dicta of Brett, then L. J., in Chartered
Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co. (I88J) Io
Q.B. 52I, 537 (C.A.) and Mellish, L. J., in The Mary Moxham (I876) I P. D. I07,
III, II3. See MARSDEN 2I5; CHESHIRE 283.
as See supra pp. 242, 276.
37 The Arum [I92I] P. I2.
38
Uravic v. Jarka Co. (I9JI) 282 U.S. 234, opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes (a
stevedore killed on board a German vessel in New York harbor); The S.S. Samovar
(1947) 72 F. Supp. 574; cf. HANCOCK 262.
89 Restatement § 407.
40
United States: Restatement § 409; The Albert Dumois (1900) 177 U.S. 240
(domestic waters); Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegaco
Lloyd Brasileiro (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1928) 31 F. (2d) 757; Standard Oil Co. of
New York v. Tampico Nav. Co. (D.C.E.D.N.Y. I921) 21 F. (2d) 795 (foreign
waters).
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law (r889) art. n; text on Commercial
Navigation (1940) art. 5·
Codigo Bustamante, arts. 290, 291.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Nov. 21, r884) Pasicrisie I885.2.39 and many other
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According to universal custom, usually followed also
in the United States, the rule does not cover, however, the
internal management and discipline of a ship which, instead,
is governed by the law of the flag the vessel flies. 41 The
idea is that torts, like contracts creating obligations between
the owner, the shipmaster, the officers and the crew, are
subject to the individual law of the vessel. Ordinarily, port
cases (domestic waters); Trib. com. Antwerp (March 4, I853) Jur. Port Anvers,
I857.I.267 and many other cases, see I Repert. 73 Nos. I72-I74 (foreign waters);
Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, I936) 36 Revue Dor (I937) I 58, Jur. Port Anvers 1936, 197.
Bulgaria: C. Marit. of Jan. 6, I908, art. I89.
Denmark: Trib. Marit. Copenhague (May 3I, 1905) Clunet 1907, II78.
Egypt: Trib. civ. Alexandria (Feb. 2, I926) 17 Revue Dor 328; see also Trib.
com. Alexandria (March 4, I929) 20 Revue Dor 237.
France: Cass. (civ.) (July 18, 1895) S. I895.I.305, Clunet I896, I30; Cass. (req.)
(Feb. IS, I905) S. 1905.I.209, Revue 1905, II4, I28, Clunet I905, 347; App. Rouen
(June 26, I907) Clunet 1908, 776. The cases refer to domestic waters only, because
the courts refuse jurisdiction as to foreign waters. The rule, however, is recognized
to extend to these in the literature, see 6 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT 192 §§ ro48 to
I05I (despite personal opposition); RoLIN, 3 Principes § I07I; PILLET, 2 Traite §
551; I Repert. 67 No. 143.
Germany: RG. (May 30, I888) 2I RGZ. I36; (Feb. I8, I929) IPRspr. I930 No. 59
(domestic waters); (July I2, I886) I9 RGZ. 7; (June 25, July 9, I892) 29 RGZ. 90
(foreign waters); OLG. Hamburg (April 17, I907) Hans. GZ. I907, HBI. No. 73;
OGH. Brit. Zone (June I, 1950) IPRspr. I95o-5r No. 29; BGH. (Nov. 6, I951)
3 BGHZ. 32I, IPRspr. 1950-5I No. 30. Cj. RG. (July I, 1896) 37 RGZ. I8I (fluvial
waters).
Italy: As in France, Cass. (July I9, I938) Foro Ita!. I938 I 1216, 7 Giur. Comp.
DIP. 307 No. I6I. Jurisdiction was not taken as to foreign vessels in foreign waters,
Cass. (Jan. I6, I939) Giur. Ita!. 1939 I I264; but see now Codice della Navigazione
(I942) art. 14.
The Netherlands: H.R. (June 24, I927) W. IJ704, I7 Revue Dor 522, Rb.
Rotterdam (Feb. 8, I939) W. 739·
Norway: S. Ct. Christiania (Dec. IS, I905) Clunet I907, 852, 23 Revue Int. Dr.
Marit. I28 (Canal of Kiel, German law).
Panama: C. Com. (1919) art. I462.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674.
41 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wright (C. C. A. 2d 1928) 2I F. (2d) 8I4, 815; Lauritzen v. Larsen (I953) 345 U.S. 57I; see for other cases Restatement§ 405; 2 BEALE
I328 § 405.I; HANCOCK 264 n. 7 who notes, however, a few contrary decisions.
An exception has been recently made by majority vote in a case where a Greek seaman signed on a Greek vessel in a United States port and was injured in United
States territorial waters, Kyriakos v. Goulandris (C. C. A. 2d I945) I945 Am. Marit.
Cas. I04I; Judge Learned Hand (at Iop) dissenting, urged the long list of precedents.
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law of I 889, art. 20; text on Commercial
Navigation of I940, art. 2I.
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authorities also refrain from taking jurisdiction in such
matters. 42
Through this important restriction on the local legal order,
the troublesome question regarding the subjection of foreign
warships to the private law of the territory is to a large
extent eliminated. For the rest of the problems, the ordinary
rules on immunity from territorial jurisdiction are observed.43 The liability of state vessels, employed in the
transport of passengers or cargoes, has been defined by an
international convention/4 in which the United States does
not participate. That the Soviet Russian State acting
through its commercial agencies is not exempted from liability has been declared in several countries. 45 Commercial
vessels chartered by a state but not commanded by a captain
appointed by the government, are not held exempt from
attachment and still less is the owner free from action for
damages. 46
(b) Exceptions. By analogy to the preference given in
some quarters to a national law common to plaintiff and
defendant in tort actions, it has been assumed in a few instances that the law of a flag flown by both vessels involved
42 Treaty of Montevideo, Draft on Commercial Navigation of I940, arts. 22, 23.
Preparation for an international convention on penal and civil jurisdiction in the
matters of navigation and collision was started by the International Maritime
Commitee; instructive reports have been printed in the Publications of the Committe, Nos. 98-102. A convention on civil jurisdiction in case of collision and another
on penal jurisdiction in matters of navigation were signed on May ro, I952 in
Brussels, GIANNINI (supra n. 22a) 503, 506.
43 Cj. BALDONI, "Les navires de guerre dans les eaux territoriales etrangeres,"
65 Recueil (I938) III I85.
44 Convention concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, Brussels, of
April ro, I926, and Additional Protocol of May 24, I934, I76 L. of N. Treaty
Series 199, HuDSON, 3 Int. Legislation 1837 and 6 id. 868.
45 See French Cass. (req.) (Dec. 15, I936) Revue Crit. 1937, 710; cj. in general,
Cass. (req.) (Feb. 19, I929) S.I930.1.1-9 and Note, NIBOYET; cf. for contracts, Ita!.
Cass. (Aug. 3, I935) Giur. Ita!. I936 II 109, Rivista 1935, 372. See later cases in
Annual Digest 1938-40, 237, 246f., 249·
46
RG. (May 16, I938) I 57 RGZ. 389 explaining Continental, British, and
American concepts.
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should govern torts even in territorial waters. 47
The contrary opinion, however, prevails universally.. It
is supported by the territorialism obtaining in tort matters,
as well as by the fact that the shipowners are not the only
interested persons; passengers, a:ffreighters, and insurers of
ship or cargo or passengers share the risk. 48 German courts,
however, inconsistently have resorted to the common national
law in the case of two German vessels colliding in foreign
waters. 49
2.

Collisions of Aircraft Flying over State Territory

By no means a matter of course, it has nevertheless been
categorically recognized by the international conventions
on air navigation " that every state has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the air space above its territory and territorial waters." 50 It follows that collisions between two airplanes occuring in the air over a state territory are subject
to the law of the state. 51
That damage done by an aircraft to third persons on the
surface of the earth is governed by the law of the territory
has been noted earlier. 52
n France. VALERY § 979 n. 2.
Norway: S. Ct. (I923) cited by CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 582 No. 187.
COdigo Bustamante, art. 289, Convention of Brussels, supra n. 23, art. I2 par.
l (2).
48 See ARMINJON, 2 Precis § I22.
u OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 7, I9I3) Hans GZ. 1913, HBI. II7 No. 52; (March I9,
I915) id. I915, HBI. I39 No. 69; see also (Nov. I2, I9o6) id. I9o6, HBI. 3I2 No.
I 54 (river boats).
60 Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, of February 20, 1928,
art. I. HuDSON, 4 Int. Legislation 2354, 2356; conforming to Convention of Paris
(I9I9) art. I; !hero-American Convention of Madrid (1926) art. r; preamble to
the British Air Navigation Act, 1920. Convention on International Civil Aviation
of Chicago (1944) arts. I, 2. United States: Uniform Aeronautics Act, 1922, § 2,
adopted in 22 states.
61 ScERNI 367 and cited authors, rejecting the exception made by others in favor
of the national laws common to both aircraft.
Switzerland: Law of Dec. 21, 1948, art. II par. r.
United States: Uniform Aeronautics Act, 1922 (supra n. so) § 7·
62
Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, of Feb. 20, I928, art.
28, HuDsoN, 4 Int. Legislation 2365. Supra p. 328 and n. o8.

MARITIME AND AERONAUTIC TORTS

347

Wrongs done on board an aircraft are governed by the
national law of the aircraft. 52a
IV.

ToRTS oN THE HIGH SEAS

r. Torts on Board One Vessel
According to a universally settled rule, a tortious act done
on board a vessel on the high seas, whereby only persons
or property on board are injured, is governed by the law of
the flag the vessel flies. 53 This rule covers personal injuries
sustained by seamen on the high seas/4 including American
seamen on foreign-owned vessels. 55 Hence, a Yugoslav seaman on a Yugoslav vessel, even during the wartime occupation of that country, could not ask for relief under the American Seamen's Act for injury he suffered on board. 56
In England, it is discussed whether the analogy of wrongs
done in a foreign country must be followed by requiring
that a maritime tort be actionable by English law. 57
Aircraft. It is an open question whether the rule should
be transferred to tortious acts committed on an aircraft flying
62a Belgium: Law on Air Navigation of June 27, 1937, art. IO par. I.
France: Law of May 31, 1924, art. ro par. I.
Greece: Law No. 5057 of June 3. 1931, art. 5 par. I.
Italy: Codice della Navigazione (I942) art. 5·
In the United States, the Uniform Aeronautics Act, 1922 (supra n. so) § 7 seems
to submit even these internal torts to the territorial law.
63 United States Federal Death Act, I920, 4I Stat. 537 c. III § 4, 46 U.S. Code
(1952) § 764 (summarizing the conflicts rule); Restatement § 406; The Titanic
(1914) 233 U. S. 718; Sonnesen v. Panama Transport Co. (I948) 298 N. Y. 262,
82 N. E. (2d) s69.
Italy: Codice della Navigazione (1942) art. 5·
14 Petter Lassen (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 938: Norwegian fireman on
Danish vessel time-chartered to an American company, Danish law.
66
Hogan v. Hamburg American Line (1934) 152 N. Y. Misc. 405, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 6go.
68
Radovcic v. Prince Pavle (D. C. S. D. N.Y. I942) 45 F. Supp. IS.
67 In contrast to Dicey 970, supported by Canadian National Steamships Co. v.
Wastson (I938) [I939] I D.L.R. 273, II Giur. Comp. DIP. (I954) 339, CHESHIRE
(ed. 4) 272 hypothetically denied the requirement (but see now 284). For the
latter view HANCOCK 269 invokes the precedent of The Halley, supra p. 242, and
FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 823, English and Canadian statutory provisions.
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over the high seas or such territories as the North Pole.
Although it is well settled that aircraft, too, have nationality,
Fernand de Visscher has pointed out that in actual practice
the commercial airlines of many nations use the same fields
and the parties dealing with them do not care about the
flag, except in the case of contractual obligations subjected
to the law of the flag by express stipulation. As the Warsaw
Convention on Air Transport confines lawsuits to either the
principal business place of the carrier or the place of destination, at the election of the victim, de Visscher thinks it would
be in the spirit of the Convention to apply the law of the
forum of the court seized. 58 Several statutes on the Continent
have resolved the question in favor of the flag. 58a In the
United States, courts have been able to apply the Federal
Statute concerning Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act
to airplane accidents on the high seas. 59
2.

Collision

Where two vessels flying the same flag collide on the
high seas, most courts apply the law thus common to the
vessels. 60 As in this case no other law is in competition, this
principle is the best possible and has appropriately been
FERNAND DE VrsscHER, 48 Recueil (1934) II at 335·
Supra n. sza.
69 46 U. S. Code §§ 76Iff.; Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co. (1941) Am.
Marit. Cas. 1941, 483; Wyman v. Pan-American Airways, Inc. (1943) 181 N. Y.
Misc. 963, 43 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 420.
60 Restatement § 410 (a); The Eagle Point (1906) 73 U.S.C.C.A. 569, 142 Fed.
453; dicta in The Scotland (r88r) 105 U. S. 24, 31; The Belgenland (r885) II4
u. s. 355, 369.
Bulgaria: C. Marit., art. r8g.
France: RrPERT, 3 Droit Marit. (ed. 4) 19 § 2076; 6 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT
§ I050.
Germany: RG. (Nov. r8, rgor) 49 RGZ. r82 (holding that Danish and Norwegian
laws are essentially the same); RG. (Nov. 12, 1932) 138 RGZ. 243 at 245·
Italy: Codice della Navigazione (1942) art. 12.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674 No. 2.
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law (r88g) art. 12, sent. r; C6digo
Bustamante, art. 292.
68

68a
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extended to vessels whose flags are different but whose laws
are essentially the same. 61
English courts, however, apply their "general maritime
law" also in this case. 62
The case where two vessels, flying the flags of different
countries, collide on the high seas, is desperate. None of the
familiar contacts is suitable when no territory is affected
and the connections established by the flags neutralize each
other. Among the innumerable strained attempts to reach
a solution, the following have been supported by various
authorities:
(i) The Montevideo Treaty of r889 on Commercial Law
provided that the law of the flag more favorable to the
defendant should be applied. 63
(ii) Another opinion distinguishes whether both vessels
have violated the rules of navigation or only one of them
is to blame. In the latter case, the law applicable would be
that of the vessel at fault. 64 Where both are found to be
guilty of fault, opinions are divided; each vessel should
pay so per cent of the damages to which it would be liable
under its own law and so per cent of those imposed by the
other vessel's law, 65 or liability is divided ex aequo et bono,66
or the law of the forum is applied. 67
(iii) More generally, as a consequence of the allegedly
general principle that the national law of the debtor or the
81 United States: Dicta in The Scotland (1881) 105 U.S. 24, 29; The Belgenland
(1885) II4 U.S. 355; The Presidente Wilson (D. C. D. Mass. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 466.
Germany: 49 RGZ. 182, supra n. 6o.
62 Brett, L. J., in Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India
Steam Navigation Co. (1883) Io Q.E.D. 521, 537·
11 Art. 12 sent. 2; probably this is also the meaning of the Treaty of 1940, on
Commercial Navigation, art. 7·
64
Congress of Genoa (1892) art. 7, see 8 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 181.
France: PILLET, 2 Traite § 551; CREMIEU, 5 Repert. 493 No. 21.
Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46; overruled (Nov. 12, 1932) 138 RGZ.
246, infra n. 71.
65 C6digo Bustamante, art. 294.
16 Congress of Genoa (1892) art. 7·
67 See below n. 76.
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defendant should prevail, it has been advocated that each
vessel's liability should be determined in accordance with
the law of its own flag. 68
(iv) In r885, the Institute of International Law and the
Congress of Antwerp advocated the rule that a vessel should
be liable only when it would be liable under both laws concerned.69 This rule has found a following. 70
( v) The German Supreme Court, in a recent decision,
has attempted to apply to collisions on the high seas the
theory of that court that every place where a substantial
element of a tort occurs is a place of wrong. Thus, since the
vessel whose crew is guilty of fault as well as the vessel
which has been damaged through such fault, are places of
wrong, the owner of the damaged vessel has the choice of
suing under that law which is more favorable to him. 71
fhis latter view may encounter the objection once raised
by Fedozzi72 that the delict has been committed not on but
68

United States: Judge Learned Hand in The James McGee (1924) 300 Fed.
L. Rev. (1925) 96; The Aquitania (1924) Am. Marit. Cas. 1924,
1440; Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co. (1925) 32 F. (2d) 720.
England: Davidson v. Hill [1901]2 K. B. 6o6.
France: App. Rennes (Dec. 21, 1887) Clunet 1888, So, affirmed on other questionable grounds, Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 4, 1891) Clunet 1892, 153; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 7,
1904) 20 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 517. The courts decide the question of fault under
French law reputed to be universally good and in the case of fault apply varying
tests. 6 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 1050, top.
Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46.
Greece: App. Athenai (1933 No. toSs) 45 Themis 268; approved by FRAG1STAS,
10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 643.
Italy: Cass. Torino (April 17, 1903) 19 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 478.
69 Inst. Dr. Int. (Lausanne, 1888) 10 Annuaire (1889) 152; Congress of Antwerp
{1885) supra n. 20, art. 8 sent. 2.
7o Bulgaria: C. Marit. art. 189.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674, No.3·
Treaty of Montevideo, draft of 1940 on Navigation, art. 7· Recently ScERN1
308 resigns himself to this solution.
D1ENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. 432 called this view the only one based on solid legal
principles.
71 RG. (Nov. 12, 1932) 138 RGZ. 243, 246; IPRspr. 1932 No. 6o; 28 Revue
Dar 45; Nouv. Revue 1935, 74; I Giur. Comp. DIP 177 (English steamer Henry
Stanley). Contra: RAAPE, IPR. 543·
72
Opinion, in the matter of the Lotus case> Revue de Droit International
(LA PRADELLE 1928) 361; if. ScERNI 3o6 n. 3·
93; Note, 25 Col.
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by a commercial vessel. Moreover, we have often been
warned not to take too seriously the fiction that a vessel
is a floating part of a territory. 73 However, looking for the
least inappropriate local connection, American courts, with
their traditional localization at the place of the injury, could
well apply the law of the vessel which, or on board of which
life or property, is injured. Occasionally, in fact, this view
seems to have been floating through the mind of a court. 74
(vi) The law of the forum is applied, either as representing a maritime custom of world-wide application/5 or
as a last resort in all cases, 76 or where one of the vessels
belongs to the forum. 77
3· Other Torts
English writers have discussed the case of two whale
fishers of different nationality contending about the same
whale. 78 The English case of an injury done to a submarine
78

See the argument of CHESHIRE 284.
" 2 BEALE I33I n. 4 mentions with hesitation La Bourgogne (I9o8) ZIO U. S. 95,
I38, and The Saginaw (I905) I39 Fed. 906.
75 England: The Leon (I88I) 6 P. D. I48. United States: The Windrush (D. C. S.
D. N.Y. I922) 286 Fed. 25I,ajj'd (C.C.A. 2d I924) 5 F. (2d) I425; but cj. HANCOCK
279, and against him, CooK, Book Review, 5 V. of Toronto L. J. (1943) I92.
TS Belgium: Older practice, see CRouvis, I Repert. 73 No. I75 and Trih. com.
Anvers (July 23, I892) id. n. 2.
Denmark: S. Ct. (May Io, 1904) cited by CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 225 No. 89.
France: I Repert. 67 No. I44: the parties by bringing their suit to French jurisdiction, implicitly submit themselves to French law, including all provisions and
prescriptions of the French Commercial Code! AssER et RIVIER, Elements § II3;
VALERY§ 978; ARMINJON, 2 Precis§ IZ2.
Germany: Older practice: Oberapp. Ger. Liibeck Gan. 30, I849) 4 Seuff. Arch.
No.4 (The General Washington).
Prussia: Obertribunal (Oct. 25, 1859) 14 Seuff. Arch. No. 197 (The Columbus,
British ship). RG. (Nov. ro, 1900) cited and restricted by RG. (Nov. 18, 1901)
49 RGZ. 182, 187 (case of"Kong lnge") and RG. Guly 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46 (case of
"Seine"). Return to lex fori has been advocated by REINBECK, "Schiffszusammenstasse auf hoher See etc.," Hans. RGZ. 1933 A, 337, 345·
Greece: 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 264 n. 23.
Italy: Codice della Navigazione (I942) art. I2.
U.S.S.R.: See supra n. 22.
77 This result is reached by a few recent writers, such as FISCHER, supra n. I,
and ScERNI, supra n. I, 307.
78 Supra ns. r8, 19.
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cable on the bottom of the high seas, 79 and the American
case of the Titanic's collision with an iceberg80 are other
examples. Should an analogy be drawn from torts done on
board only one vessel, or from collision? This is just a nice
question for law students.

v.
I.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

Rules of Navigation

It is recognized in the United States that if the responsible
persons of a vessel on the high seas observe the sailing regulations of the government shown by the flag, they are not
to be blamed. 81 The case has become rare that regulations
are different, but the doctrine should be adopted abroad.
That local port and coast regulations ought to be complied
with by all ships is settled beyond need of proof.
2.

Extent of Damages

The old European customary rule that an innocent shipowner may exclude his personal liability for maritime tort
by surrendering (abandoning) the ship, or what is rescued
from it, to the injured party, 82 has not been transferred to
the common law countries, but the United States, in the
Act of I 85I, introduced by statute a remedy conferring on
the shipowner the election between abandonment and limited
pecuniary damages. 83 Great Britain and some other countries
have a different system of limiting the amount of damages
to certain maxima computed upon the tonnage of the vessel. 84
7"

Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (1864) 15 C. B. N. S. 759·
(1914) 233
718.
8l See 2 BEALE § 408.1; 15 C.J.S. 17 § 3·
51 The rule is still in use in France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Rumania,
Spai.n, Egypt; cf. NEUHAUSER, 6 Rechtr,vergl. Handwiirterbuch 193.
8 t Congressional Act of March 3, 1851, with amendments, Rev. Stat.§§ 4983-89,
46 U. S. C. A. §§ 183-189.
8
' Great Britain: Merchant Shippirg Act, 1894/1932, s. 503. The Netherlands:
C. Com. art. 541.
811

u.s.
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Certain features of this system have recently been adopted
in the United States. 85 The variants within the groups are
considerable.
British courts, being bound by the Merchant Shipping
Acts since 1862,86 and those of the United States 87 apply
the domestic method of reducing damages, irrespective of
the place of tort and of the nationality of the ships. The
usual British argument is the long since refuted classification
of measures of damages as relating to the remedy rather than
to the right. The United States Supreme Court, however,
made it clear that at the bottom of the reasoning lies a plain
consideration of public policy. 88
Kuhn has wondered why resort should be had to American
law to limit the liability of a foreign vessel for injuries to
American citizens on the high seas. 89 Also a law review
note90 declared it "difficult to see why the principle of the
lex loci should be departed from merely because the case
came up in admiralty" and recalled the former leading case,
Smith v. Condry,91 where the lex loci was applied rather
than the lex fori. In fact, the majority of the Continental
European courts without hesitation apply that law which
in their view governs the tort claim as a whole. 92 As the
French courts observe, one could not, in fact, juridically
85 Congressional Acts of August 29, I935 and June 5, I936, 46 U.S.C.A., Supp.
I944, § I83, 49 Stat. 960, 49 Stat. 1479.
86 Merchant Shipping Act, I894, s. 503.
87 Restatement § 4II; Oceanic S. N. Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic) (I9I4) 233
718.
88 Bradley, ]., in The Scotland (I88I) 105 U.S. 24 at 33; Holmes, ]., in the
case of The Titanic (1914) 233 U.S. 718 at 733·
89 KuHN, Comp. Com. 308.
9 0 27 Mich. L. Rev. (1929) 206.
91
(I843) I How. 28, II L. Ed. 35·
92 Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (June 26, 1890) 7 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 582;
App. Bruxelles (May 26, I905) 21 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. I 14 (both speaking in
general terms).
France: Unanimous. The only question raised in this respect has been whether
a foreign defendant may use the right to abandon the ship to his maritime creditors

u.s.
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conceive that consequences of one sole act, the compensation
of the same damage, be appreciated according to different
laws and rules. The German Reichsgericht grants the owner
of a ship damaged on the high seas the choice between the
laws of both ships involved; he may recover the amount
of damages determined by the law stating the high maximum limit. 93
Does it indicate a serious doubt that in a recent English
case the High Court judge reserved for judicial decision
the question whether the total loss of an Argentinian ship
in a collision in the Parana River should free the shipowner
according to Argentine law, or English law should apply? 94
3· Public Policy
The requirements under which the action must agree
with the domestic law, as in England and in a certain respect
in Germany, have been applied to maritime torts. 95
4· Formal Requirement of Suit
The position of a plaintiff is difficult, if the court where
he finally is able to sue makes relief dependent on his having
as according to the French law of the forum. In the approved opinion he may not,
except when French law governs the collision. See Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 4, I89I)
Clunet I892, IS3, I6Iff.; cj. FISCHER, supra n. I, 3I-33·
Germany: 29 RGZ. 93; 37 RGZ. I82; OGH. Brit. Zone (June I, I95o) IPRspr.
I950-51 No. 29.
Italy: App. Genoa (Dec. Io, I894) Clunet I896, 907; Cass. Torino (April I7, I903)
Clunet I9o6, so8; BoLAFFIO, 8 c. Com. (I923) 932; DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. 354 n. I.
The Netherlands: H.R. (June 24, I927) W.II704, N.J. (I927) I29 (Swedish and
German vessels colliding in Belgian territorial waters; Belgian law); Hof s'Gravenhage (Feb. I4, I935) W. I2895 (Belgian shipowner, territorial Dutch waters);
id. (Dec. 28, I935) 35 Revue Dor. (I937) 359 (two Dutch vessels, Argentine waters).
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 582 No. I85 (law of the flag).
The Scotch Court of Sessions in Kendrick v. Burnett (I897) 25 R. 82, 35 Scot.
L. R. 62, adjusted the ordinary English double law rule in the absence of a lex loci
delicti to the effect that the measure of damages has to be agreeable to the domiciliary laws of both parties.
93
I38 RGZ. 242, 246.
94
The Madrid [I937) P. 40, [I9371 I All E.R. 216.
96 See for England supra n. 57·
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 12; ScHAPs, Das Deutsche Seerecht (ed. 2) § 485, n. 29.
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complied with the prescriptions of the law of the forum demanding protests or notices and limiting the time of bringing
action. The Antwerp Congress gave him a broad option
(supra p. 3 3 9), while the Brussels Convention simply
abolished all formalities.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of the United
States has liberally declared a foreign vessel excused from
observing the American formal provisions, 96 while various
courts in other countries have clung to their locallaws. 97
es The Scotland (1881) 105 U.S. 24, 33·
97 France: Lex fori as to the time granted for bringing the suit: Cass. (civ.)
(March 6, 1891) S. 1892.1.193, also published in 1 Repert. 67, Note (Cura~ao
waters); App. Rennes (Jan. 7, 1908) Revue 1908, 395 (Danish waters). Contra:
in case of collision on the hiJh seas, App. Aix (Dec. 23, 1857) D.1858.2.39; and in a
broad survey, LYON-CAEN, Notes, S. 1893.1.193·
In Belgium the courts have been divided, see CRouvis, 1 Repert. 72 Nos. 167,
1t9; likewise in the Netherlands, see VAN HASSELT 366.

PART EIGHT
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

In this part, the following articles published in law reviews will
be cited in abbreviated form:
Beale, "What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract," 23 Harv.
L. Rev. (I9Io) 260.
Cook, Walter Wheeler, "An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 37 Ill. L. Rev. (I943)
4 I 8; also published under the title, "The Logical and Legal Bases
of the Conflict of Laws, An Unpublished Chapter: In Conclusion,"
2I Can. Bar. Rev. (1943) 249·
Lorenzen, "The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in The Conflict of Laws," 20 Yale L. J. (I 9 I I) 42 7.
--id., "Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,"
30 Yale L. J. (I92I) s6s, 6ss.
--id., "The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Yale

L.

J.

(1923) 3I 1.

--id., "Uniformity between Latin America and the United States
in the Rules of Private International Law relating to Commercial
Contracts," IS Tul. L. Rev. (I941) I65.
Nussbaum, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus Restatement," SI Yale L. J. (I942) 893.
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Choice of Law by the Parties
(Party Autonomy)

T

HE term, contracts, is taken hereafter in the narrow
sense, restricted to agreements creating obligations,
in which it is used at common law. This excludes
agreements disposing of family or property relations. Also,
conventions modifying or terminating existing obligations
need separate treatment. Nor are unilateral declarations
directly involved.

I.

THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN LAW

The conflicts law concerning contracts is known as a source
of difficulties, particularly in the United States. Commonly,
the authorities are declared to be in great confusion and
full of contradictions, and to be inconsistent in the same
court. 1 The courts are said to choose without discernible
coordination among at least four approaches, namely,
I. The law of the place where a contract is made (lex
loci contractus),
2. The law of the place where the contract is to be performed (lex loci solutionis),
3· The law intended by the parties to be applied (party
autonomy),
4· The law which upholds the validity of the contract.
The Appellate Division of New York declared in 1936
1 See with particular regard to the validity of contracts, 2 BEALE 1077; GooDRICH § no; STuMBERO 200-215; McCLINTOCK, "Conflict of Laws as to Contracts,
Minnesota Decisions," ro Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 498, 499, 507; II Am. Jur. (1937)
397, Conflict of Laws, Contracts§ 116; 17 C. J. S. (1939) Contracts§ 12.
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that, in determining which law governs the validity of a
contract, the cases in that state variously regard as decisive:
the place where the contract was made, the place of performance, the intention of the parties, or the grouping of
the various elements which have gone to make up the
contract. 2 The court in the case at bar employed all four
methods, resulting in the same conclusion. Thus, not even
that important state can be classified in one of the various
alleged systems.
The leading authors have been in no greater harmony,
except in stating the uncertainty. Recently, in interpreting
the prevailing tendencies of the courts, four or more propositions have been set forth. Beale, who very vigorously
preferred the law of the place of contracting for determining
the validity of a contract, believed that his theory had become
victorious. 3 Lorenzen has been a most influential supporter
of an opposite opinion favorable to the law of the place of
performance and the law tending to validate the contract. 4
In Batiffol's view, the great majority of cases actually apply
the law of the place of performance whenever there is a
point in so doing. 5 Nussbaum is the only writer to deny that
there is confusion; he thinks that the decisions in reality
exemplify a method of individualizing the facts and selecting
the law most appropriate to the intention of the parties. 6
In the present writer's opinion, there is a strong old school
tradition establishing as a basic or subsidiary rule, the law
of the place of contracting; a second powerful theoretical
current toward the law of the place of performance; and
side by side, very many cases following mechanically one of
2 Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1936) 158 Misc. 466, 286 N. Y. Supp. 4;
CHEATHAM, Cases 466.
a BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1909) I, 8; 2 BEALE 1096, II7I.
4 LoRENzEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 655, 673.
6 BATIFFOL §§ 96, 97•
6 NussBAUM, D. IPR. 223; id., 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 892, 919; id., Principles 177ff
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these scholastic approaches, and very many others thoughtfully seeking a suitable law by some method or other. No
single rule can be rested on the wealth of cases, but none
is alien to all of them.
Again, if, according to certain methods used by Beale, the
American jurisdictions were believed to be bound by conflicts
rules prevailing traditionally in the courts of individual
states, the picture of interstate affairs would be illustrated
by this following example.
A merchant in Massachusetts (which is said to adhere to
the rule of lex loci contractus), by intervention of a New
York agent, enters into a transaction with a resident of
California (where the lex loci solutionis is prescribed by
statute), performance being due in Connecticut (a state
clearly following the theory of intention of the parties).
The requisites of a valid contract are established: in the
Massachusetts courts by the law of New York; in the courts
of California by the law of Connecticut; in the Connecticut
courts according to the circumstances of the case; and how
in New York nobody knows.
Parties wanting to secure their transaction against the
possible legal intricacies of the unknown governing law,
would be made more helpless by the assertion popular in
the literature that they cannot escape imperative rules of
the governing law by agreeing on the applicable law.
May it be allowed, for present purposes, to abandon the
fatalistic passivity with which either the condominium of the
several rules has been taken as an existent and unavoidable
evil or one of the rules has been perforce erected as the
present law? What the desirable method should be, has been
rather well defined in the last development of the world
literature. Although none of the existing legislations in
either hemisphere has reached the visible goal and scholarly
efforts are inchoate, we are able at least to visualize the way
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to be followed and the gigantic mass of prejudices that must
be cleared away.

II.

THE THEORIES

It has earlier been submitted in this work 7 that conflicts
law may allow the parties to a contract to select the applicable
law. However, opinions are still divided into three main
groups.
I.

Theory Negating Choice of Law by the Parties

Reading the Restatement or certain Latin-American codes,
one might feel that the parties are entirely unable to influence
in any way the law governing their obligations. But the fact
that for centuries most courts throughout the world have
allowed the parties a very broad field of decision, has impelled the innumerable theoretical adversaries of "autonomy"
to conceive a more moderate view. 8 In this view, every
contract rests upon one predestined municipal law called to
its function by the rule of conflicts without regard to the
intention of the parties in the individual case. For instance,
the law of the place where the parties make the contract, is
imposed authoritatively on them. To the extent that this law
permits the replacing of its own provisions by stipulations
of the parties, they may, instead of inventing new provisions,
quote or cite or copy a section of a foreign statute. By such
shorthand reference, they never do more than incorporate
7

Vol. I (ed. 2) p. 90ff.
The founder of this theory was BAR, see 2 BAR 4· In the United States: MINOR
4oi; BoRCHARD, "Contractual Claims in International Law," IJ Col. L. Rev. (I9IJ)
457; LORENZEN, JO Yale L. J. (I92I) 565, 6ss, 658; JI id. (I922) 53; BEALE, 23
Harv. L. Rev. (I909) 260 and Treatise § 332.2; GooDRICH 325. Lists of continental
writ,r> have been given by CALEB, Essai sur le principe de l'autonomie en dro't
international prive (I927) who has revived this theory; NIBOYET, "La theorie de
l'autonomie de Ia volonte," Recueil I927, I, 5 (the most energetic advocate); see
also lists by MELCHIOR 500 n. I; GuTZWILLER I6o6.0n the adversaries of this theory,
see Vol. I (ed. 2) p. 92 n. 66. Adde the able article by GERHARD MAYER, "Zur Parteiautonomie als Kollisionsnorm," 44 Z.int.R. (I9JI) IOJ; FEDOZZI-CERETI 690 § 2;
KosTERS in Conference de Ia Haye, Actes de Ia sixieme session, 351.
8
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the foreign provision as a term of their agreement,9 which
remains controlled by the one invariable preordained law.
German and Italian writers, among whom Zitelmann has
grounded this doctrine on scientific considerations, distinguish
this reference permitted by the governing municipal law,
under the term of "contractual reception" or "materiellrechtliche Verweisung" 10 (reference based on the substantive
law), from the forbidden reference pertaining to conflicts
law.
Although language in not a few English and American
decisions alludes to the embodying of particular legal terms
or rules in a contract, and such a provision may be said to be
a mere stipulation rather than a reference to foreign law, 11
it would seem that a consistent distinction as in German
writings is not made by common law lawyers, and correctly
so. 12 Indeed, whatever the merits of this learned distinction
may be when the question is whether a contract must be
divided under two laws, 13 it is unsound to treat the reference
to a foreign legal rule in the same manner as when the parties
refer to former arrangements or "to a work of Bentham"
(as some writer has textually suggested). Reference to a
foreign legal rule is necessarily always based on conflicts law.
9 CooK, Legal Bases 399, has used the same words to refute or tranquilize "the
critics of the 'intention' theory," who oppose the proposition that foreign law as
such should control as a consequence of the agreement. Yet, a little later Cook
seems fully to accept the intention theory in its true meaning.
10 The first term is used by PERASSI, Rivista 1928, 518. The second term seems
to have been formed by ZIMMERMAN, 44 Zentralblatt (1926) at 883 and was popularized by HAuDEK, MELCHIOR, and M. WoLFF.
11 See, for instance, DicEY (ed. 3) 61, General Principle No. VI, cancelled in
ed. 5; Judge Learn~d Hand in Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson S. S. (1930) 43 F. (zd)
824, 827; German Reichsgericht (Sept. 21, 1899) 44 RGZ. 300, 302; and see infra
ns. 130-132.
12 Infra at n. 134· It was different when the Lords in 1703, Foubert v. Trust. 1
Brown Pari. Cas. 38, 42, recognized the Custom of Paris of I sSo, declared applicable
in the contract, "as if the custom had been distinctly specified," which "by no
means (involved) an attempt to introduce foreign laws." Foreign laws at that time
were never applied in English courts. Cf. M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 418.
13 See this Chapter, infra suh III pp. 368 If.
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The purpose of the described theory is to demonstrate that
the parties are unable to transcend the margin of freedom
left them in the particular primary legal system. Under this
system, all stipulations except those which they may establish
in the domestic field, are also forbidden them to enter into
in the international realm. The so-called "imperative" provisions, jus co gens, of the predestined law are clamped down
on all transactions-they cannot be evaded. 14
Illustration. A citizen of New York entered in New York
into an agreement with a German domiciled in Germany,
without consideration as required by New York law. Under
German law it was a valid contract. Could the parties decide
that German law was to apply? Under § 332 (c) of the
Restatement the answer is strictly no, the same as given by
the majority of American, French, and Latin-American
writers. The German Supreme Court had no objection to
the agreement. 15 The Supreme Court of the United States
declared a contract under similar circumstances (without
agreement on the applicable law) valid under the Louisiana
law of the place of performance. 16

The problem is alike as respects capacity, formality, mutual
consent, fraud and error, illegality, and any other vitiating
factor. As a practical consequence, the allegedly inevitable
primary legislation must be ascertained in every particular
case, although this can be done authoritatively only by the
court adjudging the case when the matter becomes litigious,
a court unknown at the time of contracting and following
its own laws and lights. If we believe some of these writers,
it is not even just one law from which all "imperative
norms" are to be gathered, "but the law applicable varies
according to the elements of the obligation and the trans14 BRANDL, "Der Parteiwille in der Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichtes," Leipz •
Z. 1925, 816, 821; BEER, 18 Z.int.R. 358.
16 RG. (April 6, 19rr) JW. 19rr, 532, 24 Z.int.R. 305.
16 Pritchard v. Norton (1882) 106 U. S. 124.
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action in question. It is precisely this variety and this multiplicity of effective laws that makes the matter of obligations
in private international law so complex and so difficult." 17
"Autonomy," however, endeavors to obviate the unpredictable findings of unforeseeable tribunals and to consolidate
the contract under one law while negotiation is in course.
2.

Proper Law Theory

Increasingly and with few interruptions, during four
centuries from Rochus Curtius and Dumoulin to the rise
of the learned opposition in our century and ever since, unruffled by all objections, courts have followed an all-inclusive
doctrine of intention of the parties covering the entire field
of obligatory contracts. The parties may expressly declare
which law should govern their obligations; or they may
tacitly choose this law; or the judge has to ascertain the
law they may have contemplated in contracting. These three
possibilities of express, tacit, and presumed or "hypothetical"
intention are the only devices for localizing any contract,
although the courts have developed certain criteria for construing unexpressed intentions.
The purest form of this doctrine appears in England18
and is known as the doctrine of the proper law. As last
formulated by Lord Atkin:
"The legal principles which are to guide an English Court
on the question of the proper law are now well settled. It is
the law which the parties intended to apply. Their intention
will be ascertained by the intention expressed in the contract
if any, which will be conclusive. If no intention be expressed,
the intention will be presumed by the court from the terms of
17 2

ARMINJON (ed. 2) 327 § II r.
That Lord Mansfield's theory in Robinson v. Bland (r76o) 2 Burr. 1077 is
directly traceable to HuBER, has been emphasized by LLEWELYN DAVIES, "The
Influence of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law,"
18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 49, 54, 62.
18
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the contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances." 19
And Lord Wright, speaking for the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, stated:

"It is now well settled that by English law the proper
law of the contract is the law which the parties intended to
apply. That intention is objectively ascertained, and, if not
expressed, will be presumed from the terms of the contract
and the relevant surrounding circumstances." 20
The peculiar character of this traditional approach should
be well noted. The phases of choice of law according to the
intention of the parties are three also in the modern opinion,
but not identical with the above-mentioned traditional distinction. In the German view, for instance, the parties may
have agreed on the applicable law; the judge may try to
conform to the presumable will of the concrete parties; or
the judge may seek a law conforming to the empirical intention of average parties. It is entirely characteristic of the
genuine proper law theory that no such distinction is made.
From the beginning of the English doctrine, when Lord
Mansfield emphasized that the parties at bar had a view to
the laws of England,21 the courts assumed that the parties
always contract with a certain law in mind, either "with an
express view" to it, as in Lord Mansfield's case, or tacitly.
The court only discovers this view. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal, which generally applied the law of the place of
performance to the effects of all contracts, insisted upon the
statement that this is done, only because and to the extent
19 Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft [19371 A. C. 500, 529. The most recent expression of the proper law theory,
in Duke of Marlborough v. Att. Gen. (Dec. II, 1944) C. A. [19451 I All E. R. 165,
171 refers back to Lord Watson's dictum in Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery [18941
A. C. 202, 212.
20 Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [19391 A. C. 277, 289.
21 Robinson v. Bland (176o) 2 Burr. 1077, 1078; cj., e.g., Warrender v. Warrender
(1835) 2 CI. & Fin. 488, 535: "The parties in a contract like this must be held
emphatically to enter into it with a view to their own domicile and its laws."
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that this law corresponds with the presumable intention of
the parties in the particular case. 22 In the very large domain
practically covered by this idea, no distinction is made among
an agreement, an existent volition, and a merely supposed
intention.
While eminent continental writers of the I 9th century
continued to accept the doctrine, 23 in more recent times the
bulk of the literature went the other way. But quite recently,
a few scholarly attempts have been made to support this allinclusive intention theory of the courts,24 in straight opposition to the anti-autonomy doctrine prevailing thus far. The
most energetic theoretical foundation of the broadest conception of party autonomy has been undertaken by Bati:ffol. 25
In developing a suggestion by other writers, 26 he teaches that
the parties never really select the law, not even when they
expressly agree on choice of law. They merely localize the
contract. The court, then, determines the law, following their
lead. The conflicts rule approves the law of the place where
the contract has its center of gravity. The parties influence
the latter by establishing locally connected obligations, or
more directly, by selecting among several local contacts that
22 BG. (May 9, I923) 49 BGE. II 220, 225; BG. (Sept. 26, I933) 59 BGE. II
355, 36I. Cj. RoMBERGER, Obi. Vertrage 34; NIEDERER, 59 Z. Schweiz. R. (N.F.)
239·
18 E.g., I FoELIX § 94i I FIORE § I I2; DEsPAGNET § 294; AssER-RIVIER, Elements
7I.
More recently, in Argentina, ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 240; RoMERO DEL
PRADO, 2 Manual32I.
24 MELCHIOR 50iff. for German law; NussBAUM, D. IPR. § 34, esp. at 221;
1'\ussBAUM, Principles r6I.
26 BAnFFOL § I7 and pp. 44ff.; Traite 6r8 f.
26 M. WoLFF, IPR. (ed. I) 86 par. 2, 88, and in "The Choice of Law by the Parties
in International Contracts," 49 Jurid. Rev. (I937) IIo, explains party autonomy
by the assumption that the parties may constitute one of the existent local contacts
of their contractual relationship as the decisive point of gravity. But it appears
from the latest edition (ed. 3, p. I39) and from his English book, Priv. Int. Law
4I5, 428, that Wolff's own theory is not really much different from that proposed
here.
Related theories, however, have been advanced by Italian authors, such as
PERASSI, Rivista I928, SI6; BETTI, id. I930, IS; BALDONI, id. I932, 35Ii FEDOZZICERETI 697.
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one which in their own eyes is the closest or the most convenient. As they must know best about this center of gravity,
the conflicts rule relies on their choice. Batiffol claims by
this conception to conform to many modern needs and, at
the same time, to rescue the traditional practice.
However, irrespective of results which must be reached
under any approach, such a harmonization jars with the facts
at both ends. An agreement of the parties to subject their
contract to New York law is itself a perfectly serious contract that cannot be degraded into a mere "localization" or
disposal of the center of gravity. Why should this contract
be a simple element for the finding by a court, 27 instead of
a binding transaction legalized by the conflicts rule, as all
recognized contracts are sanctioned by law? Again, in the
unquestionably prevailing cases, the parties do not agree on
the applicable law and have no law in mind, or else each
party thinks of a different law. In all these cases, choice of
law cannot be based, as it must be in the first case, on an
actual will of the parties.
Moreover, were it true that choice of law is bound to
follow the distribution of local connections, besides fatal
consequences that have been inferred to these connections
respecting the pretended territorial limits of party autonomy, 28 the contract would be necessarily split into segments,
each governed by a local law, a proposition justly abhorred
by the very authors mentioned. 29
3· Theory Permitting Agreement of Parties on the Applicable Law
Despite some resistance by writers, there is practically no
doubt that the parties to a contract have a right to determine
17 BATIFFOL 156 § 176 and often; cf. the
13 See infra Chapter 29, p. 4o8 n. 56.
29 BATIFFOL

69 § 77•

authors cited infra n.

30.
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by agreement the law applicable to their contractual relationship. Only the limits may be controversial.
Such agreement is a true contract,S 0 having all requirements of a contractual engagement, but auxiliary to the main
contract. A subtle controversy as to the law by which this
accessory stipulation itself is governed,S 1 offers more academic
than practical interest. No case is known in which the law
agreed upon would not be suitable for determining also the
validity of the additional stipulation, provided that the forum
has no specific objection.
An agreement may be declared expressly or by implication
(tacitly, by conduct) as any other informal act. Implied
agreement is closely related to, and often hardly distinguishable from, presumed intention, but in theory, at least, it is
distinctly characterized. The parties are not presumed but
positively assumed to have agreed on, not only thought of,
the legal system to be applied. For instance, when an international loan debenture, written in English, follows the
American legal terminology, appoints a bank in Manhattan as
trustee in the American fashion, expresses the money amounts
in dollars and makes the capital repayable in New Yorkno one should doubt that the parties themselves have selected
the law of New York, even though they omitted to say so
in a clause. 32 Or, when it is stipulated in an American sales
contract that it should be deemed to have been made at
30 HAUDEK 88ff.; RAAPE, IPR. 4"-4, 433; Swiss BG. (Aug. 3I, I953) 79 BGE. II
"-95, 300. Contra: MELCHIOR 5I9 n. 3; BATIFFOL 46 §51.; M. WoLFF, 49 Jurid. Rev.
(I937) I30; RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 37 Col. L. Rev. (I937) 330. These authors
include implied intention and therefore think of "a coinciding view of the parties"
rather than of a contract.
31
See, for various views, WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I9"-9) 8o1.; HAUDEK 9I; MELCHIOR
51.0; RAAPE, IPR. 433; NIEDERER, 59 Z. Schweiz R. (N. F.) "-49 and Einfiihrung
I97; NIAL "-3; BoRUM IS"-; application of the law agreed upon to the problem of
the conditions for consent to the agreement, as in the text above, has also been
suggested by the special committee on conflict of laws concerning sales of goods
(I93I) art. "- par. 3, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 957 and has been adopted in the Draft
Convention of the Seventh Hague Conference (I9SI) art. 1. par. 3·
32
RABEL, Io Z.ausl.PR. (I936) 49"-, 496.
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the domicil of the vendor, 33 this means as much as to refer
directly to the law of that domicil.
Where only a "presumed" or "assumed" intention is ascertained, the applicable law is selected by the court rather
than the parties. But that courts and enactments so often
have treated all these categories on the same footing, may
rest on practical wisdom. Tacit agreement of the parties,
their probable ideas, and the efforts of a judge to find the
law most appropriate to the contract made by them, are
closely related and somewhat overlapping categories. To
treat these groups by essentially divergent rules increases
the difficulties inherent in the matter.

Ill.
I.

33

THE PRESENT SYSTEMS a

Outside the United States

Autonomy recognized. Most codes recognize either in a
complete formula "the law to which the parties expressly or
tacitly intend to refer," 34 or "the intention of the parties," 35
or establish divergent provisions, only "if nothing else has
been agreed upon." 36 In British common law since Lord
33 Case of Montreal Cotton & Wool Waste Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland (I927) 26I Mass. 385, I 58 N. E. 795·
33 a Recently, an excellent comparative survey in YNTEMA, " 'Autonomy' in
Choice of Law," I Am. J. Comp. Law (I952) 34I-358.
34 French Morocco: Decree of Aug. I2, I9I3, art. I3 par. I.
Spanish Morocco: Dahir of I9I4, art. 20 par. I.
Siam: Law on private international law of 1939, § I3 par. I
86 Greece: C. C. (I940) art. 25. This was also the theory of the Supreme Court,
decision No. I3I, I932, 43 Themis 449·
s& Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ 36, 37 (but see pp. 37If.).
Belgian Congo: Decree of Feb. 20, 1891, art. 11 par. 2.
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23 par. 1.
Egypt: C. C. (I948) art. I9 par. 1.
Iran: C. C. art. 968 (only for foreigners).
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (1865) art. 9 par. 2; Disp. Pre!. (I942) art. 25. But as to the
former art. 58, C. Com., see Cass. (Jan, 2I. 1928) Rivista I928, 514.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 7·
Quebec: C. C. art. 8.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 4·
Syria: C. C. (1949) art. 20 par. I.
Benelux-Draft, art. 17 par. I.
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Mansfield's famous dictum87 and in the great majority of
the other countries, 38 the courts firmly hold the same view,
which also has been shared by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals89
and-so far as the case required solution-by the Permanent
Court of International Justice. 40
Austrian Civil Code. Parallel to the broad reservations for
the law of the forum which the Austrian Civil Code and its
followers in Latin America have established with respect to
the capacity of nationals/ 1 they have restricted the principle
of party autonomy in favor of the law of the forum. The
Austrian Code provides:

§ 36. If a foreigner in this country enters into a bilaterally
obligatory transaction with a national, it shall be governed by
37
England: Lord Mansfield's obiter dictum in Robinson v. Bland (I76o) 1 Burr.
1077, I W. Bl. 134, cj. 1 BEALE I093; formally declared In re Missouri Steamship
Co. (I889) 41 Ch. D. 31I.
Australia: McClelland v. Trustees Executors and Agency Co., Ltd. (High Court
of Australia I936) 55 Commw. L. R. 483 at 493 opinion per Dixon, J.
38 Belgium: Cass. (Feb. 14, I938) Pasicrisie I938 I 66.
Bulgaria: See MAKARov, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (I934) 66o.
France: Cass. (civ.) (Dec. S, I9IO) S. I9II.I.119, Revue I9II, 39S. Clunet 191'-,
u56; Cass. (req.) (March 3, I924) S. I914.1.251; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 27, I93I)
S. 1933.1.4I (tacit agreement); Cass. (Nov. 2, 1937) Nouv. Revue I937, 766. On
the history of the cases see BATIFFOL § 31; see also NIBOYET 799·
Germany: "In an overwhelming number of decisions," see MELCHIOR sor § 35S,
and for the cases from 1869 to 1892 see NIEMEYER, Positives Intern. Privatrecht
91 § 177·
Hungary: See Sz.Aszv, I I Z.ausi.PR. (I937) 168, 17I.
The Netherlands: H. R. (June I3, I914) W. II18I, N.J. (I924) 859; H. R. (April
8, I917) W. u664; App. Rotterdam (Jan. 3, 1935) N. J. (I935) 86S, cited (with
regret) by HIJMANS 175; H. R. (Dec. I2, 1947) N. J. 1948 No. 6oS, Clunet I950,
922 (reserving only express provisions declaring domestic law applicable to an
international transaction). The confusing view expressed by MuLDER I64 that the
decision of June 13, I914 makes an end to the principle seems to be entirely unfounded.
Rumania: See JuvARA, Actes de Ia 6eme Conference de Ia Haye 336; PLASTARA,
7 Repert. 75 No. 248.
Spain: GoLDSCHMIDT, 1 Sistema 81; see TRiAs DE BES, "Conception de droit
international prive etc.," Recueil 1930 I 6s7; 6 Repert. 157 No. I14.
Sweden: ALMEN, I Das Skandinavische Kaufrecht (I911) so.
89 Mixed Arb. Tribunals: See for cases GuTZwiLLER, 3 Int. Jahrb. Schiedsgerichtswesen (I93I) I34ff.
40
Judgments in the cases of the Brazilian and the Serbian Loans, Publications ot
the Permanent Court of International Justice, of July n, I919, Series A, Nos.
20 and 1I, at 4I, Clunet I919, 977, I001.
41
See Vol. I, (ed. 1) pp. I15ff.
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this Code without exception; provided that he concludes it
with a foreigner, the same applies only in case it is not proved
that, in contracting, consideration was given to another law.
§ 37· If foreigners enter into transactions abroad with
foreigners, or with subjects of this State, they are to be
judged according to the laws of the place where the transaction was concluded; provided that in contracting another
law has not evidently been taken as a basis ....
The Austrian courts also apply whatever they consider
imperative rules of their law to any contracts made abroad in
which an Austrian participates. 42 Apparently, the principle
ordained in status matters that a contract by an Austrian
national purporting to cause effects in Austria is governed by
Austrian law ( § 4), is sometimes applied to other matters, too. 43
Latin America. In general, it does not appear that party
autonomy is entirely denied in Latin America, but according
to numerous codes, in certain cases the law of the forum
prevails. The Civil Code of Chile (I 8 55) inaugurated this
trend by the provision that:
The effects of contracts made abroad and to be performed
in Chile are determined by the Chilean laws. 44
Appearing as the third paragraph of a section dealing with
abienes," that is, probably meaning to indicate immovables/5
situated in Chile, the provision would seem to refer exclusively to contracts concerning domestic real property, which
class of transactions was expressly excepted from party
autonomy in the Brazilian Code. 46 Expressly under this narWALKER 409 ns. 5 and 6; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ § 27 n. IO.
OGH. (Jan. r6, 1952) Clunet 1955, r8o; OGH. (Jan. 23, I952) 25 SZ. (1952)
No. I7 (guaranty between Austrian parties, concluded in Switzerland, Austrian
Jaw); see I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ ibid.
44 Chile: C. C. art. I6 par. 3, to which provision C. Com. art. IIJ expressly refers.
45 On the doubts existing with respect to movables, see CLARO SoLAR, I Explicaciones de Derecho Civil Chilena (I8y8) 125 § 215.
46 Brazil: Introd. Law (1916) art. 13 § {mico, sub III ("transactions relating to
immovables situated in Brazil"); sub IV ("transactions referring to the Brazilian
mortgage system").
42
43
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rower conception, the provision was adopted in the Codes of
Colombia and Ecuador. 47 However, the Codes of Honduras,
Panama, and El Salvador have reproduced the entire section
without modification. 48 The Supreme Court of Chile49 not
only refers it to all objects but extends the law of the place
of performance to the effects of all contracts. A Chilean place
of performance would imperatively call for the Chilean law,
while a contract to be performed abroad would be susceptible
of an agreement in favor of a different law.
This double rule has been adopted in numerous other
Latin-American laws, notably in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico, 50 although only the Brazilian Civil Code of I 9 I 6
made it really clear that the parties may choose a law in
general, but may not do so if the place of performance is
in the country. The Argentine Code contains a maze of
mysterious provisions. 51
The Brazilian Code added the prohibition of an agreement
of the parties as to "obligations entered into in a foreign
country by Brazilians," 52 thus achieving four extensive reservations for the lex fori. The new Brazilian law, however, has
replaced all restrictions to the agreement of the parties by
47 Colombia: C. C. art. 20 par. 3·
Ecuador: C. C. art. IS par. 3·
48 Honduras: C. C. art. 14 par. 3·
Panama: C. C. art. 6 par. 3·
El Salvador: C. C. art. r6 par. 3·
49 ChileanS. Ct. (June 8, 19rr) Hoffman v. Fisco, 9 Revista Der. Jur. y Ciencias
Soc. (1914) I, 358; (Jan. 5, 1933) Artola V. de Achav. v. Compaii{a Huanchera de
Bolivia, 90 id. (1933) I, 373, 384 (shares of a Bolivian company possessed in Chile).
60 Argentina: C. C. art. 1243 (1209).
Brazil: Introd. Law (I9I6) art. 13 § unico, sub I ("contracts made abroad but to
be performed in Brazil"); Introd. Law (1942) art. 9 § I. On several controversial
questions, see 2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 187, 19r.
Mexico: C. C. (1928) art. 13; the former code (r884, art. 17) had expressly allowed
transactions made by a foreigner abroad concerning movables to be submitted to
another law.
61 Argentina: Are art. 8 (8) and 1243 (1209) imperative? The answer is difficult
because nobody knows which of the many sections involved includes the main
principle. See the attempt to disentangle this complex by 3 Vrco 122 § 137·
62 Brazil: c. c. art. 13 § unico sub II.
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one provision in favor of Brazilian formalities for contracts
performable in the country. It would seem that thereby party
autonomy is tacitly restored in all questions of substance. The
comments, known thus far, proclaim this view, excepting,
however, the "imperative" provisions of the law of the place
of contracting. 53
Another provision in favor of the domestic law was still
more extraordinary. Peru and Guatemala seemed to allow
a party agreement exclusively in favor of their own laws;
but this may be obsolete. 54
Authoritative writers have, often enough, manifested their
dissatisfaction with the described nationalistic tendencies/5
which, however, have never received, as a whole, the public
rejection they deserve. To the contrary, the exorbitant theory
that the state is entitled to dictate the lex obligationis to its
subjects has been seriously maintained by a reputed writer. 56
While certain codes omit any provision, 57 their silence may
appear ominous to the permissibility of agreements on the
applicable law, in view of a recent discussion during the
deliberation of the new text of Montevideo. The Argentine
delegate, Vico, proposed that the intention of the parties be
recognized with respect to the effects of contracts, where it
is not in contradiction to prohibitions of the law of the place
68 Brazil: lntrod. Law (I94:2) art. 9; EsPINOLA, :2 Lei Introd. 568; SERPA LoPES,
:2 Lei lntrod. 3I6ff.; TENORIO, Lei lntrod. 6o9-613 advocates restriction to the
autonomy allowed by the lex loci contractus; contra: SERPA LoPES, ibid.
64 Peru: C. C. (I85:2) art. 40 sent. :2, omitted in C. C. (1936) T't Pre!., art. VII.
Guatemala: The provision of the Law on Foreigners, I894, art. I6 sentence :2 has
been reformed and appears in the Law on Foreigners, I936, art. :24 sent. 3 restricted
to external requisites in case the act or contract is to be performed in the country.
However, MATOS 453 n. I § 3:27 does not stress or even mention this article.
u See, among others, recently, BEviLAQUA (1938) 368, although he seems (365ff.)
to understand the Brazilian rules as mere presumptions; FuLGENCio, Synthesis de
Direito lnternacional Privado (I937) 145 § :299· Contra: 2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA I9Iff.
u PoNTES DE MIRANDA, 39 Recueil (I932) I at 649.
67 The C6digo Bustamante is enigmatic. BusTAMANTE, La comisi6n de jurisconsultos de Rio (Habana I927) 119 § I4I declared that his draft recognized express
and tacit intentions of the parties, but his added restrictions are based on the
theory of a predestined national law or lex loci contractus.
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of performance; in other words, he followed the French
theory rejecting true party autonomy. To the same effect,
the present text of the Treaty was interpreted in the commission, in which, as is reported, the principle "of general
and affirmative character triumphed that denies autonomy
of intention any legitimacy for setting up a regulatory norm
of private international law." 58 The Uruguayan delegate,
Vargas Guillemette, proposed a round denial, and in fact,
a clause was inserted into the Additional Protocol of the
Conference declaring that "jurisdiction and law applicable
according to the respective treaties, cannot be modified by
the intention of the parties, except to the extent that this
law authorizes them so to do." 59 It seems that all these
formulations amount to the rule that the law of the place
of performance or the other laws prescribed in particular
cases by the treaty govern the freedom of the parties.
Other jurisdictions rejecting party autonomy. According
to a very short report, the courts of Denmark and Norway
do not recognize choice of law by the parties except within
the domestic sphere of the competent law, which, however,
does not seem defined with certainty. 60 The same is declared
in a section of the Civil Code of the Soviet Union. 61 The
68 lnstituto Buenos Aires, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano, at 285; Republica
Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano, at I67.
69 Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano 21!. Literally adopted
by the Uruguayan C. C., Final Title (as amended I94I) art. 2403.
66 Conference de Ia Haye, Actes de Ia sixieme session (I928) 276 (UssiNG, Denmark) and 337 (ALTEN, Norway); BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 224 No. So
(Denmark). Contra: now BoRUM I39, I44; LANDO, 6 Am. J. Camp. Law (I9S7) I, 3·
61 The question is declared controversial, see STOUPNITSKI, 7 Repert. I 14 No.
I6o; but see MAKARov, Precis 300ff. In commercial affairs, choice of!aw is now recognized, PISAR, 70 Harv. L.R. (1956/ 57) 593 at 63o; RAMZAITSEV, Rev. Crit. I958,
459 at 467.
It may be noted, however, that several treaties on the legal position of Soviet
trade delegations abroad state that the rule according to which contracts with the
delegation are governed by the law of the place of contracting, may be changed
by the terms of individual contracts, see, e.g., Treaty on Commerce and Navigation
with Denmark of August 17, I946, (8 U.N. Treaty Series 20I) Annex, art. 6 par. 2;
with Hungary of July IS, 1947 (Economic Treaties and Agreements of the Soviet
Bloc in Eastern Europe I945-195I. Ed. 2, New York 1952) Annex, art. 5 par. 2;
with France of September 3, I95I (Revue Crit. I953, I7o) art. 10 par. 2.
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Czechoslovakian statute of I948 and the Benelux-Draft
recognize party autonomy insofar as it does not abrogate
imperative rules of the "competent" law. 618
2.

United States

Until recently, the opinion dominant among the European
scholars was fully shared by the leading American writers.62
The most radical form of this doctrine, denying not only desirability but existence to a choice of law by the parties, has been
adopted by Beale and is evident in .the perfect silence of the
Restatement on everything connected with party autonomy.
A few, very few, cases, reflecting this principle denying
party autonomy, are best represented by Judge Learned
Hand's formulation:
"People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another
place; they may of course incorporate any provisions they
wish into their agreements-a statute like anything else-and
when they do, courts will try to make sense out of the whole,
so far as they can. But an agreement is not a contract, except
as the law says it shall be, and to try to make it one is to pull
on one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation,
and the parties have nothing whatever to do with that; no
more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes." 63
Textbooks and encyclopedias, however, readily admit that
regard to the intention of the parties is one of the approaches
which an American court may use. 64 Beale himself recorded
in I9IO as in I934 that it appeared in the second most
61
• Czechoslovakia: Law of I948 on private international law, § 9·
Benelux-Draft, art. I7 par. I sentence 2.
82 In addition to BEALE: LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (I92I) 655 and passim; GooDRICH 326; previously FooTE 397; MINOR 40I. See CooK, Legal Bases 389.
63 Gerli & Co., Inc. v. Cunard S. S. Co., Ltd. (C.C.A. 2d I9JI) 48 F. (2d) IIS,
II?; accord, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyde (C.C.A. 2d I936) 82 F.
(2d) I74· In both cases the decision was not dependent on the dictum.
64
STUMBERG 225, 234·
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numerous group of cases. 65 The Supreme Court of the United
States has most frequently followed this theory, 66 starting
from a dictum by Chief Justice Marshall in 1825,67 and has
purposefully remarked that this is the general rule "concisely and exactly stated before the Declaration of Independence by Lord Mansfield." 68 It has been said that:
"The situs of contracts is one of the troublesome problems
of private international law, but one rule stands forth clearly:
That the intention of the parties as to the law they desired
to apply will govern, if such selection be made in good faith,
and be not opposed to the public policy of the forum." 69
The courts of New York have clearly followed the same
view. In 1935, the New York court of last resort has explicitly restated the principle:
"The intention of the parties, express or implied, generally
determines the law that governs a contract." 70
However, the courts, compelled to find their way against
the hostility of the leading scholars, have been increasingly
prone to indecision and inconsistency. The doubts whether
parties may determine their law at all, may have been augmented by Beale's influence, although they do not seem to
have taken strong roots. Also, the unreasonable belief that
parties can choose only between the law of the place of
contracting and that of the place of performance, seems to
66 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1910) 26o; 2 BEALE 1172 still mentions 13 states,
as against 21 states allegedly following the lex loci contractus, but see infra Chapter
30, p. 453·
66 See STUMBERG 234 n. 42; LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) at 579; NussBAUM,
51 Yale L. J. (1942) at 919.
1 7 Wayman v. Southard (U. S. 1825) 10 Wheat. 1, cited in Pritchard v. Norton
(1882) ro6 U.S. 124 as a precedent, cf. KuHN, Camp. Com. 280.
18 Mr. Justice Gray in Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co.
(1888) 129 u.s. 397, 447·
&D O'Toole v. Meysenburg (C.C.A. 8th 1918) 251 Fed. 191, 194.
70 Compaiila de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank ot
Finland (1935) 269 N.Y. 22, 26, 198 N. E. 617.

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
have increased as an effect of Beale's teaching. 71 The confusion of the cases, so often deplored, would have been
relieved in part, if the courts had always been told in no
uncertain words that it is not at all in their discretion and
free decision to apply a law which the parties agreed to
apply. The most recent writers have claimed the theory of
intention to be existent in all American courts. 72 It should
be so in any case, and this would give, as Cook has said, as
much security as the rules of the Restatement. 73
3· Express Agreements
Stipulations concerning the law applicable to a contract
are not so rare as some writers believe. Of course, compared
to the constant flow of millions of interstate and international
transactions, a small percentage are provided with appropriate
clauses. But world commerce, advised by trade organizations
and counsel, has been using such stipulations in ever increasing types of contracts. It is true, the trend is much less strong
in the United States, a fact obviously connected with the
prevalence of interstate commerce based on federal statutes
and a critical attitude of courts. The British standard forms
with their reference to English law and London arbitration
have aroused countermeasures in the United States as well
as in Central Europe. Also, it happens that the arbitration
clauses in their large progress are powerful competitors,
since they tend toward decisions discarding legal considerations. Arbitrators of the type of ccamiable compositeur.r' or
cede facto arbitrators," have no duty to observe rules of law,
and where there is such duty, frequently no sanction is stated.
71 According to LEE, "Conflict of Laws relating to Installment Sales," 41 Mich.
L. Rev. (1942) 445, 468, most courts share in this belief. This may be doubted,
however.
72 See (in various limitations) CooK, Legal Bases 418; BATIFFOL 31 §§ 36-38;
id. 58 §§ 6J-68; NusSBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 919. Cj. infra Chapter 29 p. 405
n. 46.
73 CooK, 21 Can. Bar Rev. (1943) 249, 253 No. 8.
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The situation is different in England, some British dominions, and some American states, where the courts retain a
considerable function, and to some extent in other countries in
which arbitrators are presumed to apply the local state law. 74
But growing opposition to the arbitrariness of lawless arbitration on legally material questions ought to bring express
stipulations on the applicable law to renewed significance.
Traders of bulk merchandise have used for many decades
standard forms influenced by British habits and institutions.
Thus, in the grain trade from America to Europe, the La
Plata Grain Contract of the London Corn Trade Association
subjects the parties to London arbitration and English law.
A frequent clause providing in lengthy caution for the determination of arbitration suits, began with the following words:
"Buyer and seller agree that, for the purpose of proceedings, either legal or by arbitration, this contract shall be
deemed to have been made in England and to be performed
there, any correspondence in reference to the offer, the acceptance, the place of payment or otherwise notwithstanding, and the Courts of England or Arbitrators appointed in
England, as the case may be, shall, except for the purpose
of enforcing any award made in pursuance of the Arbitration
clause hereof, have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes
which may arise under this contract. Such disputes shall
be settled according to the law of England whatever the
domicile, residence, or place of business of the parties to this
contract may be or become.... " 75
In another, apparently now prevailing, form, only arbitration is stipulated:
"All disputes from time to time arising out of this contract
shall be referred to two Arbitrators ... or to an Umpire...."
"All Arbitrators shall be governed by the provision of the
74 For all details, see the instructive article by E. CoHN, "Commercial Arbitration
and the Rules of Law, A Comparative Study," 4 U. of Toronto L. J. (1941) I.
75 See for a list of German, French and Italian cases dealing with this form,
HAUDEK 102 n. I.
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Arbitration Act for the time being in force in England, except
so far as the same may be modified by or be inconsistent
with the foregoing provisions."
"The Arbitrators or Umpire appointed shall, in all cases,
reside in the United Kingdom, and at the time of their
appointment shall be themselves members of the London
Corn Trade Association Ltd.... " 76
In a comparable way, brokers of any place will in certain
contracts with customers refer to the rules of the exchange
and the law of the state where the order is to be executed.
For instance:
"All orders executed in New York or any New York Stock
Exchange or Curb Exchange shall be executed in accordance
with the laws of New Y ark and the rules and regulations
of the said exchanges prohibiting fictitious and illegal transactions, contracts and agreements, and it is understood and
agreed that the validity of all transactions ... executed on
any New York Stock Exchange or New York Curb Exchange
shall be controlled and determined solely by the laws of
New York." 77
References to English law are to be found also in the
contract forms of the London Rubber Trade Association,
Incorporated Oil Seed Association, London Rice Brokers
Association, London Copra Association, London Cattle Food
Trade Association, Liverpool Cotton Association, and references to German law in the general conditions of such
organizations as those of the German carriers78 and maritime
7 6 La Plata Grain Contract, form No. 4I. Parcels for Continent. Rye Terms.
(March I938) clause I I (excerpt). In the so-called North American contracts,
certificates of inspection being declared final as to quality, the disputes subject to
arbitration are such as might arise from other causes than quality of the shipment.
See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
General Legal Bulletin of March 28, I936, 7·
77 Used by a Boston broker and declared valid in Weisberg v. Hunt (I92I) 239
Mass. 190, I98, I3I N. E. 47I, 474· See also Cisler v. Ray (I931) 82 Cal. Dec. 396,
2 Pac. (2d) 987, annotated in 20 Cal. L. Rev. (1932) 97: subjection "to the rules,
reg1lations and customs of the exchange or market (and its clearing house, if any)
where executed."
78 See, e.g., Duncan, Fox & Co. v. Schremp£ & Bonke [r915] I K. B. 365.
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insurers. 79 Moreover, particular banks, underwriters, maritime carriers, and certain large merchants have stipulated
for their own law by stereotyped clauses in Germany,80 and
probably in many countries. 81 Passenger tickets of British
ships, 82 bills of lading regarding vessels leaving English,
Dutch, and Belgian ports for America have been traditionally
referred to "the common law of England, to wit, general
maritime law," or to British law. 83 More recently, it seems
more usual to declare that the contract shall be governed
by the law of the flag of the ship carrying the goods.
In maritime insurance policies, reference has often been
made to the English Insurance Act of I 906 and the conditions and usages of English Lloyd policies. A clause in a
contract between two Dutch companies "as if the policy were
signed in London," has been treated as an express reference
to English law by the Appeal Court of the Hague. 84
Aircraft transport consignments regularly provide for the
national law of the carrier, 85 insofar as international convenHAUDEK 102.
HAUDEK 101. Example: "Place of performance for both delivery and payment,
as well as jurisdiction for both parties, is in Kiel. The contractual relations are
governed by German law." (Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft Aktiengesellschaft,
Kiel-Gaarden, conditions of delivery to foreign countries, published in MuLLEREISERT, Allgemeine Lieferungsbedingungen (1932) rog.)
81 Belgium: Societe Coloniale Anversoise, contracts, see HELLAUER, Kaufvertrage in Warenhandel und Industrie (1927) 189.
Japan: Ferncliff (1938) Am. Marit. Cas. 206, 219: bill of lading to be construed
in accordance with the law of Japan.
82 E.g., in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724.
83 E.g., in the Canadian cases: Mathys v. Manchester Liners (1904) 25 Que.
S. C. 426: "All disputes regarding the bill of lading to be settled according to
common English law"; Can. Sugar Refining Co. v. Furness Withy & Co. (1905)
27 Que. S.C. 502: "the contract shall be governed by the common law of England,
to wit, the maritime law of England"; Vipond v. Furness (S. C. of Canada 1916)
35 D. L. R. (1917) 278: "Any claim or dispute arising on this bill of lading shall,
in the option of the ship owner, be settled with the agents of the Line in London
according to British law, with reference to which this contract is made to the exclusion of proceedings in any other country." Similarly, Hart & Son v. Furness, Withy
and Co. (1904) 37 N. S. R. 74·
84 Hof s'Gravenhage (May 17, 1923) W.II171. On the decision of the Supreme
Court in this cause, see infra n. 128.
8 5 FERNAND DE VrssCHER, in 48 Recueil (1934) II 325.
79
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tions do not yet regulate liabilities. International loans have
often contained86 but sometimes omitted a clause ascertaining
the applicable law, and drafters will probably be experienced
enough, by now, not to forget one. The same is true for
agreements between banks. 87 In many American contracts of
finance corporations, insurance policies, and other agreements, 88 the place of the main office of the company is indicated as the place where the contract is made, frequently with
the express addition that the law of this place shall govern.
This is a tribute paid to the historical role of the lex loci
contractus. Again, to comply with the idea that the place of
performance governs the contract, in German form blanks or
general conditions, producers and sellers almost invariably
state that "place of performance and exclusive jurisdiction"
are to be at their own domicif.B 9 This clause is regularly
regarded as if the law of this place were expressly stipulated.90 Although foreign exclusive jurisdiction is not easily
See for list of judicial cases, HAUDEK 105 n. 1.
See for an example, Schering Ltd. v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank Aktiebo!ag
(1943) [19441 Ch. D. 13.
88 E.g., oil lease, WILLISTON, 7 Contracts 5791; Montreal Cotton & Wool Waste
Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (1927) 261 Mass. 385 (sale of goods).
Conditional sales contract, Rubin v. Gallagher (1940) 294 Mich. 124, 292 N. W. 584
(the court recognizes a subjective right created by the clauses); Stern v. Drew
(App. D. C. 1922) 285 F. 925; Craig & Co., Ltd. v. Uncas Paper Board Co. (1926)
104 Conn. 559, 133 At!. 673, in which cases the clause has been discarded by the
court and by LEE, supra n. 71, at 471.
89 "Smaller enterprises and firms with widespread patronage usually provide
at least for exclusive jurisdiction to be at the place of their management; in the
industry and big trade it is very common to exclude in the general conditions state
jurisdiction in favor of private arbitration." RAISER, Das Recht der allgemeinen
Geschaftsbedingungen (1935) 41. The Industry and Commerce Chamber in Berlin,
however, advised not to use any clauses modifying the legal provisions on the place
of performance and jurisdiction, see RiiHL, J uristischer Anschauungsstoff, Heft 1
(1931) 20.
The custom is widespread. For instance, in a contract between an American
and a Danish firm, the stipulation that the place of performance and of jurisdiction
should be in London, was recognized by the Admiralty and Commercial Tribunal
in Copenhagen (Dec. 20, 1938) Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen 1939, 238, 41 Bull. Inst.
Int. (1939) 52 No. 10762.
90 Usage of merchants and practice of the courts are comprehensively treated
in LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und Schuldort, 166ff.; id. 183ff. Of course, the clause
may intend only advantages of private and procedural law, STAUB-HEINICHEN in
3 Staub 547, Anhang zu § 372 n. 6a.
86
87
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conceded by American and many other courts in suits of
residents against nonresidents, agreement on a law in the
form of determining the place of making or performance
should be respected on principle. Certainly, it should also
be out of question to invalidate the American clause determining the place of contracting as fictitious, as eminent judges
have occasionally done. 91 An English court had no difficulty in
enforcing the following clause in a contract made in New York
between a citizen of Ecuador, who never had an English
domicil, and a Canadian company, respecting certain mineral
rights in Ecuador:
"While for convenience this agreement is signed by the
parties in the City of New York, United States, it shall be
considered and held to be one duly made and executed in
London, England." 92
American life insurance companies doing business in Europe
have been compelled to settle for the jurisdiction and law
of the country of their branch. 93
In ordinary American business agreements extending over
several states, stipulations determining the applicable law
are by far not so frequent as they should be. But remarkable
91 Especially Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357·
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Italy, Cass. (July 26, 1929) Rivista 1931, 406.
To the contrary effect, e.g., England: British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg
(1921) 66 Sol. J. 18.
France: Cass. (req.) (Aug. 6, 1867) D. 1868.1.35, S. 1867.1.400 and constantly,
see BAT1FFOL 43 n. I.
92 British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (1921) 66 Sol. J. 18.
93 Thus Czarist Russia prescribed submitting of insurance policies issued in
Russia to Russian law. After the intervention of the Soviet decrees affecting the
insurance contracts, two conflicting decisions of the New York Court of Appeals
resulted, namely, Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1927) 244 N. Y. 482, 155
N. E. 749, and Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1934) 266 N.Y. 71,
193 N. E. 897. In the first case the court disregarded, in the second case the majority
of the court, against the vote of Judge Lehman, respected, the stipulation of submission to the Russian law required by the Russian statute, cf. Note, 88 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. (1940) at 986. However, the problem of the cases was the situs of the
obligation rather than the applicable law; cf. RABEL, "Situs Problems in Enemy
Property Measqres," II Law and Cont. Probl. (1945) uS, 131.
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negative references occur, a kind of clausulae salvatoriae, to
save as much of the contract as the various statutes possibly
involved may allow. Thus, in combination with a general
reference to the law of Michigan, contracts of the Detroit
automobile industry, with its many thousands of dealers in
the world, state that any provisions contravening the laws
of any country, state, or jurisdiction shall be deemed not a
part of the agreement. In conditional sales contracts, clauses
are to be found such as follow:

"If the law of Tennessee [where the contract is made]
does not apply to and govern the contract between the parties,
their rights and remedies, then the laws of Ohio or Arkansas
apply."
"It is the express intention of the parties hereto that this
agreement and all the terms hereof shall be in conformity
with the laws of any state wherein this agreement may be
sought to be enforced, and if it should appear that any of the
terms hereof are in conflict with any rule of law or statutory
provision of any such state, then the terms hereof which may
conflict therewith shall be deemed inoperative and null and
void insofar as they may be in conflict therewith, and shall
be deemed modified to conform to such rule of law." 94
By an analogous method, an automobile policy provides
that:
"Any and all provisions of this policy which are in conflict
with the statutes of the state wherein this policy is issued
are understood, declared, and acknowledged by this company
to be amended to conform to such statutes." 95
94
Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (1943) 180 Tenn. 137, 172 S. W. (zd)
812, recognizing these clauses and apparently inferring the intention of the parties

that the state of enforcement should furnish the applicable law; the decision is
understood to this effect also in the Note, 148 A. L. R. (1944) 375, 376.
See also HoAR, Conditional Sales (1937) App. B, Forms, p. 438.
95
Form used by Central Mutual Ins. Co. of Chicago and procured for me by
the kindness of Att. Edgar H. Ailes, Jr., Detroit. The stipulation continues to the
effect that nevertheless the liability of the company should not be increased but
the assured should reimburse the company for any loss, costs, or expenses exceeding
the scope of the policy. A similar daus! is concerned with the exigencies of the
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and that:
"Any stipulation therein in conflict with or contrary to the
laws of the state or province (of Canada) where the liability
arises shall be considered as not written, and the law of such
forum shall apply."
and moreover:

"If any condition of this policy relating to the limitation
of time for notice of accident or for any legal proceeding is
at variance with any specific statutory provision in the State
in which the accident occurs, such specific statutory provision
shall be substituted for such condition." 96
A company appointing a branch manager usually inserts
in the employment contract a clause restraining him from
engaging in the particular trade during a certain period after
the termination of the contract. Such clause may expressly
refer for construction to the law of the place of performance,
meaning the state in which the branch is situated, 97 because
the legality of the clause would presumably be judged by
the courts according to this law.
The most notable similar clause in the international field
was introduced to safeguard maritime affreightment contracts
against the danger of contravening the American Harter
Act. 98 At present an analogous so-called "clause paramount"
is ordered by many enactments in connection with the Hague
Rules to be inserted in bills of lading99 and in addition often
voluntarily adopted. The clause states that the contract of
transportation shall be subject to the Convention of Brussels
of 1 924 that sanctioned the Hague Rules, or to a sea carriage
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of the state or province in which the
policy is (eventually deemed to be) issued.
96 Duncan v. Ashwander (D. C. D. La. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 829, 832.
~7 Form drafted by Mr. Thomas G. Long in Detroit.
98 See infra Chapter 29, p. 426 n. 135·
99 Thus in the United States: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, of April 16, 1936,
c. 229 § 13, 49 Stat. 1212, 46 U.S. C. A. § 1312.
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of goods act embodying these Rules, and that any contrary
stipulation shall be null and void. The clause is "paramount"
to all other stipulations. 100
During war times, the United States Government in contracts with firms undertaking comprehensive works, often
assumed its direct liability for the obligations undertaken
by the contractor to a subcontractor in a subcontract made by
him; to secure the subcontractor independent rights as a
beneficiary in all courts, this agreement is declared to be
governed by the laws of the District of Columbia. 101
On principle, despite Beale, there cannot be the slightest
doubt that all the mentioned agreements are held valid in
all countries, including the United States, with the possible
exception of a few Latin-American jurisdictions. The courts
recognize reference to sister states as well as to foreign countries.102 Only the limits have to be discussed.
4· Implied Agreements
Parties agree tacitly to the application of a particular law
when their behavior shows their obligations to be intentionally connected with the private law of a certain country.
If they have only a law "in mind" but do not express their
intention at least by conduct, there is no case for a tacit stipulation. But, for instance, parties having in their former transactions agreed on the application of a certain law, may well
be supposed to intend a similar submission in making a new
contract.
1oo For the interesting particulars, see the informative article in 40 Revue Dor
(I939) I69.
1o1 For this information, too, I am indebted to Mr. Thomas G. Long. The situation existing without such a clause has been described by GRASKE, War Contract
Claims (WILLISTON, 9 Contracts, 1945) § 172.
1 02 For instance, Italian law: Mittenthal v. Mascagni (I903) I83 Mass. I9,
66 N. E. 425.
Canada: M. A. Kennedy v. Fiat of Turin (I923) 24 0. W. N. 537: "all controversies shall be referred to the Turin Law Court to be dealt with according to
Italian law."
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In addition to the cases of international loans and sales,
another typical example free from doubt is a transaction at a
stock or commodity exchange. Every participant knowingly
submits himself to the regulations and usages of the exchange
as well as to the state law in force at the place. Even an order
to a broker in ZUrich, to be performed at the local exchange,
has been considered an intentional subjection to the usages
of ZUrich and to Swiss law. 103
Assuredly, the borderline between tacit and presumed
intention is often dubious. Where the parties by agreement
submit to the jurisdiction of a certain country, some decisions
have taken for granted that the agreement extended to the
municipal law of that country. 104 The English House of
Lords declared this inference so sure that no one could
doubt. 105 Others, more cautiously, only infer a presumable
intention to submit to this law. 106 But it seems settled that
the court or board of arbitration to which the parties have
submitted, would apply, if not its own municipal law, certainly its own conflicts rules. 107
In the English courts, also a clause of submission to English arbitrators is regularly deemed to imply reference to
English law. 108 Analogous inferences, although with more
1 0 3 Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1942) 68 BGE. II 220; but this is a controversial
matter.
10 ' Germany: RG. (Feb. 22, 1881) 4 RGZ. 242 and in constant practice; see also
IPRspr. 1926-27 No. 3; 1931, 63, 78; 1933, 19, 40; Bay.ObLG. (May 16, 1934)
IPRspr. 1934. 44·
France: Cour Paris (July 21, 1950) Revue Crit. 1952, 706, 708; BAT1FFOL,
Traite 645.
1 06 England: N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. James Finlay & Co.,
Ltd. [1927] A. C. 6o4, 6oS, 6o9 (H.L.) per Lord Dunedin and Lord Phillimore.
tos Canada: See 3 JoHNSON 449·
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II at 302 and precedents cited;
cj. Oune 9, 1936) 62 BGE. II 125.
1 07 See arbitration, Hamburg. Hans. RGZ. (1931) B 419, 421.
10 8 Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery [1894] A. C. 202; Spurrier v. La Cloche [1902]
A. C. 446 (P. C.); Sanderson & Son v. Armour & Co. (1922) 91 L. J. (P. C.) 167
(H.L.); N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. Finlay & Co. [1927]
A. C. 6o4 (H.L.); Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A. C. 277·
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dependence on the circumstances, occur elsewhere. 109 Arbitration, however, in this country110 and in many others, at present very often entails decisions without reference to any particular private law. But such a clause has been said to influence
conflicts law by excluding the ordinarily applicable law. 111
Much discussion has been devoted in Switzerland to the
case where both parties in court plead application of a certain
law to the litigious contract. Can the parties agree on choice
of law even as late as in court? Party autonomy can hardly
be pushed so far, except where there is a clear-cut new contract modifying their relation. 112 However, the Swiss Federal
Tribunal previously was inclined to consider statements of
counsel on the applicable law as a conclusive argument for
a tacit agreement in contracting. 113 At present, the Swiss and
German highest courts regard such statements only as one
among other clues for assuming a hypothetical intention. 114
Quite recently, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has again reversed its viewpoint; express and even tacit agreements in
109 Germany: RG. (June 19, 1906) JW. 1906, 452; (July 8, 1913) Hans. GZ.
I9I3, 282 and others.
France: See conclusions by BATIFFOL § 152·
Switzerland: BG. (May I8, I9I7) 43 BGE. II 228; Cass. Zurich (April 8, I924)
Bl.f.Zurch.Rspr. 248, 2 Int. Jahrb. Schiedsgerichtswesen (I928) 352.
Contra: Germany: RG. (Oct. 14, I9I3) Warn.Rspr. 1914, 42; (Nov. I9, 1929)
JW. I930, I862; (June ro, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, 44·
Contra: The Netherlands: Hof s'Gravenhage (Feb. ro, 1911) W.9r6r; Rb. Amsterdam (March 3, I911) W.92o8.
Italy: Cass. (Dec. 27, 1948) Giur. Ita!. I950 I r, I30.
The great majority of governments, in their answers concerning the sales of
goods (Sixieme Conference de Ia Haye, Documents 46o), denied that even in the
intention of the parties the designation of arbiters was in strict connection with
the application of the national law of the arbiters.
110 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § 1924; IsAACS, "Two Views of Commercial Arbitration," 40 Harv. L. Rev. (I927) 929, 937·
111 Th~ Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (May 3, I934) N.J. (1935) 958.
112 Cj. BG. (June 9, I936) 62 BGE.II 125, denying any force even to a novatory
agreement, if not foreseen in the contract; German OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 21, I90I)
I I Z.int.R. 443 regarded the party disposition binding on the court.
113 See 43 BGE. II 228 and for the history of the practice, FRITZSCHE, 44 Z.
Schweiz.R. (N.F.) 232a; NIEDERER, 59 Z.Schweiz.R. (N.F.) 249-252.
114 49 BGE. II 225; 62 id. II 125; 63 id. II 307; RG. (April 4, 1928) IPRspr.
1929 No. 3I; RG. (April 27, I932) 86 Seuff. Arch. 299, IPRspr. I932 No. 32; RG.
(June ro, I933) I5I RGZ. I93, I99·
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court on the applicable law are held conclusive. 114a That the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were only too glad to encounter
consonant declarations of the parties permitting them to
avoid entanglement with two or more conflicts laws, 115 is
well understandable. It seems that most courts believe themselves to be entitled to accept the pleading of both parties
based on the law of the forum, without further investigation.
This may be legitimate when it conforms to the procedural
rules, which is not self-evident. Foreign law is not really
a mere fact.
In conclusion, agreements on the applicable law, made
otherwise than by words, are not very frequent, but should by
no means be overlooked in the search for the applicable law.
5. Scope of the Agreement
(a) Problem of renvoi. There seems to be general agreement that parties stipulating for an applicable law intend to
apply the municipal law without renvoi. 116
(b) Nullity by choice of law. Some adversaries of party
autonomy have ridiculed the consequence that a contract
should be void because the law referred to by the parties
prohibits it. Savigny countered this objection by suggesting
that the reference should be construed as not meant to include
the provisions that would nullify the contract. 117 However,
nullity in this case is a sound and natural consequence of
the rule, as well as of the more or less considered will of
ma BG. (Aug. 31, 1953) 79 BGE. II 295 (express agreement); BG. (May 26,
1954) So BGE. II 179 (tacit agreement by not invoking foreign law).
In accord for Germany: RAAPE, "Nachtragliche Vereinbarung des Schuldstatuts," Festschrift fur Gustav Boehmer (1954) 1II-123, and IPR. 435·
m E.g., Recueil trib. arb. mixtes: Vol. 4, 36o, 520, 534, 627; Vol. 5, 563.
116 Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1955) 81 BGE. II 391.
United States: Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd. (1955) 221 F. (2d) 189,
194; dissenting Judge Frank invokes a dictum of Lord Wright in Vita Food Products Co., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd. [1939] A.C. 277 (P. C.) which, however,
never was followed and has been sharply criticized, see SHARwooo, "Renvoi and
Contractual Choice of Law," 5 Am. J. Comp. Law (1956) 120-125; cj. also MELCHIOR 238.
117 SAVIGNY § 374·

390

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

the parties concerned, and this is the victorious opinion. 118

IV.
I.

CHOICE OF SEVERAL LAWS

Special References

The economic interests of parties to a contract sometimes
require that certain phases of their relation should be governed by particular laws, as when, for instance, examination
of goods sold is subjected to the local law of the place where
the goods arrive for inspection. 119 Accordingly, it is well
settled also that the parties may refer a part of the contract
to a specific law different from that governing the rest of
the contract.120 As choice of law is a matter of agreement,
the Supreme Court of the United States says, "the agreement may select laws and also limit the extent of their
applicability." 121
Contractual provisions for a certain law, virtually different
11 8 England: See BENTWICH in WESTLAKE 303-304.
Germany: RG. (May Io, I884) I2 RGZ. 34 rejected Savigny's opinion, no presumption of submission being required; OLG. Braunschweig (Feb. 7, I9o8) I3
ROLG. 362.
France: "Less characteristic, but the possibility of annulling a contract even
in case of conflict of laws is clearly admitted," BATIFFOL 5I n. I.
The Netherlands: Hof Haag (May 17, I923) W.u I7I: marine insurance having
reference to English law; the clause that the policy should be the only evidence of
the interest, makes the contract invalid under the Life Assurance Act, I774, and
Marine Insurance Act, I906, s. 4 (2-b).
11 9 Cj. BAGGE, Recueil I928 V at I67.
120 England: DICEY 720, 728; CwESHIRE 242; Adelaide Electric !Supply Co. v.
Prudential Assurance Co. [I934] A. C. I22, I45, I5I; Hamlyn v. Talisker, Kwik
Hoo Tong v. Finlay, see supra n. Io8.
France: Cass. (civ.) Uune 12, I883) S.I884.I.I64; (Dec. 4, I894) D.I895.1.526;
(Dec. 5, I9IO) S.I9Il.I.I29, Revue I9II, 395, Clunet I9I2, II 56.
Germany: RG. (June 23, 1927) II8 RGZ. 370, 374; (Nov. I4, I929) 126 RGZ.
I96, 2o6; obiter dictum 122 RGZ. 3I6.
Italy: Cass. (Nov. 28, I927) and (Jan. 21, 1928) Giur. Ita!. 1928 I 647, Rivista
1928, 514, 4 Z.ausi.PR. (1930) 587.
The Netherlands: H. R. (June 13, 1924) N.J. (1924) 859, 861.
Perm. Court of Int. Justice (July 12, 1929) Series A, Nos. 20, 21; Clunet 1929,
977·
Benelux-Draft, art. 17 par. I sentence I.
121 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (I904) I93 U. S. 551, per Mr. Justice Brewer;
literally followed in Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Minehart (Ark. 1904)
83 s. w. 323.
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from that intended for the contract in general, are frequent
in such matters as mode of performance and particularly
currency questions, exemption from liability of common carriers by reference to section 3 of the Harter Act or similar
laws, reference to the Antwerp York rules for general average in maritime contracts, or clauses concerning land securities
to be subject to the lex situs.
A series of disputes has arisen about the scope of these
references, because of the widespread indifference with which
standard contract forms used in interstate and international
commerce often contain inconsistent mixtures of old and new
clauses. Thus, American insurance policies, for instance, have
referred to the law of New York to control the contract generally and in another clause stated a waiver by the insured
of notice preliminary to forfeiture, although New York law
unconditionally prescribes the notice. In such a case, the
Supreme Court of the United States has construed the general reference as restricted by the special clause; the law of
New York could not extend its imperative force to a contract
made in another state and subjected to this law only by
stipulation. 122
Similar combinations in bills of lading or affreightment
contracts have been decided in an analogous manner, when
feasible. 123 Reference to the Harter Act has been held in
Germany to be restricted by a simultaneous broad exemption
clause based on German law. 124 In a charter party made in
Mutual Life v. Hill, supra n. I2I.
In Ocean Steamship Co. v. Queensland State Wheat Board [1941] r K. B.
402, the bill of lading contained two clauses, the first referring to the Australian
Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1924 (instead of the provisions of the schedule only)
and declaring anything inconsistent null and void, and a second subjecting the
contract to the law of England. The second clause was held void because s. 9 of
the Australian Act provided that the parties would be deemed to have intended to
contract according to the law in force at the place of shipment and any stipulation
or agreement to the contrary should be null and void.
124 OLG. Hamburg (July 7, 1905) Hans. GZ. 1905, 227; (July 5, 1907) Hans. GZ.
1907, 244· In another case where the "Holland clause" (referring to Dutch Law)
was inserted, it was declared compatible with the added exemption clause, OLG.
Hamburg (Feb. 12, 1936) Hans. RGZ. 1936 B 243 No. 70.
122
123
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New York and expressly subjected to American law, the
parties inserted a clause exonerating the shipowner from
liability for negligence, contrary to the Harter Act, but
valid under French law obtaining at the port of discharge
in Guadeloupe. The Court of Cassation in Paris recognized
the exemption as valid under the assumption that the parties
intended to submit themselves to French law known by
them as validating the clause. 125 It would have been simpler
to admit that the special stipulation limited the general
reference. 126 This argument was used, in fact, by the Appeal
Court of Brussels when general reference to English law
conflicted with an express reference to the Canadian Water
Carriage of Goods Act, corresponding with the Harter Act. 127
It might be argued, however, that the Hague Rules, now
replacing the just-mentioned laws and adopted in the most
important countries, require a stricter application. So far
as they reach, they exclude party autonomy. Stipulations in
the bill of lading inconsistent with the Rules may be generally understood as nullified.
A Dutch marine policy referred to the English Marine
Insurance Act, r 906, and the conditions and usages of Lloyd
policies "as if the policy had been signed in London," but
contained a clause that payment would be due without further
proof of interest than the policy itself, which clause would
have made the insurance contract void under the English
Act. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands decided that
the reference to English law was restricted by the clause,
basing this clause on Dutch law. 128
The same view has sometimes been taken with regard to
loan debentures under which amounts are due at one of
several places, at the option of the bondholder, in the money
125

s,

Cass. (civ.) (Dec.
1910) S.I9II.I.I29, Revue I9II, 395, Clunet 1912, rrs6.
See also BATIFFOL 67 n. 3.
117 App. Bruxelles (Nov. 15, 1922) 61 Jur. Port Anvers 661.
128 H. R. (June 13, 1924) N.J. (1924) 859, r VAN HASSELT 206.
126
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of the place, the parties agreeing that the law of the country
selected by the bondholder should determine the amount and
method of payment. In this view, American law governing
the currency of payment in New York should be construed
as an exception, for example, to English law determining
other phases of the obligation. 129
2.

Nature of Special References

Courts of various countries examining the scope of special
references, often assert that they have to construe agreements
only, not laws. Lord Esher said: "the parties introduce the
words of the Harter Act which I decline to construe as an
Act but which we must construe simply as words occurring
in this bill of lading." 130 The language of American judges131
and foreign courts132 is sometimes similar. Evidently, in this
connection, there is no question of a reference to foreign law
valid only when it merely embodies words of foreign laws in
the contractual stipulations. 133 But does this kind of expression
yet acknowledge a difference between reference to foreign
law on the basis of conflicts law and a mere transformation
of foreign law into ordinary stipulations? German scholars,
in fact, have stressed this alleged difference and, although
recognizing both types of reference as binding, have preferred to presume that the law generally governing a contract
12 9 This has been contended in criticizing the House of Lords decision in Rex v.
International Trustee etc. [19371 A. C. sao, by the anonymous writer in IS Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (I937) 220.
130 Dobell & Co. v. Rossmore S. S. Co. [1S9S1 2 Q. B. 408-C. A. Cj. Ocean
Ste.'.mship Co., Ltd. v. Queensland State Wheat Board [I94I1 I K. B. 402, 4I2, 4IS.
13 1 See, e.g., Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Minehart (Ark. I904) S3 S. W.
323: reference to New York law does not mean that the statutes of New York are
in force but only that they are a part of the contract. See also the language of
CooK, Legal Bases 399·
132 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 4, I936) Clunet I936, 967: the provisions of
the State of New York, by being referred to in the stipulations, changed their
character from legal to conventional.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March I?, I9I3) Hans. GZ. I9I3, HBl. IS7, ISS,
aff'd, RG. (Jan. 28, 1914) Hans. GZ. 1914, HBI. IoS: the Australian Sea Carriage
Act of 1904 had become part of the contract.
133 Supra p. 362.
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extends to these stipulations, because this interpretation promotes the unity of law governing a contract. 134 Admittedly,
however, average parties are not at all aware of this subtle
contrast, nor are the courts prepared to observe it. 135 They,
definitely, presuppose a plurality of laws whose borderline
only needs analysis. By the above language, the courts seek
to emphasize only that the scope intended by the specially
invoked law is not binding, even though it is intended to be
compulsory; that the court is free to assume to what extent
the parties have referred their obligations to that law; that
the reference is to be reasonably interpreted and restricted. 136
If the courts were to follow the suggestion mentioned they
would have to favor the more general reference at the cost
of the special clause. But the judicial inclination is just to
the contrary. Courts profess that the special clause derogates
from the general one.
In addition, a mere incorporation of a foreign rule in
stipulations would have the result that, if the rule is changed
subsequent to the contract, the obligation would not be
affected. This, as said earlier, is an undesirable effect.
But it may be asked, instead, whether parties are permitted, if they so intend, to limit the reference to the unchanged text of a certain legal rule. The question came up on
the occasion of the American loans in the nineteen-twenties
134 See HAUDEK 38; MELCHIOR 523 § 384; WoLFF, IPR. (ed. I) 88. This view
seems to be shared by KAHN-FREUND, Annual Survey of English Law (I940) 254·
For a different distinction, which I believe to be the correct one, see infra Chapter
32, II, 3, p. 534·
135 In RG. (Nov. 24, I928) 122 RGZ. 3I6 cited by MELCHIOR 522 n. 3 for his
thesis, the court expressly stated that a particular stipulation may be subject to a
separate law. This was not altered by the correct decision in the case at bar that
the litigious question of who has to bear extraordinary costs in a sea carriage, was
covered by the main reference to English law. In RG. (Nov. I4, I929) I26 RGZ.
I96, 206 (cited by MELCHIOR 522 n. 4) it was stated that the presumptive intention
of the parties, decisive according to German, not the Austrian, conflicts law, excluded the Austrian law from the question of effects exercised by Austrian decrees.
136 See e.g., Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hill, supra n. I2I, at 557: " ... the laws
of New York are controlling in any respect only because the parties have so stipulated, and, as we have indicated, the stipulation in respect thereto is to be harmonized
with the other stipulations in the contract."
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to European governments, cities, and corporations. Interest
and capital were payable in gold dollars. When by the Joint
Resolution of Congress in 1933 recovery in gold coins as
well as in gold value was prohibited, bondholders attempted
to save their claims by contending that a reference made in
the contract debenture, and possibly in the bond, to the law
of New York, was not intended to include the unforeseeable
American dollar depreciation. The German Reichsgericht
replied that "one cannot select a national law and exclude its
imperative rules. Only an unrestricted submission assures that
the contract be disciplined, if necessary, against egoistic purposes of the economically stronger party or even both parties,
considering the general interests in changing times .... " 187
There was no doubt about the correct interpretation of the
individual loan agreements. None of them could be understood otherwise than as taking the Joint Resolution in its
stride, since the alternative would have been the complete
lack of an applicable law, an impossible result. 188 In theory,
however, the problem of conditional references to a legal
rule is new and unsettled. 139
RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058; cj. 10 Z.ausi.PR. (1936) 385.
RABEL, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 509, 513.
139 For the negative solution, see WoLFF, 49 Jurid. Rev. (1937) at 124; for the
affirmative, NussBAUM, "Comparative and International Aspects of American
Gold-Clause Abrogation," 44 Yale L. J. (1935) at 83; for reasons of doubting,
DuDEN, 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 625.
137
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Theories Restricting Party Autonomy
ANY objections have been raised against the right
of parties to select their law. Often overlapping
and elusive, they may be distinguished according
to their main ideas.

M

I.
1.

DocTRINEs oF GENERAL ScoPE

Doctrines Reserving Imperative Rules

(a) Imperative rules of a predestined law. As mentioned
before, in the majority opinion of the scholars, every contract is born into a certain law, the "imperative rules" of
which it cannot escape. That is, any rules of this law which
parties cannot modify by contracting in a purely domestic
sphere, they do not avoid by an agreement that another
law should govern. 1
Although the numerous followers of this doctrine are
categoric in asserting that imperative rules are inescapable,
they strongly disagree in determining what rules are imperative. The learned reporter of the Institute of International
Law, Baron Nolde, sternly warned against the frequent
tendency of the literature2 to reduce these norms to a small
number of secondary problems identical with what is properly
called ccordre public." These concern such classic examples as
wagering, usury, smuggling, or social protection. Imperative
1 The arguments have been expounded with particular authority by LoRENZEN,
JO Yale L. J. (I92I) s6s; NIBOYET, Recueil I927 I, IJ, J6, 53, 62; PILLET, Principcs
§ 227; AumNET, I Melanges Pillet 65.
2 As a recent example, see the convincing demonstration by EsMEIN in 6 Planiol
et Ripert, Traite Pratique 646 that provisions of domestic law, protecting the
weaker parties or the interests of society in general or good morals, can not simply
be transposed into the international field.
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rules, on the contrary, according to the reporter's energetic
assertion, cover a "vast and normal domain," including
formation and validity of contracts, the principle of freedom
of contracting, the clausula rebus sic stantibus, rescission on
the ground of nonperformance, the effect of contracts on
third persons, assignment, plurality of subjects of obligations,
"many" of the rules concerning discharge of obligations,
and a "very great number" of rules dispersed in the codes
including those on collective bargaining. 3 Thus, not much
remains for agreements of parties, nor is it easy to see exactly
what their sphere may be.
This entire theory has influenced a few recent legislative
texts/ but it has been opposed at least by Anzilotti 5 in the
Institute, and more recently thoroughly refuted by English,
French, and German writers. 6 It has no real background in
any of the significant court practices.
Nevertheless, in a new variant, the predestined law has
taken the form of the locally "most closely connected law,"
pretending to decide whether the parties may submit to
another law. 7 Discussion may be deferred until we meet the
problem of territorial limits to autonomy (infra p. 404).
(b) Le:>e loci contractus necessarily governing validity.
The idea that every contract necessarily depends on the law
of the place where it is made and, hence, is in an intimate
and inseparable conjunction with this law, is old. It goes
3

32 Annuaire (I925) 52-57·
Supra PP· 374-375·
6 32 Annuaire (I925) 512.
8 See Vol. I, pp. 90-94. The draft convention on the conflicts rules for international
sales of goods (I95I) satisfied the opinion expressed by the great majority of governments in extending party autonomy to the "imperative rules." Art. 2 par I says
simply: "The sales contract is governed by the internal law of the country indicated
by the parties to the contract," and par. 3 expressly includes "the conditions relating
to the consent of the parties." See Conference de Ia Haye de droit international
prive, 7th Session (I95I) Actes p. 382, and committee report, Documents p. 5·
7
MoRRIS, "The Proper Law of a Contract in the Conflict Laws," s6 Law Q.
Rev. (I940) 320, 337·
4
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back to Bartolus8 and was revived by the scholars believing
in vested rights. 9 Modern writers added their perennial fear
of a circulus inextricabilis: party autonomy would determine
the law which itself permits party autonomy. 10 It is also
argued that the essential requisites of contracts are regulated
by "imperative" rules where the contracts originate,11 thus
resuming the thesis mentioned before.
The old doctrine has undoubtedly left some vestiges. In
the nineteenth century, even in the French courts, it preceded
the revival of the principle of autonomy 12 and, in its application to such contracts as transportation, seems to have retained much vigor. 13 Remnants in this country are even more
noteworthy in Beale's works and in the Restatement14 but
they have their securest domain outside of conflicts law
proper, in defining the power of a state to subject contracts
to its domestic law notwithstanding the due process clause. 15
Switzerland was the only important jurisdiction following
until recently this idea in its proper meaning, that is, making
the lex loci contractus exclusively applicable without any
BARTOLUs, ad I. Cunctos Populos § I3, infra p. 446.
among many others, AuoiNET, I Melanges Pillet 67; RoLIN, I Principes §
3Io; STRISOWER and NEUMEYER, cited by NoLDE, Revue I926, 448; MINOR 401;
BEALE, Summary § 2 and 23 Harv. L. Rev. (I910) at 270.
10 E.g., NIBOYET, I Repert. 248 No. 37; Judge Learned Hand's "bootstraps"
theory, supra p. 376 n. 63. Contra: see WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 791; HAUDEK
64; BATIFFOL § 386; MAYER, op. cit. (supra Chapter 28 n. 8) I I I, I3r.
11 NIBOYET, r6 Recueil (I927) I 3Sff. Contra: WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 8os.
12 See BATIFFOL 27-29 § 32.
13 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 23, I864) S.I864.1.38S; BATIFFOL 2S8 § 284.
Luxemburg: Trib. comm. Luxemburg (Nov. 8, I9S2) IS Pasicrisie Lux. 396
(contract concluded in Strasbourg, France, invalid under French exchange restrictions).
Restatement § 322, cj. § 3S8.
14 A decision influenced by the Restatement, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Hyde (C. C. A. 2d I936) 82 F. (2d) I74 understands the clause of a trust made
in France that it was "to be construed and interpreted by the law of New York"
as not including the validity but only the meaning and effect of the terms. In the
argumentation of the court, the intention of the parties is not supposed to be that
they would withdraw the question of validity from the lex loci contractus-"nor
would such intention, if expressed, be controlling."
16 See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Accident Comm. (I93S) 294 U. S. S32, and
STUli!BERG 62.
8

D See,
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possibility for the parties to change the rule. The Federal
Tribunal in constant practice applied the law of the "place
of contracting" to all legal requisites of validity, such as offer
and acceptance, consent, permissibility, significance of error,
fraud or duress. 16 In 19 52, the Federal Tribunal abandoned
this scission, and recognizes now that the parties may determine the law governing the effects as well as the validity
of a contract. 17
(c) Illegality under lex loci contractus invalidating the
contract. One of Dicey's influential exceptions to the proper
law theory states that validity of a contract under the proper
law is of no avail if the making of the contract is unlawful
under the lex loci contractus. 18
This statement, distinguishable from its probable mother
rule, above sub (b), precariously reposes on Lord Halsbury's
well-known opinion. Although terming untenable the proposition that a prohibition by the lex loci contractus could always
prevent us from enforcing a contract/ 9 he added:
"Where a contract is void on the ground of immorality or
is contrary to such positive law as would prohibit the making
of a contract at all, then the contract would be void all over
the world and no civilized country would be called on to
enforce it."
Such a contract regarded as illegal, that is, "criminal" at the
place where it is made, would be regarded all over the world
as obnoxious to public policy and therefore void, though not
illegal. As a result, the House of Lords in In re Missouri
minimized the force of the Massachusetts statute prohibiting
18

See BGE.: 23 I 822; 32 II 415; 38 II 519; 44 II 28o; 49 II 73·
BG. (Feb. 12, 1952) 78 BGE. II 74 at 83, 85, with note GuTZWILLER, 10
Schwz. Jahrb. (1953) 304; cf. already BG. (Dec. 18, 1951) ibid. 346.
18 DICEY (ed. 5) 655 exception (2) to Rule r6o omitted in the latest edition
DrcEY (-KAHN-FREUND) 782. FooTE 402. See for criticism MANN, "Proper Law
and Illegality in Private International Law," 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937)
97, !OJ; CHESHIRE 234·
19
In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321, 336; accepted as the law
by Greer, L. J., in The Torni [1932] P. 78, 88.
17
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exemption from carrier's liability. Its violation, hence, was
not a case of a "criminally" or morally tainted foreign offense
that would move an English court. The distinction was made
in remembrance of a curious old contrast between mala in se
and mala prohibita, which a judge in 1822 had declared
"long since exploded." 20
More recently, Lord Wright in his turn, in the Vita
Food's case,21 has commented on Lord Halsbury's dubious
dictum in another questionable way. 22 The fact is, however,
that in all these cases and others, the judgment for validity
was based purely on English law considered as governing
the contract, despite the law of the place of contracting.
Only one English case, The Torni, 23 is apparently consistent with the alleged rule, but its well-considered reason
lies elsewhere, 24 and has been rejected by the decision in the
Vita Food's case.
The conclusion had been reached even before the lastmentioned decision that invalidity under the law of the place
of contracting as such is simply immaterial in English courts. 25
Legality is determined by the proper law, except that enforcement may be refused also on the ground of the public
policy of the forum.
Apart from academic theses, in this country obiter dicta
may be found, such as in a supreme court decision, that
parties outside of the state of New York may make the laws
of this state controlling upon both parties,
"Provided such provisions do not conflict with the law
or public policy of the State where the contract is made." 26
20 Best, J., in Bensley v. Bignold (1822) 5 Bar. & AI. 335, 34I noted by MANN,
supra n. I8, I04 n. I; cf. WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5006 § 1764.
21 Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. (I939] A. C. 277, 297, P. C.
22 See CooK, Legal Bases 42Iff.
u [1932] P. 78.
u Infra p. 428.
26 CHESHIRB (ed. 2) 278.
26 Mr. Justice Brewer in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (I904) I93 U. S. 551.
Similarly, a few Massachusetts decisions concerning insurance statutes, infra n. 83.
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This general formula is hardly more than a tribute to school
reminiscences. In no other country is there any sizeable following of this theory. 27
(d) Prevailing rule. All versions of a predestined law
have been abandoned by the present jurisprudence of mercantile countries. The English view is beyond any doubt.
French and German courts definitely apply the law upon
which the parties agree, with all its implications, and do not
apply another law solely because it would be applicable m
the absence of a party intention.28

Illustration. In a case decided by the Mixed Anglo-German
Arbitral Tribunal in 1922, a contract entered into by correspondence between an English and a German member of
the Liverpool Cotton Association, made subject to the Rules
of this Association and thereby to the jurisdiction of the High
Court of Justice and the law of England, was held valid
under this law. It was immaterial which law would have
governed without this submission and whether the contract
27 The only exception known to me is a surprising contention by NussBAUM, D.
IPR. 244 repeated in 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 908, Principles 176; against which see
GuTZWILLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 656; MANN, supra n. 18, at 103, and Book Review,
7 Modern L. Rev. (1944) 172; RAAPE, IPR. 428; STAUB-HEINICHEN in 3 Staub ss6
n. rra. For the dominant view that illegality arising out of making the contract is
treated like other questions of validity, see STUMBERG 268 n. 33·
28 England: It suffices to refer to the opinions of the Privy Council in the Vita
Food's case, supra n. 21.
Belgium: PouLLET 343 § 299 n. 2 reproaches the Belgian courts since they do not
distinguish between supplementary and imperative rules.
France: The court decisions ought to be discussed at the proper places, but even
ARMINJON, 2 Precis (ed. 2) 257 n. I § 79, cites only one decision, Cass. (civ.) Oan.
8, 1913) S.I913.1.243, as being reluctant to admit all consequences of party autonomy. The decision refuses to recognize that an arbitration stipulated in the contract
may judge the question of fraud, because French courts give effect only to conventions freely consented. Thus freedom of contracting is a ground for public
policy overriding the conflicts rule which in itself is not contested.
Germany: See the stringent documentation by MELCHIOR so6ff.
Portugal: VEILJA BEIRAO, draftsman of the C. Com., commented on art. 4 to
the effect that every rule may be changed by the parties, except that on capacity.
Only the subsequent doctrine introduced the "imperative" rules. See EsPINOLA,
8 Tratado 538.
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would have been unenforceable under the German prohibition against dealing in futures. 29
In the United States, the questions involving validity of
the contract are decided in a majority of states according to
criteria other than the law of the place of contracting, and
often according to the intention of the parties. The dogma
postulated by Beale exists nowhere.
2.

Evasion

(a) Fraudulent evasion. The French doctrine of "fraude
ala loi," although slowly vanishing, in certain cases has been
applied, under an apparently broad formula, to stipulations
in favor of a foreign law, when a contract was both made and
to be performed in France. 30 However, the nucleus of these
cases consisted in c.i.f. sales contracts on overseas grains, made
between Frenchmen in France under the standard forms of
the London Corn Trade Association and similar to those
under which the seller had bought the goods overseas. That
nullity of such agreements violated the interests of international commerce, was recognized by the Court of Cassation
itself. Moreover, it is characteristic of the crude method
protecting some true or imagined domestic public interest by
the theory of fraud, that in most cases the required evidence
of "fraudulent" evasion could not be produced. 31
(b) Contracts without foreign elements. The German
Reichsgericht once nullified a stipulation of choice of law
in an isolated case. An agreement with a matrimonial agency
was made and to be performed in the Kingdom of Saxony,
29 Gruning & Co. v. Gebr. Fraenkel (Feb. 6-17, 1922) r Recueil trib. arb. mixtes
726. To the contrary effect, for instance, the Czechoslovakian Supreme Court
(March 2, 1934) ro Z.ausi.PR. (1936) r68: action for the balance arhing out of a
grain transaction, dismissed on domestic standards. For this application of public
policy, see infra Chapter 33 pp. 570 ff.
3 °Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 19, 1930) and (Jan. 27, 1931) S.I933.I.41; and cases mentioned by BATIFFOL 63 n. 4•
31 BATIFFOL § 70.
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both parties being resident there. The contract referred to
Prussian law which, in contrast to the Saxon, considered valid
a promise of award given to a matchmaker. 32
Here, indeed, the transaction belonged, personally and
substantially, to one jurisdiction, lacking all and any foreign
elements; the parties referred to a foreign law exclusively
for the purpose of evading a prohibition intended to maintain
good morals. The case deserves to be noted in this respect
but has often given rise to exaggerated conclusions.
(c) Lex fori in imperative role. The Austrian and several
Latin-American Codes have gone so far as to make the law
of the forum imperative in large groups of cases, such as
those where the contract is performable in the country or
where nationals of the country contract abroad. 33 A similar
provincialism occurs in sporadic cases throughout the world,
when a court for the protection of a resident believes itself
entitled to apply its domestic statutes without justifying a
stringent public policy of the forum.
(d) American law. The American position is not simple
to state. It appears that repeatedly stipulations of choice of
law have been disregarded, for varying reasons or sometimes
almost without justification, evidently on the ground of a
belief such as that expressed by Beale that the parties have
no right to select a law. However, these cases are a small
minority. Furthermore, they belong, with isolated exceptions,
to certain groups which we shall have to discuss hereafter
(sub II and III). Anticipating the result, we may note that
the cardinal rule, also in this country, particularly at present,
is the acknowledgement of the right of the parties to determine the law, and all exceptions that can seriously be sustained simply flow from public policy.
32

RG. (Sept. 21, 1899) 44 RGZ. 300.
E.g., Argentina: C. C. art. 1243 (1209).
Mexico: C. C. art. 13.
See for more details supra Chapter 28, pp. 371-374·
33
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3· Requirement of Substantial Connection
In a current of dicta, English and American authorities
have required as a matter of course, that the intention of the
parties to select a law must be confined within certain limits.
American courts have said that an agreement of the parties to
choose a law should be "made with a bona fide intention," 34
not "fictitious " 35 based on "a normal relation" 36 or a "natural
37
'
and vital connection."
English decisions have declared that
the chosen law ought to have "a real connection with the contract,"38 or that the intention expressed should be "bona fide
and legal." 39 Also, the German Supreme Court has sometimes mentioned that the parties may stipulate a law in
material connection with the obligation, 40 and similar views
are likely to occur in other courts41 and statutes. Some theoretical backbone was sought for all these propositions in the
doctrine of Westlake:
"That the law by which to determine the intrinsic validity
and effects of a contract will be selected in England on
substantial considerations, the preference being given to the
country with which the transaction has the most real connection, and not the law of the place of contract as such." 42
34 2 WHARTON 1210§ sro(o)is cited for this requirement in Seeman v.Philadelphia
Warehouse (1928) 274 U. S. 403, 408.
36 Crawford v. Seattle etc. R. Co. (1915) 86 Wash. 628, 150 Pac. 1155.
36 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse (1928) 274 U. S. 403, 4o8; Brierley v.
Commercial Credit Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1929) 43 F. (2d) 724, afj'd, id. 730.
37 2 WHARTON 1210 § 510 (o); Green v. Northwestern Trust Co. (1914) 128
Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229 (usury).
38 South African Breweries v. King [1899] 2 Ch. 173, aff'd [1900] 1 Ch. 273·
39 Lord Wright in Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A. C.
277 at 290.
40 RG. (July 5, 1910) 74 RGZ. 171, 173; (July 8, 1910) Recht 1910 No. 3358;
(Apri14, 1928) IPRspr. 1929 No. 31; (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2871.
41 France: App. Rennes (July 26, 1926) Clunet 1927, 659, Revue 1927, 523,
reversed by Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 19, 1930) Clunet 1931, go, Revue 1930, 282.
Switzerland: BG. (July 16, 1898) 24 BGE. II at 544, cj. RoMBERGER, Obi.
Vertrage 45·
Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, § 9·
United States: Uniform Commercial Code s. I-105 (6); 1957 revision: s.1-105 (1).
42 WESTLAKE 212.
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It should be noted that this famous passage in an excellent
formulation advocates an objective construction of the applicable law, in criticism of the traditional mechanical application
of the law of the place of contracting. Whether the idea was
latent in Westlake that a law to be selected by the parties
must have some connection with the contract, is not clear. 43
Certainly, he did not pretend that the parties have to choose
just that law which a judge would think to be in the closest
connection-as recent English writers propose. 44
In fact, other writers, 45 with whom Cook apparently associated himsel£, 46 conclude that choice by parties is limited to
those countries with which the contract has a "substantial"
connection. Hence, in the cases of multiple local connections,
the parties may select any one of these contacts, if it is not
merely accidental; they are not bound to select the one contact which a judge would assume to be the most vital. Otherwise, the axiom would indeed abolish autonomy altogether.
But even so, we notice at once that this establishes a broad
theory against evasion which nevertheless does not prevent
the parties from choosing a foreign law having some "substantial" connection with the contract but rejects claims of
the forum grounded on a much closer connection. Such a
theory is unable to replace that of public policy. What, then,
is its value? And why can the forum not tolerate a foreign law not "connected" at all with the contract, when not
harmful to its public policy? With these questions in mind,
Cj. WESTLAKE 287 and the note by BENTWICH in WESTLAKE 289; cj. DICEY 725.
MoRRIS, 56 Law Q. Rev. (I940) 320, 337, CHESHIRE being cosigner of the
article.
46 HAUDEK 39; MELCHIOR 5o6; ScHLEGELBERGER, Die Entwicklung des Deutschen
Recht in den letzten fiinfzehn Jahren (1930) I33, see 4 Z.ausl.PR. 417; M. WoLFF,
IPR. 86, id. in 49 Jurid. Rev. (1937) II9, 12I, and in Priv. Int. Law 424 (where he
contends that this is the prevailing continental opinion; I doubt this contention);
BATIFFOL 52 § 57·
46 CooK, Legal Bases 423, unaware of the continental discussion, developed
his views very cautiously and rather ambiguously; he expounded them more firmly,
however, in his last article, 21 Can. Bar Rev. (1943) 249, 253·
43

44
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we shall register what further information can be gained.
The Polish Law on private international law has preferred
another approach. It enumerates the law open to choice as
follows:
The parties may submit an obligation to the law of the
national state, the law of domicil, the law of the place of
making the transaction, the law of the place of performance,
or the law of the place of situs. 47
In Beale's system the question is nonexistent, but the places
of contracting and performance are the only ones he recognizes at all as contacts. 48
Feeling that the familiar formulas include much obscurity,
Lord Wright, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in the much discussed Vita Food's case, has had
the merit of attempting clarification. On the rule that the
ascertained intention of the parties is conclusive, he observes:
"It is objected that this is too broadly stated and that
some qualifications are necessary.... But where the English
rule that intention is the test applies, and where there is
an express statement by the parties of their intention to select
the law of the contract, it is difficult to see what qualifications
are possible, provided the intention expressed is bona fide
and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the
choice on the ground of public policy."49
Again, this comment needs supercomment. What does
"bona fide" and "legal" meanr 50 Had the court in mind
evasion under qualifying circumstances? Yet Lord Wright
was prepared to give effect to a most obvious escape from
Newfoundland to English law, in a case of an affreightment
47

Art. 7· See against this attempt of regulation, HAUDEK 44·
2 BEALE II27 n. 8, II 59 n. 4, II66 n. 6. Contra: see BATIFFOL 53 n. 3 and 4·
49
[1939] A. C. 277 at 290.
60 See Note, 55 Law Q. Rev. (1939) 323, 325.
48
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beginning in Newfoundland, "even where the parties are
not English and the transactions are carried on completely
outside England."
As mentioned earlier, a citizen of Ecuador who had no
ties with England and a Canadian corporation contracting in
New York could validly submit to English law in the eyes of
an English court. 51
There is more reason for wonderment. Apart from frequent references in the American usury cases, which are a
special matter, when courts mention the requirement in question/2 they quite regularly do so in order to state in the
case at bar the contract does have a sufficient connection with
the chosen law. This is true for most American as well as for
all English and German decisions, 53 and this is only natural.
In regular commerce, parties never select a law having "no"
relation to their obligations. 54
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, however, in the
case of an employment contract, once made serious use of the
alleged rule that questions of validity and construction cannot
be referred by the parties to the law of a state in which the
contract is not made nor to be performed. 55 For some reason
unfortunately not revealed in the case, the employing circus
enterprise, whose permanent address was Chicago, localized
the contract in Sarasota County, Florida. Counsel for the firm
adduced dubious evidence for his plea that under the Florida
British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (I92I) 66 Sol. J. IS, supra p. 3S3 n. 9I.
Out of IS cases considered in the note, "Validity and effect of stipulation
in contract etc.," II2 A. L. R. I24 to I30 (left), only three are not concerned with
usury. One trust case is without significance. On the two others, namely, Gerli v.
Cum>d S. S. Co., involving bills oflading, see supra p. 376 n. 63, and on the principal
case, Owens v. Hagenbeck, see below n. 55·
63 For the American cases see BATIFFOL 4I n. I. In England, the decision in
"The Torni" is no counter-instance and its main argument has been challenged in
the Vita Food's case. The German decisions cited supra n. 40 have in each case
approved of the stipulation.
64
See MELCHIOR, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) I79·
66 Owens v. Hagen beck-Wallace Shows Co. (R. I. 1937) I92 At!. 15S, aff'd, 464,
II2 A. L. R. II3.
61

62
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decisions the plaintiff could be dismissed practically at the
defendant's pleasure. The court, quite evidently moved by a
strong feeling of social equity, rejected the plea by refusing
the express reference to Florida law, allegedly not substantially connected with the contract, and simultaneously eliminated as not proved, the law of Indiana where the contract
in fact was executed. Massachusetts, where the defendant
gave written notice and where the circus was held until the
expiration of the term for dismissal, was not further mentioned. Thus, the Rhode Island court seized of the suit
during a brief performance in Providence, believed itself
entitled to apply the law of its own state, which had no connection whatever with the contract. This happened in the
name of the requirement of close connection. An arbitrary use
of conflicts rules, once more, had to lead, on an easy though
incorrect_ way, to an equitable decision.
Of course, there is a practical question involved. Originally, the writers seem to have believed that choice by the
parties is geographically limited/ 6 and the Polish list of permitted contacts reaches the same result. In international
relations, however, there are many cases in which a contract
ought to follow the legal fate of another agreement. When a
grain shipment under a form of the London Corn Trade
Association, arriving from Argentina to Bordeaux, is resold
by the French buyer to another Frenchman in France, this is
a cccontrat de suite." The middleman in this frequent situation is in dire straits if he is liable to his successor on warranties not covered by his rights of recourse against the Argentine vendor. 57 As early as 1909, a German appeal court expressly denied the existence of a public policy precluding two
16 Clearly so, HAUDEK 39, rejecting (40 n. 3) my opinion (infra n. 57) with the
contention: when goods sold do not touch English territory, the interest of the
parties in English law which they select, is not based on the international structure
of the contract but is only personal to the seller.
67 RABEL, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 417 followed by WoLFF, IPR. 140; RABEL, I
Recht des Warenkaufs 53; BATIFFOL 54 § 59 and Traite 643.
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German merchants in grain from submitting to London arbitration and English law. 58 French courts, haunted by their
fear of "fraude ala loi," could not satisfy this need, but their
mistakes will probably not be repeated anywhere else. 1m Normal economic interests of those engaged in international trade
must be as well safeguarded as trade within a territory.
Other examples of "entailed contracts," which should conveniently be adjusted to the law that governs another contract, have been adduced, such as a bond for a foreign debt, 60
reinsurance, and subsequent insurance for merchandise in
transitu on a vessel. 61 Analogous reasoning would quell
doubts, when a debt guaranteed by mortgage in one state,
is expressly subjected to the law of the situs, even though
no other contact with it existed. 62
A reference to English law will not be rejected by English
or German courts whenever a certain type of contract is internationally unified according to English commercial customs, irrespective of the individual parties to the contract. 63
International commerce, indeed, must escape the narrow
margins of any formula binding the parties to one or the
other of their domiciliary laws and look for unified usages
and stipulations.
It has been conceded, moreover, that parties may select a
law for the reason that they know it well or because it is
competently elaborated. 64 For this reason, English courts
seem always to recognize the reference to English law. Why
OLG. Rostock (Feb. 22, 1909) 65 Seuff. Arch. No. r, 20 Z.int.R. 92.
Supra p. 402.
60 BATIFFOL s6; M. WoLFF, IPR. 87 and in 49 Jurid. Rev. (1937) 120.
61 Cases brought to attention by HAuDEK 41.
62 In American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co. v. Jefferson (1892) 69 Miss. 770
the parties stipulated for the law of Mississippi where the land security was. The
court held the stipulation to be void (infra n. 73) whereas the case is suitable to
demonstrate the need of a clear recognition of such agreements.
63 See CLAUGHTON ScoTT, Conference de Ia Haye, Actes de Ia Sixieme Session
296; M. WoLFF, 49 Jurid. Rev. (1937) 120 and Priv. Int. Law 421 § 402.
64 Such a situation evidently occasioned the party agreement in British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (1921) 66 Sol. J. r8; BATIFFOL 55 § 6o.
68

59
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should they not? Why, indeed, should an American court not
allow residents of the Philippines and Australia to agree in
a contract on the application of the law of California?
Finally, as is well known, English courts are inclined to
accept submissions to English law without any qualification.
This has recently been advocated in generalized form as a
privilege for the lex fori of all countries. 65 But in a reasonable
international private law, it should not be so significant which
forum is seized of the case.
It seems after all that the alleged general rule limiting
the choice of law by the parties to a determined number of
legislations, does not and should not exist. Its possibly more
serious purpose is sufficiently defined through the old concept
of evasion of some law; but this purpose must be pursued on
the basis of its own merits-which are very small.

II.

SPECIAL AMERICAN DocTRINEs

The following topics cannot be treated without anticipating
in some respects the conflicts rules existing in case the parties
have not determined the applicable law, but such discussion
is needed for a final judgment on the limits of party autonomy.
r. Usury Statutes66
In regulating the rate of interest in loan contracts, the
various jurisdictions employ different methods and permit
varying amounts. With respect to a contract fixing interest
without an additional stipulation for the applicable law,
former divergent conceptions have been finally superseded
by a habit of maintaining the stipulated rate, provided that
it is agreeable to some law connected with the contract, such
as the law of domicil of either party, or that of the place of
n M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 42r § 403,
66

No comparable doctrine exists abroad.
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payment, or sometimes that of the situs of a land security. 67
Thus, if a loan is made by a Pennsylvania corporation to a
resident of New York, who even pledges certain property
in New York as security, the Supreme Court of the United
States has declared the agreement lawful, although it would
have been void under New York law. Mr. Justice Stone said:
" ... We think it immaterial whether the contract was
entered into in New York or Philadelphia .... Respondent,
a Philadelphia corporation having its place of business in
Philadelphia, could legitimately lend funds outside the state
and stipulate for repayment in Philadelphia in accordance
with its laws and at the rate of interest there lawful, even
though the agreement for the loan were entered into in
another state where a different law and a different rate of
interest prevailed."68
In this group of cases, we find in fact a combination of two
tendencies that have been generalized in the literature. One
idea is that several state laws are connected with the contract
and the judge may choose among these but no other laws. 69
The other impulse is given to favor the law upholding the
stipulation. Thus, this entire doctrine does not serve as a
limitation but as a favor to the contract.
As a third feature of the cases, however, the connection
has to be "real," not "fictitious." The North Carolina court,
finding that payment under a contract was arranged to be
made in another state solely for the purpose of avoiding the
usury statute of North Carolina, applied the latter. 70 In this
sense, the stipulation of interest must be covered by the law
of one of the places bona fide involved in the case. Bona fide
67 See STUMBERG 237; GooDRICH § I 11; 2 BEALE § 347·4; cf. also 6 Banks and
Banking (Michie I93I) I99 and Supp. (I945).
68 Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. (I927) 274 U. S. 403.
&9 Arnold v. Potter (I867) 22 Iowa I94·
70 Meroney v. Atlanta National Building and Loan Ass'n (I893) 112 N.C. 842,
I7 S. E. 637; Ripple v. Mortgage and Acceptance Corp. (I927) I93 N.C. 422, I37
S. E. I 56. See also infra ns. 74 and 75·
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seems to mean that the place should not be intentionally selected for the purpose of evasion.
Stipulation for a law. It is in this light that we must regard
the approximately twenty-six decisions dealing with stipulations on the applicable law. 71
Of fourteen usury cases holding such stipulation void,
eleven invalidate it because it refers to a foreign law conflicting with that of the forum. 72 Only one old Mississippi case
protests against the advantage taken of its own usury statute
in a contract made in either New York or Tennessee; it is
a singular case also in the respect that the situs of the mortgage in the state, for most courts one of the most vital contacts, is disregarded. 73 Another case, in a lower court, disregarding the reference to Virginia law because the contract has
more relation to the District of Columbia, concerns a loan
corporation chartered in Virginia but operating in fact in
Washington, D. C. The judge observes that if the payment
had been stipulated to be in Virginia, the stipulation would
have been proper. 74
It is impressive that nine of these fourteen cases were prior
to 1902. In the few others, the principle that any law having
a substantial connection with the contract suffices, is expressly
adopted. In the four last cases (of 1923, 1930, and 1931),
the place of incorporation of the lending Delaware company,
71 I am much indebted to Mrs. Oberst, formerly Elizabeth Durfee of Ann Arbor,
for her excellent contribution in establishing the list of these cases and the conclusions to be inferred from them.
72 Falls v. U.S. Savings, Loan and Bldg. Co. (1893) 97 Ala. 417; Meroney v.
Atlanta Building and Loan Ass'n (1895) 116 N. C. 882; U.S. Savings & Loan Co.
v. Scott (1896) 98 Ky. 695, 34 S. W. 235; Locknane v. U.S. Savings & Loan Co.,
(1898) 103 Ky. 265; Fidelity Savings Ass'n v. Shea (1899) 6 Ida. 405; Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n of Dakota v. Bilan (1899) 59 Neb. 458; Snyder v. Fidelity Savings
Ass'n (1901) 23 Utah 291; Floyd v. National Loan & Investment Co. (1901) 49
W.Va. 327; United Divers Supply Co. v. Commercial Credit Co. (C. C. A. 5th 1923)
289 Fed. 316; Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co. (C. C. A. 3d 1930) 43 F. (2d)
730, cert. denitd, 282 U. S. 897; Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co. (1931) 200 N.
c. 73511·
American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co. v. Jefferson (1892) 69 Miss. 770,
supra n. 62.
74 Stoddard v. Thomas (1915) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 181.
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different from its principal place of business, is discarded,
but the rate stipulated in the contract is nevertheless saved
by judicial choice of another law validating the contract. 75
Twelve decisions, from r865 to 1937, agree in applying
the stipulated law, which in half of the number was that of
the borrower and in the rest that of the lender. 76 A Kansas
decision holding a stipulation for Colorado law valid, since
many elements of the contract related to Colorado, refuted
the contrary opinion, as follows:
"The position assumed by some courts in reference to
this matter, when considering building and loan association
cases, can scarcely be regarded as anything less than the
result of a tour de force." 11
Thus, the courts in this matter are not satisfied with the
mere fact that the parties have signed the agreement. They
analyze the facts in order to see whether enough elements
support the stipulated localization, with the alternative that
the parties are deemed to have intentionally evaded the usury
laws of some other state.
In summary, although it remains not quite certain which
combination of elements will satisfy a court, 78 it seems that
76 See the last three citations, supra n, 72, and Manufacturers Finance Co. v.
B. L. Johnson & Co. (1931) IS Tenn. App. 236.
76 Townsend v. Riley (1865) 46 N.H. 300; Dugan v. Lewis (1891) 79 Tex. 246;
Smith v. Parsons (1893) 55 Minn. po; Lanier v. Union Mortgage, Banking &
Trust Co. (1897) 64 Ark. 39; Ashurst v. Ashurst (1898) 119 Ala. 219; Midland
Savings & Loan Co. v. Solomon (1905) 71 Kan. 185; Steinman v. Midland Savings
& Loan Co. (1908) 78 Kan. 479; Goode v. Colorado Investment Loan Co. (1911)
16 N. M. 461, II7 Pac. 856; Le Sueur v. Manufacturers' Finance Co. (C. C. A.
6th 1922) 285 Fed. 490; Castleman v. Canal Bank & Trust Co. (1934) 171 Miss.
291; Merchants' & Manufacturers' Securities Co. v. Johnson (C. C. A. 8th 1934)
69 F. (zd) 940, cert. denied 293 U. S. 569; Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co. (C. C.
A. 5th 1937) 88 F. (2d) 449; also Meinhard, Greef & Co. Inc. v. Edens (1951) 189
F. (2d) 792.
77 Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Solomon (1905) 71 Kan. 185, 191,79 Pac. I077·
71 In U. S. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Lanzarotti (1929) 47 Ida. 287, 274 Pac.
630, 632, with no express reference to a law, the agreement that the note should
be paid in Montana at the domicil of the lending corporation, was rejected as not
supported by innocent intent. If facts of the case were better known, the true
motive of the court would be clearer.
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the stipulation is likely to be accepted when it refers to the
law of a state in which one of the parties is effectively domiciled and in which at the same time either the contract is
deemed to be made, or to be performed, or the land security
is situated, or payment is to be made.
Hence, the usury doctrine of the American courts, also in
its extension to express agreements on the applicable law, is
a remarkable specialty, suggestive of ideas, but by no means
susceptible of simple generalizations. It rather demonstrates
the usefulness of an elaborate approach to individual problems.
Insurance Statutes
In "a few instances," 79 courts of this country have disregarded express contract stipulations determining the place of
the contract and thereby the applicable law. 80 It seems that
all these decisions were rendered in Massachusetts and Missouri. The latter state has waged a long and gallant legislative battle, with repeated reverses in the Supreme Court of
the United States, to protect its residents against forfeiture
clauses and other contractual deteriorations of their insurance
in New York companies. 81 Certainly, if an insurance contract
has all the characteristics of a Missouri contract, stipulations
inserted in the policy providing, for example, for a different
2.

79 CoucH, I Cycl. of Insurance Law (I929) 44I. These cases, it seems to me,
have impressed BATIFFOL 6o n. I by far too much; but, it is true, CARNAHAN,
Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (ed. 2, I958) 269, 290 also voices the
impression that choice of the law of the home office of the insurer is ineffectual, if
this law is less favorable for the insured than the law at the place of making.
80 Massachusetts: Albro v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (I902) 119 Fed. 629, aff'd
(I904) I27 Fed. 28I; Dolan v. Mutual Res. Fund Life Ass'n (I899) I7J Mass.
197, 53 N. E. 398.
S. W. 519,
Missouri: Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co. (I899) 148 Mo. 583,
aff'd (1900) 178 U.S. 389; Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co. (I899) 151 Mo. 6o4,
52 S. W. 356; Haven v. Home Insurance Co. (1910) I49 Mo. App. 291, 130 S. W.
73; Saunders v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. I92J) 253 S. W. 177; Hoffman v. North American Union (Mo. App. 1933) 56 S. W. (2d) 599; Ragsdale v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (Mo. App. 1934) So S. W. (2d) 272.
81 Instructive: Missouri Annotations to the Restatement 142 § 332.
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rule of computation from that prescribed by the statute or
for waiver of surrender value, forbidden by the statute,
would be recognized as ineffectual at present as it was in 1891
with the approval of the Supreme Court of the United
States. 82 If in such a case of an insurance contract belonging
to the law of one state, the law of another state is stipulated
for, it is a question of public policy whether the statutory prohibition should be maintained nevertheless. A court, then, may
qualify the agreement as an ineffectual attempt at evasion
within the sphere of the prohibition. This, indeed, seems to
be the view taken for a long period in Massachusetts in
certain cases of violations. 83 The agreement, however, ought
not to be considered void as a whole. The Missouri court
exaggerated by asserting that the interpretation and effect of
the terms of insurance are governed by Missouri law when
the contract is deemed to have been made there, despite a
clause referring to New York law. 84
However, the vastly prevailing doctrine respecting insurance contracts is summarized in the leading encyclopedia to
the effect that, "if the policy or certificate does expressly provide that a specific state shall be the place of contract, the law
of the state agreed upon as governing controls the nature,
validity, interpretation, and effect of the contract, whether
the specified state be the state wherein the contract was made,
or a foreign state or country and notwithstanding the insured
82 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Clements (1891) 140 U. S. 226. I cannot
agree with the conclusion by LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) at 579 n. 73 from this
decision that the intention of the parties is not permitted to violate the statutes
of the lex loci contractus.
sa Dolan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (1899) 173 Mass. 197, 53 N. E.
398; Millard v. Brayton (1901) 177 Mass. 533, 537; 59 N. E. 436.
u Pietri v. Seguenot (1902) 69 S. W. ross, 1057. Kerner, ]., in New England
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass. v. Olin (C. C. A. 7th 1940) II4 F. (2d) 131,
137, despite his similar sweeping dictum in an otherwise correct opinion, certainly
wanted to say only that the contract and the agreement involved were made in
fact in Indiana, and therefore the nonforfeiture statute of Indiana prevailed over
the stipulation for Massachusetts law.
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resides, or the property is located, in another state" 85
This being the settled rule, all justifiable exceptions are
fully explained by the operation of a specific public policy,
a viewpoint needing separate discussion.
The constitutional limits of public policy to be exercised
by a state, have been illustrated in New York Life Insurance
Company v. Dodge. By a contract undoubtedly made in Missouri, a resident of that state was insured in a New York
company. The insured concluded a collateral agreement with
the company under the stipulation that the agreement should
be deemed to have been made in New York, although most
elements of its conclusion pointed to Missouri. The Supreme
Court of the United States denied the state of Missouri the
constitutional power to enforce its prohibitions against this
agreement, thus rejecting the argument sustained by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in a dissenting vote that the individual's
right created under the Missouri contract was not susceptible
of being disposed of by contracting anywhere. 86 However, on
this question there is a long line of federal as well as state
decisions which it is difficult to reduce to a summary. 87
In addition, courts have approved the claim of states to
govern insurance policies issued to residents by foreign companies licensed to do business in the state. 88 In the case of in85 CoucH, I Cycl. of Insurance Law 440 § 199; see also Note, II2 A.L.R. 130
and 44 C. J. S. (1945) 516 §54 n. 86. Cj. Trexler,]., in Stoddard v. Thomas (1915)
6o Pa. Super. Ct. 177 at r81 where a stipulation for the law of the domicil of a
finance company was invalidated, supra n. 74: "No one questions the right of a
corporation, such as an insurance company for example, to provide that its policies
although issued to a person in another state, shall be governed by the laws of the
state of its residence."
It is agreed that where the law of the insurer's domicil is more favorable to the
claimant, express provisions in its favor are readily recognized. See, for instance,
CARNAHAN, supra n. 79, 287.
86 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357, 375 (opinion of the
court); 377, 382 (dissenting vote) among other arguments probably not equally
prominent in Mr. Justice Brandeis' mind.
87 See CARNAHAN, supra n. 79, 85ff., 6s8ff., 67off., 694·
8& New York Life Ins. Co. v. Craver.s (1900) 178 U.S. 389; Great Southern Life
v. Burwell (1926) 12 F. (2d) 244, cert. denied 271 U. S. 683; Owen v. Bankers'
Life Ins. Co. (1909) 84 S. C. 253, 155, 66 S. E. 290.

THEORIES RESTRICTING PARTY AUTONOMY

417

surance, indeed, states are entitled to the exercise of greater
control, unless new restrictions are to follow from extending
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution to insurance business.

III.

ExEMPTIONS FROM LIABILITY

Municipal laws and unifications. 89 While no debtor can
effectively stipulate that he should not be responsible for his
own fraudulent conduct,90 gross negligence is treated on the
same footing only in part of the legislations. Moreover, many
courts traditionally view stipulations lessening the extent of
liability with disfavor and construe them punctiliously, although at present in most commercial cases insurance may
replace such liability. 91 Finally, in certain cases, liability for
lack of ordinary care (negligence, culpa levis), either of the
debtor himself or also of his agents, may not be contracted
out under modern views, the strictest of which are to be
found in this country. Thus, in contrast to British and German laws, the Supreme Court of the United States has proclaimed that common carriers by land and sea could not
exempt themselves from liability for loss or damage arising
from negligence of their servants, "and that any stipulation
for such exemption was void as against public policy."92 The
declared reasons for supporting this thesis were the economic preponderance of big enterprises, not giving customers
fair opportunity to bargain for conditions, and the educational
purpose of severe rules of behavior. 93 Later, stipulations for
foreign laws favorable to the carriers were disregarded, beu Cj. HoLLANDER, 3 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 534·

eo

PAULUS

in Just. Dig.

2,

14,

27,

3: Illud nulla paclione t.f/it:i potest, ne dolus

praestetur.
91

See a similar observation by GLANVILLE WILLIAMs, 7 Modern L. Rev. (I944)

75, I 54 commenting on a new English decision.
92 Mr. Justice Gray in Knott v. Botany Mills (I900) 179 U.S. 69 at 7I; Clark
v. Southern R. Co. (19I8) 69 Ind. App. 697, 119 N. E. 539·
93 New York Central R. Co. v. Lockwood (1873) 17 Wall. 357, 379·
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cause frequently the party submitting thereto has no actual
intention to do so and there is no freedom of contracting. 94
The federal legislation regulating interstate communication
and carriage by land and sea was inspired by these views.
With respect to maritime affreightment-which has created
the outstanding international problem in this field-the
Harter Act of I 893 and subsequent congressional acts95 have
established liability of the shipowner for certain occurrences
without possibility of exemption, while no liability exists in
other cases. Canada, Australia and New Zealand have enacted
laws following this modeJ.96 A variant of the same method
was pursued in the Hague Rules of I92I 97 and, on their basis,
by the Brussels Convention of 1924, ratified by many states,98
which has also been incorporated into English and, recently,
American laws. 99 France and Italy diverge only in certain
significant particulars. 100
94 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724, 727: "The
customer cannot afford to higgle or stand out"; Phillips v. The Energia (1893) 56
Fed. 124; Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. (1941) at 668.
91
Act of Feb. 13, 1893, c. 105, 27 Stat. 445, 46 U.S. C. A. §§ 190-192; Law of
Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 728.
11 Australia: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1904·
Canada: Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1910 (9 & 10 Edw. 7, c. 61).
New Zealand: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1908.
17 Hague Rules of the International Law Association, 1921, see 30th Report
(1922) 2, 26o.
u Convention on the Unification of certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading
for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Brussels, August 25, 1924, HuosoN, 2 Int.
Legislation 1344, U. S. Treaty Series No. 931, 51 U. S. Stat. 233, 120 L. of N.
Treaty Series 155, 157, 183, ratified by Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France,
Germany, Great Britian and many British dominions and dependencies, Hungary,
Italy, Monaco, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, United States.
For a full list see KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of Lading (ed. 4, 1953) 73-88.
19 E.g., England: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924.
United States: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, of April 16, 1936,49 Stat. 1207-1213,
46 u.s. c. A. §§ 1300-1315.
Canada: Water Carriage of Goods (Hague Rules) Act, 1936.
Australia: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1924.
Also the maritime part (Book II) of the Netherlands' Commercial Code, revised
in 1924 and 1926, is strongly inftuenced by the Convention.
German HGB., amended by Law of August 10, 1937, RGBI. I 891.
10 France: See DEMOGUE, 5 Obligations 462-501; JossERAND, Les transports
(ed. 2) 609 § 627ff.; EsMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique s6o § 400ff.;
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Land transportation rules of civil law countries have been
largely unified by the conventions of Bern on the carriage
of goods, 101 and a similar convention on carriage of passengers has been signed. 102 The latest endeavors have been
devoted to air transportation, in which field regard for the
weak position of private customers has seemed to be counterbalanced by the desire of many states to develop a young
and costly industry. Nevertheless, in conventions, 108 numerous laws, 104 and cases/ 05 comparative severity has prevailed,
although the standard of liability maintained in this country
against maritime carriers considerably surpasses the risks imposed on air carriers under the Warsaw Convention. 106
More isolated legislation in particular countries has dealt
with restrictions on liability in employment contracts, agreements of attorneys and notaries, and others. Differences,
however, still exist in all fields, some of considerable weight.
To appreciate the varieties and the merit of the unifications
obtained, the background of policy must be remembered. The
variety of maritime liability has now largely been ended by
successful unification, but forms a memorable chapter of
history. Shipping in England and Germany and marine insurance in England have had an eminent function in the
public economy; it was often thought a national interest to
maintain their power of competition at low rates, whereas
DANJON, 2 Droit Marit. § 845ff.; RtPERT, 2 Droit Marit. § 1737ff.
Italy: The principles concerning maritime affreightment have been summarized
in Cass. (Feb. 27, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936.1.297, 35 Revue Dor (1937) 291; see now
Codice della Navigazione (1942) arts. 419-438.
101 Convention on the Transport of Goods by Rail, of Oct. 25, 1952, arts. 26-40.
HAUSTEIN-PscHIRRER., Internationales Eisenbahnrecht (1956) 187ff.
102 Convention on the Transport of Passengers and Luggage, of Oct. 25, 1952,
arts. 28-40, id. 350.
103 Convention of Warsaw for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International Air Transport, of Oct. 12, 1929, HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation too; Hague
Protocol of Amendment of Sept. 28, 1955·
1 0' ALLEN, "Limitation of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers," 2 Journal
of Air Law (1931) 325.
1 06 For the United States, see Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. (1941) at 666.
106 RoBINSON, Admiralty s6o.
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affreighters and passengers were supposed to cover their
risks by insurance. In the authoritative French opinion, efficient prohibitions on exemption clauses have always been
believed impossible except by international convention, lest
French shipping be sacrificed to foreign competition. 107 Also,
the various rules of liability and nonliability combined by the
Harter Act, though largely influenced by the desire to protect
American cargo shipping which at that time was mostly
carried on foreign lines, were also designed to facilitate the
carrying trade in order to aid incipient American shipping
competition with foreign rivals. Certain liabilities of the
general maritime law were considerably lessened and the
bargaining position of the American companies was improved by imposing the same conditions on foreign vessels
leaving, or even headed for, American ports. These circumstances influenced a series of conflicts cases, which have remained the leading cases on the entire matter in discussion,
although the domain of possible conflicts of laws in sea
carriage of goods is greatly narrowed at present. We must
therefore concentrate on this classic topic.
Conflicts laws. 108 There is no doubt about the principle that
the law governing a contract also determines the permissibility of agreements releasing or restricting the obligor's
liability, even though this law may be called for by another
stipulation. 109 With regard to carriage of goods by sea, this
has been recognized not only in the English, 110 German,111
1° 7

See RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. (ed. 4) No. 1743.
On the American interstate conflicts remaining since the federal enactments,
see Note, "Limitations of Carriers' Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 54 Harv. L.
Rev. (1941) 663.
109
Atchison, Topeka & Santa FeR. Co. v. Smith (I9IJ) 38 Okla. 157, IJ2 Pac.
494 should not be excepted; the decision validates a waiver of liability printed on
the ba<;k of a free railway pass, in application of the law of the forum deemed to be
the law of the place of performance, although favor for the law more favorable
to the stipulation (i.e., the waiver) is also expressed.
110 In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. J2I.
111
RG. (May 25, 1889) 25 RGZ. ro4, 107; (Jan. 2, 19rr) 75 RGZ. 95·
108
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and Italian courts, 112 but also in the United States. 113 Where
an English vessel takes on a cargo in Liverpool for transportation to Cuba, both the stipulations referring to English law
and exempting the shipowner from liability for negligence
of the mate, have been held valid. 114
Conflicts arise, of course, when a vessel sails from Liverpool to Baltimore; the English courts definitely claim that
its contracts of transportation are determined by English
law, 115 while the American courts since the Harter Act subject
it to American law. 116 Other conflicts are caused by the abstention of the Brussels Convention from regulating transportations agreed upon without issuing a bill of lading and
from including the periods of time before the goods are loaded on and after they are discharged from the ship (art. I b
and e) ; and particular divergences arise out of the unregulated methods of implementing the Convention, which may
be done by ratifying and sanctioning it as a whole, or by ratifying it and reproducing it more or less exactly in separate
laws (Protocol of Signature, par. 2 ), or else by adopting a
part of it in an independent law. 117
The only problem, however, presenting itself at this juncture, concerns the nonapplication of an exemption clause
112 Italy: App. Venezia (March I, I935) Schiaffino v. Capano, 112 Foro Ita!.
Rep. I935, I363 ns. 43-46; Giur. Ita!. Rep. I935, 6oi ns. 4-7, applying English
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, I924, manifestly upon reference to English law.
113 Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (I889) I29
U. S. 397 (American law applied on the ground of presumed intention); The Oranmore (D. C. D. Md. I885) 24 Fed. 922, aff'd, 92 Fed. 396 (stipulations of English
law and exemption valid).
1H The Miguel d.i Larrinaga (D. C. S. D. N. Y. I9I4) 2I7 Fed. 678 (English law
stipulated, English vessel from Liverpool to Cuba); and see Note, 35 Yale L. J.
(I926) 997·
116 In re Missouri Steamship Co. (I889) 42 Ch. D. 32I, 330, cj. DICEY (ed. 5) 650
n. (m).
114 Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (I889) I29
U. S. 397; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, I936, § I3.
117
This fact has been deplored by Bateson, J., in The St. Joseph [I933] P.
119, I34· The divergences of the French Law of April 2, I936 from the Brussels
Convention (ratified by France according to the Law of April 9, I936 by Decree of
the President of March 25, I937) are reviewed in the Note, S.I936.5.I6S~·
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stipulated under a law selected by the parties. Decisions denying effect to such clauses must be regarded as exceptions to
the rule and need justification by strong public policy on the
ground of a sufficiently close relation of the case with the territory of this policy. In fact, the laws and courts are far from
giving an exclusive role to the lex loci contractus.
Dealing with the Harter Act, the American courts have
interpreted the Act as including in all its provisions, foreign
vessels 118 leaving or arriving119 in American ports. In all
these cases, a clause of exemption contrary to the Act is invalid, although it may be valid under the law of the place
where the contract is made or the law agreed upon. 120 This
has been laid down very distinctly in section I 3 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936. Dutch law prescribed, likewise, that reference to foreign law is not generally able to
restrict liability of shipowners, but recognized stipulations
if valid by the law of the place where the goods are loaded, 121
at least in the case of foreign vessels. 122 Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile, as well as the former Italian Commercial Code
according to a certain interpretation, have declared imperative
the force of their rules concerning affreightment upon foreign
vessels if (or insofar as) the contract is to be performed in
the country. 123 These are outstanding examples of the most
The Silvia (I898) 171 U.S. 462; The Chattahoochee (1899) 173 U.S. S4o, sso.
Knott v. Botany Mills (1900) 179 U. S. 69.
To an analogous effect, Belgium: C. Com. art. 91 as amended by Law of Nov. 28,
1928, art. I, discussed in The St. Joseph [1933] P. 119, I2I; France: Cass. (civ)
(Feb. 21, I9SO) Revue Crit. 1950, 427.
12o Knott v. Botany, supra n. 119.
121
The Netherlands: C. Com. (I838) arts. 470, 470a, SI7d, cj. pot; H.R. (Dec.
12, I947) N.J. 1948 No. 6o8 with good note p. 982, Clunet I9SO, 922. Art SI7d as
modified by law of Aug. IS, I95S, declares Dutch law applicable to all vessels leaving Dutch ports.
122
Rb. Rotterdam (June IS, I938) W. I939, 617 restricts art. SI7d to foreign
vessels.
ua Argentina: C. Com. art. I09I.
Brazil: C. Com. art. 628 (these both speaking of contracts wherever stipulated
but performable in the country).
Chile: C. Com. art. 97S par. 2 (speaking of the part of the contract concerning
discharge of the vessel or other act to be made in the country).
Italy: Cass. (Oct. IS, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II 529; ScERNI 223 n. 2; but the
intention of the parties has been considered in App. Venezia (Jan. 22, 1931), The
"Stylianos," cited and criticized by ScERNI 217.
118

119
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extended policy which evidently governs the exception to
the conflicts rule on affreightment and not the rule itself.
The American courts have never doubted, before and after
the Harter Act came into being, that they applied it compulsorily on the ground of public policy, not on account of some
obscure dogma. The acts declaring exemptions from liability
to passengers invalid expressly impose the prohibition as
public policy. Of course, the Supreme Court has construed
an affreightment made in the United States on an English
vessel for a journey from an American port to England as an
American contract so as to apply the Harter Act as a part of
the governing law rather than to restrict the governing
English law by an exception of American public policy. But
this was expressly done, "unless the parties (to the contract)
at the time of making it have some other law in view."124 The
principle, until recently, appeared well settled that there
had to be a particular interest of the United States, if American public policy should be invoked against a foreign law
governing the contract. 125
A divergent conception, however, was developed in matters not covered by the Harter Act in the New York federal
and state courts. It started in a case 126 where the British
White Star Line contracted with American excursionists who
were represented by a tourist agency in Boston for passage
from Montreal to Liverpool. The contract expressly referred
to English law and required the passengers in case of injury
to give notice to the company within three days after landing.
On the journey to England, a school teacher from Indiana
was grievously hurt by inexcusable negligence of a steward
and, after landing, was brought from the ship's hospital to a
114 Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 129 U.S.
397, 458ff.
126 Distinctly to this effect, The Fri (C. C. A. 2d 1907) 154 Fed. 333: exemption
clause under the stipulated law of Colombia for transportation from Carthagena
to Cienfuegos valid.
12s Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (C. C. A. 2d 1925) 9 F. (2d) 724.
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hospital in Liverpool where she had to stay for months. To
the claim for £ so,ooo damages, the line defended on the
ground of omission of notice. The New York court, comparing the American law which would grant a reasonable
time for giving such notice127 with English law allowing a
shorter time to be fixed, found the former applicable by
public policy against the expressed intention of the parties.
The argument, in the words of Judge Rogers was that "the
contract of exemption, being made in the United States, was
void by the law of the place where it was made." Hence, even
a Canadian travelling from Canada to England, would be
protected by American law, if he contracts through an American agency. This extension of public policy, in the clothes of
lex loci contractus, has been authoritatively criticized as extravagant.128 Evidently, reasons of fairness prompted the
result which the court seemingly felt unable to sustain otherwise, viz., by a restrictive construction of the clause. It would
make sense to dispense with formal notice of claim to the ship
company in the case of a passenger treated by the ship's
physician and brought ashore on a stretcher to a hospital by
the crew. But also the recent federal legislation maintains
formality in this respect.
However, the New York Circuit Court of Appeals has
continued its way. In 1930 Judge Learned Hand in a dictum
confirmed that the lex loci contractus governs a contract of
carriage even though the parties expressly stipulate for another law. 129 In another case130 dealing with no personal inThe Kensington (1901) 183 U.S. 263.
CooK, Legal Bases 408; see also Notes, 35 Yale L. J. (1926) 997; 10 Minn. L.
Rev. (1926) 530. To the contrary, RoBINSON, Admiralty 559 asserts that the
contract would be void under the federal statute of June 5, 1936, c. 521 § 2, 46 U.S.
C. § 183 c; but since this statute is also limited to vessels from and to ports of the
United States, I cannot see the basis of this assertion.
129 Louis-Dreyfus et al. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (1930) 43 F. (2d) 824, 826.
1ao F. A. Straus & Co., Inc. v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (1930) 254 N. Y. 407,
173 N. E. 564; criticized in Notes, 31 Col. L. Rev. (1931) 495; 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
(1931) 635·
127
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jury at all, but involving a cargo of silk, the shipowner was
declared liable for loss from theft, despite a stipulation to the
contrary and submission to British law in the bill of lading,
and although the bill was issued in Shanghai, British Crown
Colony, for carriage to Vancouver, British Columbia, and the
theft in question occurred on this stage of the voyage. The
only contacts with the forum were the facts that the bill of
lading covered also the railroad transportation from Vancouver to New York and that the destination was a firm in
New York. The Court knew that no federal policy applied;
it developed state policy of an intransigent character. Further,
the exemption clause in a passenger transportation by airplane
was invalidated under New York law because of booking and
beginning of the transport at the airport of Albany, New
Y ork. 131 A federal district court in New York has finally concluded that release of a common carrier from liability for his
own negligence is held illegal and void in New York, evidently under all circumstances. 132 In this case, indeed, the
passenger's ticket was issued in the state, but the journey was
to be made between Bergen, Norway, and Newcastle, England, and Norwegian law was stipulated. That the court, in
addition, resorted to admiralty law, supposedly overruling
the stipulation for another law, is another ground for astonishment.
It is difficult to reconcile this chain of cases with otherwise
established rules. It approaches rather closely such fighting
radicalism as was shown in the Italian Aviation Law, of
August 20, 1923, declaring all clauses of exemption void irrespective of the law governing the contract. Opposing doctrines prevail. For instance, the Dutch Supreme Court has
recognized an exemption clause regarding an air flight of a
J3l

Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc. (1935) 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N. E.

692·

1' 2

Barndt v. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab, The Venus (1938) 28 F. Supp.

815, 1939 Am. Marit. Cas. 1564.
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Dutchman from the airport in Bangkok on a plane of the
Royal Dutch Aviation, valid under Siamese law but contrary
to Dutch; 133 the Canadian courts conceive that prohibitions
of waiver of liability by the Railway Act of Canada are
inapplicable so soon as the transport leaves the Canadian
border, 134 and so forth.
Extraterritorial effect. The Harter Act has been regularly
applied abroad, if the contract of affreightment was considered governed by American law or when reference to it was
inserted by the very wide use of an appropriated clause. 135
In the latter case only, restrictions to its application may
result from added clauses of exemptions, earlier discussed. 136
The same treatment has been given to the Australian Act
of 1904137 and the Dutch Maritime Law. 138
133 The Netherlands: H. R. (March rS, 1938) W. 1939 No. 69 with a critical
note by Meyers approving of the decision on other grounds.
13' Ontario: McDonald v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (1896) 31 0. R. 663.
116 England: Dobell & Co. v. Rossmore S. S. Co. [18951 2 Q. B. 408 (C. A.);
Rowson v. Atlantic Transport Co. [1903] 2 K. B. 666 (C. A.).
Canada: Jas. Richardson & Sons v. The Burlington [19311 S.C. R. 76: American
ship from American port to Canadian port, with a clause of exemption held to be
visibly inspired by the Harter Act.
Argentina: Pratt y C£a. v. Munson Steamship Line (Cam. Fed., Oct. 20, 1922)
9 J ur. Arg. 523 and other decisions, cited and criticized because of wrong application
of the Act, by DE LAS VEGAS, Note, 75 Jur. Arg. (1941) 233, 234·
France: App. Rauen (July 31, 1895) Clunet 1895, roSS; Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5,
1910) S.I9II.I.I29, Clunet 19r·z,:;II56, Revue 19II, 395 (express stipulation for
American law recognized although with restriction by exemption clause); Cass.
(req.) (Nov. 12, 1918) S.r920.1.29 with note listing many other cases. See also on
the clause: "weight unknown," RrPERT, 2 Droit Marit. 735 § 1782.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg in 20 Hans. GZ. (1899) HBI, 122; 26 id. (1905) HBI.
227, 270; 28 id. (1907) HBI. 244; if. RG. (Sept. 24, 1930) Hans. RGZ. 1930 B 707.
The contract being considered governed by German law, the Harter Act was
rejected: RG. (May 25, r889) 25 RGZ. 104, 107.
Egypt: App. Mixte Alexandria (Jan. 25, 1939) 40 Revue Dor (1939) 231 (goods
shipped from San Francisco; insurance clause invalid under Harter Act).
136 Supra pp. 391ff.
137 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March 17, 1913) 24 Hans. GZ. (1913) HBI. 157
No. 74. a.ff'd, RG. (Jan. 28, 1914) Hans. GZ. (1914) HBl. roB No. 52.
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Dec. 15, 1926) W. 12048, 21 Revue Dar 447
(Australian Act of 1904 declared to have been agreed upon with force against the
special clauses for exemption!).
138 England: The Roberta [1937158 Ll. L. Rep. 159; [193816o id. 84 (implicitly).
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 12, 1936) Hans. RGZ. (1936) B 243 No. 76.
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International needs. In such important international matters as the Hague Rules, a normal international situation
would be guaranteed, if the peculiar public policy of each
state were limited to certain cases. For example, in the
majority of countries prohibitions on exemptions in maritime
affreightment are imperatively imposed only on vessels
loading the goods in a port of the prohibiting country, or,
as it is usually put, issuing the bill of lading in such a port.
Economically or politically justifiable extensions such as
the American application of the domestic law to vessels
arriving in American ports, are at least neat enough to be
taken account of in contracts. A vessel travelling from Pernambuco to New York may adjust its bills of lading to both
laws. But such practice as that of the New York courts is
exorbitant when it insists on protecting all residents, or all
persons booking in the state, wherever the journey begins
and ends. If other countries were to reciprocate this claim,
there would be chaos again. On the other hand, the English
courts are generally believed to be too much inclined to
accept a reference to English law, irrespective of geography.
The Vita Food's case has given new force to this reputation
inasmuch as an exemption under English law prevailed
in the court, although the vessel departed from Newfoundland to the United States. However, in this case the material point was simply whether the omission of the "clause
paramount" nullified the bill of lading- which question
was negatived primarily under English and, more cautiously,
under Newfoundland law- whereas the exemption clause
itself was as good under the Hague Rules adopted in
Newfoundland as under those adopted in England. Hence,
at least, the Privy Council did not detract from the internationally acquired ground of the Hague Rules. These are
the painfully won results of long negotiations among ship-
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owners, affreighters, maritime agents, exporters, and insurers of the greater part of the world. The compromise
was so delicate that the legal experts at the Brussels Conference did not dare to reform the nai've drafting, and that
opposition is still flaring in some quarters. It would be
irresponsible for any court even of countries not participating in the Convention to jeopardize its operation by a
unilateral public policy applied to vessels on foreign voyages. The more so should courts of member states recognize
the prohibitions prevailing at the place where the bill of
lading is issued irrespective of the distinction whether the
Hague Rules are adopted at this place by ratification or only
by independent enactment. 139
Similar considerations may come to the rescue of the much
criticised decision of the English Court of Appeals in The
T orni. 140 The vessel carried oranges from Jaffa in Palestine
to Hull in England. The Palestine Ordinance, which had
adopted the Hague Rules was concerned with bills of lading issued in Palestine, while the analogous British statute
was confined to bills of lading issued in Britain. By stipulating for English law, the bill of lading issued in Palestine
consequently would have allowed clauses of exemption prohibited by the Hague Rules, despite both laws adopting
them. The court acted wisely in depriving this stipulation of
such force. The technical arguments of the judges, it is
true, are easily challenged. The presumptive intention of
the parties was a weak support; general recognition of any
illegality provided by the lex loci contractus is untenable;
and a bill of lading is not void, without an express and inadvisable legal sanction, solely because the "paramount"
13 9 Such a distinction is made, however, by KNAUTH, The American Law of
O:ean Bills of Lading (ed. 4, 1953) r6o probably on the ground of a literal interpretation of art. ro of the Brussels Convention.
uo [1932] P. 27, 37; 78, 831f.; see supra ns. 23, 24.
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clause is omitted. But regard for the law of a friendly nation
may very well prevail precisely in this subject.
IV. CoNcLusioNs
Contrary to many assertions, the leading conflicts laws
do not recognize any imperative rules governing a priori
(supra I, I). Equally, the often repeated general postulate
that the parties can select a law only if it has a substantial
connection with the contract, has proved a fallacious idea
(supra I, 3). It is true, the use of this idea in more recent
American usury cases has produced a unique and specially
elaborated compromise among the regulations of interest on
loans in the various sister states (supra II, I). This may well
serve as a model to solve other particular conflicts, restricting rather than freely allowing the public policy of the forum
in its opposition to a stipulated foreign law. However, a
general rule confining the choice of law by the parties to a
certain number of legislations is impracticable; the transfer
of the American interstate policy in usury cases into the field
of international commerce would be disastrous.
In a somewhat different manner, also the American cases
concerned with insurance contracts testify to a struggle between the clauses for application of foreign law and public
policy of the forum. Here, outstanding local interests in protecting citizens and supervising intrastate business have found
a basis in the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court
(supra II, 2). The last word has not been spoken, however,
and general inferences drawn from this delicate subject would
be highly adventurous.
The important topic of exemptions from liability shows
another similar strife (supra III). If it is borne in mind
that any resort to domestic prohibitions must be justified by
stringent public policy claiming to dominate the contract,
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courts will refrain from imposingthe policy of their states
upon prevailing foreign relations. On the other hand, international commerce should be restricted as well as protected by common compromise rather than one-sided dictates.
Excluding the dubious exception of public policy, there
is only one tangible leading idea emerging from the manifold confused attempts to restrict party autonomy. This is
the desire to obviate evasion of the law. But we have found
merely one situation in which in the universal opinion a
law is not permitted to be avoided, that is, when a contract
by all (not only by some) substantial connections belongs
to one sole jurisdiction and, thus, is devoid of all considerable foreign elements. The claim of any state exclusively to
govern contracts entirely radicated in its territory is well
enough founded to justify its recognition by all other states.
While in the case just mentioned the parties are precluded from selecting a foreign law against imperative domestic rules on an objective basis, the theory of fraus legi
facta disapproves always and only the evident purpose of
evasion in an agreement. The French and also some American courts are inclined to favor this idea. It is well known
how difficult is the proof that the main purpose of an obligatory agreement was intentionally to avoid the application of
a law. On the other hand, what may be regarded as evasion
from the angle of one country, may be recognized elsewhere
as legitimate resort to another law, particularly in the state
whose law is adopted. If a contract has more than one territorial connection, there is no reasonable background for its
compulsory attribution to one state just because this state is
hostile to the contract and the parties feared frustration by its
law.
The entire problem, therefore, reduces itself to two questions involving contracts with multiple local connections.
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First, what is the public policy on the ground of which
courts may react against the choice of a foreign law?
Second, under what conditions should the overriding
policy of one state be recognized by the others?
While public policy as a unilateral means of barring the
play of conflicts rules is an old subject of discussion, the
mutual respect for internationally significant policies is in
its very first development.
Deferring both questions to the following chapters, we
may conclude by urging that party autonomy should not be
wantonly discarded for the sake of local policies. A minimum
requirement for any court should be a solicitous analysis of
the extraterritorial value of state policy in relation to interstate and international needs. Never should it be forgotten
that party autonomy is the least dangerous method of bringing certainty into the agitated problems of international
private law, and thus, helps to produce that "swift and
certain rule" 141 so important to merchants.
141 Celebrated words, see the citations by HIRAM THOMAS "The Federal Sales
Bill etc.," in 26 Va. L. Rev. (1940) 542.
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Absence of Party Agreement

A.

juDICIAL CHOICE oF LAw

I. INDIVIDUALIZED CHOICE OF LAW

r. Presumed Intention of the Parties
CORDING to their basic proper law theory, English
; ; _ courts, in the absence of an agreement of the parties,
will analyze the stipulations and circumstances of a
contract, to ascertain the law the parties had "in mind," "in
view," "in contemplation," "upon which they acted." This
method taken at its face value presupposes that there was a
certain law in the background of the negotiations, although
the parties did not even tacitly adopt it. Such things happen.
When, for instance, an irrevocable power of attorney was
declared to be granted in a document executed in New York,
by a resident to another resident, for the purpose of cashing
the debt of a German debtor, the natural assumption was
that New York law should determine whether the power
could be revoked, although as a rule authority of an agent is
governed by the law of the place where he acts. 1 The intention presumed here is implied rather than merely supposed
and may be closely associated to the cases of agreement by
conduct. 2
Usually, however, the parties do not even realize that
there may be a question of the applicable law. In this vast
majority of cases, the task of the courts is more adequately
defined by the question which law the parties probably would
1
1

German RG. (Oct. 24, 1892) 30 RGZ. 122; see RABEL, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 807.
Cf.loan debentures of New York banks, see mpra p. 369.
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have chosen if they had been conscious of the conflicts problem - their so-called cchypothetical intention," formulated
as:
"The intention which would have been formed by sensible
persons in the position of X and A if their attention had been
directed to contingencies which escaped their notice" (Dicey) ; 3
"What the parties would have determined in reasonable
and fair consideration of all circumstances" (the German
Reichsgericht) ; 4
"The law which the parties reasonably could and should
have expected to be applied"; 5 or "the law which the parties
would have declared applicable if they had thought at all
of stipulating on the question" (the Swiss Federal Tribunal) ; 6
The law upon which the parties "might be supposed instinctively to rely," the variant of a judge of the High Court
of Australia, aptly explaining the net result of the English
rule. 7
This has been the usual approach of all European courts
during the last century, and in part until today.
The inquiry of the court, thus postulated, is essentially
concerned with each individual contract. The choice of law
is "a matter of construction of the contract itself, as read by
the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding
circumstances." 8 It is true that certain types of circumstances
have acquired traditional weight. The writers have dedi3 DICEY

719.
RG. (Dec. 13, 1929) 126 RGZ. 196, :206.
Similarly, the Dutch courts, looking for the law agreeable to the supposed fair
intention of the parties, see VAN HASSELT 175·
5 BG. (Sept. r8, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 300; see also (Dec. 13, 1932) 58 BGE. II
at 435 citing previous cases; Uune 19, 1935) 6r BGE. II at 182.
1 BG. (March 2, 1937) 63 BGE. II 42, 43; (May 26, 1936) 62 BGE. II 140, 142
and cited precedents.
7 McClelland v. Trustees Executors and Agency Co., Ltd. (1936) per Dixon,
J., 55 Commw. L. R. 483, 493; 42 The Argus Law Reports 405, 409·
8 Bowen, J., in Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (1884) 12 Q. B. D.
589, 6oo.
4
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cated great care to gathering and analyzing these "indicia" of
the supposed will, and to classifying their significance. Most
elaborate is the list recently given by Batiffol with regard to
the United States, England, France, and Germany.' The
criteria include domicil and, in Europe, the nationality of any
party; the situation of an immovable or enterprise; the currency of a money debt; use of a standard form or a public office; the language; reference to a law or terms of a legal
system; the domicil of the party who had the contract or
form drafted; the situation of collateral guarantees; submission to arbitration or jurisdiction (where this is not considered equivalent to an express agreement) ; the conduct of
the parties after contracting and in pleading. None of these
single instances is conclusive by itself/ 0 and there is in reality no effective difference of rank among them; any one
may prove decisive.
Instead of going into the debatable details of the list, we
may illustrate the method by the arguments of outstanding
courts in a few cases representing what has been called accumulation of contact points. 11
The Supreme Court of the United States in a case deemed
to be fundamental, considered the facts of a carrier's contract
as follows: "The bill of lading for the bacon and hams was
made and dated at New York, and signed by the ship's agent
there. It acknowledges that the goods have been shipped 'in
and upon the steamship called Montana, now lying in the
port of New York and bound for the port of Liverpool,' and
are to be delivered at Liverpool. It contains no indication
that the owners of the steamship are English, or that their
principal place of business is in England, rather than in this
country. On the contrary, the only description of the line
of steamships, or of the place of business of their owners,
is in a memorandum in the margin, as follows: 'Guion Line.
g
H

BATIFFOL 69-I54•
DICEY (ed. 5) 648 n. (f).

11 HARPER

and

TAINTOR,

Cases (ed.

I) I7J·
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United States Mail Steamers. New York: 29 Broadway.
Liverpool: I r Rumford St.' No distinction is made between
the places of business at New York and at Liverpool, except
that the former is named first. The reservation of liberty,
in case of an interruption of the voyage, 'to tranship the goods
by any other steamer,' would permit transhipment into a
vessel of any other line, English or American. And general
average is to be computed, not by any local law or usage,
but 'according to Y ark-Antwerp rules,' which are the rules
drawn up in r864 at York in England, and adopted in 1877
at Antwerp in Belgium, at international conferences of representatives of the more important mercantile associations of
the United States, as well as of the maritime countries of
Europe. Lowndes on General Average (3d ed.) Appendix Q.
"The contract being made at New York, the ship-owner
having a place of business there, and the shipper being an
American, both parties must be presumed to have submitted
themselves to the law there prevailing, and to have agreed
to its action upon their contract. The contract is a single one,
and its principal object, the transportation of the goods, is
one continuous act, to begin in the port of New York, to be
chiefly performed on the high seas, and to end at the port
of Liverpool. The facts that the goods are to be delivered
at Liverpool, and the freight and primage, therefore, payable
there in sterling currency, do not make the contract an
English contract, or refer to the English law the question
of the liability of the carrier for the negligence of the master
and crew in the course of the voyage." 12
High Court, Chancery Division, South African Breweries,
Ltd. v. King [1899] 2 Ch. 173, 177, per Kekewich, J. The
contract of employment was executed and intended, though
not exclusively, to be performed in the South African Republic. "That, however, is not all. Many other considerations
require attention." The defendant, an Englishman, had been
and was residing in Johannesburg, and intended it to be his
place of business, and therefore of residence. The successive
u Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1888) I29 U. S.
397, 458; see also Pritchard v. Norton (I882) I06 U. S. I24; Grand v. Livingston
(I896) 38 N.Y. Supp. 490, ajj'd (I899) ISS N.Y. 688, 53 N. E. I I25.
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employers of the defendant were English companies, resident
in England. Nevertheless, "it is not according to sound ideas
of business, convenience, or sense to say that a company
having a registered office with directors and secretary in
England, not, however, otherwise carrying on business here,
but carrying on business in South Africa, must be treated as
resident in England for the purpose of ascertaining whether
a contract entered into by them respecting their business in
South Africa was intended to be governed by English law or
the local law of that part of South Africa.... The stipulation
in question (restricting the defendant's business engagements
on the termination of the contract) has reference to South
Africa and not to England, where the defendant is free to
carry on business as he pleases. . . . This contract was not
intended to be governed and is not governed by English
law." Affirmed [1900] I Ch. 273, 275, per Lindley, M.R.:
It is doubtful whether the defendant had to act as brewer
and conduct his business in Natal or elsewhere in South
Africa besides Johannesburg. "However, be that as it may,
Johannesburg is the primary place to which this contract
refers.... That being so, and having regard to the fact that
the defendant was settled there at the time and that this
contract was entered into between him at Johannesburg and
the company's representative at Johannesburg, I think that
clause 8 (the stipulation in question) cannot possibly be
independent of the Transvaal Law."
German Supreme Court (October 29, 1927) II8 RGZ.
282, IPRspr. 1928 No. 6o. The author of a play, the composer of the music and the writer of the stage direction,
all conveyed their copyrights to an editor in Stuttgart, Germany. All three at the time of the contract clearly were
domiciled in Vienna, where they had also to perform their
own contractual obligations according to the purpose and
nature of the latter, and all arising legal disputes had to be
decided by the Viennese court. But the documents of the
contract showed only Stuttgart as the place of m:aking, which
was also the domicil of the publisher, and the only place
of his performance. The royalties due to the authors are
all expressed in German currency. It is of particular weight
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that in the present lawsuit both parties from the outset,
without expressing any doubt, invoked German law and
presently discussed the provisions of the German law on
literary property. Pondering these grounds of doubt results
in the assumption that the application of German law agrees
with the presumable intention of the parties to the contract;
it would be, in addition, the appropriate choice of law, if the
arguments pro and contra completely balanced each other. 13
Swiss Federal Tribunal (September 23, 1941) 67 BGE.
II 21 5. By an agreement with a New York bank, heading
a New York syndicate, the defendant Hungarian bank guaranteed that a certain credit granted by the syndicate to a
firm in Budapest would be repaid. The Federal Tribunal
declared the law of New York to be exclusively applicable,
on the following argument. As the Hungarian bank received
a commission, no emphasis is to be placed on the domicil
of the promisor as would be done in case of a surety. By
assuming a share in the risk of the transaction, the defendant
entered into close association with the New York syndicate.
The presumption is strong that the parties, and particularly
the bank leading the syndicate, intended to subject all internal relations to one uniform law rather than to the different laws of the various domicils of the participant firms. Such
a consideration must have seemed only natural to the defendant, an expert participant in international credit business.
Furthermore, the contract of guaranty is written in English.
The place of performance for the defendant's obligation
is New York, since the debtor had to pay in New York,
and so had the guarantor. Finally the money sums, throughout the transaction, are expressed in United States dollars. 14
Courts in most other countries use the same method. 11;
13
See also e.g., 68 RGZ. 205; 73 id. 388; 120 id. 72; 126 id. 206. The individual
decision in uS RGZ. 282 has been criticized by 2 FRANKENSTEIN 176 n. 179, and
BATIFFOL 183 n. 2.
14 See also 6r BGE. II r82.
15
See for Belgium: App. Liege (June 21, 1905) S.I907·4·2I, 23.
France: Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, 19Io) S.I9II.I.129, Clunet 1912, IIS6; (May JI,
1932) D.1993.I.I69; (May 15, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1935, 341; Cass. (req.) (Nov. 2,
1937) Nouv. Revue 1937, 766.
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (Oct. 19, 1915) W. 9937; Hof den Haag
(Dec. 10, 1920) N.J. (1921) 1089.
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2.

"Objective" Theory

In most contracts, there is no agreement of the parties on
choice of law. Insofar, in fact, "intention is a misnomer." 16
As the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which has repeatedly
professed its inclination to follow the law intended by the
parties, 11 has stated:
"In a search for the actual intent of the parties when
none is expressed, there is an element of legal jugglery.
Usually parties to transactions ... , referable to one state
or another, or in part to one state and in part to another,
have no unexpressed but actual intent as to the law which
shall control. The question of what law governs does not
suggest itself to them." 18
What courts in reality look for, is a suitable local connection of the contract with a country. Presumed intention is no
actual intention. Westlake has contributed much to this view
by advocating that a contract should be governed by the law
with which it has the most real connection. 19 However, the
contrast between this objective and the subjective method
should not be exaggerated. Also, the inquiry required by both
opinions follows strikingly similar methods, though the objective approach does not purport to read the minds of the
parties on "contingencies which escaped their notice," 20 but
seeks the law suitable to their stipulations. The above examples of reasoning may be read without any substantial
change also in this sense.
The German Reichsgericht has sometimes consciously lent
the "objective" approach its proper color by using the term
familiar to German jurisprudence, "suppletive construction"
of the contract, which is approximately the same as the
16 5TUMBERG 236 n. 49·
17 Thomson-Houston Electric

Co. v. Palmer (1893) 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W. I 137;
cj. McCLINTOCK, IO Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 498 at 503.
18 Green v. Northwestern Trust Co. (19I4) 128 Minn. 30, 36, ISO N. W. 229, 231.
U WESTLAKE§ 212.
20 DICEY 719.
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method of implying stipulations. 21 While pure "interpretation" attempts to discover the true meaning of an existing
declaration, constructive analysis may add by implication
to an incomplete declaration what the parties would or
should have agreed, being honest and prudent people, or
what an ordinarily prudent man would have declared upon
reasonable and fair consideration of all circumstances.
The objective approach has been enacted into law by
Poland and Czechoslovakia; 218 these statutes have improved
it by establishing certain types of contracts and determining
the law of the characteristic obligation in each class.
3· Rationale
Although at present the literature seems to prefer the
"objective" approach, a distinguished author 22 defends the
subjective formulation because of its suggestive power; it
reminds the judge that he should distinctly envisage the two
concrete persons at the time of contracting. No doubt also
American courts by visualizing the parties and their situation, are aided in the effort to overcome stereotyped rules
such as that of the lex loci contractus. Other writers, however, have pointed to the danger of judges disregarding, in
a strained search for individual mentalities, the type of the
contract so important in the eyes of businessmen. 23
We may set aside such imponderables and also disregard
positive legal complications, such as those occurring when in
Germany the Supreme Court reviews a statement by the
lower court of an objective rule but not of a presumed intention because the latter is a mere fact. 24
21
RG. Guly 5, 1910) 74 RGZ. 171, 174. Suppletive construction of a contract
should serve to fill a gap in the contract, not to enlarge the scope of the contract,
87 RGZ. 2II; 136 id. 176, rSs; r6o id. r87.
21
• Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, §§ 44-46.
Poland: Law of 1926 on private international law, arts. 8-9.
22
M. WoLFF, IPR. 142. See also HAUDEK ro6.
23 RAAPE, IPR. 441.
24
RG. Qan. 27, 1928) 120 RGZ. 71, 73; MELCHIOR 513.
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What it means that the parties "contemplated" a certain
law in making the contract, should not be difficult to understand, as parallels are numerous. Anglo-American common
law makes the seller of goods liable for "special" damage
caused by his failure to perform, to the extent that the parties
"contemplated" or could foresee the circumstances causing
the damage. The seller has to compensate the buyer's loss of
gain by resale, if resale was contemplated in contracting, that
is, if both parties would have affirmed this liability, had they
been asked during negotiations. The pertinent question in
such a case is whether, at the time of the making of the contract, it must have been in the contemplation of the parties
that the goods contracted for might be25 resold by the buyer.
To this method of inquiry, it has been objected that parties
making a contract think of performance rather than of breach
of contract. To this the celebrated author of the British Sales
of Goods Act replied:
"But the answer is this. The liability to pay damages for
breach of contract is an obligation annexed by law independently of the volition of the parties, and the criterion
is necessarily an objective one. What the parties themselves
may have contemplated is immaterial. The question is what
a reasonable man with their common knowledge would
contemplate as a probable consequence of the breach if he
applied his mind to it. The same result will be arrived
at if the supposed contemplation of the parties be wholly
eliminated." 26
This is practically identical with the provision in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts:
"In awarding damages, compensation is given for only
those injuries that the defendant had reason to foresee as a
probable result of his breach when the contract is made.... " 27
26

Hall, Ltd. v. Pim Jr. and Co., Ltd. (1927) 33 Com. Cas. 324-H. L.
CHALMERs, The Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 54·
27 § 330. See Mr. Justice Holmes in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co.
(1902) 190 u. s. 540, 543·
26
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Indeed, the Restaters, very accurately, have pointed out
that the requirement of foreseeability does not really depend on a previous consideration of a possible violation of
contract, or on a tacit promise of compensation for it, but on
the construction of the contract. 28 In this purified form, the
common law principle is able to become the basis of a satisfactory general theory deriving the obligations of the parties
from the purpose of the contract. 29
In the same manner, the judicial standard for selecting
the law is that of a man of average intelligence and knowledge such as is required in the profession or commerce of
either party, who weighs the relative importance of all surrounding circumstances and the stipulations adopted.
The usual formula may mislead a judge into substituting
the purpose of one party for the purpose of the contract. Or
the inquiry into the probable intention of the parties may
fail because each party is supposed to have differently conceived of the legal background. Frequently, in our day, one
party prevails and drafts the contract or dictates the use of a
blank. The Continental doctrine realistically concludes that
the law at the domicil of this dominant contractant may be
deemed to be chosen. Courts in this country are instinctively
reluctant to increase his predominance by favoring his law.
The latter view rests on considerations of public policy alien
to our present problem; but, similarly, if a court applies the
law of a carrier, bank, or mail-order house rather than that
of the customer, this choice of law does not depend on any
contemplation of the individual parties, but on the social and
economic circumstances.
Another dubious feature in the traditional approach is
the emphasis laid on too many "criteria" or "indicia." The
judge is induced to consider a mass of irrelevant detailswhat bearing, after all, has the use of English language in
28
29

Restatement, Law of Contracts § 510.
RABEL, 1 Das Recht des Warenkaufs 484, 495ff.
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a contract written in New York? He is beset by unnecessary
doubts and tempted to weigh mechanically the various elements, rather than to ascertain the most characteristic local
contact.
Conclusion. In conclusion, the task of the court is this: it
has, in the absence of an agreement, first, to state whether
the individual facts of the contract are colored by a certain
law; if not, second, whether the contract belongs to a class
typically centering in a certain country. This inquiry has to
be done in full consideration of the circumstances personal
and economical, but without inferring judicial or state polictes.
II. GENERAL RULES

r. Prima Facie Rules
The English proper law theory has developed certain
presumptions or prima facie rules, ordinarily in former times
in favor of the lex loci contractus, and in specific types of
cases in favor of the lex loci solutionis, or the law of the flag,
or the "most effective" law. 30 Similar methods prevail on
the Continent in case investigation into the circumstances
fails to reveal a presumable intention. In France and many
other countries, the presumption for the law of the place
where the contract is made, continues stronger than in England. In Germany and numerous other jurisdictions, following Savigny, the parties are presumed to have in view the
law of the place of performance. In some countries, the fact
that the parties have a common nationality or domicil constitutes a presumption prevailing over all others. 31
3° CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 259-269 (in his latest edition, the author opposes any presumptions, p. 2II); DICEY 738, rule 148 sub-rule 3·
31 Czechoslovakia: Law on private international law of 1948, § 46 No. 5 (common
do:nicil, if none of the four enumerated types of cases is present).
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (1942) art. 25 par. r (common nationality).
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 (common domicil, if none of the seven enumerated
types of contracts is present).
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The "presumption" in all these cases is meant as a guide
for the judge, as a starting point and a subsidiary help. The
court may or may not resort to it. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has once, facing an inflexible conception of lex loci
solutionis, declared that the presumption is rebuttable
through clear, though not necessarily direct, evidence to the
contrary. 32 But the danger is great that the easy way of the
presumption may be followed in neglect of the purpose of
the individual contract. As a matter of fact, in many jurisdictions the presumption has slowly turned into a rigid,
though merely subsidiary, rule.
It is wise, therefore, always to remember how artificial
all these presumptions are. As Lord Wright has recalled for
English law:
"English law in deciding these matters has refused to treat
as conclusive rigid or arbitrary criteria such as lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis and has treated the matter as
depending on the intention of the parties to be ascertained
in each case on a considetation of the terms of the contract,
the situation of the parties and generally on all the surrounding facts. " 83
2.

Rigid General Rules

Rigid general rules have developed, as by transformation
from original presumptions, also in the absence of an ascertainable intention, or when party autonomy was entirely repudiated. The most pronounced instance of all-inclusive general rules without any regard to party intentions appears in
the Restatement. 34 The same system may also be regarded as
C6digo Bustamante, art. I 86.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 7 par. I (common nationality).
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, § 13 par. I.
32 D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (I9I4) ISS Wis. 541, S44,
14S N. W. 372, 373·
38 Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and General
Mutual Life Assurance Society, Ltd. [1938] A. C. 224, 240.
34
§§ 332, 333·
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dominant m the Scandinavian countries35 and most LatinAmerican jurisdictions. 36
Such rigidity deprives the courts of the flexibility enjoyed
by American courts under the proper law theory, when they
want to escape an inherited lex loci contractus, and by German courts, when feeling the need of a corrective to the
lex loci solutionis.
3. "No Rule"
In opposition to the mechanical working of conflicts rules
purporting to include all obligatory contracts, a few writers
have proclaimed that no fixed principle should govern contracts in generaP 7 It has been replied that this proposal itself contains a general principle,S 8 viz., that of an individualized choice of law. 39 This principle comes near in effect to the
English doctrine of proper law, which avoids tying a court
"down to any rigid presumption."40
4· The Most Characteristic Connection
Looking back on the tortuous development of doctrine, we
see distinctly that Savigny's main principle, in the form given
to it by Westlake and modernized again in our times, has
gained supremacy. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, improving
its older formulas, has formally declared that the effects of
35 Sweden: 7 Repert. 136 No. ws; for elastic solutions, however, the modern
literature, MrcHAELI, Internationales Privatrecht gemass schwedischem Recht
und schwedischer Rechtsprechung (1948) 296; KARLGREN, Kortfattad Larobok i
Internationell Privat-och Processratt (1950) 95 ff.; NrAL 28-45.
Norway: 6 Repert. 578 No. 147
Contra Denmark: BoRUM 147 ff.; ¢stre Landsret (March 26, 1953) (U.f.R. 1954,
359, 20 Z.ausl.PR. (1955) 508.
16 See supra pp. 372ff.
37
See Draft, RoouiN, Actes de Ia Jeme Conference de Ia Haye (1900) 62 art.
5 par. 3; ]ITTA, 2 La substance des obligations (1907) 509, 515.
ss NoLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) 119.
39
See among others, 2 BAR 23; RoLIN, 32 Annuaire (1925) 96, 117, 513; LEWALD
197 No. 257; NussBAUM, IPR. (ed. 1) 221, 226; BATIFFOL 73 § So; RAAPE, D.
IPR. (ed. 1) 263.
40 Words of DICEY (ed. s) 962.
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contracts should be governed by the law having the closest
local relation with the contract. 41 In the frequent case of several substantial or even vital local connections of a contract,
the degree of proximity may be hard to analyze. But it should
always be possible to discover the most characteristic connection of an individual contract and, certainly, that of the usual
types of business contracts. 418
This, in the opinion of the writer, is the direction in which
all efforts ought to be concentrated.
We are now prepared to survey the main contacts selected either on the strength of a presumption or in virtue of
a specific rule. That their importance as general devices is
entirely questionable, is a foregone conclusion from the preceding discussion. The particulars, however, are significant.

B.

CoNTACTS

I. HISTORICAL NOTE

The statutists, in the manner of their time, exploited a
few fragments of Justinianus' Digest. The "lex contraxisse"
was the text most frequently cited:
D. 44, 21, Julianus lib. III. ad Minicium. Contraxisse
unus quisque in eo loco intellegitur, in quo ut solveret se
obligavit. This is commonly understood as meaning: every
one is deemed to have contracted at the place where he
should perform according to his promise (and not: where
he promised the performance).
The jurist did not speak of the applicable law but probably, as other passages do, of jurisdiction in the case of bankruptcy proceedings which were alternatively at the domicil
of the debtor or at the place where he had failed to satisfy
41

BGE.: 6o II 300; 63 II 385; 67 II 179, r8r ("constant practice").
a New York: "Center of gravity," Auten v. Auten (1954) 308 N.Y. 155, 124
N.E. (2d) 99i Global Commerce Corp. v. Clark-Babbitt Industries, Inc. (1956) 239
F(zd) 716. 2 ScHNITZER 639 ff.
41
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the creditor. 42 Whether generally a creditor was entitled to
sue in contract at the forum solutionis, as is commonly believed, 43 seems not certain.
Another basic text of the statutists, the "lex si fundus," 44
refers exclusively to the interpretation of a sale of land, and
states that the obligation of warranty is that customary in
the region.
It is interesting to note that the Romans in reality did not
consider the problem and that the confusion clouding the
matter was started by the earlier statutists. 45 Bartolus himself knew of the two kinds of "locus contractus," ever since
in the mind of writers, and understood both fragments mentioned as referring to the place where the promisor has obligated himself, that is, where the contract is made, locus ubi
est celebratus contractus, while locus in quem collata est
solutio, the place of performance, figures in a rule which
he deduced from other passages. To harmonize these conflicting rules, he distinguished the rights deriving from the
contract at its origin (quae oriuntur secundum ipsius contractus naturam tempore contractus), from the effects of subsequent events, such as the consequences of nonperformance
or default (quae oriuntur ex post facto propter negligentiam
et moram).
The first were to be governed by the law of the place
where the contract was celebrated; the second by the law of
the specific place of performance, because the default occurred

s.

• 2 See LENEL, Palingenesia Juris Romani, sub: Julianus 862; Dig. 42,
I and 3
(Gaius 23 ad ed. prov.); Gaius Inst. 3, 79· Other texts are mentioned by SAVIGNY
2II § 370 n. (c); LENEL, 27 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung, Romanistische
Abteilung (1906) 74·
43 BETHMANN-HoLLWEG, 2 Zivilprozess (1865) 126fT.; L. WENGER, Institutionen
des Riimischen Zivilprozesses (1925) (Engl. trans!. (1940) Institutes of the Roman
Law of Civil Procedure) § 4 n. 6o.
u Dig. 2I, 2, 6 (Gaius IO ad ed. prov.); cj. Dig. so, 17, 34 (Ulpianus 45 ad
Sabinum).
ts BARTOLUS, I. I C. deS. Trinitate I.I, §§ I3-I8; cj. WAECHTER, 25 Arch. Civ.
Prax. (I842) 42; I LAINE 135.
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there; or if this place were not specified, by the law of the
forum. In the fifteenth century, Paulus de Castro46 added a
basic argument for the law of the place of contracting:
Quia talis contractus dicitur ibi nasci ubi nascitur, et, sicut
persona ratione ongmts ligatur a statutis loci originis, ita
et actus.
The law under which a contract is created, is its natural
statute, quite as a person is bound by the law of the place
of his origin!
These conceptions were maintained, developed, and modified by subsequent generations of jurists and reappear astonishingly well preserved in the doctrines of Beale.
I I. LAW OF THE PLACE OF CONTRACTING

1.

To Govern the Entire Contract

By logical necessity. Canonists as early as about I200
A.D., and statutists from the fifteenth century, have regarded the law of the place where a contract is "celebrated"
as naturally governing. 47 The variants of this school became
numerous, and Anglo-American conflicts law has experienced
the tenacity of that radical branch of opinion conceiving a
contract "born" in and created by the sovereign of the territory where the parties agree. It is well known that in the
Virginia Convention, when a member asked which state determines a contract, Marshall replied that this was decided
according to the laws of the state where the contract was
made, and those laws only. 48 In a celebrated English case of
49
I 86 5,
the rule of lex loci contractus was still based on the
48

Paul. de Castro ad I. Si fundus, Dig.

21, 2,

6.

25 Arch.
Civ. Prax. (r842) 42.
48 ELLIOT, 3 Debates on the Federal Constitution (ed. 2 Philadelphia I866) ss6.
49 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (r865) 3 Moo.
P. C. Cas. (N. S.) 272, 290.
n NEUMEYER, 2 Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 84, 135ff.; WAECHTER,
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thesis that domiciled persons are subjects of the territorial
compulsory power of the sovereign and temporary residents
also owe him allegiance. For a long time writers of international law have invoked Ulric Huber's deduction from
the principle of territorialism, that the lex loci contractus is
endowed with extraterritorial authority. 50 The axioms of
Dicey and Beale stemmed from the same roots.
By presumed intention. Although, in the doctrine of
Dumoulin, Boullenois, and Bouhier, the law of the place of
contracting lost its leading role which was taken by the intention of the parties, the same result still obtained in the
absence of contrary evidence by general presumption. 51
At present, the lex loci contractus, as a general rule by
virtue of a rebuttable presumption de facto, continues to
apply in France/ 2 Belgium, 53 Argentina, 54 Spain, 55 and other
countries/; 6 while the Dutch courts57 are as much divided as
the American. It is also sometimes claimed that it remains
the primary contact in England, where no other law is inIO HuBER, De conflictu legum XV, cj. v (in SAVIGNY, tr. Guthrie, SIS, Sio);
see WHEATON, International Law {ed. Carnegie Endowment I936) I2S § 90;
TAYLOR, International Public Law {I9oi) § I70.
61 See DICEY 738, rule I48 sub-rule 3; 2 BEALE I0901f.; BATIFFOL 22, 3S·
62 Cass. {civ.) {Dec. S, I9IO) S.I9II.I.I29.
63 Trib. com. Anvers {Dec. IS, I904) Revue I907, 970; Trib. civ. Anvers {May I4,
I926) Jur. Port Anvers I926, I32, I36; PouLLET 343 § 299·
64 Argentina: C. C. art. I205 (I239) regarded as representing the principle,
see 3 VIco I22 § I37; RoMERO DEL PRADO, 2 Manual 343 notes that the codifier
has followed STORY §§ 242, 28o; GoLDSCHMIDT, 2 Sistema 489.
65 Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, 6 Repert. 257 No. I24 par. 2. See, however, GoLDSCHMIDT,
2 Sistema 82 If., 457·
16 Denmark: As a limited rule, see BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 224.
Italy: For civil contracts on the basis of Disp. Prel. I865, art. 9 § 2: App. Trieste
(Jan. 7, I937) Riv. Dir. Com. I937 II S47; Disp. Prel. I942, art. 25, which are
probably to be understood to apply a factual presumption.
C6digo Bustamante, art. I 86, at least nominally speaks of lex loci contractus,
if the parties are of different nationalities, as a presumption; it seems, however,
that no counterproof is allowed, see art. I 84 par. 2, which substitutes the criteria
of art. I 86 for the tacit intention of the parties.
67 The Netherlands: See for the cases, VAN HASSELT 176 and Supplement 4S·
The attempt by KosTERS 774 to base the lex loci contractus rule on art. I382 of the
Civil Code prescribing construction of contracts according to the local customs,
has been abandoned by the author himself in Themis I926, 48o; cj. E. M. MEIJERS,
Note inN. J. (I927) 323.
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tended or presumed, and this seems true in the Dominions. 58
But it may be doubted whether the law of the place of performance has not in fact won precedence in the favor of the
English courts. 59
By fixed conflicts rule. On this historical background in
many countries the lex loci contractus has become the law
generally applicable to contracts, either as a subsidiary rule in
the absence of contrary intention of the parties or even with
higher pretensions. The list of codes thus providing is long. 60
58 England: CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 26I principally alleges Peninsular and Oriental
Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (I865) 3 Moo. P. C. Cas. (N. S.) per Turner, L. J.,
272, 290 and another case, both of which, however, deal with transportation; in the
latest edition (ed. 4, 208), the author opposes any presumption.
Canada: The principle is confirmed in Bondholders Securities Corp. v. Manville
(Sask.) [I9331 4 D. L. R. 699; Comm. Corp. Securities, Ltd. v. Nichols (Sask.)
[I93313 D. L. R. 56 (bills and notes); see also 3 JoHNSON 457 n. I and the Digests.
South Africa: De Wet v. Browning (I930) S. A. L. R. Transvaal Prov. Div. 409
(sale of land, laesio enormis).
59 See RABEL and RAISER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 66; BATIFFOL 90 § 99·
60 Georgia: C. Ann. (I955) § Io2-108 (8) first sentence.
Austria: C. C. §§ 36, 37 with exceptions.
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. I I par. 2.
Brazil: C. Com. art. 424, replaced by Law No. 2044, of Dec. 3I, 1908, art. 47;
for bills of exchange, generalized by the doctrine, see BEV1LAQUA (ed. 3) 365;
C. C. Introd. (I9I6) art. I3 par. I; Introd. Law (I942) art. 9·
Bulgaria: See MAKAROV, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 66o.
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23 par. r.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 7 par. I.
Czechoslovakia: Int. Priv. Law, § 46 No. 5·
Egypt: C. C. (I948) art. I9 par. I.
French Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. 13 par. 2.
Guatemala: Law of Foreigners of 1936, art. 24 sent. I.
Iran: C. C. art. 968.
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (I865) art. 9 par. 2; (I942) art. 25; former C. Com. art. 58.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 7 par. 2.
Panama: C. Com. art. 6 (I) not altered by C6digo Bustamante in relation to
the United States, see EDER, I5 Tul. L. Rev. (1941) 52I at 524 n. 283.
Peru: C. C. (I936) art. VII.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 Nos. I, 2.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 4 § I.
Quebec: C. C. art. 8.
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, § 13 par. r.
Soviet Russia: Codes of Civil Procedure, art. 7, cf. STOUPNITSKI, 7 Repert. r I4
Nos. I 56, I 57; RASHBA, "Settlement of Disputes in Commercial Dealings with the
Soviet Union," 45 Col. L. Rev. (I945) 530, 552; PrsAR, 70 Harv. L. Rev. (1956/57)
593, 633; RAMZAITSEV, Rev. Crit. 1958, 459 at 469.
Spanish Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. 20.
Syria: C. C. (I949) art. 20 par. r.
Uruguay: C. C. art. 2399·
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That this favor has been so tenaciously granted to a device
of very difficult application, must have been aided by the universal acceptance of the same law to control the formalities
of contracts. In Lorenzen's opinion, the American law has
never adopted that distinction between form and substance in
contracts, by which in the Continental doctrine the old adage,
locus regit actum, was confined to formalities. 61 A modern
writer has directly accused the rule prescribing the law of the
place of contracting for all contracts as arising out of a confusion between form and content. 62
The Soviet codes of civil procedure prescribe with very
cautious words that the court should "consider" the law of the
place in a foreign country where contracts and documents
have been made. The more recent Ukranian version is more
categoric on this point. But writers have seen in this hint
not a conflicts rule but an advice that Soviet law is controlling
in every single case. 63
2.

To Govern the Making of Contracts

The old doctrine expressed by Bartolus has produced various theories, splitting the problems of contracts into origin
and subsequent events. 64 Story611 and Savigny,66 however,
repudiated these efforts by adopting an all-inclusive law of
the contract and in this respect were followed by the great
et LoRENZEN, JO Yale L. J. (19:21) 655 at 664.
62 RocurN, Actes de Ia 3eme Conference de Ia Haye (rgoo) 62.
13 KELMANN, Int. Jahrb. Schiedsger. Wesen (1928) 84 n. 34; MAKAROV, Precis
299 (slightly more optimistic in assuming resemblance to a conflicts rule). RSFSR,
Code of Civil Procedure (1923) art. 7; Ukraine, Code of Civil Procedure (1929)
art. 9· See also the provisions in treaties on the status of Soviet trade delegations
abroad, supra p. 375 n. 6r. For genuine conflicts rule authors cited supra n. 6o.
64 BuRGUNous, Tractatus 4 Nos. 7, ro, 29; BouLLENOis, Traite de Ia personnalite
et de Ia realite des loix (1766) Vol. II, 451; CASAREGIS, Discursos legales de commercia, Disc. 179 §§ 561f. P. VoET, De statutis eorumque concursu, sect. 9 cap. II
No. 12 (SAVIGNY, tr. Guthrie, 490); Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht I, 5 § 256/f.
For refutation: WAECHTER, 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. {1842) 41; GUTZWILLER r6ro.
66 STORY § 280, as he thought, in conformity with the Roman law.
66 SAVIGNY § 372, tr. Guthrie 225, although his method of treating the Roman
sources is not approved at present.
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majority of scholars. Nevertheless, some writers in the nineteenth century returned to the method of dividing contracts
into two parts. 67 The formulas were varying, but none was
in precise terms. The leading idea seemed to be that the
local law of the place of contracting should govern the legal
effects naturally arising from, and inherent in, the contract,
or believed to be positively intended by the parties. This reasoning still clung to the belief that these "effects" necessarily
grow out of the local law. These are contrasted with "suites"
of the contract, i. e., the influence of more remote or unforeseen events, such as acts of God, new legislation, insolvency, illness, impossibility, or any cause of nonperformance,
including the problems of fault, default, and damages as well
as the ratification of a void contract. These ulterior influences on the contract are deemed subject to the law of the
places either where performance was due, or where the
events occur. Again, this theory has been decisively criticized.
"Consequences, effects, suites: these three words appear
synonymous to us." 68 But strong remnants of the old bisection are to be found in court decisions and in the teachings
of Minor and Beale. 69 The Restatement, unfortunately, has
solemn!y proclaimed this very approach ( § 3 3 '2).
While American courts, however, pay no more than lip
service to this theory, in Switzerland the original idea has
been fully received by the Federal Tribunal. Until recently
this court subjected, by imperative rule, all problems connected with the creation of contracts to the law of the place
67 I FoELIX § I09; VALERY 987 § 685; I FIORE§§ 119, I2I and in 20 Annuaire
(I904) I76; in Spain: MANRESA, r Comentarios COd. Civ. Esp., art. II § IX;
VALVERDE, I Trat. Der. Civ. (ed. 3) 129; FoELIX's doctrine has impressed PHILLIMORE, 4 International Law §§ 709ff.
68 AssER-CoHN 46; AssER-RIVIER 8I § 37 (sometimes erroneously cited as
follower of FoELix); SuRVILLE 355, 357; liARBURGER, 19 Annuaire (I902) I37;
RocuiN, id. (I904) 77; RoLIN, id. (I9Q6) I99; DESPAGNET 897 § 303; NoLDE,
Revue 1926, 448.
69 MrNOR 401; 2 Beale 1199 § 346.1. Contra: see BATIFFOL 69 § 77·
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where they were made. 70 The "effects" of the contract are left
to the intention of the parties and subsidiarily to the law of
the place of performance.

Illustration. Where a dye firm in Milan sent an agent
to ZUrich to buy dyes, the Federal Tribunal determined
under Swiss law the question whether the firm or the agent
was the party to the contract, and under Italian law whether
the buyer was entitled to reject the merchandise. 71
The Swiss literature, once divided on this question/ 2 has
influenced the recent reversal of the Federal TribunaF2 a
restoring accord with the general opinion. It is true that
the Supreme Court of the United States once also, in r875,
pronounced the rule that the formation and validity of
contracts follow the lex loci contractus while matters regarding performance are subject to the lex loci solutionis. 78 This
leading case has had some following but has been regularly
disregarded by the Supreme Court itself. The German
Reichsgericht has occasionally used arguments of this kind
in case of a mistake made in applications for insurance. 74

Impracticability of the division. While the various approaches resulting in bisecting the development of the contract produce somewhat different disadvantages, their com70 Supra pp. 398-399. For the purpose of the special case concerning the extent
of authority of an agent making the contract, the Federal Tribunal expressed the
rule in the form that the conflicts rule of the place of contracting determines whether
the contract is perfected. BG. (Dec. 14, 1920) 46 BGE. II 490, 494·
71 BG. (March 5, 1923) 49 BGE. II 70. See also the proposals by LAPAJNE,
4 Bl. IPR. (1929) 65.
72 FRITZSCHE, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1925) 229a, 245a, 257a; SAUSER-HALL,
id. 298a, 319a; OsER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allg. Einleitung LIV § 51; 2 ScHNITZER
(ed. 3) 574 (strongly disapproving); HANS-WERNER WIDMER, Die Bestimmung des
massgeblichen Rechts im int. Vertragsrecht (Ziircher Studien zum Int. Recht, Heft
9) (1944) 102 (disapproving). MosER, Vertragsabschluss, Vertragsgiiltigkeit und
Parteiwille im internationalen Obligationenrecht (1948) 2o6; KNAPP, 5 Schwz.
Jahrb. (1948) 83-II6; NIEDERER 21!.
72
• BG. (Feb. 12, 1952) 78 BGE. II 74, 83.
73 Scudder v. Union National Bank (1875) 91 U.S. 4o6.
74
RG. (Dec. 4, 1926) JW, 1927, 693; (Dec. 23, 1931) IPRspr. 1932, 61 No. 30.
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mon idea is inadequate. A conflicts rule concerned with validity or formation must include the extent of the obligation
created, as Beale has conceded. But there is no consistent
dividing line possible between the extent of a contractual
obligation and its performance. Both together form the purpose of the contract and are its very core. Whether an event
making performance impossible or onerous frees the debtor
from his entire duty, or only from paying damages, or not
at all, is determined by the distribution of effort and risk
implied in the contract. 75
This is true of the civil law systems, in which specific performance is the object not only of the obligation but also of
the judgment in case of breach. It is equally true in common
law, although merely the duty to pay damages for nonperformance is enforced. For it is always the contractual
promise that creates the primary object of the obligation. 76
3· American Law
Surveys covering cases in the United States are unanimous
in stating that validity of contracts is tested in the courts by
varying criteria. 77 In Beale's own statistics of 1910, only a
minority of six states professed to follow the place of contracting rule. 78 In 1 934, he claimed that under the influence
of the Restatement drafts the number of these states had increased to eleven certain and eleven other dubious states, 79
but these statements have been criticized in several respects. 80
On the basis of recent observations, we ought to be aware of
76

For consequences, see infra pp. 531, 537, 542, 577-578.
See BucKLAND, "The Nature of Contractual Obligation," 8 Cambr. L. J.
(1944) 247, against Holmes.
77 See 2 BEALE 1077; GooDRICH § no; STUMBERG 225-240; RoBERTSON, Characterization I76; IS C.]. S. ConflictofLaws (I939) §II; II Am. Jur. (I937) 397 § u6.
76 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (19I0) I94 at 207.
79 2 BEALE I I72 and I 173 with respect to a doubtful presumption for this law
in New York.
so See in particular BATIFFOL 87 § 96; NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 892, 901ff.
76
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the fact that the cases in which courts have resorted to this
rule, pertain to at least four groups.
(i) In the majority of the cases, no problem is presented,
particularly when the place of contracting and that of performance, or the former and the domicil of the parties are
situated in the same jurisdiction, and no other connection
competes in significance. 81
(ii) In other cases the contract is made in a jurisdiction
where also some other element considered determinative
occurs, although performance and domicil of one, or even
of both parties may be elsewhere. For instance, contracts of
carriers are ordinarily subjected to the law of the place where
the contract is made and the transport begins. 82
(iii) Not infrequently, lip service is paid to the place of
making rule, while in fact a quite different law is applied. 83
(iv) The rule is mechanically applied without appreciable discernment in a considerable number of cases. Moreover, it is not the habit of the courts when they apply the
law of the place of contracting to a problem of validity, to
decide whether the same law would apply also to other
contractual problems. And conflicts respecting validity are
in an overwhelming majority in this country, a phenomenon
obviously caused by the differences of statutes in such matters as statute of frauds, usury, exemption from liability, or
Sunday laws, in contrast to the uniformity of the common law
rules on performance.
All this warns strongly against Beale's statistical estimates.
Not only is the exclusive force of his validity rule inconsistent with the existing law but its significance for the development of the practice is greatly overestimated. Scholars
of such intimate knowledge of the decisions as Lorenzen and
Batiffol conclude that, whenever the choice between con81 MuELLER, 8 Z.ausi.PR. (1934)
81 BATIFFOL 239 § 267.
83

r;/., e.g., infra pp. 46of., 464.
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tracting and performance has become material, the latter has
been emphasized by the courts. 84
4· Determination of the Place of Contracting
Where is the place of contracting? Which law has to govern this question? We do not share the opinion of an old
Canadian case that "the question as to what country is the
locus contractus in each particular case is not a question of
foreign law, it is a question of fact." 85 Without exhausting
the much debated matter, we ought to mention a few delicate points.
Contracts between absent persons. The present municipal
laws are notoriously in disagreement on the question at
which moment a contract in the making by correspondence86
emerges from preliminary negotiations. At common law, a
contract is considered executed as soon as the addressee of
an offer dispatches his acceptance (theory of expedition, mailbox-theory, Vbermittlungs-Theorie). Civil law countries are
divided in their adherence to the following views: that acceptance must only be declared (theory of declaration, Aeusserungs-Theorie); or must arrive at the offeror's address
(theory of arrival, Zugangs- T heorie); or must be received
by him (theory of reception, Empfangs-Theorie); or must
come to his knowledge (theory of information, V ernehmungs-Theorie ). It is by no means settled that all these
views of the time when negotiations arrive at the stage of
binding force, justify conclusions on the question at what
place a contract is made. But generally this seems to be taken
for granted. If so, it is important which law is decisive to
84 LoRENZEN, JO yale L. J. (1921) 565 at 578; BATIFFOL § 96. We shall have to
make our own remarks at a later juncture.
85 Cloyes v. Chapman (1876) 27 U. C. C. P. 22, JI.
86 For comparative law, see RABEL, I Recht des Warenkaufs 69-108; Institut
International de Rome pour !'Unification du Droit Prive, De Ia formation des
contrats entre absents. Etude Preliminaire (mimeographed) S. d. N.-U. D. P.
1935, Etude XVI.
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answer the question where "the place of contracting" IS.
(There arises, of course, the other problem whether a contract is created at all, but this will be discussed later.)

Illustration. In 1913, when Trieste was Austrian, an insurance company domiciled in that city concluded contracts
by a general representative in Tunis, on the basis of "gold
francs." In I 934, after the various currency depreciations,
Italian courts having to decide on the amount of the insurance
claim, followed the conflicts rule of the Austrian Civil Code
( §§ 3 6, 3 7) which refers to the law of the place of contracting. Although the construction of these provisions is
doubtful, it was assumed that a contract is concluded under
Austrian civil law by information to the offeror and under
Austrian commercial law sometimes by information and
in other cases by expedition of the acceptance, while it was
believed that under French law applicable in Tunisia, declaration of acceptance was decisive (which is doubtful, too).
The Italian courts, for the purpose of applying the Austrian
place of making rule, attempted to ascertain the location of
this place under the lex fori, which meant in this case the
Austrian Commercial Code and, consequently, held the contract to have been perfected by delivery of the policy through
the agent in Tunis. Therefore, French municipal law was
to govern the money problem. 87
The method, hence, is the same as that used in ascertaining
jurisdiction. Supposing a court has jurisdiction to judge a
breach of contract only if the breach occurs in its district, an
ordinary simple case is decided as follows:
Plaintiff resided in Ontario but carried on business in
Montreal. He sold this business to the defendant; the
agreement was executed by plaintiff in Toronto, sent to
defendant in Montreal, and signed by him there. The
Ontario court held that the execution in Montreal completed
87 App. Trieste~(Jan. 25, 1934) 2"Recueil general relatif au droit international
(ed. Lapradelle) 1935·3.101. Cj. for nearly identical facts, but decided under the
Italian conflicts rule with the same result: Trib. Rome (Oct. 5, 1951) Foro Ita!.
1952 I 386, Revue Crit. 1953, 128.
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the contract, hence the Quebec law applied to the effect that
the place of payment was at the domicil of the debtor. Therefore, the breach of contract took place in Quebec, and the
Ontario court had no jurisdiction. 88
This astonishing game of lawyer's niceties may, in this
case, rest on the unexpressed background that an Ontario
court does not want unnecessarily to interfere with the sale
of a business in Quebec. This, in fact, would furnish a wise
rule. But embarrassment is the daily characteristic of the
prevailing approach.
Every court using this method applies its own domestic
theory. An English court will stress the place where the
letter of acceptance is posted. 89 A Canadian will do likewise,
provided that this letter reaches the offeror. 90 It is true that
a merely casual mailing on a voyage need not necessarily be
accepted as decisive. 91 Numerous conflicts laws provide for
the same solution. 92 Belgian, Dutch, Italian, and Swiss courts
Phillips v. Malone (I90I) 3 0. L. R. 47, aff'd (I902) 3 0. L. R. 492 (D. C.)·
Benaim and Co. v. Debono [I924] A. C. 514, SI9; Muller & Co. v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners [I927] I K. B. 780, afj'd [I928] A. C. 4o-H. L.; WESTLAKE
§ 224.
A contract by telex communications, being an instantaneous communication, is
only perfected when the offeror receives the acceptance; this English rule was
applied to negotiations between England and the Netherlands, Entores v. Miles
Far East Corp. [I955l 2 Q.B. 327 (C.A.).
90 Magann v. Auger (I90I) 3I S. C. R. I86 applied to these problems, see cases
in 3 JoHNSON 670 n. I; Charlebois v. Baril [I927]3 D. L. R. 762.
91 CHESHIRE 226; 3 JoHNSON 473; MANN, IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I937)
(supra p. 397 n. I 8) at I04. CooK, Legal Bases 425 regards casual places of mailing
ruled out by the real meaning of the place of contracting, which he does not explain,
however. French courts resort to interpretation of the intention of the parties; see,
for instance, Trib. civ. Seine (July 5, I939) Revue Crit. I939, 450, Note, id. 456:
agreement between three German refugees in a hotel room in New York, German
law common to all applied. Compare the refusal to apply the lex loci contractus in
the case of a Sunday contract made in a hotel room of New York, Brown v. Gates
(I9o4) I2o Wis. 349, 97 N. W. 22I, infra Chapter 33, p. 566 n. 36.
Switzerland: BG. (July I2, I938) 64 BGE. II 46.
92 China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23.
Czechoslovakia: Law of I948 on private international law, § 46 No. S·
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9·
Poland: Law of I926 on private international law, art. 9 par. I.
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, § 13 par. 2.
88
89
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employ their own theories of reception 93 or information,94
and the French courts, being divided in the municipal
domain, follow each its usual view. 95
If the internal systems involved agree, some writers presume an implied agreement of the parties in favor of the law
thus indicated. 96
Proposals flowing from awareness of the international
purpose of conflicts law have either radically discarded the
role of "contracting" in case of correspondence, 97 or have
pointed rather to the place from which the first offer is sent,
the offer deserving preference over the acceptance as the
initial step and the basis of the contract. 98
United States. Characterization according to the lex fori
93 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (March 14, I924) Jur. Com. Brux. I924, I46; Trib.
com. Liege (Nov. I9, I926) Pasicrisie I927 III 69; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. I7,
I936) Jur. Com. Brux. I937, 93; noted Clunet I938, 359i App. Gand (March 3,
I949) J.d. Tr. I9SI, 448.
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 29, I947) N.J. I948 No. 6I9, Clunet
I9SO, 928.
Italy: (C. Com. art. 36): App. Milano {Dec. II, I888) Clunet I892, 512; (Disp.
Pre! (I86S) art. 9): Trib. Trento (June Io, I926) Monitore I926, 620, and with
respect to taking jurisdiction at the place where obligations originate, Cass. (Aug. 3,
I935) Rivista I935, 372, 374 {place where the offeror acquires knowledge of the
acceptance). Where no answer is requested, the place of acceptance is decisive,
App. Genova (Nov. 27, I906) Clunet I907, II99i Cass. Napoli (Sept. I8, I9I4)
Clunet I9IS, 703. The new Civil Code, art. I326 par. I requires knowledge of the
acceptance; applied by Cass. {May 3, I954) Foro I tal. I9S4 I 734, Rivista I95S, 94·
Switzerland: HeMBERGER, Obi. Vertrage 53; 2 ScHNITZER 622; NIEDERER, 59
Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 247.
9• KosTERS 763, 766.
95
SuRVILLE 340 n. 2, 34I; BACCARA, 5 Repert. 223 No. 26 (distinguishing four
systems); App. Rennes (Dec. IS, I89I) Clunet I892, 9I2 {theory of declaration of
the acceptance); App. Colmar (March II, I92S) Clunet I926, 4II {arrival of the
letter of acceptance; possibly following the German view).
96 KosTERS 768.
97
See the authors cited supra n. 37·
98 To this effect the old writers cited by WAECHTER, supra n. 64, at 45; in modern
times, SuRVILLE, in Clunet I89I, J6I, cj. Io28; DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 478;
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE (ed. 3) 449 § 360, abandoned in the latest edition (ed. 6,
p. 407); WALKER in I Klang's Kommentar JI8 and authors cited; Institute of Int.
Law, resolutions of I9o8, art. 4, 22 Annuaire (I9o8) 99, 285, 291.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. I sent. 3: where the offeror receives the acceptance of the offer.
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, § IJ par. 2 (place of receiving
acceptance of offer).
Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civil Law (I889) art. 37; (I940) art 42: law of the
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has recently been advocated also in this country. 99 However,
thanks to the fairly uniform doctrine of contracting in the
United States, the problem does not present itself with the
same acuteness. The Restatement had no difficulty in providing on principle that the place of contracting is the state from
which the acceptance is sent(§ 326, b), parallel, though not
in necessary conjunction, with the principle that a contract
is made at the time when the last act contributing to the
consent is done, as formulated in the Restatement of Contracts, § 64. But it is not clear whether this proposition, which
is specifically American, applies to a contract made by correspondence between persons in San Francisco and Mexico
City/ 00 or New York and Paris. If so, the lex fori doctrine of
the other countries is followed with the identical disastrous
effect, that different places of contracting will be stated in
the courts concerned, and thus different results are produced
under the same conflicts rule.
Contracts on board a ship or airplane. On the continent,
the law of the flag substitutes the law of the place of contracting/008 in the United States, the Uniform Aeronautics
Act designated the state over the territory of which the contract was concluded as locus contractus. 100b
Contracts in consulates or embassies. Italian courts have
held contracts concluded in foreign consulates or embassies,
at least for purposes of jurisdiction, as concluded in Italy. 100c
place of dispatching the offer.
Brazil: Introd. Law (I94:2) art. 9 § :2: law of the place of residence of the offeror;
EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I8II § I48 Note (p), wonders why the domiciliary test,
ordinarily basic for the new law, is discarded.
u :2 BEALE Io46 § 311.:2; Restatement § 311; House v. Lefebvre (I94:2) 303
Mich. :207, 6 N. W. (:2d) 487.
1oo Mexico: C. C. art. I807 requires reception of the acceptance by the offeror.
10 0a Belgium: Law on Air Navigation of Nov. I6, I9I9, art. 6 par. 3·
France: Law of May 3I, I9:24, art. IO par. I.
Greece: Law No. 50I7 of June 3, I93I, art. 5 § I.
Italy: Codice della Navigazione (I94:2) art. 5·
lOob Uniform Aeronautics Act, § 8, adopted in 22 states.
100 c App. Genova (Nov. I9, I952) Foro I tal. 1953 I IJ26, Rivista I954, 404 (Swiss
consulate); Trib. Rome Gan. 30, I955) Rivista 1955, 376 (Greek embassy).
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Binding force of offers. An analogous problem arises out
of the diverse effects of offers.
Illustration. Renfrew Flour Mills in Ottawa, Ontario,
offered to Sanschagrin, limitee in Trois-Rivieres, Quebec,
40,000 bags of flour with the proviso that "the contract must
be entered into within eight weeks, otherwise this offer is to
be withdrawn." Before the end of the time, however, the
offer was retracted. Under Quebec law, the offer, strangely
termed a "contrat unilateral," was considered binding.
Ontario law does not recognize a transaction without consideration. The court applied Ontario law without squarely
facing the problem. 101
Various cases treated in the Restatement. The Restatement devotes twenty-one sections to the determination of the
place of contracting. Some of these provisions are highly
questionable. For instance:
"A, in state X, writes to the M company, a mail-order
house in state Y, ordering a stove from M's catalog and
offering to pay the catalog price. M in response to the letter
procures the shipment of the stove from its factory in state
Z. The contract to pay for the stove is made in Z." (§ 323,
illustration 5).
This type of contract, termed in the Restatement an "informal unilateral contract," at common law has not been
absorbed into the ordinary concept of sales contracts. A's
promise of payment is made under the condition that B send
the stove. 102 Therefore, obviously the Restatement draws an
analogy between mailing a letter of acceptance and expedition of the stove. But it forgets that business letters concluding a sale are usually posted at some place of management
and not sent from a mere manufacturing plant situated in
another state. Reasonably, the place of shipment may determine the applicable law, if an individual stove is bought and
10 1
1 02

Renfrew Flour Mills v. Sanschagrin, limitee (1928) 45 Que. K. B. 29.
Restatement of the Law of Contracts §§ 12, SS·
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the buyer knows of its location in Z, or if the catalog states
that delivery shall be made at the factory or warehouse in
Z. In the given example the solution is inadequate. 103
If the Restatement localizes rights arising from tort at the
place where the last act completing an injury is done, this is
a tolerable solution because the lex delicti commissi is closely
connected with territorialism. But the two questions when
and where a contract is concluded, ought not to be indiscriminately identified. The time of completion is of great importance for many problems of substantive law in which the
place is of none. 104 Again, in private international law, localization should be subordinated to foreseeability by the
parties and other considerations of convenience.
Another striking illustration to the same section ventures
the following bizarre solution:
A father in state X promises his son $ IO,ooo if he marries
M. The son marries M in state Y. The contract for payment of the money is made in Y.
The mistake of confusing the making of a conditional
promise with the fulfillment of the condition underlies also
if a guarantee for future credits is localized at the place
"where the credit is given in reliance upon the guarantee"
(§ 324). 105 Whether these rules are sound in themselves, is
another matter.
Discretionary assumptions. This survey would be incomplete without noticing that the uncertainty included in the
principle of lex loci contractus is sometimes welcomed by
the courts. When a proposal is sent from one state to another,
or an agent intervenes in transmitting an order, an application, an insurance policy, a note, prepared here and sent there
for approval and signature and then forwarded again to a
103 CooK, Legal Bases 384, observes that the cases are directly contrary to the
illustration given in the Restatement.
104 RABEL, I Recht des Warenkaufs 93·
to& This section has been already criticized by NussBAUM, Principles 171.
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third state-a court may sometimes manage an equitable decision concerning the capacity of a married woman or the violation of a usury statute, by purposefully locating the place of
contracting in the desirable jurisdiction. It is a process similar to the stating of an individual's domicil so as to reach a
final judgment seeming sound, both tricks that may appear
satisfactory so long as the conflicts rules are not.
Contracting in another state. Finally, the lex fori theory
encounters another obstacle. As will be remembered, it has
been urged that a court should not assume domicil (like nationality), to exist in another state, contrary to what is assumed in that state itself. It is not less strange that states X
and Y should each locate an individual contract in the territory of the other, and in this way obtain opposite results as
to validity or effect. Such a negative conflict of conflicts rules
is particularly queer in view of the traditional support of lex
loci contractus by the idea that the contract is dominated by
the state of its origin. The truth of the matter is that the lex
loci contractus is a fallacious device wherever the making of
a contract is substantially connected with two states.

5. Rationale
Critical appraisal of the lex loci contractus has been so
frequent and thorough that only a short resume is called for.
Once, the law of the place of contracting was deduced from
some idea of sovereign power over the persons doing acts in
the territory, and simple facts were faced such as a sale in
an open market, or a deed solemnly executed in an official's
room, the latter a case still enjoying a privileged place in
some otherwise poor conflicts codifications. Of all the theories
of sovereignty, territorialism, and vested rights, none has
survived criticism. Lex loci contractus is no logical necessity
for any problem. This much has become a commonplace
despite Beale and formerly the Swiss courts.
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Respecting arguments of convenience, the place of contracting has lost its obviousness in all those modern situations in which either there is no one such place or the place
of creating the contract has no significance for the purpose of
the contract.
Followers of this inherited approach, it is true, never grow
tired of assuring us that it is the most certain place, best
known to the parties who therefore can easily ascertain the
applicable law. Hence, the rule should at least serve well as
a general subsidiary precept. 106 The adversaries, from
Savigny to Wharton, Dicey, Lorenzen, and innumerable
Continental writers, point to the accidental nature of this place
in our epoch of travel, the indifference of most parties to the
local law, or for that matter, to any law, and the difficulties
inherent in contracts by correspondence. 107 All international
draft proposals have rejected the lex loci contractus. 108
The solution ought to depend on the facts. When a contract is concluded in a state where both parties live, or in an
international market, or in a cash and carry operation between
a resident and a transient, all practicable theories agree on
the law of this state as a subsidiary rule. But the real problems begin beyond this circuit. The rule is a device insufficient
in itself, because it needs supplementary facts to operate, and
is inadequate in many cases. It defies common sense every
time when it makes the fate of a contract dependent on the
legalistic finesses determining at what place the deal was
completed in the juristic sense.
Under this angle, it is regrettable that even some advocates of the law of the place of performance take refuge in
the law of the place of contracting as such, when the former is
108 Most recently, CAVERS, Book Review, s6 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) at II7J,
claims usefulness of the Restatement rule, because it provides ready answers.
107 LORENZEN, JO Yale L. J. (1921) s6s, 6ss; id., Jl Yale L. J. (1921) 53·
108 See RoourN, Actes de !a Jeme Conference de !a Haye (1900) 62; DE VrsscHER,
48 Recueil (1934) II 354-356; NoLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) 62-64; STUMBERG 231;
BATIFFOL §§ 83-85.
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uncertain or insignificant. 109 This seems rather to prove the
defective nature of all schematic rules for contracts in general.
Courts adhering to this venerable but unreliable tradition,
have often turned the tables on it. Sometimes the old quid
pro quo of the Pandectists has been used, calling the law of
the place of performance the lex loci contractus, 110 or confusing lex loci contractus, that is, the law in force at the place
where the contract is made, and lex contractus, that is, the
law governing the contract as a whole. 111 These artifices have
been censured. 112 Again, as early as r892, lex loci contractus
has been referred by a sensible American court "to the place
of the seat of the contract as distinguished from the place
where it may casually happen to have been signed." 113 Finally, the rule very often has been rendered meaningless by
asserting the lex loci contractus to be the general rule and, in
the same breath adding that when performance is due in
another state, the law of the latter state governs. 114 This
amounts to a pure recognition of the lex loci solutionis.
I I I. LAW OF THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

1.

Historical Note

Savigny and his school 115 substituted the law of the place
where the contract is to be fulfilled for that where it is
concluded. They believed that the Roman jurists agreed with
their view, and argued that in contrast with the accidental
1 09

BATIFFOL 87.
Dig. 44, 7, 21, supra n. 42; DrcEY, 597; Pritchard v. Norton (r882) ro6 U.S.
I24, per Matthews, J.; Johnson County Savings Bank v. Walker (1908) So Conn.
509, 69 At!. IS; Blandi v. Pellegrini (1915) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 552·
111 See IS C. J. S. 88o. French writers often use lex loci contractus in this sense
and term the law of the place of contracting lex loci actus, a misleading terminology.
m See NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. IIJ against Clunet r89r, ro26.
113 Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer (1893) 52 Minn. 174, 179,53 N. W
IIJ7, IIJ8, quoted by McCLINTOCK, IO Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 498, 501.
114 STORY§ 280; cf. LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 667; infra this page.
116 SAVIGNY § 370; 2 BAR 9; UNGER, I System 179; DERNBURG, I Pandekten res;
REGELSBERGER, Pandekten 173; Saxony C. C. (1863) § rr; report by ENNECCERUS
and resolution, 24 Deutscher Juristentag, 4 Verhandlungen 83, rr2, 127.
110
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nature of the locality of contracting, the parties carefully determine the details of performance. It is true, indeed, that
business stipulations, in connection with usage, make it ordinarily clear where goods or services are to be delivered and
received. This place, the authors emphasize, is of paramount
importance for the structure of the contractual relationship,
and foremost in the interest and "expectation of the parties."
Story had paved the way to this consideration. Although
he upheld the tradition that "the validity of a contract is to
be decided by the law of the place where it is made" (§ 242 ),
which proposition he based on the presumed intention of the
parties, he added:
"But where the contract is either expressly or tacitly to
be performed in any other place, there the general rule is,
in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that
the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation and interpretation is to be governed by the law of the place of performance." (§ 280).
2.

Countries

Under these influences the lex loci solutionis has become
the firmly established subsidiary test of all contractual obligations in Germany, 116 and certain American and other jurisdictions.117 Sometimes it is the test only for the "effects" of
116 RG., 6th Civil Chamber, in 6r RGZ. 343; 62 RGZ. 379 under ZrTELMANN's
influence applied the domiciliary law of the debtor; overruled by RG. (Sept. 25,
I9I9) 96 RGZ. 262, (Sept. 29, 1919) id. 270. The fifth chamber left the question
open in RG. (Dec. r8, 1920) IOI RGZ. I4r, but agreed with the law of the place of
performance (Dec. 7, I92r) in 103 RGZ. 259; (June 2, I923) I07 RGZ. 44; (Oct. 3,
1923) Io8 RGZ. 241. The subsequent decisions are collected by LEWALD 224 No.
28IIf.; MELCHIOR, JW. I925, I574 n. 38.
117 California: C. C. § I646.
Montana: C. C. (I895) art. 2211, Rev. C. (I947) § I3-7I2.
North Dakota: Rev. Code (I943) § 9-0711.
Oklahoma: Stat. (I94I) IS § I62.
South Dakota: Code (I939) § IO.oio6.
Chile: C. C. art. IS §I (if this place is in Chile).
Greece: Formerly, C. C. (r856) art. 6.
Liechtenstein: Sachenrecht of Dec. 3I, 1922, art. I7 par. I,
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VI, I4.
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contracts,118 and in some countries, it is imperative when
contracts are to be performed within the forum. 119
In British courts, this law is not an exclusive but a favorite
device. 120
In the countries applying the law of the place of contracting on the basis of a presumption, such as France and Italy,
counterevidence is allowed to prove that the intention of the
parties veered to the law of the place of performance.
United States. In striking contrast to the Restatement,
Lorenzen has concluded from the cases that "most of them
apply the law of the place of performance when it differs
from that of the place of contracting, without reference to the
other surrounding circumstances." 121 In a recent inquiry the
French scholar, Bati:ffol, confirms this view. He thinks the
American courts have given Story's text an adequate and
successful interpretation by adopting the lex loci solutionis,
if at the time of the contract the place of fulfillment was
already determined in the mind of the parties. 122 Such statements, of course, provide us merely with a starting point in a
complicated inquiry.
3. Mode of Fulfillment
Irrespective of the law applying to the rest of the contract,
Spain: C6RoavA, "EI Derecho Interregional," 107 Revista Gen. Legis!. y Jur.
(1905) at 20; CAsTAN ToBENAS, r Derecho Civil Espana!, Comiin y Fora! (ed. 6,
1943) roo.
Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civil Law (r889) arts. 32, 33; (1940) arts. 36, 37·
Saxony: Formerly, C. C. § II.
Czarist-Russian law, see 14 Z.int.R. 31, 35·
118 Louisiana: C. C. (in all editions) art. ro par. 2.
Switzerland: (As to the "effects") BGE.: 32 II 268; 34 II 648; 36 II 6; 37 II 6or;
''constant practice" recognized in 47 II 541; 49 II 225; 59 II 361; cj. HaMBERGER,
Obi. Vertrage 41; NIEDERER, 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1941) 275a.
119
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 23, 1930) r6 Arch. Jud. 5, 99 Revista Dir. 287,
leased on C. Com. art. 628. On the literature, see 2 PoNTES DE MiRANDA 192ff.
An,.~ntina, Chile, Mexico and others, see supra pp. 372-375 and p. 401 n. 33·
lZO WESTLAKE 300 § 2II; DICEY 738; BATIFFOL § 99·
121
LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) s6s, 578.
122 BATIFFOL 89.
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the law of the place of performance is firmly entrenched
as governing the "mode and incidents," 123 or "modalities"
of payment or other performance, if no contrary intention
is proved. 124 This universal rule includes the application of
the lex situs to the transfer of real or personal property as
object of an obligation, and of the local law to the precise
place, time, and manner of tender and delivery. Judge
Learned Hand once125 took opportunity to enumerate American cases applying this rule with respect to a moratorium, 126
payment upon a forged endorsement, 127 delivery of a note
as payment/ 28 payment in one currency or another/29 the
question who is the proper payee130 or consignee/81 and time
of grace on commercial papers. 132 The international literature
and practice agree in subordinating to this law: the tender of
goods and services, the duty of the creditor to deliver a receipt, the currency in which a money debtor may be compelled to pay the amount due, for example what "franc" or
"pound" means if it is also a money unit at the place of per123 Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (I884) I2 Q. B. D. 589, 6o4 per
Bowen, L. J.; Lord Wright in Adelaide Electric Supply Co., Ltd. v. Prudential
Assurance Co., Ltd. [19341 A. C. I22, rsr; Auckland City Council v. Alliance
Assurance Co., Ltd. [I9371 A. C. 587, 6o6.
124 BouLLENOIS, 2 Traite de Ia personnalite et de Ia realite des loix (I766) 500;
I FoELIX 233; 2 BAR 2I, 88; WEiss, 4 Traite 387; FooTE 399, 477; and all other
writers with the only exception of PILLET, 2 Traite I8I § 486.
Austrian Allg. BGB. § 905: "With regard to measure, weight and kind of money,
the place of delivery is determinative." Former Italian C. Com. art. 58, as
commonly construed, see, e.g., Cass. Gune 8, I933) Foro ltal. I933.I.938.
125 Louis-Dreyfus eta!. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (I930) 43 F. (2d) 824, 827.
The following citations have been adduced by Judge Hand himself.
128 Rouquette v. Overmann (I875) Io L. R. Q. B. 525·
127 Kessler v. Armstrong Cork Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1907) I58 Fed. 744; Belestin
v. First Nat'! Bank (I914) I77 Mo. App. 300, I64 S. W. I6o.
128 Tarbox v. Childs (I896) I65 Mass. 408, 43 N. E. I24; Gilman v. Stevens
(I896) 63 N.H. 342, I Ad. 202.
129 Anonymous (1784) r Brown Ch. C. 376; Benners v. Clemens (I868) 58 Pa. 24.
130 Graham v. First Nat'! Bank of Norfolk (I88I) 84 N.Y. 393, 38 Am. Rep. p8.
131 Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (I923)
I23 Wash. 387, 2I2 Pac. 564; rehearing, 216 Pac. 85I.
132
Bowen v. Newell (I855) I3 N.Y. 290, 64 Am. Dec. 550.
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formance, 133 and like questions of weights, measures, working
days, and business hours. 184

Illustration. Two merchant firms in Capetown arranged
with a bank of the same city credits for buying flour in the
United States. The bank promised to honor the seller's
draft upon them at its New York branch, provided that the
bills of exchange were accompanied in one case "by bill
of lading and insurance policy," and in the other "by full
set of shipping documents including marine and war risk
policies for merchandise shipped to Capetown." The South
African court presumed that the parties intended to have
American law govern the question what documents the
bank was obliged to tender with the drafts in performance
of the contract. 135
The exact scope of this minimum application of the lex
loci solutionis, however, will need investigation by detailed
discussion. It is a mistake to extend the lex loci solutionis
when it is not the law governing the entire contract to the
currency problems determining the quantity of money to be
paid. 136 This is a part of the substance of the contractual obligation, and the same should be recognized as to the persons
by whom or to whom performance shall be made, sufficiency
of tender, and excuses for nonperformance. The Restatement
(§ 358) assigning these problems to the law of the place of
performance, although it forcibly subjects the nature and
extent of the duty for the performance and the time of
performance to the lex loci contractus, has established a
unique and untenable proposition.
ua See Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and General
Mutual Life Assurance Society, Ltd. [1938] A. C. 224-P. C., per Lord Wright,
and in case of a stipulation to the contrary effect, De Bueger v. Ballantyne & Co.
[1938] A. C. 452-P. C.
m In Germany the law of the place of performance is applied to these questions
as incident to its general scope, see 6 RGZ. 132; 96 id. at 272; 106 id. at 61; RG.
(April 22, 1922) Warn. Rspr. 1922, No. 57·
m Standard Bank of South Africa, Ltd. v. Efroiken and Newman (1924)
S. A. L R. App. D. 171, 176, 178, 196.
m See for the present, 2 ZITELMANN 396; LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und Schuldort
92; MELCHIOR § 192; MANN, The Legal Aspects of Money (ed. 2, 1953) 289.
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4· Several Places of Performance
Savigny conceived that a contract may embrace several
duties each to be fulfilled at a separate place. He meant to
apply the law of each place respectively. 137 Windscheid 138 and
Bar139 formed their own variants of this theory which has
since been consistently observed by the German Supreme
Court. 140 In particular, where bilateral contracts are not by
intention assigned to some unitary law, the obligation of
either party is determined by the law of the place where he is
obliged to perform. A part of the writers have been resigned
to this splitting of the contract. 141 The Swiss Federal Tribunal espoused the theory, 142 and Dicey extended his advocacy of the lex loci solutionis to this application of two substantive laws. 143
To exemplify the effects of this "splitting theory" or
"two laws system" on the most important contract, sales
of goods, in the absence of a presumed intention of the
parties, the obligations of seller and buyer are to be distinguished, as well as their several duties. A separate place
of performance may exist, and hence a different law apply
to the seller's duties to deliver the goods, to be liable for
warranties and conditions, 144 or default, 145 and to replace
SA VIGNY 200, 202, § 369.
WINDSCHEID, I Pandekten § 35 No. 3·
2 BAR IS.
14 0 Cases collected by LEWALD 246-256.
141 See LEwALD 246. Also the writers advocating the law of the nationality or
domicil of the debtor are satisfied with a similar bisection, see infra n. I75·
Switzerland: BECKER, 5 Gmiir 294 § 3I2 V n. 2o; 304 §§ 319-362 II n. 2.
142 BG. (Oct. 31, 1908) 34 BGE. II at 648; (Oct. 22, I9I5) 41 BGE. II at 594;
RoMBERGER, Obi. Vertriige 48; Reports to the Swiss Lawyers' Ass'n, by NIEDERER,
"Die Spaltung des Vertrages," and KNAPP, "La division des effets du contrat,"
etc., 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (I94I) 221a-354a. Against exclusive relevance BG.
(Dec. 13, 1932) 58 BGE. II 435 and later decisions.
143 DicEY (ed. S) 675; the latest edition, DrcEY (-KAHN-FREUND) 746 restricts
this rule to exceptional cases.
144
RG. (Oct. 21, 1899) ]W. 1899, 751; OLG. Hamburg (April 14, 1905) r2
ROLG. 58, r6 Z.int.R. 322.
145 RG. (Jan. 21, 1908) Leipz. Z. 1908, 309; (Apr. r, 1930) 84 Seuff. Arch. 252;
OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 24, 1912) Hans. GZ. 1913, HBI. No. 20; (Jan. 4, 1918)
JW. 1918, 38o.
1a7
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defective merchandise. 146 Again, the existence and effect of
the various duties of the buyer depend on the laws at the
places where he has to pay the price and accept the goods, 147
accept a substitute,148 examine the goods, and give notice. 149
But also the remedies a buyer has on the ground of defects 150
and nondelivery, 151 have been subordinated to the law determinative of the obligation to pay.
These and other scholastic and unsound results have been
harmful to the reputation of lex loci solutionis. 152
German courts themselves have become uneasy of this
artificial play and admittedly try hard to avoid it in particular
cases by presuming an intention of the parties in favor of an
all-inclusive law. 153 The Swiss Supreme Court seems to deny
to the adopted principle almost any practical influence. 154
In fact, this principle is based on the mistaken conception
that a bilateral contract can be reasonably partitioned into two
unilateral obligations. This conception may be excused in
earlier stages of Roman and English jurisprudence; it was
largely superseded by the late Roman law, and has been entirely abandoned in modern law. The very nature of a synallagma is ignored when a sales contract is torn up into halves
148

RG. (April 19, 1910) 73 RGZ. 379, Revue 19II, 403.
RG. (Nov. 18, 1899) JW. 1900, 12 No. 5; OLG. Jena (Dec. 31, 1917) JW.
1918, 380 No. 5, stressing the local connection of each litigious obligation; cj. 55
RGZ. 423; 65 id. 332. Similarly, as to the portions to which each of several buyers
is obligated, OLG. Jena (June 30, 1897) 8 Z.int.R. 335, Clunet 1899, 6o8.
148
RG. (Oct. 13, 1894) 34 RGZ. 191.
149
RG. (April 28, 1900) 46 RGZ. 193, 195; (April 19, 1910) 73 RGZ. 379; (Feb.
4, 1913) 81 RGZ. 273, 275; for details, see LEWALD 254 ff. According to OLG.
Miinchen (Feb. 16, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 33, the duty of notice is subject to the
law of the domicil of the buyer.
150
RG. (June r6, 1903) 55 RGZ. 105; (April 26, 1907) 66 RGZ. 73; (May 25,
1932) IPRspr. 1932 No. 33·
151
RG. (May 27. 1924) IPRspr. 1926/27 No. 43·
152
See citations infra n. 169. See also FIORE § 120; PILLET, 2 Traite 263 (against
Savigny's emphasis on the place where jurisdiction will be taken); ALCORTA, 2
Der. Int. Priv. 314; MATOS 457 § 330. For other difficulties, see LEWALD § 284.
153
RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 207; (Jan. 27, 1928) 120 RGZ. 72.
154
NIEDERER, 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1941) 26oa-265a; see also GuTZWILLER,
id. 415a; adde BG (Oct. 21, 1942) 68 BGE. II 22o, 223.
H7
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belonging to different legislations. No wonder that recent
criticism has discovered a number of contradictions and inconveniences, and has stated that rescission of a contrace55 and
risk for fortuitous loss of the goods 156 cannot be classified
properly, and that in truth the alleged law of one party was
applied to both. 157
The Anglo-American courts seem never to have thought
of such consequences of the place of performance theory, and
with the exception of Dicey, 158 no writer has entirely followed the German example.
If, however, we become aware that not the several duties
but the whole contract is to be connected with the law of
some state, it must also be realized that by making the "place
of performance" the determinative concept, we are far from
meaning the domestic concept bearing the same name. Indeed, in progressive suggestions the whole of the contract
has been localized at the place where the typically 159 prevailing, or principal/ 60 contractual duty should be discharged. 161
It has also been suggested that a new uniform concept of
place of performance should be established for the entire
contract rather than for the duties created by it. 162 But even
this may turn out to be too narrow a formula. Another step
farther, Strisower has advocated that the place of performance should be deemed to be found, not at the place where
performance ought to be made in fact but the place where,
according to the nature of the obligation, the "social sphere
166

To this effect already ROHG. (Dec. 9, 1875) 19 ROHGE. 132.
See NEUNER, 2 Z.ausi.PR. (1928) 121; LEWALD 249 No. 309; RABEL-RAISER,
3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 77·
167 NEUNER, id. 123.
168 See supra n. 143·
169 HeMBERGER, Obi. Vertrage 49. so; BG. (Oct. 21, 1941) 67 BGE. II 181.
110 NoLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) 504; LEWALD 248; for other literature, see BATIFFOL 83 and infra p. 474 n. 169.
181 In the opinion of BATIFFOL 87, this is the existent rule in the United States.
161 NEUNER, 2 Z.ausi.PR. (1928) 130; followed by NIEDERER, 6o Z. Schweiz. R.
(N. F.) 242 a; OsER-SCHOENENBERGER p. LVII No. 57·
168
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is centered in which the obligation is to be discharged." 168
More simply we should say that the center of the obligation
rather than the place of its discharge is the adequate contact
for choice of law.
To take an example, it is an excellent rule that employment contracts should be governed by the law of the place
where the employee is expected to do his work. This rule is
amenable to the theory emphasizing the place of performance of the outstanding obligation established in such a contract. But whoever would be satisfied with this aspect of the
rule must be embarrassed by the case of a traveling salesman visiting a dozen states according to the varying instructions of his employer. Again, there is prevailing agreement
that in this latter case the law of the employer's domicil
governs. In both cases, however, the selected localizations
are convenient for determining the center of the particular
type of contract.

5. Lack of a Certain Place of Performance
It does not often happen in normal commercial sales,
loans, or bailments that the parties are unable to ascertain at
the time of contracting at what place the duties are performable. When, however, insurance payments or life rents are
made payable at the domicil of the creditor, his changes
of domicil are decisive. Bonds may be payable in any of several countries at the option of the bondholder. Goods may be
shipped to a destination to be declared during the carriage.
Or a vessel, plying on the ocean, is bought with the stipulation that it should be conveyed to the purchaser at its next
port of call. 164 As mentioned before, in such cases it has been
suggested that as a measure of despair, the lex loci contractus
may be applied. Resorting to a more logical method, courts
regarding the lex loci contractus as starting point, sometimes
163 STRISOWER, 32 Annuaire (1925)
164 Case referred to by 2 BAR Io n.

507.
9·
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will say that where there is no place of performance, the
court cannot do better than fall back on the general rule that
lex loci contractus governs. 165 The I 940 draft of Montevideo
(art. 40), expressly provides that if the parties cannot, at the
time of contracting, determine the place of fulfillment, the
contract is governed by the law of the place of contracting.
All these are makeshift constructions.
6. Characterization
Courts have been taught to determine the place of performance according to their lex fori. The German Reichsgericht strictly observing this method, considers neatly two
successive phases, first inquiring where the German municipal law 166 locates performance, in order to find the applicable law; and when this law is found, inquiring where
performance is due under this law, in order to decide the
claim. 167

Illustration. D in ZUrich, Switzerland, owes money to
C in Berlin. Under the German Civil Code, § 270, the
debtor has to send the money at his own cost and risk to
the creditor, but nevertheless ZUrich is his "place of performance." This means that if the mail is delayed en route,
he is not in default ( 78 RGZ. I40 ). But applied to the
conflicts matter, it means that Swiss law governs the debt.
Consultation of the Swiss Code of Obligations will result
in finding that the place of performance is with the creditor
in Berlin. Therefore, by delayed mail the debtor is in default
after all, therefore liable for interest and in certain cases
for rescission, although not for other damage. (C. Obi. art.
74 ( I ) , 106 ff.)
166 See for instance, Morgan v. New Orleans M. & T. R. Co. (z 876) 2 Woods 244,
17 Fed. Cas. 754 No. 9804; Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co. (1941) 388 Ill. 447.
58 N. E. (2d) 46o. The main advocate of this rule at present is BATIFFOL 85 § 94·
166 BGB. §§ 269, 270. Many German writers following LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort
und Schuldort (1907), however, refer these sections directly to conflicts la.v.
MELCHIOR 171 virtually concludes from this view that the courts have no choice
other than to apply them.
167 ROHG. (1875) I7 ROHGE 292; (1877) 22 id. 296; RG. (March u, 1919) 95
RGZ. 164, and constant practice, see MELCHIOR I72 n. I, I7J n. 2.
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The Swiss Federal Court, professing the same method, if
consistent, must reach the opposite result in favor of German
law. 168 This is a wonderful example to demonstrate Bartin's
thesis that harmony is impossible. But more and more, we
may wonder whether any "place of performance" can fulfill
its pretended function.
7.

Rationale

The opinion is well-reasoned that performance has in many
cases more significance in the eyes of parties to a contract
than the locality where they declare their consent, if such a
common locality exists. However, the former enthusiasm for
this variant of the old doctrine has not stood up against
accumulated criticism. 169 The place of performance may happen to be as accidental or insignificant for choice of law as any
other place involved; as when an English and an American
merchant engage in a transaction to ship meat from Argentina to Egypt; or Americans agree with one another for sea
carriage to Venezuela; or when a traveling salesman is hired
to go to distant countries.
Such fruits of the theory of place of fulfillment resulting
in bisection of bilateral contracts are particularly objectionable. They cannot be removed by a fictional pretension that
a contract producing two main obligations of different location has only one place of performance. The relations between creditor and debtor are often necessarily localized at
more than two places. Conflicts law cannot schematically
rely on such a device. 170
168 The Swiss Fed. Trib., in fact, resorting to lex fori for defining the place of
performance in its decision (Oct. II, 1918) 44 BGE. II 416, 417 applied the law
of the creditor's Swiss domicil, but applied the domiciliary law of the debtor, being
again Swiss law in BG. (July 3, 1909) 35 BGE. II 473,476, 20 Z.int.R. 102. Thereby
it managed both times to apply the law of the forum.
169 See 2 BAR u; 2 MEILI 8; 2 ZITELMANN 372; RoGUIN, Actes de Ia 3eme Conference de Ia Haye (I900) 62; ALMEN, I Skandinav. Kaufrecht 52; LEWALD 226, 227.
17 0 F. LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und Schuldort 123 has very well noted this point.
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Lex loci solutionis without more qualifications, 1s as msufficient a test as the lex loci contractus.
IV. LAW OF THE DEBTOR'S DOMICIL

A subsidiary rule based on the nationality of the debtor,
postulated on a priori axioms, 171 has been commonly rejected.172 But the law of the domicil of the debtor functioning
as a general rule, has found increasing favor with writers. 173
The principal arguments are that a debtor cannot be presumed to have promised more than his habitual law makes
him liable for, and that his domicil is the place where he may
be sued and his assets are legally concentrated, according
to the most fundamental principles of jurisdiction and enforcement. That in most cases he is in fact sued at that forum
and the domiciliary law then coincides with lex fori, is
claimed to be another advantage.
Adversaries 174 object that the domicil of the debtor has
no title to govern acts of performance in another country, and
that there is no reason why the domicil of the debtor should
be of more significance than that of the creditor. The dismemberment of a bilateral contract seems even more difficult to avoid with this than with the doctrine of the place of
performance; the advocates of the personal law realize this
and approve of the splitting. 175 Where a buyer refused payment, while another buyer paid the price in advance, and
171

2 ZITELMANN 372; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 126.
RG. (March II, 1919) 95 RGZ. 164; (Oct. 3, 1923) ro8 RGZ. 243; E. lsAY,
14 Z. f. Volkerrecht (1928) 254.
173 z BAR 12; REGELSBERGER, Pandekten § 44 n. 4; HARBUROER in 22 Annuaire
(1908) II4; NEUMEYER in 32 Annuaire (1925) 99 No.3; STRISOWER in id. 91, if.
135; GuTZWILLER 1608 n. 1; LEWALD 230 No. 287; FRITZSCHE, 44 Z. Schweiz. R.
(N. F.) 254a; RAAPE, IPR. 451 (regarding this theory as probably dominant in the
German literature); ALMEN, r Skandinav. Kaufrecht 54 n. 68 citing other Swedish
followers.
174 See LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) at 667; BATIFFOL 100.
176 It has been adopted by z ZITELMANN 405; MirrEIS, 4 Verhandlungen des 24.
Deutschen Juristentages 98; z FRANKENSTEIN 190, 295fT.; NEUMEYER, IPR. (1929)
27; BAooE, Conference de Ia Haye, Actes de Ia sixieme session, at 289.
172
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both rescind, there develop curious differences between the
applicable laws, because the second purchaser has changed
his position from debtor to creditor. 176
In legislation177 and courts, 178 this approach has not had
much following. Lacking the historical background of the
leges loci contractus and loci solutionis, it has no better
rational justification than these for dominating by itself all
contracts.
It is another matter that the domicil of a party, being the
basis of his status, has been said to furnish a last resort, if
the requirements of all other conflicts rules fail. In this respect, we shall discuss 179 cases such as that of a merchant who
sends out a catalog intending, under his domiciliary law, to
invite customers to make offers, while at the places of receipt the catalog is regarded as an offer; or cases concerning
the different appreciation of silence as acceptance or denial
of an offer.
V. THE LAW MOST FAVORABLE TO THE CONTRACT

Inspired by earlier theories, the Austrian Code of I 8 I I
has a special rule referring to the personal law of a foreigner making a gift within the country, if the gift is valid
under such law rather than under the otherwise applicable
ALMEN, r Skandinav. Kaufrecht 55, vainly tries to justify this difference.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 (as to unilateral contracts); applied to loans,
Polish S. Ct. (Nov. I8, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop. R. (N. F.) (I937-38) 380.
Czechoslovakia: Law of 1948 on private international law, § 47 (unilateral
contracts).
178 German-Rumanian Mixed Arb. Trib., Negreanu v. Meyer (June I6, 1925)
5 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes (I927) 200, 2I3; Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib.,
Biisse v. Brit. Mfg. Stationary Co. (1927) 7 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes (1928) 345,
JW. 1928, 2047; cj. RABEL-RAISER, 3 Z.aus!.PR. (I929). 62
Denmark: BoRUM-MEYER, 6 Repert. 224 Nos. 78, 79; BoRuM 148 now does not
give any preference to the debitor's domicil.
Norway: s. Ct., Norsk Retstidende I928, 646 and 826, id. I934, I52; see 7 z.
aus!.PR. (1933) 946, 942; ro id. 632; see also CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 578 No. 146.
Sweden: MALMAR, 7 Repert. 136 No. !05; against any preference for the lex
debitoris KARLGREN, Kortfattad Larobok i lnternationell Privat- och Processratt
(1950) 95 f.; NIAL 45·
179
See infra Chapter 32, p. 524 n. 19.
176

177
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lex fori. 180 Argentina 181 and Nicaragua182 conversely provide
for application of their own laws, when they are more favorable to the validity of transactions than the foreign laws
called for by the conflict rules. In England and America,
Lord Phillimore's words have often been repeated that "the
parties cannot be presumed to have contemplated a law which
would defeat their engagements"-an application of the
maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 183 Mr. Justice Matthews speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States
appropriated this consideration as
" ... a circumstance highly persuasive in its character of the
presumed intention of the parties and entitled to prevail
unless controlled by more express and positive proofs of
a contrary intent." 184
The illustrative English cases using this argument involve
an arbitration clause, valid under English law at the place
of making, invalid under the Scotch law of the place of performance, 185 and clauses exempting a ship company from
liability. 186 Similar stipulations of carriers 187 and of some insurance companies 188 have been treated to the same effect in
this country. The Supreme Court of the United States has
applied it to a bond void for lack of consideration where
180 Allg. BGB. § 35; cj. Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht I 5 § I I3 (applied by
RG. (March IS, I900) 46 RGZ. 230 to the form of a gratuitous discharge).
181 Argentina: C. C. art. I4 (4).
182 Nicaragua: C. C. art. VIII No. 4·
183 4 PHILLIMORE § 654; followed by WHARTON § 429; obiter dictum in South
African Breweries, Ltd. v. King [I899] 2 Ch. I73, I8I.
184 Pritchard v. Norton (I882) 106 U. S. I24, I37·
185 Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery [I894) A. C. 202; 6 R. I88-H. L.
186 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (I86s) 3 Moo. P. C.
Cas. (N. S.) 272, 290; In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321.
187 Hazel v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. (I891) 82 Iowa 477,48 N.W.
926; W. A. Ryan & Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (1885) 65 Tex. 13 (citing
numerous precedents); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Smith (1913) 38
Okla. 157, I32 Pac. 494·
188 Coffin v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co. (I928) 27 F. (2d) 616. Arkansas
cases, cited by LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 213 n. 48.
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made but valid where to be performed. 189 One case concerns the capacity of a married woman, 190 two others, oral
transactions. 191 The argument has more often been used in
usury cases, 192 although even there in less than twenty-five
per cent of the cases/ 93 and occasionally with respect to other
causes of illegality. 194 A few instances of analogous reasoning
exist in decisions of other countries. 195
On the other hand, neither in England196 nor in this
country197 can any consistent judicial doctrine be stated in
this sense. Often the argument was unnecessary and served
to support the escape from lex loci contractui98 or lex loci
solutionis. 199 In the cases concerning capacity, favor of validity would seem adequate but has hardly ever been openly
and decisively granted.
Nevertheless, it provokes thought that the preference of
the more favorable law has found considerable support in
the literature, particularly in this country. 200 What can theom Pritchard v. Norton (1882) Io6 U.S. I24.
Greenlee v. Hardin (1930) I 57 Miss. 229, 127 So. 777, 71 A.L.R. 741; as a
most subsidiary argument in Hauck Clothing v. Sophie Sharpe (1899) 83 Mo.
App. 385.
191 Hubbard v. Exchange Bank (C.C.A. 2d I896) 72 Fed. 234, cert. denied 163
U.S. 690 (verbal acceptance of a bill of exchange); D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly and
Pauly Cheese Co. (1914) ISS Wis. 541, 145 N. W. 372.
192 Supra p. 410.
193 This has been stated by BATIFFOL I98 § 222, see (n. I) his revision of cases
cited by 2 BEALE I I 57 n. 2.
194 Exemption of liability of railway: Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v.
Smith (1913) 38 Okla. IS7, IJ2 Pac. 494, but the argument is unnecessary, supra p.
420. Intention of the parties is the main reason, as in Coffin v. London & Edinburgh
Ins. Co. (D.C.N.D. Ga. I928) 27 F. (2d) 616 (insurance).
195
E.g., RG. {March I3, I928) IPRspr. I928 No. I.
us CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 269 cites Maritime Assurance Co. v. Assecuranz-Union von
I86s (1935) 52 Ll. L. Rep. 16.
197 BATIFFOL IJ9 §§ IS7, 158. [Adde the thoughtful observations by PAUL A.
FREUND, "Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Harv. L. Rev. (I946)
1210, 1212-1218].
198 E.g., Hubbard v. Exchange Bank, supra n. 191; Brierley v. Commercial
Credit Co. (1929) 43 F. (2d) 724.
119 E.g., Canale v. Pauly, supra n. 191.
200 LoRENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (1921) 53: the contract is valid if the law of any
state with which the contract has substantial connection is complied with and execution is not prohibited by some stringent policy of the place of contracting and
performance is legal at place of performance. (On these three provisos see supra
190
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retically justify such a view? How could it be formulated?
In its nature, distinctly emphasized by the English writers,
the selection of the validating law has been dependent upon
the assumed intention of the parties. Indeed, the argument
demands not only a so-called presumptive intention but a
real, though tacit, agreement of the parties; by stipulating as
they did, they wanted to adopt the law under which the
stipulation would be valid. But this reasoning is frustrated by
the doubtless correct thesis that where the the parties agree on
a certain law, this law applies even though it nullifies the contract. 201 Batiffol, who seems to refer the doctrine in question
to the hypothetical intention of the parties, is only prepared
to regard it legitimate, where, at the time of the contract or
at least before one of them invokes nullity, the parties knew
that one law annuls and the other validates their stipulation,
and expressed their knowledge by their conduct. 202 But the
cases state at most that the parties may be supposed to have
known the law. Cheshire has abandoned the whole idea. 203
If the proper law theory is rejected, what should be the
idea, or the content, of the rule? We have seen that no rule
exists prescribing that a contract is void, if it is contrary to
any one of several laws "substantially" connected with it.
On the other hand, could a rule be really acceptable, which
says that whenever a contract is connected with several jurisdictions, we cannot hold it void except when its nullity is
assured by all of them? Certainly not.
In reality, the casual popularity of the law upholding the
contract in the American courts is very closely related to
their unprincipled conflicts practice. On the one hand, rules
Ch. 29); STuMBERG 237, 240: "To apply the law which will uphold the contract,
if the contract has some bona fide substantial connection with the place of that law,
would, it is believed, in carrying out the purpose which the parties had in view
in their negotiations, better serve business convenience by making their acts
legally that which they purport to be; i.e., an enforceable promise."
2o1 Infra Chapter J2.
202 BATIFFOL 138 § 156.
m CH1SslfJ.I~.E zrz, as compared with (ed. 2) 269 and (ed. 1) 196.
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are allegedly traditional and fixed; a court believes to a
certain extent in the lex loci contractus or in another device.
On the other hand, nothing is really certain; the courts experiment; they are benevolent to a party who appears to
deserve protection; they do not want, in particular, to allow
a right to be frustrated by a local statute, either outmoded
or having no reasonable claim to govern exclusively an interstate transaction. Very clearly, the courts in general do not
favor the peculiarities of state provisions on Sunday contracts,
statute of frauds, usury, or the formalities of insurance
policies. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, speaking of a sale
made in its own territory without a memorandum in writing,
discards the law of the place of contracting and its rule of
unenforceability, stating there is "nothing inherently bad
about such convention, despite our statute of frauds," and
the contract is declared valid under the foreign law of the
place of performance. 204 The usury cases, a very particular
phenomenon, are inspired by mutual tolerance as there are
many ways to solve the problem. The courts desire to free
legitimate business from dispensable local impositions. A
finance corporation has carried on its loan business for fifteen
years, has used the same type of stipulations as other companies, for customers in all jurisdictions. Why should such
a usual and standard form be stigmatized as fraudulently
evading the law of the debtor's domicil or the law of the
forum? 205 The courts manifestly think that one system of
regulating the rates of interest is as good as another. They
weigh and compare the needs and policies. Their final choice
is not so much meant to favor the validity of the contract
as to encourage the reliance of trade and commerce on interstate protection. The solution would be strictly contrary, if a
prohibition were violated comprising a basic requirement
in a state to which the contract should exclusively belong.
204
205

Canale v. Pauly, supra n. 191.
Manufacturers Finance Co. v. B. L. Johnson & Co. (1931) IS Tenn. App. ZJ6.
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These considerations include several particular circumstances, which do not often occur in international transactions
and even in the relations among the American sister states
strongly restrict the application of the principle in question.
Equivalence and comparative unimportance of local policies
is one of these considerations. Another is the equivalence of
various conflicts rules to be used at pleasure. A third is the
neglect of party choice by both courts and parties, and a
fourth the replacement of one determined applicable law
by a number of laws among which any one may be selected.
This orbit of legal systems is circumscribed by the fortuitous
connections the parties establish. But to prevent the parties
from too much arbitrariness, it is required that they observe
some limits which, in general, are not defined more closely.
Only one limit has been settled in the usury cases: the law
of the charter state of the lending corporation is excluded,
if the actual place of business is elsewhere. Hence, if a court
should find that the system of differentiated rates of interest
in the charter state is superior to the statutes of the debtor's
domicil as well as to those of the actual business place and
the situs of a mortgage, it still would not be allowed to apply
that law even though the parties may have expressly stipulated for it.
After all, it is not incidental that the principle of the upholding law has not seriously been applied to the bulk of
the American contracts cases, not to speak of the international
practice.
In the opinion of the writer, the advocates of this principle
seem to feel quite correctly that something is needed, in
the chaos of uncertain and unsatisfactory conflicts rules, to
obviate the sacrifice of honest commerce. The spontaneous
inclination of courts to safeguard contracts from local prohibitions serves as an excellent emergency device, and as such
is to be recommended. If every type of contract were to be
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endowed with a stable subsidiary conflict rule adequate to
the nature of the contract, and if the parties were plainly
permitted and encouraged to select the governing law, with
assurance that it will be applied, neither the parties nor the
courts would be in need of such subterfuges; and the legislatures would not have to tolerate them.
VI. RENVOI

If a court presumes that the parties have had a certain
law "in view," it is reasonable to think that this law is a
substantive, municipal, law. 206 But also if judges are supposed
to choose a law amenable to the character of the contract, it
seems a useless detour to select a conflicts law instead of
a municipal law. 207 Only in case a mechanical rule points
to the law of a certain place whereas the court of this place
would instead apply a third law, does renvoi have its usual
significance. This is the reason why German courts have
repeatedly resorted to references from the law of the place
of performance to another law, 208 or in suits for carriage by
sea, from the law of the port of discharge to the law applied
at this port. 209 In a case where two Austrian nationals living
in Turkey entered into a contract of employment, the Italian
Supreme Court applied their common national law and, by
transmissive renvoi from the Austrian conflicts rule, the
law of Turkey. 210
VII. CONCLUSIONS

Specialized Rules

I.

The negative result reached by some modern authors is
2° 6
207

MELCHIOR 239, citing OLG. Kalmar (May 19, 1893) 4 Z.int.R. 151.
Swiss BG. (Oct. 21, 1955) 81 BGE. II 391, 394· See MELCHIOR, JW. 1925,
1571 and HAUDEK 94 against LEWALD 206.
208 RG. (Jan. 23, 1897) 38 RGZ. 140, 146; (Oct. 11, 1907) 19 Z.int.R. 222, 224,
and others, see MELCHIOR 239 n. 2. BGH. (Feb. 18, 1958) NJW. 1958, 750, Rev.
Crit. 1958, 542.
2o9 RG. (April4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 210 (incidentally).
110 Cass. (Dec. 29, 1937) 9 Rivista Dri. Priv. (1937) 228, see Vol. 1 (ed. 2, 1958)
p. 85-86 ns. 38 and 39•
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unimpeachable. No one conflicts rule can serve for all obligatory contracts. A wrong method had developed when writers,
enactments, and judicial decisions tried to apply either always
the law of the place of contracting, or always the law of the
place of performance, or always the personal law common
to the parties, or that of the debtor, or always to connect the
making of the contract with one place and its effects or
performance with another place. All these doctrines have
thoroughly failed.
A more attractive method is that of carefully investigating
and following up the presumable intention of the parties.
But where a real, though tacit, agreement of the parties is
lacking, such quest turns into a search for the most appropriate connection between the dispositions of the parties and a
territory. Clues hinting at the law the parties might have
had in mind, are certainly not negligible; yet they have to
be integrated into the entire circumstances.
What, however, is the positive gain of this dispute? If all
mechanical rules are repudiated, does this mean that the
circumstances of every single contract should be examined
to find the most closely connected law? Some authors, led
by their regard for the hypothetical intention of the parties,
come near to such a view. Others want to recognize every
substantial territorial contact. In the United States, a place
has been sought where the law is most favorable to the validity of any obligation. Each of these suggestions contains
valuable material. But at the same time, the viewpoint of
the practical lawyer has been recently stressed by Griswold's
opposition to Cook's apparently unlimited dissolution of
fixed conflicts rules 211 and Cavers' doubt whether the negative criticism on Beale's rigidly dogmatic rules does not leave
judges helpless. 212
211 See the reply by W. W. CooK, 21 Can. Bar. Rev. (1943) 249 and in 37 Ill.
L. Rev. (1943) 418.
n1 CAVERS, supra n. 1o6.
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This reaction is sound, not implying a reproach to the
necessary clarification, but a suggestion for future policy.
If we could do no better than refer the courts to their own
estimates of what is in every single case the most closely
connected law, or what is appropriate to the case at bar, the
judges would soon fall back on their formulas.
A margin of judicial discretion, of course, must remain so
as to do justice to peculiar forms of contracts and individual
mentalities of parties. But roughly speaking, we need a
developed system of conflicts rules on contracts, rather than
just one or two rules, and we have to build it not on rules
so vague as to abandon the judge regularly to his worry
or fancy, nor on specifications so tight as to omit important
kinds of agreements. This program requires comparative
research in the municipal laws and in commercial practice
with respect to each single type of contract, a work so far
only partially started. Experience, however, seems to show
that commerce is served by a number of standard forms,
with newly devised clauses rapidly imitated throughout the
world. In the vast domain of sales of goods, differences in
stipulations are caused much more often by the natural
differences of merchandise sold than by local or national
predilection. Insurance, banking, carriage of goods contracts
may be distinguished in analogous groups under rational
rather than local criteria. For this and other reasons, it may
be less difficult than appears at first sight to resolve the local
attachments most characteristic of the individual groups of
contracts.
However, that not inconspicuous pains must be taken, can
be seen in the quick defeat of the proposed special rules for
various contract types, in the Institute for International Law.
Divergences of opinion were declared too profound, and,
indeed, many members were devoted to the principle of
nationality and hostile to party autonomy, prejudices which
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in themselves could wreck any international enterprise. In
addition the Institute stated that the matter was immature
and deferred discussion for an indefinite time. 218 Lists as
sketched in the reports to the Institute, in the Polish law,
or in the Montevideo Treaty are the unconvincing product
of divination rather than inquiry. Comparison of the actual
choice of law decisions in the Anglo-American, French, and
German courts, meritoriously begun by Batiffol, gives some
very valuable suggestions but no comprehensive certainty.
On the other hand, the successive drafts of conflicts rules
determining sales of goods elaborated in the International
Law Association and committees of the Sixth Hague Conference,214 show remarkable progress. The work to be done
is indeed vast. The present writer, in fact, does not believe
himself able, in a lonely study, to do more than to point out
a few examples and to suggest some methods of research.
2.

The Law of the Contract

The task ahead will be to aim at ascertaining, in case the
parties do not themselves choose their law, of what the main
local connection is under given conditions, or to express it
shortly:

In what jurisdiction a certain type of contract is centered.

If the elements of the contract in question allow it, its
connection with one law is very desirable. Almost all modern
writers are agreed on this point. To split the incidents in
the manner of the Restatement and, formerly, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, or in that, formerly, of the German Supreme
Court, is a grievous mistake, as was shown and will appear
again later. That various obstacles that have been raised in
the literature to the application of a unique law to this or that
incidental problem are unfounded, will be discussed in Chapter
213 33 Annuaire (r927) III 224ff.
2u See the last draft in 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 957·
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32. Formalities, it is true, should be treated with some
liberality (Chapter 3 I), while capacity should not be distinguished. In the conviction that "depefage," division, is bad
and unity of contract is precious, we have been confirmed by
a powerful lesson received from comparative research. The
various legal systems operate with different terminologies
and techniques, but in the hands of fair judges they usually
work out all right and to strikingly similar ends. To maintain
such satisfactory machinery, however, we have to leave to one
system the entire living situation. Mixing several municipal
provisions is quite likely to jeopardize justice. 2111
Of course, there are certain types of contracts, such as, for
instance, international loans with separate issues of "tranches''
in several countries and "payable" at several places, with
respect to which it would be a forced method to ignore the
several laws involved. There are also certain incidents such
as the examination of goods sold and delivered, or the time
and manner of payments, which are conveniently governed
by special laws. 216 Hence, it is generally the lex contractus,
or as we shall term it, the law of the contract, that must be
found. By exception we have to recognize either more than
one law of the contract, or in addition to this law, a special
law.
216 See Eo. WAHL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 782.
In continental Europe called statu/ special, Ntbenstatut.

216

CHAPTER

31

Form of Contracts 1
I.
I.

THE RuLES

Lex loci contractus

T

HE original doctrines of the statutists included in
the validity of a contract form as well as substance.
Hence, the law of the place of contracting, whether
considered as governing the entire contract or at least its
validity, covered the formalities for completing a valid
agreement, and it may be inferred that this very application
has always given the principle of lex loci contractus its most
convincing aspect. This ancient doctrine has retained its full
vigor in the basic American conflicts rule which, to believe
Beale, still prevails. According to the Restatement ( § 331,
b), the law of the place of contracting determines the validity
of a promise, as in other regards, also with respect to "the
necessary form, if any, required to make a promise binding."
2.

Locus regit actum

In the main development of the statutist doctrine, the
significance of the maxim, locus regit actum, from the sixteenth century on was reduced to the problems of form. 2 The
idea that an obligation originates in the territory of a sov1 (The form of negotiable instruments will not he included in the following
chapter, except by occasional mention, since this topic warrants a separate discussion; see Vol. 4 ch. 59.)
EooUARD SrLz, Du domaine d'application de Ia regie "locus regit actum" (Paris
1933); RHEINSTEIN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterhuch 36o-371; L. I. BARMAT, De
regel "locus regit actum" in het internationaal privaatrecht (Amsterdam 1936).
2 On the history of the rules concerning formalities, see WAECHTER, 25 Arch. Civ.
Prax. (1842) 368, 405; 5AV1GNY § 382; I BAR 337; NEUMEYER, 2 Gemeinrechtliche
Entwicklung 84, 87, 135; E. M. ME1JERS, Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van het int.
privaat- en strafrecht (1914) passim.
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ereign and therefore depends on the conditions imposed
there, retained greater force in application to the exterior conditions of contracting than for the capacity of the parties.
Others deduced the maxim from voluntary submission of the
parties, or from a general customary law. But finally, writers
have emphasized reasons of convenience, viz., that parties are
in the best position to learn what formalities the local law prescribes and can readily adjust themselves to these; that they
are not interested in other forms for their own sake; and may
well be uncertain with which law they should otherwise
comply. 3
(a) Compulsory rule. The theory that a contract is "born"
in a territory drew with it the logical necessity that the local
11rescriptions govern the form. Hence, locus regit actum
acquired compulsory force. Whatever law may govern the
contract in other respects, the law of the place where it is
made always determines whether any formalities are obligatory, and if so, which are required. In this shape as imperative,
the rule was recognized for a long time in England, 4 and
appears in a number of countries. 5 The French courts, until
3 See LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 256 § 244; BATIFFOL 363ff. §§ 424, 425; ToTTERMAN, "Functional Bases of the Rule Locus Regit Actum in English Conflict Rules,"
Int. Comp. Law Q. I953, 27-46.
4
Alves v. Hodgson (I797) 7 T. R. 24I; Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez [I927]
I K. B. 669, 691, both leading cases concerning the want of a stamp locally required
at a foreign place; WESTLAKE 281 § 209j DICEY (ed. s) 641 Rule 159(2) recognized
in the latest edition as permissive, DICEY (-KAHN-FREUND) 774 Rule 152; FooTE 388.
Canada: Former Quebec practice: Furniss v. Latocque (r886) 2 Montreal
L. R. s. c. 405 {erroneously cited by DICEY (ed. s) 642 n. z as existing law).
1 Argentina: C. C. art. I2 and art. 9I6 (new 950), cf. 2 Vrco 280-285, §§ 346-348,
and cases collected by 2 RoMERO DEL PRADO 306-310.
Bolivia: C. C. art. 36.
Brazil: Introd. Law (1916) art. II; but see infra n. Io.
Chile: C. C. art. 17.
Colombia: C. C art. 21.
Cuba: c. c. art. II par. r; c. Com. arts. sr, 52.
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners, 1936, art. 24 sentence 2.
Honduras: C. C. art. rs.
Iran: C. C. art. 969.
The Netherlands: Allg. Bepalingen (1829) art. 10 according to the dominant
opinion criticized by ]ITTA 138; KosTERS 185; 0FFERHAus, "The Private International Law of the Netherlands," 30 Yale L. J. (1920) 116, but historically
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909, were divided on the question. 6
Transactions before consuls in foreign countries, of course,
follow the forms provided by the domestic law of the consul's
state.
(b) Optional rule. In a part of the old literature/ however, and in the course of the nineteenth century under
Savigny's influence,8 the rule was more and more regarded
merely as a favor to the parties, as a permission to use the
local formalities or formlessness.
In a first variant expressing the rule, the lex loci contractus
was still given first place. The contract, as was said, should
be valid also if complying with the law governing the contract
as a whole. 9 Later, this order was reversed. The German
Introductory Law in I 896 formulated the rule thereafter
prevalent:
I

Art. I I ( I ) The form of a transaction is determined by
the laws governing the legal relation that constitutes the
grounded, see BARMAT, supra n. I, I 57· The Supreme Court, H. R. (Dec. 6, I9~8)
N.J. (I929) 465 avoided a direct answer.
Peru: C. Com. art. 52 but see infra n. Io.
The Philippines: C. C. art. I7 par. I; but for permissive interpretation
SALONGA 330·
Portugal: C. C. art. 24; C. Com. art. 4 (3) (doubtful).
Puerto Rico: C. C. art. II; C. Com. art. 83 n. 2.
Rumania: Some decisions, see PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 77 No. 255.
Spain: C. C. art. I I par. I (for public acts) generalized in the literature, see
TRiAs DE BEs, 6 Repert. 245 No. 65 and Revue 1927, 23, 27 who recognizes only
certain exceptions. Accord, CASTAN ToBENAS, I Derecho Civil Espaiiol (1943) IOI.
Switzerland: Formerly all problems of validity were governed by the lex loci
contractus, see supra p. 399 n. z6. In its decision reversing this rule the Federal
Tribunal expressly excepted questions of formalities from the uniform law of the
contract, BG. (Feb. 12, 1952) 78 BGE. II 74 at 86.
Venezuela: C. C. art. II par. I.
On the scope of some of these provisions, see infra n. 35·
6 For imperative character: Cour Paris (May 25, I8p) S. 1852.2.289, aff'd, Cass.
(req.) (March 9, 1853) S. I85J.I.274, D. 1853.I.2I6 and others, cited by NIBOYET
676 § 553·
In Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. IJ, I889) Pasicrisie z889.2.170.
7 See the learned report by the Procureur General Baudouin, in the case, Gesling
v. Viditz, infra n. Io, Clunet I909, IO<J7, III3; cf. STORY§ 262, notes.
8 SAviGNY § 381 note (p) with references to older authors.
9 Saxony: C. C. (1863) § 9·
Italy: C. C. (I865) Disp. Pre!. art. 9·
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subject of the transaction. It is sufficient, however, to observe
the laws of the place where the transaction is made.
( 2) The provision of paragraph 1, sentence 2, shall not apply
to a transaction by which a real right is created or disposed of.
In other words, the ulex causae" is considered as governing in the first instance; but if its formal requirements are not
fulfilled, validity is saved by compliance with the local law.
This optional or permissive function of locus regit actum
has been adopted in the vast majority of modern doctrines
and enactments. 10 It has also been claimed to be the existing
1°Canada, Quebec: C. C. arts. 7, 776, as construed by the Supreme Court of
Canada, Ross v. Ross (I893) 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 307.
Austria: OGH. (Nov. 20, I894) GlU. No. I530I; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ 109;
WALKER 233·
Brazil: Former lntrod. Law (I9I6): prevailing interpretation. See C. BEVILAQUA,
I c. c. Com. I33, obs. Ij BEVILAQUA 258; I PoNTES DE MIRANDA 528; EsPINOLA,
8 Tratado 584ff.; CARVALHO SANTos, I C. C. Interpret. 154 and others (against a
small minority of writers); and the great majority of court decisions, see more
recently, App. Fed. Distr. (Sept. I4, I933) 28 Arch. Jud. 473; App. Sao Paulo
(Jan. I6, I94I) I30 Rev. Trib. Sao Paulo 655.
lntrod. Law (1942) art. 9 § I, as commented upon by EsPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd.
s86; SERPA LoPES, 2 Lei Introd. 347· Contra: TENORIO, Lei Introd. 337·
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 26.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8.
Czechoslovakia: Law of I948 on private international law, §§ 7, 8.
Denmark: BoRuM 84.
Egypt: C. C. art. 20.
France: Cass. (civ.) (July 20, I909) Gesling v. Viditz, D. I9I I.I.I85, s. I9I s.I.I6S,
Clunet I909, I097, Revue I909, 900, recognizing validity of a will under the testator's national law, but this is extended in the literature to all contracts (NIBOYET
677 § 553, LEREBOURs-PioEONNIERE 259 § 247; BATIFFOL, Traite 629) and to every
lex causae (BATIFFOL 366-367 § 429 against other writers); App. Alger (May 26,
I9I9) Revue I92I, II?, Clunet I920, 24I (will); Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 23, I921)
Revue I922, 622.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. II; similarly, the former German common law: App.
Restock (Nov. 12, I866) 24 Seuff. Arch. No. ISS; RG. (April 27, I88I) 37 Seuff.
Arch. No. I; RG. (July 7, I883) I4 RGZ. I83.
Greece: C. C. art. II.
Hungary: See ScHWARTZ, 40 Z.int.R. (I929) I99·
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (I942) art. 25.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8.
Norway: See CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 57I No. 85.
Peru: C. C. art. XX.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 5·
Siam: Law of I939 on private international law, §§ 9 par. I, I3 par. 3·
Soviet Union: Probably, MAKARov, Precis 253.
Sweden: See MALMAR, 7 Repert. I35 § xoo; NIAL 47·
Syria: C. C. art. 21.
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11

law in England.
If we say that the parties are permitted to use the local
form, this does not necessarily require that they actually
know the differences of formal prescriptions or intentionally
prefer the usages at the place where they happen to be. Although there were statutist writers who explained the rule,
locus regit actum, by self-subjection of the parties to the
consuetudo loci,12 it is well settled everywhere, excepting
a recent ill-advised English decision, 13 that the rule in any
version operates independently of the intention of the
parties. 14
In either variant, at present, the scope usually is extended
to all transactions of private law with definite exceptions.
Thus, the German provisions except transactions modifying
the title to property, subjecting them to the lex situs. However, agreements to convey property, including immovables,
in modern law generally follow the rule, locus regit actum. 15
But the Polish law and the Swiss doctrine and others also
refer to the lex situs obligations entered into to transfer or
to constitute rights in immovables situated in the forum.
These are rather regrettable rules, inviting conflicts to the
detriment of the parties acting in good faith.
Most codes, moreover, contain special rules for marriage,
adoption, wills, negotiable instruments, and other acts, which
are not included in the discussion here.

Illustration. Rhea agreed orally in South Dakota, for a
consideration of ten dollars, to convey his land situated in
Iowa to Meylink. The statute of frauds in South Dakota
11 CHESHIRE 218; DICEY (-KAHN-FREUND) 774 rule 152; GRAVESON 207; WoLFF,
Priv. Int. Law 446.
12 See, for instance, PAuL VoET, De statutis eorumque concursu, Sect. IX Cap.
2 § 9 (to be found in SAVIGNY 488, tr. Guthrie) refuted by STORY§ 26I.
13 In re Priest, Belfield v. Duncan [I944] I All E. R. 51, per Bennett, J., criticized
by KAHN-FREUND, 7 Modern L. Rev. (Nov. I944) 238.
14 Nice peripheral questions arising when parties temporarily dwell in a foreign
country have been treated by RAAPE I86.
15 This is also the well-known rule of English law, see DicEY 778, CHESHIRE 565.
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"struck," as the Iowa Court expressed it, at the contract itself
and did not admit an exception in case of partial payment.
Under the Iowa Statute, only the question whether the
contract was provable depended on a written document and
the payment of ten dollars made the sales agreement
enforceable. The Supreme Court of Iowa applied this, its
own, law on the ground that lex situs governed the entire
contractual relation. 16
As we are not concerned now with the transfer of real
property, we shall set aside this construction and consider
the configurations arising if the obligatory contract to sell
an immovable is sharply separated and construed on its own
merits, as Mr. Justice Holmes once did, 17 and many laws
do, following the advanced Roman system.
(i) Lex causae imperative. If the court had thus separated
the problems of obligation from those of title, it could have
nevertheless reached the same result, by application of the
Iowa law either as lex loci solutionis or as the law presumably
intended by the parties, assuming it to govern the entire
contractual relation. 18
(ii) Lex causae optional. German courts recognize an
agreement orally made in Germany by persons of any nationality, creating the obligation to transfer ownership, for
instance, of an Italian immovable, according to Italian law/9
although the German Civil Code, § 313, requires that an
agreement to transfer land be embodied in an instrument
drawn up by a court or notary. 20 (EG. BGB., art. I r, para15
Meylink v. Rhea (1904) 123 Iowa 310, 311, 98 N. W. 779, 780. The case is
taken as an illustration only. We shall discuss sales contracts with respect to
immovables in a special chapter in Volume III, ch. 38.
17
Polson v. Stewart (1897) 167 Mass. 211, 213, 45 N. E. 737, 738.
18 See Note, "Conflicts of laws as to contracts in relation to real property,"
L. R. A. I9I6A, lOll, I02I/f.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6 par. 3 {domestic form compulsory for contracts
concerning immovables in Poland); in accord Switzerland: see 2 ScHNITZER 590.
l i Written form is sometimes claimed to be required by Italian C. C. art. IJI4
{new 1350), also for the obligatory contract; but see FEDOZZI 251.
20
RG. {March 3, 1906) 63 RGZ. 18 states the rule. Accordingly, OLG. Miinchen
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graph r, sentence r, supra p. 489)
(iii) Lex loci contractus optional. Conversely, where two
Germans in Austria agreed by simple written contract on
the sale of a German immovable, the Austrian law of the
place of contracting sufficed to validate the act even before a
German court. 21 (EG. BGB., art. r r, paragraph r, sentence
2, supra p. 490)
(iv) Lex loci contractus obligatory. Under the doctrine
as it was formerly settled in England, compliance with the
formalities of lex loci contractus was necessary, hence all
solutions discussed above, except sub (iii), would be excluded.
The contracts in South Dakota and Germany would be unenforceable. It is very significant that, in the case of an agreement to sell land, an exception was recognized in England.
In this case, formal validity was said to be sufficiently
supported by the proper law of the contract, which in general,
though not necessarily, is the lex situs. 22
These few examples demonstrate the great interest parties
unaware of foreign law have in the rule and particularly
in its optional form.

3· Lex Causae
United States. Exactly what is the present rule in this
country? Story seemed favorable to the imperative lex loci
contractus with special reference to formalities. 28 Wharton
stated a practical concurrence of English and American jurists
in acknowledging the rule, locus regit actum, and only
doubted whether the rule was imperative or optional. 24 He
was followed by Mr. Justice Hunt, speaking for the
(Feb. 7, 1912) 26 ROLG. 246: formless promise in Germany of a trousseau valid
although the governing Austrian law required notarial form, see Law of July 25,
187I, RGB!. No. 76.
11 KG. (March I9, I92S) 44 ROLG. 152 expressly denying the objection of
public policy; RG. (May I6, I928) I2I RGZ. IS4, IS7 (Czechoslovakian immovable).
22 DICEY (ed. s) 644 exception I to Rule IS9i CHESHIRE s6s.
2a SToRY § 26o cf. § 242a.
24 2 WHARTON I436, I438 §§ 676, 679.
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Supreme Court, who stated that "obligations in respect to
the mode of their solemnization are subject to the rule locus
regit actum."25 To some writers reviewing the situation
from the angle of European doctrine, the cases appear
practically, though not by definition, to agree with the optional rule. 26 This, however, as a description of the existing
law, is certainly inaccurate.
With good reason, Lorenzen has always maintained that,
as in former times, form, unseparated from substance, is
governed by the general law of the contract, which need not
by any means be that of the place of contracting. 27 No modern
case has been found distinctly applying the law of the place
of making solely because formal validity was in question.
The decisions mostly involve the statute of frauds, immovables, insurance policies, conditional sales, and negotiable
instruments. We shall have to deal with each of these subjects later on. 28
Other countries. The Treaty of Montevideo applies its
pt inciple of lex loci solutionis also to the problems of formal
validity, with the exception only that "the forms of public
instruments are governed by the law of the place in which
they are executed."29 This exception has been criticized as
inconsistent with the principle and in the revision has been
reduced to the execution of the public forms prescribed by
the applicable law. 80 That obligations referring to immovables, though independent contracts, as remarked before,
26

Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank (1875) 91 U. S. 406, 41 r.
BATIFFOL 372 § 435; NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (1912) 893, 9o6ff. and Principles
148 § rs; HINRICHSEN, Die lex loci contractus im amerikanischen Internationalprivatrecht (Heidelberg 1933) 6.
27
LoRENZEN, 20 Yale L. J. (1911) at 427; 6 Repert. 317 No. 174; 15 Tul. L. Rev.
(1941) 165 at 173; Book Review, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) 123; see also GooDRICH
317 § 109.
28 On the Statute of Frauds, see infra II 2.
29 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civil Law (1889) art. 39 cj. 32, following the
doctrine of Gonzalo Ramirez. See ALFREDO ARoCENA, Los Actos Juridicos en el
Derecho Internacional Privado (1896, reprint Montevideo 1941).
80 2 V1co 288 § 351; Vrco, Report on the Revision of the Treaty, Republica
Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano (1940) r6s; SALAZAR id. 207.
26

FORM OF CONTRACTS

495

are compulsorily subject to the lex situs, is provided in the
Polish law. 31
4· Exceptional Rules
(a) National law. Some codifications, with the earlier
prevalence of the local law in mind, have offered as an
alternative only that the form agree with the common national law of all parties. 32 Diverse codes derive therefrom
a triple option: the form may comply with any of three
laws, that governing the whole transaction, or that of the
place of making, or the national law of all parties,33 and the
new Egyptian and Syrian codes offer another additional
form, that of the domicil of the parties. 33a
(b) Cumulated tests. The C6digo Bustamante declares
that "the law of the place of contracting and that of performance shall be applied simultaneously to the necessity of executing a public indenture or document for the purpose of giving effect to certain agreements and to that of reducing them
to writing." This seems to mean that, instead of favoring the
contract by an alternative, the requirements are cumulated. 84
This definitely is a cumbersome solution.
(c) Law of the forum. Using a method of reserving application of the lex fori, described earlier, several Latin-Ameri31

Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6; in accord Swiss writers, see 2 ScHNITZER 590·
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. II par. I.
Greece: Formerly C. C. {I856) art. 7 for Greeks abroad.
Italy: Formerly Disp. Prel. (I865) art. 9 par. I, C. Com. art. 58.
Spanish Morocco: Int. Priv. Law. art. 19, and Tangier; Int. Priv. Law, art.
Io for transactions of foreigners in the zones.
33 Greece: C. C. (1940) art. II.
Italy: Disp. Prel. (I942) art. 26.
French Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. Io knows even four possibilities for validity,
viz., the laws of nationality of the parties, those of France, those of the Protectorate,
and the laws and customs of Morocco.
aaa Egypt: C. C. art. 20.
Syria: C. C. art. 2I.
34
C6digo Bustamante, art. I8o. DE BusTAMANTE, Manual 28I § II4 gives no
reason. Probably to the same effect, the new Brazilian Introd. Law (I942) prescribing Brazilian forms, infra n. 35, nevertheless requires observation of the law
of the place of contracting.
32
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can enactments, headed by the Chilean Code, which followed
an Austrian suggestion, impose their internal formalities on
contracts "destined to have effect" in the state, a formula
which would seem to presuppose a place of performance
at the forum, but sometimes appears to require no more
than a law suit for enforcement at the forum. 35 This is also
provided in Georgia.36 An illustration has been given by a
Chilean writer: a contract of partnership, executed in France
by private instrument, is without value in Chile where solemn
execution is required. 37
On the other hand, we may recall those codes that uphold
the validity of contracts agreeing with the law of the forum. 88
Sometimes these code provisions have been understood to
cover only formal requirements; 39 with this restriction, the
rule has been adopted in several Latin American countries. 898
15 Brazil: Introd. Law (I942) art. 9 § I, a most confusing provision, seems to
envisage contracts performable in Brazil and to provide that they must follow the
formalities compulsorily prescribed in Brazil (forma essencia/). See TENORIO, Lei
Introd. 337; SERPA LoPEs, 2 Lei Introd. 347; probably also EsPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd.
6o3. But Dr. Frazao orally advises caution, because forma essencial might be
reasonably understood as referring to the necessity of a public instrument only and,
hence, might be applicable exclusively to contracts for the transfer or constitution
of rights in immovables, under C. C. art. I34 II.
Restricted to public documents:
Chile: C. C. art. I8.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8 par. 2.
Ecuador: C. C. art. I7.
El Salvador: C. C. art. I6.
Honduras: C. C. art. I6.
Panama: C. C. art. 8.
Uruguay: C. C. art. 6 par. 2.
Venezuela: C. C. art. I I par. I.
P·~rhaps also VALERY I223 § 873 and his Note, Clunet I922, 990 has been influemial on some of these laws.
Colombia: C. C. art. 22 replaces the reference to be found in the Chilean Code
to "proofs which shall have effect in Chile," by reserving "matters of national
competence"; 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 45-47 § I03I asserts that this reduced role
of the lex fori is justified, but is it clear?
II Georgia: Code Ann. (I933) § I02-I08.
17 G. PALMA RoGERS, I Derecho Comercial (I940) 3I2.
as Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ 35-37·
Argentina: C. C. art. I4 (4).
18 See, e.g., I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ I IO § 30 in reference to § 35 of the Austrian
Allg. BGB.
ua Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8 par. I.
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The Civil Code of Mexico gives an option between the
law of the place of contracting and the national law of the
forum to be exercised only when persons domiciled in the
forum contract abroad for performance within the forum. 40
This awkward legislation causes many doubts.
(d) Preponderance of lex causae. A few European writers
have postulated a general subordination of the local law to
the lex causae. 41 French authors, in particular, have been
preoccupied by the formalities of marriage, conceiving lex
causae and national law as identical, and have requested that
solemnities should always be prescribed by the lex causae;
the lex loci contractus should intervene only for determining
the acts by which or the manner in which a solemnity can be
executed. 42 Following this current, the Institute of International Law in r 92 7 adopted a set of rules by which the
law governing the substance of a transaction not only may
dispense it from solemnities required by the local lawwhich does not go beyond the optional meaning of locus regit
actum-but also may "expressly," though not by mere
construction, impose an "authentic," i.e., public, act not required locally. 43 Of course, the C6digo Bustamante, art. rSo,
goes beyond the restriction upon the local law, providing
quite generally that both the law of the place of contracting
and that of its "ejecuci6n"-which probably means performance-shall be applied simultaneously to the necessity
of properly executing a public indenture or document.
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners of 1936, art. 24 sent. 3; Law on Constitution of
Judicial Power of 1936, art. XXIII par. I.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VI {14) par. 2.
Panama: C. C. art. 7·
40 Mexico: C. C. (1928) art. rs.
41 In particular for the protection of the national Jaw, I FRANKENSTEIN 522;
DEVos, I6 Revue Inst. Beige (I930) I33 at ISS and writers cited therein; DEVos,
2 Probleme 689.
42 2 ARMINJON I3S § 59 with references. Contra: especially LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 360 § 315 who observes that the parties cannot know which law will govern.
43
Annuaire I927 III I8S, 3I7, 335 (art. VI). To a similar effect, Belgian revised
draft, art Io, NEUMANN, IPR. 20I.
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In the field of obligatory contracts, such theses seldom
have been put into actual practice. At most, there are instances
like the following. The German Reichsgericht has reasonably
argued that parties selecting the applicable law are supposed
to leave to this law, which is the lex causae, the decision
whether it recognizes the maxim, locus regit actum. 44 Another
case has aroused much attention. Membership in a German
private limited company ( Gesellschaft mit beschrankter H aftung) cannot be transferred except by a public instrument.
At a time when this type of corporation had not yet been
adopted in Switzerland, a transfer of such a membership
was made there by simple written contract, under the general
Swiss rule that contracts need no form. A German court
invalidated the contract on the ground of German public
policy discarding the rule, locus regit actum. 45 Others attained
the same result by the argument that the Swiss law of the
time had no provision at all for this specific type of contract. 46
The local law, thus, would only be applicable, if it recognizes
the same kind of contract. This proposition, however, is
strikingly inconsistent with the assumption that parties may
evade the most solemn formalities of the lex causae by
using less or no formality under the law of the place where
they are. In fact, the decision should have been justified
on a third basis. The formal and substantive requirements
of transfer of membership do not pertain to the scope of
obligatory contracts but are a part of the personal law of
the corporation. German law, hence, determined imperatively
the formal conditions of a change in the membership; and
contrary to the Reichsgericht, it should not make any difference what formality is prescribed by the present Swiss
44

RG. (Feb. 27, 1913) Warn.Rspr. 1913, No. 302.
OLG. Karlsruhe (July rr, 1901) 3 ROLG. 263, rr Z.int.R. 458; NIEMEYER,
Das IPR. des BGB. rr6. Contra: RAAPE r89 and IPR. 2ro.
46
RG. (March 22, 1939) r6o RGZ. 225, 228, evidently following the views of
I FRANKENSTEIN 201 n. 156; LEWALD 69 No. 91.
45
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law in the case of Swiss private limited companies.

II.
1.

ScoPE OF THE RULEs

Concept of Formal Requirements

There is practically no doubt that the concept of form
includes the problems whether oral conclusion suffices or
there is required written documentation, use of certain words,
signature with one's own hand, seal; co-operation of a public
official, such as authentication of signatures and minutes of
declarations of consent, taking oaths, or entry in a public
register; presence of witnesses; service of declaration by
registered mail, or by a sheriff or marshal, et cetera. On
the other hand, it is also certain that formality has nothing
to do with capacity to contract/ 7 with agency; with the questions whether an obligation is created by a unilateral declaration, and whether declarations must reach the addressee in
order to be effective; with the rules of evidence; and with
the consent of third parties, called in certain countries "forme
habilitante." It is obvious that formal in contrast with substantive requirements are concerned with the exterior of
contractual declarations, the means of expressing eonsent.
However, the border lines between form and substance are
not free from uncertainty in all laws, and this gives the
dominant theory one more opportunity to entrust to the
domestic law of the forum the power to decide what should
be form in the meaning of the conflicts rule. 48 The opposite
47 It is true, there is a theory of a few French writers that such a provision as
that requiring promises of gift to be in writing (French C. C. art. 9JI; German
BGB. § SIS and many other codes) involves the capacity of the donor rather than
form and hence are subject to his national law. See 2 LAURENT 4331f. §§ 24off.,
6 id. 693 § 4I7; LEON DuouiT, Des conflicts de legislations relatifs a Ia forme des
actes civils (Paris I882) IIJ (unavailable); PouLLET § 289; RoLIN, Annuaire I925,
228; NIBOYET 66o-66I § 537· This has been generally recognized as an error. See
e.g., PILLET, 2 Traite 459 § 623; WEiss, 3 Traite III; KosTERS I9o; ARMINJON,
2 Precis § S9·
48 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. III; LEwALD 6s; MELCHIOR 143 § 98; NussBAuM,
IPR. 89; RAAPE 174 and IPR. 215 (with uncertain restrictions).
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theory of characterization, according to the law referred to,
results in applying the municipal provisions of the law at the
place of making to those problems which are considered problems of form at this place. 49 In the writer's opinion, the precise domain of form must be defined, for the purpose of
conflicts law, according to the common denominator of what
is regarded as form in the various municipal systems: Form is
the external side of the making of the contract, the expression
as opposed to the content of legal declarations. A separate rule
for "form" as contrasted with "substance" of the contract
is only justified, if at all, by the relatively minor importance
of the manners of expression. If the Dutch Code provides-to
use the most celebrated example, although it deals with
wills and not with contracts-that a Dutchman should not
make a testament in a foreign country by private document,
this regards form. To characterize this provision as one restricting capacity to make a will, as many French writers
have done, is a plain artifice, which no Dutch lawyer employs. 50 In reality, the Dutch conflicts rule permitting local
foreign forms is discarded in this case. Other countries may
or may not give effect to this prohibition by adjusting their
conflicts rules, as a matter of international policy. But it is
difficult to see why they should yield to this exorbitant Dutch
pretension. All countries have a stake in the security of
transactions, not to be disturbed by willful national claims.
Still less, are singular national "characterizations" entitled
to extraterritorial recognition. It is a perfect parallel to the
controversial character of compulsory religious marriage. 51
Hence, if the law of the place of contracting, that governing
the contract, or that of the forum should have developed some
extraordinary method of tracing the border line between
form and capacity or other substantive incidents, this is imt•

M. WoLFF, IPR. 128.

See MELCHIOR 143 § 98.
uSee citations Vol. I (ed. 2, 1958) pp. 2J0-2JJ.
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material for the scope of the conflicts rule relating to form.
2.

Form and Procedure52

(a) Statute of Frauds. The variants in which the old
Statute of Frauds ( 1677 ) 53 reappears in British and American
statutes, 54 all contain formal requirements, if judged according to the normal conceptions of a modern lawyer, and
therefore have to be taken as subject to the conflicts rules
concerning form. It does not matter how a statute of frauds
is treated for particular purposes of municipal law in the
positive practice of courts. This, indeed, agrees with the conclusion of recent English and American writers,55 strengthened by the French parallels to be discussed hereafter, as
well as with the prevailing attitude of American cases. 56 In this
country, Leroux v. Brown57 and the American cases following
this ill-famed precedent or other mistaken theories 58 should
no longer continue to be held as authority. 59 The arguments
62 It is not intended to deal here with those contracts made for procedural
purposes previous to or during a lawsuit, such as submission to arbitration or to a
state court, confession, release, waiver of remedies. They involve particular conflicts
problems not thoroughly investigated thus far.
63
29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 4·
"'On the maximum amounts for oral agreements in the various jurisdictions
of the British Commonwealth and the United States, see RABEL, I Recht des
Warenkaufs IIO-II2. For a summary of American cases, see PARMELE, "Statute
of Frauds and conflict of laws," ro5 A. L. R. (I936) 652-68I; DoBBINs, "Conflict
of Laws-Statute of Frauds as Defense to Enforcement of Contract Executed in
One State and Sued on in Another State. [Illinois]," 3 Wash. and Lee L. Rev.
(1941) 103; BRIDGFORTH, "The Mississippi Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of
Laws," 14 Miss. L. J. (I942) 256; Note, 6 Md. L. Rev. (1942) 262.
65 BECKETT, CHESHIRE, LoRENZEN, CHEATHAM, BEALE, GooDRICH cited Vol. I
(ed. 2, I958) p. 55· This was also STORY's well-known position (ed. I, I 834) § 262, and
that of 2 WHARTON § 690 and THAYER, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 390ff.
56
Cochran v. Ward (1892) 5 Ind. App. 89, 29 N. E. 795; Franklin Sugar Refining
Co. v. Lipowicz (1928) 247 N.Y. 465, 16o N. E. 916 with ample references; Oakes v.
Chicago Fire Brick Co. (1941) 3II Ill. App. III, 35 N. E. (2d) 522 following "the
weight of authority."
67 (1852) 12 C. B. 8o1.
68
LoRENZEN, "The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Yale L. J.
(1923) 3II, 315-318; STUMBERG 143-147·
69
Because of uncertain arguments in a few cases, noted in 3 Wash. and Lee
L. Rev. (1941) IOJ; 14 Miss. L. J. (I942) 256; 6 Md. L. Rev. (I942) 262, some
annotators have assumed a continued grave division of opinion.
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underlying the better modern approach have been vigorously
expounded in Lorenzen's excellent papers60 and more recently
summarized by the Delaware Superior Court :61 ( 1) It assures
more security for the inhabitants of a state to know that all
contracts made in such state either must be written or may
be oral, respectively; (2) while England has one statute
of frauds, there are as many as there are jurisdictions in
this country; and (3) the fate of a contract ought not to
depend on selecting a court before which to bring the suit.
As the significance of this classification has been treated on
an earlier occasion,S2 it remains only to illustrate the practical
effects by a few cases.
(i) Goods of more than £10 value were sold in England
without a memorandum in writing. Although English courts
may have regarded the unenforceability of an action on the
contract as Jack of a remedy, foreign courts had to apply
section 4 of the English Sale of Goods Act as a part of
English law, deemed to govern the form. 68
(ii) An oral agreement was entered into in Tennessee,
to sell a quantity of cheese free on board cars in Wisconsin.
The amount involved exceeded the permitted scope of an
executory oral contract under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin
court held the contract governed by the law of Tennessee
because it was so intended by the parties, and therefore valid. 64
(iii) Even though the forum were to characterize its own
statute of frauds as "procedural," it will confine this characterization to the purposes of domestic private and procedural law. It will not apply this statute to contracts the
form of which is regarded as governed by foreign law.
That courts in this field would tend to uphold the contract
LoRENZEN, supra n. ss.
Lams et ux. v. Smith Co. (I93S) 36 Del. 477, I78 Atl. 6SI; the importance
of this decision has been noted IOS A. L. R. (I936) 646; Clunet I937, 873 with
Note by Barbey; BARBEY, Le Conflit 94, 97·
62 Vol. I (ed. 2, IgS8) pp. ssff.
83
LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (I923) 3II at 3IS.
64 D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (I9I4) ISS Wis. S4I, I4S
N.
372.
60
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by the means of choice of law cannot fairly be stated. Most
cases have been of such nature as to justify in the opinion
of the courts the application of the law of the place of contracting, often identical with the law of the forum. 65 Other
decisions favor the law of the place of performance over the
l.L!x loci contractus for various reasons. 66
(b) Exclusion of nonwritten evidence. The French Civil
Code (art. I 34 I) provides that any transaction exceeding
the value of (originally) one hundred fifty francs must be
executed before a notary or by private writing, and that no
proof by witnesses is accepted. This provision has been widely
imitated, with many variants in civil and commercial laws.
Testimony may be entirely excluded, as under the former
Russian law; or some mention of the agreement in a letter
suffices as a "commencement" of proof which may be completed by testimony; or the agreement is enforceable, if the
other party admits its making. Also in France witnesses may
be admitted to testify to a commercial agreement in the discretion of the court. 67
In the French tradition, stemming from the fourteenth
century, all these provisions belong to the group of decisoria
litis, contrasted with ordinatoria: they are notmerelydestined
to regulate the course of proceeding but also to decide the
substance of the suit. In this conception repeatedly pronounced by the French Supreme Court and shared by the
65 Resulting in validity: Hunt v. Jones (1879) 12 R. I. 265, 34 Am. Rep. 635;
Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. (1886) 15 R.I. 380, 2 Am. St. Rep. 902; J. H. Ellis
and Cap Baker v. The Eagle-Picher Lead Co. (1924) u6 Kan. 144, 225 Pac. 1072;
Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. {1925) 8 F. (2d) 601; and
particularly Lams et ux. v. Smith Co. (1935) supra n. 61.
Resulting in unenforceability: Dacosta and Davis v. Davis and Hatch (1854)
24 N. J. Law (4 Zab.) 319; Cochran v. Ward (1892) 29 N. E. 795; Osborne v.
Dannatt (1914) 167 Iowa 615, 149 N. W. 913 (Nebraska law).
16 See for a list PARMELE, supra n. 54, 105 A. L. R. (1936) 675-677.
Garnes v. Frazier & Foster (Ky. 1909) uS S. W. 998 rejects the action on the
basis of the law of the forum which was also that of the place of performance as
against the lex loci contractus of West Virginia. The court seems to construe the
defense as a remedy depriving the plamtiff of a cause of action.
87 See the survey in RABEL, I Recht des Warenkaufs 108-uo.
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overwhelming majority of the Latin countries, legal presumptions, judicial confession, and certain kinds of party
oaths terminating litigation, also are substantive matters and
governed by the lex causae, at least to the extent that none
of these procedural means is admissible unless it is permitted
by the law governing the substance. 68
This theory of "preconstituted proofs" certainly extends
the domain of substantive law further and restricts that of
procedure more than the common law or the laws of Northern
and Central Europe can concede. A French writer, on the
background of comparative research, suggests in fact the
elimination of such institutions as confession and oath from
the doctrine. 69
But, notwithstanding some doubts in past times 70 and
isolated opposition by modern writers/ 1 the rules restricting
testimony by witnesses in favor of written documentation
generally enjoy classification as pertaining to formalities in
the meaning of conflicts law. 72 This is a very interesting fact.
It is quite true that the idea of legislators drafting such
18 Cass. (civ.) (February 23, 1864) D. r864.1.166, S. r864.1.385; and many other
decisions, particularly Cass. (civ.) (June 14, 1899) Abdy v. Abdy, S. I9QO.I.22S,
Clunet 1899, 804 followed in the same cause by Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 6, 1905) D.
I90S·I.48I, S. 1907·1·393, Clunet 1906, 412. Cj. PILLET, Note, S. I9QO.I.22S;
SuRVILLE 667 n. 3; NrBOYET 678 § 557; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 341 § 318;
BATIFFOL 376 § 442. And see for the application of the Ordonnance de Moulins,
1566, art. 54, precursor of C. C. art. 1341, DANTY, Traite de Ia preuve par temoins
(ed. 6, 1769) 49 No. 1I.
89
BATIFFOL 377 § 444·
70 Obertribunal Stuttgart (Sept. 25, 1858) 13 Seuff. Arch. No. 182, cited by
LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923) at 319 n. 31 and 334 n. 81 is not representative of
the German doctrine.
71
FRANKENSTEIN 364-370 and in JW. 1929, 3506; RAAPE 175, later abandoned,
IPR. 219. However, the West German Supreme Court has recently endorsed this
view, BGH. (July 30, 1954) Juristenzeitung 1955, 702, Revue Crit. 1956, 58.
72 See the long list of writers, collected by LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923)
at 329 n. 66.
Germany: 2 BAR 377 § 395; KG. (Oct. 25, 1927) JW. 1929, 448, IPRspr. 1929
No. 7 (oral agreement in Russia exceeding value of soo gold rubles; Soviet Code of
Civil Procedure applied); RABEL, 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 280 and authors cited;
NussBAUM, IPR. 90; RAAPE, IPR. 218, 3·
Greece: App. Athens (318/1934) cited by FRAGISTAS, 10 Z.aus!.PR. (1936) 644.
Poland: S. Ct. (Nov. 18, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 380.
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provtswns centers in the procedural situation of a snit on
the contract; originally they attempted to obviate perjury
by bribed witnesses. But, as the French Advocate General
in a learned report of I 8 8o remarked, in the eyes of the
parties making a contract, the problem is whether they must
reduce it to writing. 73 This, however, is enough of a form
problem for the purpose of conflicts law, despite the fact
that admission of a witness is certainly a judicial act.
Lorenzen has correctly co-ordinated this indirect compulsion to writing with the statutes of frauds, both to
be treated under the conflicts rule concerning formalities.
Johnson, too, writing in Quebec, has seen the analogy of
the two institutions (which in reality rests upon a close
historical connection), and, after hesitating between Leroux
v. Brown and the French doctrine, wisely preferred the
latter. 74
(c) Parol evidence. In England and the United States,
the rules excluding parol evidence controverting the text
of written contracts have sometimes been construed as remedial/5 but the great weight of authority classifies them as
substantive for the purpose of conflicts law. 76 This sound
view agrees with the Continental theory. 77
3· Form and Revenue Law
A vivid discussion went on for a time between followers
73
Proc. Gen. Desjardin in the case Benton v. Horeau, Cass. (civ.) (August 24,
I88o) D. I88o.I.447, Clunet I88o, 480.
74
3 JoHNSON 704-724. Historical analysis, as I may add, joins the English and
French legislation in an unsuspected relationship. The Statute, in fact, was inspired
by the French Ordonnance de Moulins of A. D. IS66, art. 54, predecessor of arts.
I34Iff., C. C., and both to a large extent had the very purpose of prescribing formalities. See RABEL, "The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History," 63 Law
Q. Rev. (I947) I74·
76
Downer v. Chesebrough (I869) 36 Conn. 39, 4 Am. Rep. 29.
76
Dunn v. Welsh (I879) 62 Ga. 24I; Baxter Nat'! Bank v. PeterS. J. Talbot
(I89I) I54 Mass. 2I3, 28 N. E. I63; Restatement § 599; THAYER, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence (I898) 390; WIGMORE, 5 Evidence {ed. 2, 1923) § 2400;
GooDRICH 249 § 89; STuMBERG I43·
77
See French C. C. art. IJ4I and its literature cited above.
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of the idea that the revenue laws of a foreign state are not
to be enforced/ 8 and the advocates of locus regit actum. The
former denied/ 9 the latter recommended80 the rejection of
contracts that are declared void for want of a stamp at the
place of making. Older English decisions have recognized
the invalidity imposed by the law of the place of contracting.81 But in the field of bills of exchange where the question
is more important, the British Bills of Exchange Act of I 8 82
departed from this view, 82 and the Geneva Convention of
1930 concerning stamp laws, adopted by many countries,83
pronounced that the validity or the exercise of the rights
flowing from such instrument shall not be subordinated to
the observance of the provisions concerning the stamp.
It seems high time to generalize this sound principle, in
agreement with the American cases. Since one of the two
conflicting views must yield, it stands to reason that laws
clinging to fiscal sanctions against the security of contracts
should be internationally ignored.
78 In re Visser, H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [I928] Ch. 877; Moore
v. Mitchell (I929) 30 F. (2d) 6oo, note opinion of Learned Hand, J., reproduced by
3 BEALE I637·
79 United States! Ann. Cas. I9I5 B 844, Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer (I8o6) I
Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 94i Skinner v. Tinker (N. Y. r86r) 34 Barb. S. C. 333·
Italy! App. Napoli (Dec. 29, I926) I9 Rivista (I927) 268.
80 NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 89 n. 2, 3I9 n. 5 cites and approves a few Continental
cases; FEoozzi 255 and GooDRICH 3I9 approve the older English view.
81 Alves v. Hodgson (I797) 7 T. R. 24I at 243 by Kenyon, C. J. "Then it is said
that we cannot take notice of the revenue laws of a foreign country; but I think we
must resort to the laws of the country in which the note was made, and unless it be
good there it is not obligatory in a court of law here." Clegg v. Levy (I8I2) 3
Camp. I66; Bristow v. Sequeville (I85o) 5 Ex. D. 275; Republica de Guatemala
v. Nuiiez [I927] I K. B. 669. In case the foreign law declares only that an unstamped
contract is inadmissible as proof, the English courts applied their procedural
theory of disregarding the foreign rule of evidence, James v. Catherwood (I82J) 3
D. & R. I9Q; In re Visser, H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [I928] Ch. 877.
See DICEY 848 note 28; CHESHIRE 2I9.
82 45 & 46 Viet., British Bills of Exchange Act, I882, c. 6I, s. 72 (I) (a).
Canada: An Act relating to Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes,
Rev. Stat. I927, c. I6 s. I6o (a).
83 Convention concerning Stamp Laws in connection with Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes, Geneva, June 7. I930i HuDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 56o No. 26o;
see literature cited Vol. I (ed. 2, I958) p. 38.

FORM OF CONTRACTS
4· Determinations of the Place of Contracting
The question where to locate the place of contracting
again arises, with all its grave difficulties.
(a) Contract by correspondence. On the ground of the
usual characterization "according to the lex fori," a contract
is considered made at the place where the final act necessary
under the law of the forum for completing the consent is
done. 84 We have discussed this approach before. 86 It may
suffice to remember that under this method a German court
should ascertain a place of contracting in the United States
by consulting the German Civil Code. By another approach,
out of sheer dogmatism, cumulative application of the consent
requirements in both domiciliary laws has been advocated 86
Continued discussion of the problem has fostered more
propctsals and a more complex situation. 87 A unilateral act,
however, such as giving notice to a debtor or making a binding offer, though usually becoming legally significant only
upon its reception, is generally held in conflicts law to have
occurred at the place where it is sent. 88
This confusion is incurable. The maxim, locus regit actum,
was not invented for contracts or acts by correspondence, any
84
United States: Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (Tenn. I943) 172 S. W.
(zd) 8Iz; 2 BEALE Io69ff. §§ 325.I, 326.I.
Germany: RG. (Feb. I2, I906) 62 RGZ. 379, 38I (where the acceptance is declared in the case of§ I5I BGB., cf. LEWALD 7off.); RG. (Jan. 29, I9oi) I2 Z.int.R.
II3 (where the formal act is completed); GEILER in I Diiringer-Hachenburg 55 n. 20.
86 Contra: RAAPE I78; supra Chapter 30 pp. 455ff.; in this special field the theory
of Bartin was theoretically attacked by MARCEL VAUTHIER, Sens et applications
de Ia regie locus regit actum (Bruxelles I926) IOiff.
86 I BAR 36I; NIEDNER, EG. BGB. art. II; 2 ZITELMANN I64; RAAPE, IPR (d. 1)
I30 abandoned in ed. 4, 2I4; also OLG. Celie (Nov. 7, 1879) 35 Seuff. Arch. No. 89;
apparently also Czechoslovakian Law of 1948 on private international law, § 8.
Contra: NEUMEYER, 22 Z.int.R. (1912) 519.
87
See the hard task faced by RAAPE 178-I81.
ZwEIGERT makes the noteworthy suggestion, "Zum Abschlussort schuldrechtlicher Distanzvertrage," I Festschrift Rabel (1954) 631-654, that the offeror may
comply with the form of the place where he sends the offer, and the offeree with
the form of the place where he sends the acceptance; followed by RAAPE IPR. 2I4.
88 HABICHT 89; WALKER 229; NEUMEYER, IPR. I4; FRANKENSTEIN S4S; RAAPE
177 and IPR. 213.
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more than was the lex loci contractus. If it is to be practicable
in our time, it ought to be appropriately modified.
(b) Determination by the parties. If the parties agree
that their contract should be deemed to be made at a certain
place, while they make the contract at another place, the
local law of the place indicated is not able to prevail over
both the law of the real place of contracting and that governing the contract. But it may, and generally will, be itself
the lex causae, by virtue of the party agreement. This is a
controversial consideration, however, with respect to signatures on negotiable instruments, if they need the indication of a place of issuance and name an agreed location. 89

III.
I.

OPERATION oF THE RuLEs

Solemnities Prescribed by Lex Causae

Even though a court may follow exclusively the formal
requirements of the law governing the entire contract-as
American courts do-it has to account for local differences
in particulars. Therefore the following rule of the Restatement is true beyond its intended scope:

"§ 335· The law of the place of contracting determines
whether an instrument alleged to be a contract under
seal is effectively sealed; whether it is duly executed and
delivered ...."
This rule is meant pleonastically to explain the principle
that formal validity is altogether determined by the law of
the place of contracting. However, it must apply also to
some effect when, contrary to the Restatement, another law
governs validity and requires an instrument under seal.
On the other hand, contracts governed by the law of the
forum and thereby needing some publicity, may be executed
89 Germany: RG. (Jan. rs, 1894) J'l RGZ. IIS, II7. On the controversy and the
position of the Geneva Convention of 1930, see BRAcco, La Legge Uniforme sulla
cambiale (1935) 27; ScHNITZER, Handelsr. 383.
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outside the state in an analogous but not identical manner.
This, in fact, seems to be the meaning of the elaborate provisions commonly found in American statutes, declaring what
officers may take acknowledgments outside the state in the
United States and without the United States. 90 New York
has a long list of such foreign officers, qualified according
to different countries. 91 Only in Ohio is it expressed that
"any instrument in conformity with the law of the foreign
country is valid,"92 but if Oregon declares it unnecessary
for the instrument to state that "it is executed according to
the laws of the country where made," 93 the idea evidently
is prevalent that a deed acknowledged before a consul of the
United States, a French notary, or a German court is sufficient at the forum, if the officer conforms to his own law. The
main importance of these provisions concerns their application to deeds disposing of real estate in the state, but is not
confined to them.
The same is true in civil law countries, at least to the
extent that, if in one country notarial form is prescribed, a
notarial document of another is satisfactory despite differences
of officers, recitals, witnesses, signatures, and recording. 94
Even under a conflicts rule such as that of Venezuela requiring public instruments or private documentation according
to its own Civil Code,95 it may be presumed that these
writings can be drawn up according to the local style. The
new text of the Montevideo Treaty expressly provides that
the formalities pertaining to the class or "quality" of instru90 See CARL Louis MEIER, Anderson's Manual for Notaries Public (Cincinnati
I940) §§ I62ff.
H New York: Book 49, Real Property Law (McKinney I936) § 30I, Book 49,
Real Property Law (McKinney I944) §§ 30I, 30Ia.
92 Ohio: Rev. Code Ann. (I953) § 5301.06.
93 Oregon: Rev. Stat. (I953) § 93-520, L. I907, c. I69 § I p. 325.
94 Universal doctrine, evidently meant to be expressed in the Brazilian Introductory Law (I942) art. 9 § I. See, e.g., '2 BAR 379 § 397; NIBOYET 66o §§ 535,
536; HABICHT 87.
95 Venezuela: C. C. (I942) art. I I par. '2.
See other references supra n. 35·
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ments required by the governing law (which is always the
lex loci solutionis) is determined by the law of the place
of contracting (art. 36).
Very cautious provisions looking in the same direction
are contained in the Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of
Attorney, sponsored by the Pan-American Union, of which
the United States is a member. 96
It is regrettable that numerous European writers have
confused these obvious rules by talking of the "imperative
character" of locus re git actum, because a notary has necessarily to follow the procedure prescribed by his own law. 97
In reality, the principal function of locus regit actum is not
even in question, but, on the one hand, internal rules are
construed so as to permit authentication by foreign officials, 98
and, on the other hand, the foreign official obeys the regulations of his own state by virtue of administrative rather than
conflicts law. 99
An important doubt has been raised, however, concerning
the equivalence of the institutions for securing evidence. In
France, from Roman times, and in many other countries
by old, if less venerable, tradition, notaries form a veritable
profession of accepted standing with proper education, organization, and discipline. Their intervention in the drawing
of minutes and records implies a certain investigation into
the physical and mental state of the parties appearing and
affords certain guarantees beyond the identification of persons. The question is whether notaries public or other officers
in the Anglo-American countries, in Denmark, Sweden, and
others, can replace a French notary or a German notary or
98
56 Stat. 1376, arts. V, IX, X, 36 Am. ]. Int. Law (I942) Supp. at 195, 196.
See supra p. I96 n.
97 2 LAINE 409 § 226; DEsPAGNET 663fT. § 2I7; Institute of International Law,
Draft I927, Annuaire I927 III 335 art. 4·
88 NEUMEYER, Annuaire 1927 III 169, I7Ii NussBAUM, D. IPR. 94i BARMAT,
supra n. I, 358.
99 NEUMEYER, Annuaire I927 III 170; BARMAT, supra n. I, I33, 359·
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court not only in authenticating signatures, which is unchallenged, but also in establishing a French ccacte authentique''
or a German ccoffentliche Beurkundung eines Rechtsgeschafts."100
In the United States, acknowledgments may be taken in
all jurisdictions, before notaries or similar officers, in procedures analogous to the two elements of a European notarial
document, viz., the certification by the public officer entitled
to full faith, and the party's declaration, the object of the
certification, which may be refuted by ordinary evidence. 101
The party may produce an instrument and acknowledge
having signed it; by the reference in the certification and
inclusion in the official record, the requirements for German
notarial minutes, for instance, are literally fulfilled. 102 Of
course, proceedings and background for such authentications
vary. Also, a contract under seal is generally perfected by
delivery of the instrument, whereas a civil law contract requires acceptance of the promise. Nevertheless, the European
courts have generally not hesitated to accept American certifications, even in matters not permitting the use of a foreign
local form, such as articles of association for a German
limited partnership or a conveyance of real estate.
A special situation exists in New Yark. An opinion of a
New Y ark Attorney General has encouraged the notaries
to adjust their declarations and attestations completely to the
requirements for proper recordation in any foreign state. 103
The notary does not assume responsibility for the validity
of his act, nor would the county clerk attest to more than
the genuineness of the notary's signature and his qualification
to act as notary in the state. Nevertheless, the act may come
1 00 The problem has been noted with the request of inquiry by I FRANKENSTEIN
536; RAAPE 165; M. WoLFF, IPR. 128. Cf. Clunet 1910, 478.
1o1 GLASSON et TISSIER, 2 Traite de procedure civile (ed. 3, 1926) 679 § 6o3;
DALLoz, 9 Repert. Pratique 392ff. §§ 14off.
1o2 Germany: Law on Voluntary Jurisdiction § 176.
1oa State of New York, Annual Report of the Attorney General {1941) 458.
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fairly close to foreign models. It is surprising, though, and
may stir doubts abroad, that the legal basis of this practice,
notable in itself, should be found in a clause of the New
York notary law dealing only with bills of exchange and
promissory notes. 104 It may be timely to suggest that these
provisions be expressed in a separate clause when a future
law is drafted.
2.

Form Agreeable to Lex Loci Contractus

The proper meaning of the rule, locus regit actum, goes
farther than the mere substitution of a foreign solemnity for
the domestic formality. Limitations upon such replacement
often have been attempted, but provoked such unanswerable
questions as whether an English will of a Frenchman attested
by two witnesses, or a holographic will of a Frenchman made
in Louisiana in the presence of his wife, may be recognized
in France as an ccacte authentique," 105 or, after all, what
106
ccacte" is ccauthentique'' and what is not.
As the rule has
come to be interpreted, in the common opinion, no other
solemnity is needed than that required at the locus, and
none, if the transaction takes place in a jurisdiction where
no formality is necessary.
Thus, under the Civil Code of Quebec, a promise to make
a gift needs notarial form, and the original is to be kept of
1 04 Executive Law, Consolidated Laws of New York I909, Vol. 2, c. IS§ IOS (I)
{Book r8, Executive Law, McKinney 1916): "A notary public has authority:
r. Anywhere within the state to demand acceptance and payment of foreign and
inland bills of exchange and of promissory notes, and may protest for the nonacceptance or non-payment thereof, to exercise such powers and duties as by the
law of nations and according to commercial usage, or by the laws of any other
government, state or country, may be performed by notaries." Only the following
subsection (2), Consolidated Laws of New York 1909, Vol. 2, c. 18 § 105 (2) {Book
r8, Executive Law, McKinney 1916) and Laws 1943, c. 333, concerns the power
to take affidavits and to certify the acknowledgment and proof of deeds and other
written instruments.
105 Long ago the courts answered wisely in the affirmative; Cass. {civ.) (Feb. 6,
1843) S. 1843 1.209; Cass. {req.) {July 3, 1854) S. I854·1.417.
1os On this dispute, especially among Dutch authors, see BARMAT, supra n. 1, 3521f.

FORM OF CONTRACTS
record; but the same section of the Code expressly recognizes execution validly made outside the province without
notarial form. 107
Public policy. But does public policy of the law governing
the contract not react unfavorably, especially if it happens
also to be the law of the forum? Can a law requiring certain
acts to be clothed in writing and especially ordaining recording by public instrument, in order to secure serious deliberation before the deal and reliable evidence after it, simply
be avoided by the parties going abroad? The objection has
been voiced in various ways by Paul Voet and later authors,
refuted by Waechter and Savigny, and repeated again by
modern writers up to Niboyet and Frankenstein. 108 Several
Latin-American codes, mentioned earlier, have been inspired
by similar ideas. 109 To this, the reply has always been 110
that opportunities to obtain consular authentication, though
useful, are insufficient, that the old customary rule precisely
intends to give the parties the right to conclude their transaction under any sovereign, and that the privilege given to
the parties serves international business and security. It may
be admitted that the doubt has some foundation in such vital
matters as recognition of children and perhaps also marriage
contracts. But the tutorial concern of legislation for persons
engaging in a surety agreement, a promise to make a gift
1 07 Quebec: C. C. art. 776. Even a petitory action was maintained on a deed of
sale of Quebec land made under private signature in Chicago, Brosseau v. Bergevin
(1905) 27 Que. S. C. 5!0; 3 }OHNSON 332.
108 SeeP. VoET, op. cit. supra n. r2; FoELIX (ed. r, 1843) 96 § 58, (ed. 3) § 82,
I and IV with citations; 2 LAURENT §§ 240 ff., 6 id. §§ 4I7ff.; NEUBECKER 79;
NrsoYET 66I § 537; I FRANKENSTEIN 52off.; EcoNoMoPouws in 2 Acta, International Academy of Comparative Law (I935) Part 2, 522.
1 09 Supra n. 35; see for instance, BEVILAQUA 259ff. commenting on Brazilian law.
The dominant liberal rule, however, is adopted, for instance, in Argentina, see S.
Ct., 2I Fallos 25I, 23 id. 526; 32 id. rr8.
110 WAECHTER, 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (I842) 4I3; SAVIGNY § 38I, GuTHRIE in his
translation 324 note (n) discussing English law; 2 WHARTON I463 § 695; I BAR 350;
SuRVILLE 301 Nos. I9off.; WALKER 224; 2 ARMINJON 134 § 59; FEoozzr 250. For
wills in particular, see WErss, 4 Traite 647ff.; FEoozzr 253.
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or an obligation to convey land must not extend over the
entire world. Even though parties could temporarily go
abroad for the sole purpose of obtaining an easier mode of
contracting, the establishment of an exception for the repression of such evasion 111 would open the door to inquisitions harmful to the great task of cclocus regit actum."
The French Court of Cassation, indeed, although always
particularly wary of the observance of French law by French
nationals, has not hesitated to recognize in two leading cases
a marriage contract made in Constantinople and a donation
made in Canada, both formally valid according to the respective local laws but not in compliance with the French Code;
ordinary obligatory contracts are included by an obvious
argumentum a fortiori. 112
Also in the United States, although a few courts have not
been certain how to treat their domestic statutes of frauds,
if such a court should decide to construe its statute as nonprocedural, it would hesitate to enforce it as an expresswn
of public policy. 113
3· Renvoi
As usual, renvoi may serve to relax a too rigid conflicts
rule. Argentina decrees an imperative lex loci contractus for
formal validity. Whether renvoi is admitted in Argentina,
111 Recently, 2 ARMINJON 161 ff § 68; RAAPE 189, but now IPR. 212. The contrary
dominant opinion is approved in Norwegian law by GJELSVIK, Das internationale
Privatrecht in Norwegen (Leipzig 1935) 125.
112 Cass. (req.) (Aprilr8, 1865) S. r865.1.317; Cass. (civ.) Oune 29, 1922) D.
1922.1.127, S. 1923.1.249; NIBOYET 678ff. § 557; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 339
§ 315; 2 ARMINJON 134ff. §59·
111 One of the few cases regarded as adopting this view, following WHARTON 1442
§ 690 is Barbour v. Campbell (1917) 101 Kan. 616, 168 Pac. 879. See also the
obiter dictum in Farley v. Fair et ux. (1927) 144 Wash. 101, 256 Pac. 1031.
An analogous suggestion in Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William D. Mullen Co.
(D. C. D. Del. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 470, 473 was reversed (C. C. A. 3d 1926) 12 F. (2d)
885. Contra: See Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 141.
148, 162 N. W. 1082, 1085; Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (1914) ISS
Wis. 541, 145 N. W. 372 (supra p. 502); Henning v. Hill (1923) So Ind. App. 363,
141 N. E. 66; and see LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J, (1923) at 334ff., 105 A. L. R. (1936)
652, 66gff.
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is an unsettled question, but it has been hypothetically resorted to in several cases. 114 In fact, if we suppose a contract
made in Quebec, void there under the domestic law but
valid under the law of New York where it is to be performed, and the parties have stipulated for New York law,
a Quebec court would have to apply the lex causae under
the optional rule locus regit actum. An Argentine court
ought to decide in the same way by use of transmittance. But
any American court should judge likewise, independently
of its theories of either formal validity or renvoi. In the
case where the two foreign laws involved agree in the result,
foes of renvoi have perforce conceded its necessity.
4·

Defective Form

Where parties have failed to comply exactly with both
the forms of the lex causae and the lex loci actus, the effects
of nonobservance may be very different in the two laws.
Accordingly, in the traditional meaning of locus regit actum,
a party may avail himself of that law which more nearly
approaches giving effect to the act. 115 An adverse opinion,
however, mentioned earlier in connection with formally defective marriages, urges the supremacy of the lex causae. 116
An agreement to sell land, for instance, violating the
statute of frauds of both states, may be considered void in
one and merely unenforceable in the other; or void under
the lex loci contractus because of violation of the statute of
frauds and under the lex situs merely lacking proper evidence
and curable by various events; or void at both places but
creating an obligation to pay damages for reliance in one
jurisdiction. Only the dominant theory is logical and prac114 2 VI co 28 5· The problem discussed in the text has been recognized by GJELSVIK,
supra n. III, at I27 and has been treated more often with respect to the form of wills.
116

Cases, Vol. I (ed. 2, I958) 235 n. 68.

m NIEMEYER, Das. IPR. des BGB. I14; RAAPE 186, 255 and IPR. 2II No.4;

MANNL, II Z.ausi.PR. (1937) 786-Bo6; cj. Vol.

I

(ed. 2, 1958) 241.
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tical. Why should, for instance, curing of a formal defect
under the law of the place of contracting not have its full
effect? If the theory of locus regit actum is sound in itself,
its stature should not be reduced by half.
On the other hand, the dominant opinion may run into
some practical difficulties in particular cases, which, however,
thus far have not been experienced or discussed.

IV.

CoNCLUSION

Of all the ordinary and exceptional rules stated above,
only two are susceptible of serious competition: The American
application of the lex causae and the optional rule, locus regit
actum, prevailing in the rest of the world. The compulsory
rule in England is antiquated, 117 and the nationalistic LatinAmerican experiments deserve sharp rejection. The proposals of the Institute of International Law have attempted
a compromise between governing law and local law, envisaging national prerogatives over family and inheritance law
rather than the needs occurring in contracts.
The rule, locus regit actum, shares the fate of many older
principles; it has been widely accepted but justified by conflicting theories. Sovereignty, international law, regionality
of public policy, customary law, voluntary submission of the
parties, vested rights, convenience of the parties, expediency
for international business- each one singly and all these
motives in co-operation - have been advanced as the true
basis of the rules. The draftsmen of the German codification
considered only reasons of practical convenience,118 and at
present this is the dominant conception. The attribution of
exclusive force to the lex causae is opposed as a source of
iniquity.
11 7
118

Cf. recently, M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 447·
2 ZITELMANN I43ff.; 6 Protokolle Zweiter Lesung des Entwurfs des BGB.

32-37; MELCHIOR § ISS; GEILER in I Diiringer-Hachenburg

s6 n.
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In fact, the American courts have in many cases escaped
untenable results by shutting their eyes to the consequences
their rulings would have on questions other than those of
form. A court may be satisfied with the justice of treating
an oral contract under the law of the place where it is
made. But, if it operates in conjunction with a general rule
that validity, or validity and effect, is governed by lex loci
contractus, this law would have to apply also to the necessity
of consideration, the capacity of a married woman to contract,
the influence of misrepresentation made by an agent, the
validity of a clause exempting a party from liability, and
so forth. Such incidents, in their turn, have been judged in
individual cases by other criteria. The Supreme Court in
Pritchard v. Norton (supra p. 364) took the question of
consideration away from the law of New York, the place
of contracting, to Louisiana, the place of performance. Certainly, it is by no means desirable to divide the contract into
fragments, instead of subjecting it to the one law of characteristic significance. But formal validity, if guaranteed by the
law of the place of making as an added opportunity to grant
validity under the over-all law, leaves the latter intact and
satisfies practical needs. With respect to wills, the Uniform
Wills Act, Foreign Executed, adopted by thirteen states, 118a
has created a special rule for formalities and permits a will
to be executed in the mode prescribed by the law either of
the place where executed or of the testator's domicil. 119
Cases concerning bills and notes before the Negotiable Instruments Act could best be harmonized by a permissive
locus regit actum, as suggested by Lorenzen, 120 who has
llBa Now replaced by the Model Execution of Wills Act (1940) s. 7, adopted
only in Tennessee.
119 See for comment, WALTER W. LAND, Trusts in the Conflict of Laws (New
York 1940) 24,54 §§ 8, 16 and see his observation, p. 45, regarding tangible property
on the alternative reference rule of most statutes.
110 LORENZEN, The Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes (New Haven,
London 1919) 89; cj. KuHN, Comp. Com. 267.
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proposed this rule also for a Pan-American unification of
conflicts law. 121 If the rule were adopted by the American
courts, an irritating source of disturbance would disappear.
The courts would gain more freedom to choose the proper
law for the substance of the contract.
We have, however, realized the necessity of developing
the rule so as to take care of the really typical modern cases.
Whenever the laws of two or more territories are involved
in the formation of a contract, to give exclusive preference to
one of them is quite as wrong as to cumulate their requirements. Rather, compliance with one of the two local laws
should suffice. The problem is different from the inquiries
for determining the place of contracting for the purpose
of finding the governing law or the law deciding whether
or not the contract has been formed. The customary privilege
for upholding formal validity is sound; hence it ought to be
extended rather than curtailed. Consequently, in the case
of contracting by correspondence, the law of the place where
the offer is dispatched should suffice for determining validity
of the contract, as well as the law of the place whence the
acceptance is sent. 121a
An even broader possibility has been suggested by Laine
to the effect that the law of the forum, and any other law
indicated by an interest of the parties, also should be able
to validate the form of a contract. 122 In this country, the
idea of giving the law of the forum a favorable influence on
validity was revived by Lorenzen with respect to the statute
of frauds at a time when the statute of frauds was widely
regarded as procedural. 123 The very success of Lorenzen's
construction of the statute of frauds as substantive in conflicts
law seems to obviate this emergency solution.
IS Tul. L, Rev, (1941) at 167.
In this sense Argentina: C. C. art. rr8r.
122 LAINE, Clunet 1908, 674, 68r-68s, 692-693.
123 LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923) at 333-334·
tu LoRENZEN,
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The law of the forum as such, indeed, should not compete
with the others in the field of obligatory contracts, either for
the sake of a permissive policy or for that of rejecting foreign
transactions.
Domestic policy should not be opposed, in particular, to
the free use of foreign instruments, as it is done in numerous
Latin-American codes, when the solemnities required at the
forum for similar transactions are lacking. Respect for foreign
law should also be maintained in carrying into practice the
universally recognized rule that solemnities prescribed by the
governing law are replaceable by compliance with analogous
local formalities. An apparent exception to this minor function of the rule locus regit actum exists in the United States
to the extent that the statutes indicate what persons are empowered to take acknowledgments outside the state. This is
probably intended to be a facilitation rather than an imposition.
Usually the enumeration of the designated legal officers is
extensive. Nevertheless, it would be preferable to leave their
selection to the respective foreign systems and to make it clear
that, as a rule, obligatory agreements do not need to comply
with the domestic formalities when they are executed abroad.

CHAPTER

32

Scope of the Law of the Contract

W

HEN the law governing a contract, or a group
of contracts, has been ascertained, what problems
does it cover? In principle, notwithstanding the
theories that would split the contract into segments, it should
embrace all incidents of the contractual relationship. 1 Special
rules regarding form 2 and those concerning the application
of a personal law to capacity to contract,8 have been treated
earlier in this work.
This chapter, however, will discuss doubts and objections
that have been raised to the rule of a unitary law for the
problems arising on a contract. This discussion cannot be
exhaustive, since questions of classification originate with the
consideration of each special type of contract. Moreover,
such topics as acts of parties modifying the obligation or
transferring rights or duties, and the whole doctrine respecting limitation of actions and termination of contractual rights,
cannot be expounded at this juncture.
While American conflicts literature is accustomed to ask
whether lex loci contractus, or lex loci solutionis, or lex fori
applies to a problem, we have here to speak in terms of
the law of the contract, of a second law applicable to special
problems, and of public policy opposing foreign law. This
divergency of method causes some difficulties in the effort
of comparing the solutions.
1

t
1

See particularly the comparative survey as of 1917 by KosTERS 773-779·
Supra Chapter 31.
Vol. I (ed. 2, 1958) Chapter 4·
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r. Consent in Form

The problem. The municipal laws provide diverse solutions for questions such as whether an offer binds the offeror
and, if so, for what length of time; whether acceptance must
be declared, dispatched, arrive, or be perceived, to conclude
the consent, and whether perfection of the contract has retroactive effect. Many particulars, too, vary. 4
What law to apply to these questions, is a matter of both
practical and theoretical interest. 5
Illustrations: (i) Binding force of offer. Lorenzen6 has
presented the following example: A resident of New York
having made an ordinary offer, without time limit or other
qualification, by letter to a German in Germany, revokes
it by cable a few hours after the letter is received. The
addressee, knowing that under German law the telegraphic
withdrawal is inoperative, at once accepts the offer. Under
New York law, the offer is revocable until dispatch of
acceptance and the contract fails to come into existence. If,
according to Lorenzen's suggestion, the lex fori were to
apply, the parties would be held to the contract in any
German court but not in any American court.
(ii) Acceptance by silence. A seller in New York offers
merchandise to a firm in Liverpool with which he frequently
has business relations and which had declared a desire for
these particular goods. The addressee does not answer. Courts
in the United States, and decidedly many Continental courts,
are more inclined than English courts to imply acceptance
by silence. In an analogous case, a Swiss seller and a French
buyer had negotiated through the seller's agent in Paris;
the agent had no authority to conclude the bargain, and
4 For comparative law see RABEL, I Recht des Warenkaufs 69-108; International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, De Ia formation des contrats entre
absents, Etude Preliminaire (mimeographed) S. d. N.-U. D. P. 1935, Etude XVI.
6 EDuARD WAHL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 775; AcHENBACH, Der briefliche und telegraphische Vertrag im vergleichenden und internationalen Privatrecht (Hamburg 1934); FERID, Zum Abschluss von Auslandsvertragen (Sonderdruck der
Studiengesellschaft fUr privatrechtliche Auslandsinteressen, No. 10, 1954).
6 LoRENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (1921) at 53·
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the seller failed to give an express confirmation. The Swiss
Federal Tribunal nevertheless held the contract to have been
completed under Swiss law as the lex loci contractus. 7
(iii) Loss of letter of acceptance. A merchant in Paris by
letter to a firm in New York offers to buy certain goods; the
letter of acceptance is lost in the mail. The New York seller
sues on the basis of a contract perfect under New York law.
The French party denies the contractaccordingtoFrenchlaw.
(iv) Delayed answer. In a Norwegian case, 8 A in New
York, owning land in Norway, by a letter to B in Norway,
offered to sell the land but limited the time for acceptance.
B answered affirmatively in time, but his letter was delayed
in the mail and reached the offeror when the time limit, and
let us suppose, a reasonable time for receiving an answer,
had expired. A failed to make any reply. The majority of
the Supreme Court in Oslo granted B's action against A,
by application of Norwegian law, because A should have
notified B of the delay or otherwise should have complied
with the contract. The minority dissented on the ground
that New York law as the law of A's domicil applied.
Conflicts rules. Many approaches have been tried. Beale, as
well as the Swiss Federal Tribunal, according to his usual
method, applies the lex loci contractus/ which, however, in
relation to foreign countries leads nowhere. 1° Continental
writers have proposed to resort to the national law of the
offeror, 11 or the law of his domicil in several variants. 12
BG. (Sept. 28, 1912) 38 BGE. II 516, 519.
NorwegianS. Ct. (1924) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 873 No. 51; HAUDEK 67 approves
the majority vote and RAAPE, IPR. 457 No.3 the dissident vote.
9 2 BEALE II74-II76; Restatement § 332 (c).
Swiss BG. (June 9, 1906) 32 BGE. II 415; (Sept. 28, 1912) 38 BGE. II 516, 519·
The recent decision reversing this rule in favor of the law of the contract left questions on the formation of agreement deliberately open, BG. (Feb. 12, 1952) 78
BGE. II 74, 86.
1o Supra Chapter JO, p. 457·
u BARTIN, 2 Principes 89.
12 German RG. (Nov. 20, 1902) 53 RGZ. 59 (isolated}; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 239
FERID (supra n. 5) § 24; BATIFFOL 345 § 393 and n. 2 suggesting that a prolonged
sojourn may replace domicil; in Traite 665, for law of the contract.
A similar result is perhaps viewed in Brazil by C. C. art. I087; the contract is
made where the offer has been made, and Introd. Law (1942) art. 9 § 2: where
the offeror resides.
7

8
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Another doctrine, following the usual way out of embarrassment, cumulates the requirements of both laws involved. 18
But more often the true emergency solution, lex fori, has
been suggested. 14
Only the German courts have been in position to face the
problem squarely. 15 They apply the same law that would
govern the contract if it were valid. 16 Where the automatic
force of the law of the place of contracting is eliminated, this
is the natural solution, approved by those modern writers
who are not afraid of an alleged vicious circle, nor of the
existence of a contract which may be denied by the domiciliary law of one party. 17

Illustration: ( v) It is litigious whether a contract has been
effectively agreed upon between S, operating a sawmill in
A, State X, and P, a manufacturer of furniture in B, State Y,
to sell four carloads of lumber, deliverable at a certain date
on the side tracks of the railway depot in A. Because of this
determination of the place of delivery, as will be submitted
in the third volume of this work, the law of State X governs
the contract. This includes all questions of consent in form
as well as in fact. There is no inquiry into such questions
as which party has first made an offer or where acceptance
has been signed or mailed or received.
Writers following this theory have been preoccupied, it
is true, with hardships resulting, for instance, if an American
party, contrary to his own law, should be declared bound by
13 LEwALD No. 295; PACCHIONI 329 § 10; for cumulation modified by favor to
validity AcHENBACH, supra n. 5, criticized by WAHL, Book Review, 10 Z.ausi.PR.
(1936) 1070.
u LoRENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (1921) at 53; PILLET, 2 Traite 18a-z8z; DzENA, 2
Prine. 256; HAUDEK 91. Contra: PACCHIONI 328 § IO.
16 Statement by BATIFFOL 346 § 394 !lis and n. I.
18 This is the law intended by the parties or the law of the place of performance.
See RG. (Jan. 3, 19II) 55 Gruchot's Beitrage 888; (May 15, 1917) Warn. Rspr.
1917, 267; {Jan. 16, 1925) 34 Z.int.R. 427; (March 13, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. z;
(May 12, 1928) Leipz. Z. 1928, 155c; (Feb. 3, 1933) lPRspr. 1933, 19 No. 10.
The lex loci solutionis has been a.s:> advocated in Argentina by ZEBALLOS in 2
Weiss-Zeballos 295 n. (a).
17 WAHL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 788-8oo; RABEL, id. 753·
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an offer, as in the above example (i) under German law, or
an English party bound by his silence as in the above example
(ii). One proposal is that the court of such a party's domicil
might free him on the ground of public policy. 18 This, however, would not help, if the case were to be tried in the other
court, and would defy the purpose of the rule. A more attractive suggestion has been to consult the domiciliary law of
each party, not for all, but for the single question, whether
his conduct presents any declaration that might be a subject
matter for legal construction. 19 The underlying argument of
equity, however, is doubtful in view of the interest of the
other party, which, supposedly, would be protected by his
own law. In addition, English and American courts cannot
be expected to follow a personal law.
Indeed, the apparent hardship disappears, if the modern
principles of interpretation are duly transferred into the field
of international business transactions. A German court under
German law cannot treat a proposal to contract as a binding
offer, if the offeror must be presumed to have intended the
contrary. 20 An offer by a New York firm, in the absence of
particular circumstances, can not be understood as would an
offer of a German to another German. Nor should an offer
by a New Yorker to a Norwegian, under express limitation
of time, be construed as embodying the conception that he
must repudiate a belated acceptance. Under any law whatever, informal declarations ought to be construed according
to the principles of good faith, considering the laws and
usages of the place where the declarant lives. Certainly, if
a declaration is sent out into the world, the sender is not
entitled to expect that the effect will always be the same as
18

BATIFFOL 346 § 394i RAAPE, IPR. 456.
M. WoLFF, IPR. 123 and Int. Priv. Law 439; WAHL, 3 Z.ausi.PR. (1929) 8oo;
RABEL, id. 754; K. Th. KIPP, in Fischer-Henle-Titze, Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (1932)
II09 II r; RAAPE, IPR. 455ff.
to See also WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8or. For an analogous appraisal of the
question whether a proposal is meant as an offer, RAAPE, IPR. 458 No. 5·
19
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under the law of his domicil. But this does not affect our
cases. Wise judges are careful not to subject foreign promises
to domestic standards, unless submission to them appears to
be required by usage.
2.

Consent in Fact

The problem. Error, fraud, duress, and simulation are
everywhere grounds for nullity or voidability, yet circumstances vary. 21 Error, in particular, may be either more or
less liberally allowed to vitiate the consent. The most important difference of laws resides in the question whether
error must be caused by misrepresentations of the other party
or at least the latter must have been unaware of the error.
In addition, the various shades of invalidity are divergently
regulated, and so is the liability of the party avoiding a
contract on the ground of his own mistake. The following
examples may illustrate the ensuing conflicts problem:
(i) A, a resident of British Columbia, acquired what in
his opinion were treasury bonds of a corporation in the state
of Washington, but were actually common stock shares, the
holder of which was liable under the corporate charter for
certain payments.
The Canadian court refused to apply the law of the
charter, using the argument that, because of the seller's
misrepresentation, A had never become a shareholder under
the law of British Columbia. 22 The report of the case does
not state why this law applied, but probably it was taken for
granted that the contract was made there and that the lex
loci contractus governed the entire contract. A comparable
case came recently before the Supreme Court of the United
21 For comparative municipal law see YEHIA TAG-ELDINE, Le dol fran~ais et Ia
misrepresentation anglaise, contribution a !'etude de Ia theorie du consentement
et de ses vices. (Vol. XVI·Bibliotheque de l'Institut de Droit Compare de Lyon,
1926.)
22 American Seamless Tube Corp. et a!. v. Goward [1930] 3 D. L. R. 870
(B.C. S.C.); fortunately, the court adds that the contract would have been voidable
under California law, too.
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States. 23 A mutual insurance company, chartered in New
York, became insolvent. Assessments were adjudged in proceedings in New York against the policy holders regarded as
members under New York law, and suit for enforcement was
brought against residents of Georgia at their domicil. The
Georgia Supreme Court refused enforcement on the ground
that the policy was a contract made in Georgia and therefore
governed by Georgia law. 24 Under the New York statutory
law, the policy holders were liable to the assessment, but
according to the law of Georgia they were deemed not to
have become members of the company, a clause on the back
of the policy being insufficient to produce this effect. Although
in this case protection of residents was conspicuous, the reasoning was simply based on the law governing the contract.
( ii) In I 89 7, a German reinsurance company in the Rhineland, the Aachener Riickversicherungs A.G., consented to a
reinsurance contract for three-fifths of a fire risk in Japan
with an insurance company of Hamburg, through an agreement made in Japan by the agents of both parties. The company in Aachen contested the validity of the agreement
because its agent had not been made aware of the unusual
fact that the other two-fifths of the risk had been covered
previously by another reinsurance. The Reichsgericht applied
articles I I I o and I I I 7 of the French Civil Code, in force
in the Rhineland at the time of contracting, as the law of
the domicil of the debtor. 25

Conflicts rules. Aprioristic theory, again, has postulated
that the personal law of the party whose assent is concerned,
should govern, 26 or that the lex loci contractus must necessarily determine this problem of validity/7 but courts in
Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc. (1941) 314 U.S. 201.
Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc. (1941) 191 Ga. 502, 13 S. W. (2d) 337·
RG. (Dec. 5, 1902) 53 RGZ. 138.
16 For the national law among others: 8 LAURENT 228-229 § rs8; PILLET, Principes 448 § 238; BARTIN, I Principes 175, 177, 2 id. 6o; AuorNET, I Melanges Pillet
78; I FRANKENSTEIN 572. For the domiciliary law, PILLET, 2 Traite 289 § 537;
LEWALD 239 No. 296. Contra: WEiss, 4 Traite 392 n. 4i KosTERS 774; and decisively
BATIFFOL 336ff. §§ 38I-384.
17 FooTE 402; 2 BEALE I22S; RoLIN, r Principes 481 § 291; 2 ARMINJON 234
II§ 97·
Switzerland: BG. (April ro, r896) 22 BGE. 471, 483; 32 id. II 416; 38 id. II 519;
23
2'
25
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England, 28 Belgium, 288 the United States, and Germany
have instinctively applied the same law that would govern
the contract if it were valid. In the United States, this has
been, as usual, either the law of the place of contracting,29
that of the place of performance, 30 or the law intended by
the parties. 31 In Germany, the Supreme Court and other
courts in the last decade have firmly upheld the law of the
contract, 32 and finally this attitude has found the deserved
theoretical recognition. 33 Frail French authorities at present
are understood as aiming at the same effect. 34
The Hague Draft Convention (I 9 5 I) on conflicts rules
concerning sales of goods has adopted this view in applying
even the law stipulated by the parties to the consent problems.35 Occasionally courts have resorted to the law of the
forum. This happened in England, when the foreign law
did not seem to guarantee annulment of a contract made
under duress, 36 in a case of the German Reichsgericht disTrib. com. Ziirich (Feb. 14, 1937) Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. 1937, 164 No. 85, cited 12
Z.ausi.PR. (1939) 594·
The German Reichsgericht argued similarly in two or three isolated cases.
28
SeeM. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 439 § 421; BATIFFOL 341 § 387.
28a Belgium: App. Gand (March 3, 1949) J.d. Tr. 1951, 434·
29 Cases: 2 BEALE 1225 § 347.1; but in Elbro Knitting Mills v. Schwartz (1929)
30 F. (2d) 10, the "Michigan contract" was not questioned.
3
°Cases: 2 BEALE 1226 § 347.1 ns. I-6.
31 Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard (1896) 94 Va. q6, 26 S. E. 421.
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (June 6, 1935) W. 1936, 402.
32
RG. (Dec. 5, 19II) 78 RGZ. 55: sale of membership in a limited private
company, error on the money paid in; OLG. Hamburg (Sept. 27, 1918) Hans.
GZ. 1918 HBI. No. 92, aff'd, RG. (March II, 1919) 95 RGZ. 164: sale of nuts, the
price payable in Vienna, Austrian law applied to the excusable ignorance by the
German buyer of a German war decree; RG. (Oct. 30, 1926) 39 Z.int.R. 276, 281,
Revue 1928, 523 (duress); (June 13, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, 31 (fraud); and many
older cases, see the list established by LEWALD 240 No. 297·
33
WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 782; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 237; BATIFFOL 340
§ 386; see also NusSBAUM, Principles 178, and ARMINJON, 3 Travaux du comite
fran~ais de droit international prive (1937) at 94·
31
BATIFFOL 343 § 389,
36
Conference de Ia Haye de droit international prive, 7eme session, 1951, Actes
382; 1 Am. J. Comp. Law (1952) 275·
36
Kaufman v. Gerson [1904) 1 K. B. 591, Clunet 1905, 1063; Societe des Hotels
Reunis, Societe Anonyme v. Hawker [1913) 29 T. L. R. 578. See also Hope v. Hope
(1857) 8 De G. M. & G. 731 (agreement illegal according to English law).
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regarding the Turkish law on employment,87 and in one or
two American insurance cases involving misrepresentation of
the insured. 88 The most characteristic of these decisions is
that by the English Court of Appeals in Kaufman v. Gerson.
The defendant, a woman, had promised the plaintiff, her
husband's creditor, to pay the debt in consideration of his
promise not to prosecute her husband criminally. Under
English law, the contract would have been bad because its
object was to stifle a prosecution and it was obtained by
coercion. However, the places of contracting and of performance made it a French contract, and under French laws,
supposedly, the promise was valid. The court argued, however, that enforcement in England would violate the rule
that the plaintiff must come into court with clean hands.
The decision deserves the severe criticism it has suffered,39
since opinions are and may well be divided on the existence
of unlawful coercion when a creditor attempts to obtain
satisfaction of his valid claim by threatening legal sanctions.
3. Want of Consideration
The common law requirement of consideration has a
parallel in the much-debated requirement of the French
Civil Code (arts. II o8, I I 3 I) by which an obligation must
have une cause licite: "An obligation without cause or on a
false cause or on an illicit cause can not have any effect." 40
87

RG. (Oct. 30, I926) 39 Z.int.R. 276, Revue I928, 523·
Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Miazza (I9o8) 93 Miss. IS at 36 and 422 at
435, 46 So. 8I7 at 8I8 and 48 So. IOI7 at Ioi8. In John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Yates (I935) so Ga. App. 7I3, I79 S. E. 239, the court operates on the
assumption that the materiality of representations made by the insured in his
application affects the remedy only and therefore is to be decided under the law
of the forum.
39 DICEY, (ed. s), Appendix, Note 3, 882; FALCONBRIDGE, The Law of Banks and
Banking (ed.
I93S) 902, also Essays 388; 3 BEALE I647 § 6I2.I; GooDRICH 307
n. 9; Notes, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I93I) 63s; 33 Col. L. Rev. (I933) soB. On the
problems in substantive American law, see the remarks of DAwsoN, "Economic
Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law," I I Tul. L. Rev.
(1937) 34S, 3S9·
40 For comparative municipal law, see LoRENZEN, "Cause and Consideration
88
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To believe a considerable part of the French doctrine, 41 this
provision includes the rules that in onerous contracts a
promise must have an actual counterpart in a promise or in
a giving or doing by the other party, and that on principle,
with exceptions, obligations ought not to be separated from
their economic background. Central European systems,
however, use other forms of thinking that do not need this
general requirement.
Any law governing the contract will naturally determine
the requirement of consideration.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Pritchard v.
Norton applied the law of the place of performance, according to the presumed intention of the parties, thus preventing
the contract from being held invalid for want of consideration under the lex loci contractus. 42 There are parallels to
this decision in England 43 and France. 44 The American cases
referring the question to the lex loci contractus seem to consider this law as governing the entire contract. 45 For German
courts, the application of the law of the contract follows as
a matter of course. 46
in the Law of Contracts," 28 Yale L. J. (1919) 621 at 623. On the peculiar combination of both in Louisiana, see SNELLINGS, "Cause and Consideration in
Louisiana," 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) 178.
41 See on the vast controversies, EsMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique,
in particular his own thesis at 350 § 252.
4 2 (1 882) 106 U. S. 124.
43 British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (1921) 66 Sol. J. 18 (applying English
law expressly stipulated for in the contract); In re Bonacina Le Brasseur v. Bonacina
[1912] 2 Ch. 68, 73 (validity under Italian law conceded although the action is
dismissed on other grounds).
44 App. Paris (Feb. 28, 1935) Revue Crit. 1935, 748 applying French law as
lex loci solutionis to a German-created bill of exchange, see comment by BATIFFOL,
Revue Crit. 1937, 434· The Court of Cassation (req.) has affirmed the decision,
(Dec. 14, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1938, 131, on the basis of German lex loci contractus,
in a laconic reasoning, well explained in the note ibid.: under German law the bill
was valid but the action could be refuted by pleading that the plaintiff would be
enriched without cause.
46 BATIFFOL 353 § 408 n. 5·
4 6 Bay. ObLG. (July 6, 1904) 5 Bay. ObLGZ. 357 (force of an I. 0. U. not indicating the ground of obligation); OLG. Miinchen (April 13, 1929) Zeitschrift fiir
Rechtspflege in Bayern (1929) 365 cited by LEWALD 244 No. 302 (consideration
required by English law). See also supra p. 364 n. 15.
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Recently, the Tribunal de la Seine dealt with several
strange agreements made in New York by German refugees,
whereby a man promised huge sums to his wife and daughter,
without any visible motive and as was supposed, with no
intention of making a gift. The court thought it probable
that the promise was void under the German law, applicable
as presumably intended by the parties, but added that, if
approved by German law, the agreement would be void
under French imperative public policy. 47 This is one of the
easy ways of dealing with obscure facts; the case could have
been conveniently solved under the German Civil Code.

II.
1.

NATURE AND EFFECTS

The Nature of the Contract

The law applicable to an obligatory contract should determine what kind of a contract is made.
Illustration. Before the German Civil Code came into
force, a promise to deliver goods to be manufactured with
materials owned by the promisor was considered in the courts
following common (Roman) law as a sales contract, whereas
the Prussian Landrecht assumed that a contract for work
and labor entitled the customer to cancel his order. In several
cases one party was domiciled in the territory of the common
law and the other in that of the Landrecht.
Instead of treating each party as debtor according to his
own law, as was done in other cases, the German Supreme
Court subjected the entire contract to the law of the promisor. 48
No one thought of resorting to the law of the forum.
A deterrent example of a contrary reasoning may be found
in a case of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, influenced by the two
unnatural theories which recommended splitting the contract
47

Trib. civ. Seine (July 5, 1939) Revue Crit. 1939,450.
RG. (May 13, 1891) z Z.int.R. 587. For other German cases, see
248 No. 306.
48

LEWALD
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and characterizing its nature according to the lex fori. 49
A resident Swiss, having executed by letter an admowledgment of a loan of £3250, to an English woman domiciled
in Paris, demurs to an action for recovery, brought by an
assignee, because he has not received the money. What law
determines his plea? In this case, suitable for an elementary
law class, the Federal Tribunal argued as follows: First, it is
considered that the making of a loan contract, under French
law, requires as in Roman law the transfer of the money
to the borrower as an essential prerequisite; that under Swiss
law the mutual consent of the parties suffices to create contractual rights of the borrower to receive and of the lender
to recover the money; and that English law is still different,
the court using an unusual term probably meaning that
English law does not make a promise to lend or borrow
specifically enforceable. The court considers, further, that
under the French approach no contract has been made, unless
the money was given, hence, the question would be one of
formation, governed in Swiss conflicts law by the lex loci
contractus. If, however, under the Swiss construction, the
contract originated independently of delivery, the issue would
be merely one of the requisites for recovery, pertaining to the
"effects" and determined by the law chosen by the parties
or, subsidiarily, by that of the place where repayment is due.
In this dilemma, remembering that a court characterizes
problems according to its own domestic law and citing
Nussbaum, the Federal Tribunal resorts to the Swiss construction of a loan as a consensual contract and reaches the
law of the place of performance which is-the French law.
Thus, because under the Swiss Code of Obligations a loan
may originate by mere consent, the French Civil Code is
applied, under which it may not! Even the harmful division
between validity and the effects of contract can be worked
out in a more suitable way than by the domestic construction.
It was the task of the court candidly to interpret its own
dubious conflicts rule and to state, once and for all, whether
the problem is attributable to "validity" or to "effects."
49

BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE. 397·
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The Restatement, at least, does not fail to explain that any
requirement for making a promise binding is determined
by the law of the place of contracting (§ 332,d).
The law of the contract, no doubt, should include all
requisites for validity as well as the legal category of the
transaction and, therefore, its legal effects.
2. Intended and Legal Effects
Most courts do not hesitate to include interpretation of a
contract in the law which governs the whole of the contract.
They also apply this law to the questions, who obtains rights
through the contract, and what is the object of these rights.
For it is plainly not feasible to consult two different laws
for determining the extent of the contractual duties, the one
when they are to be inferred from construction of the parties'
intention, implied in fact, and the other when they flow
from legal rules completing an agreement, implied in law.
In the narrower domain of interpretation, the natural
conception was adopted in this country over a century ago by
the Supreme Court of the United States. When two sureties
in New Orleans signed a bond payable in Washington, D.C.,
the court held that, in the absence of a stipulation to the
contrary, their liability was joint, according to the common
law of the District rather than divided in half under Louisiana
law. 50 Nobody then doubted that the bond was subject as
a whole to the law of the place of performance, a rule also
applied by the Supreme Court in Pritchard v. Norton. 51
Analogous results may be found in many decisions relating
to legal effects of contracts.
Nevertheless, the Restatement, influenced by a few cases,
has confused the matter. It determines "the nature and extent
of the duty for the performance" by the lex loci contractus
( § 332, f), but declares "the duty for the performance" to
6

°Cox and Dick v. U.S. (1832) 31 U. S. (6 Pet. S. C.) 172.

61

Supra n.

42.
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be "discharged by compliance with the law of the place of
performance." (§ 358). It is instructive to see how hard
Stumberg tries to apply these contradictory tests. 52 He deals
with an Oklahoma case53 where a contract granting an automobile agency was made in Michigan with the Ford Company and the agency was to be maintained in Columbus,
Ohio. The plaintiff in obtaining the contract acted for the
benefit of a company in which he took an altruistic interest
and invested money to help manage the agency. The court
applied Michigan law as the lex loci contractus to the "execution, interpretation, and validity." Hence, the breach of the
contract by the Ford Company was found not to entitle the
third beneficiary to sue for damages, nor the promisee who
sued as assignee. The decision, as Stumberg recognizes, might
have been otherwise, if the center of the contract had been
sought in Ohio without clinging to the mechanical use of the
lex loci contractus, although perhaps the facts relevant for
equity were not fully published. However, Stumberg wonders whether this problem would fall under the "extent of
the duty" or the "compliance with the duty," especially the
determination of "the person to whom performance shall be
rendered" (§ 366), and asks: "Is it practically possible to
draw a line sharply dividing the extent of the obligation of
the contract from its performance?" Our answer has been
given before and is strictly: No. 54
3· Interpretation of Terms
Rules of interpretation. It is a settled principle that rules
of interpretation contained in the law governing the contract
must be applied to the exclusion of those of the lex fori. 55
51 STUMBERG

245 n. 74 continued on p. 246.
Brown v. Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. roth 1931) 48 F. (2d) 732.
u Supra p. 452; and see the vain efforts in the Restatement itself, § 332 comment c, to solve the "difficult problem" of separation of duty and performance.
For another consequence see hereafter p. 538.
u STORY §§ 272, 280.
California: C. C.§ 1646, cj. Monarch Brewing Co. v. George J. Meyer Mfg. Co.
53
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But doubts have long been raised against this principle. 56
In fact, if the contract is mechanically governed by the law of
the place of contracting, there is no consideration provided
for the circumstances under which parties envisage performance in another country. Moreover, we might hold this
principle to be objectless to the extent that the various rules
of interpretation are superseded by the proposition recognized
in national laws as well as in the international practice as a
"general principle," that we must always look for the real
and harmonious intention of the parties when they bound
themselves. 57 On this basis, the court of any country must
pay natural and necessary regard to the foreign origin of
an instrument.
Ascertainment of true meaning. Thus, in a leading English
case, a Brazilian in Brazil executed in the Portuguese language a power of attorney, granting authority to a London
broker to buy and sell shares. The Court of Appeals, before
deciding what law determined the extent of the authority,
held that the exact meaning of the declaration ought to be
ascertained through interpreters and experts according to the
(C. C. A. 9th 1942) 130 F. (2d) 582. The courts adhering to the lex loci contractus
commonly enumerate construction and interpretation as well as validity as subject
to this law.
England: In re Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite, Feist v. The Company [1933l Ch. 684, 690; St. Pierre v. South American Stores Ltd. (1937l 3 All
E. R. 349, 351, 355·
France: Lex loci contractus, Cour Paris (April 5, 1905) Clunet 1906, 170; Trib.
civ. Seine {March 12, 1908) Clunet 1908, 1132; WEiss, 4 Traite 348, 364; RoLIN,
1 Principes 429 § 231, 547 § 344, 550 § 346.
Germany: RG. (March 15, 1892) JW. 1892, 220 No. 27; (April 6, 1911) 24
Z.int.R. 305.
C6digo Bustamante, art. 184 with exceptions.
In principle, though with exceptions, the law governing the contract also includes
the force allowed to commercial usage, see 1 Recht des Warenkaufs 62; this problem
will be studied with particular reference to sales contracts.
65 See 2 BAR 34; 7 LAURENT 582 §§ 479-482; DEsPAGNET 896 § 302; SuR VILLE 332
§ 219; VALERY 978 §§ 678ff.; all inspired by BouLLENOIS.
67 Permanent Court of Arbitration, decision between the Netherlands and
Portugal in the Island of Timor case, The Hague (June 25, 1914), in The Hague
Court Reports {ed. J. B. Scott 1916) 354, 365, 382.
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language and the habits at the place of transaction. 58 A charter party between two German corporations contained clauses
usual in English maritime trade, including an exception
clause, a cessor of liability clause, and an indemnity clause. 59
In another case, a vessel was insured, both parties being
German corporations doing business in New Guinea, with
the general conditions attached in English. (Institute Time
Clauses). 60 In both cases, the German Supreme Court stated
the meaning of the English original, although the contract
was governed by German law. Indeed, in all cases of party
statements and agreements, the true meaning must be discovered under full observation of all circumstances. This may
be supposed to be provided for in practically all municipal
laws61 and does not touch conflicts problems.
Reference to local conceptions. Neither is conflicts law
affected, when it appears that parties expressly or probably
referred to the conceptions of a place other than that of
contracting. It has been held that in a fire insurance policy
an indication of time was to be computed according to the
law of the place where the property covered was burned, 62
and with respect to a contract of accident insurance prescribing that packing should be done in the presence of an adult,
that who was an adult ought to be determined by the law
of the place where the packing was supposed to be done. 63
To explain such decisions as though they referred to the law
68 Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Ltd. (1891] I Q. B. 79, 82 per
Lord Esher, M. R., 85 per Lindley, L. J.
59
RG. (May 22, 1897) 39 RGZ. 65.
60 RG. (November 7, 1928) 122 RGZ. 233·
81 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 461 § 432 calls attention to the English rule of
construction that words of an instrument must be interpreted from the context,
or understood in their plain and literal meaning, and requires that this rule be not
applied in interpreting a contract governed by French, German, or Swiss law.
This is correct; but the same is true and recognized by the English courts when the
instrument is executed abroad, irrespective of the applicable law.
62 Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. David Moffat Co. (1913)
154 Fed. IJ.
83
Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mutuality Casualty Co. (1904) 124 Iowa 576,
roo N. W. 532.
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of the place of performance,64 is inaccurate. The packing firm
had nothing to "perform," nor had the insurance company
to "perform" at either of the two places mentioned. Also,
it could well have been that a commercial usage might have
interpreted time or adult quality differently from the general
law of the contract, and the former would have prevailed.
It follows, at the same time, that German courts are wrong
when they purport to apply English law as an exception to
German law governing the entire contract, whilst they simply
ascertain the significance of certain clauses inserted in a bill of
lading or an insurance policy according to English usage. 65
It is a definitely distinguishable phenomenon that the
parties or conflicts rules may subject a part of the contractual
relationship to special applicable laws. What is to be done
in interpreting foreign expressions has been well said to be
really a question of fact. 66
The rule of the law of the contract in itself, however, is
perfectly sound.

III.

LEGALITY

In the Anglo-American conflicts literature, the doctrine of
"illegality" has been singularly inflated and confused by
sweeping English dicta relied upon by Beale. We have to
state the correct opinion to this effect:
(a) The pertinent question is not whether the "making"
or the "performance" of a contract is prohibited, but whether
or not the contract is valid and enforceable by the applicable
law, which is the law governing the contract as a whole. This
observation needs no proof, although it seems to be widely
neglected.
14

2 BEALE 1261 ns. 2 and 3; STUMBERG 263 n. 18, 245 n. 73·
See the cases supra n. 55 and Bay.ObLG. (Oct. 14/28, 1912) Recht 1913
No. 70, cited by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 242 who seems to approve of it in principle.
8
' Note, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (r9ro) 563.
86
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(b) The law of the place of contracting (if it does not
govern the contract) is immaterial, and its prohibitions without any importance, as expounded earlier. 67
(c) The law of the place of performance as such is of no
greater significance.
(d) The rules of private law of the forum likewise should
not obstruct the application of foreign law, except in extraordinary cases.
The two last contentions will be developed here and in
the next chapter, respectively.
One of Dicey's rules reproduces the assertion of English
judges that a contract valid under its proper law is nevertheless void if prohibited by the law of the place of performance. 68
Repeatedly, renowned judges have connected this alleged
rule with the broader proposition that English courts should
not sanction the breach of the laws of other independent
states. 69 The principal thesis, alone contemplated here, recurs
in the municipal English law of obligations and, according
to critics, belongs only to that branch of law; 70 in fact, it
has been used in no case where a law other than English
law or the law of the place of performance itself governed
the contract. 71 The Restatement of the Law of Conflicts,
however, has elaborated on this rule:

"If performance of a contract is illegal by the law of the
67

Supra Chapter 29, pp. 399-401.
DICEY 788, exception to Rule I 53·
69 Scrutton, L. J., in Ralli Brothers v. Compaiifa Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920]
2 K. B. 287, 304. The principle was called"•.• too well established now to require
further discussion" by Lord Wright, M. R., in International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft v. Rex [1936] 3 All E. R. 407, 429.
NEUMAYER, Rev. Crit. 1957, 579 ff.; 1958, 53 ff. (56 ff.) urges respect for foreign
imperative rules of international relevance.
70 MANN, "Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law," r8 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1937) 97 at 107-113; MEZGER, Nouv. Revue 1937, 527 at
531ff.; CHESHIRE 235; FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 389-394; MoRRIS, "The Eclipse of
the Lex Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Exploded," 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. (1952/53)
505-532, so8ff. See also NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 893 at 917, and the mental
reservation in DICEY (-KAHN-FREUND) 790 n. II.
71 MANN, id. at 111.
68
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place of performance, there is no obligation to perform so
long as the illegality continues." 72
The comment assumes that a local prohibition at the place
of the intended fulfillment makes the contract unenforceable
at any place, although this law does not govern the contract
(or in Beale's theory, its validity). 73 Again, the rule reappears in the American Restatement of contracts law. But
Williston at least indicates how uneasy he feels about this
unreasonable dogma; and in a somewhat forced argument,
he leads the discussion to the result that illegality under
any nongoverning law does not itself kill or paralyze an
obligation. 74
The mistake, indeed, is of a double nature. Neither (I)
has the place of performance in conflicts law the absolutely
dominant role which Dicey and Beale believed; nor ( 2) does
a prohibition of the contractual performance absolutely eliminate the contractual duty in the law of obligations.
In the first place, we are carried back to the unfortunate
attempts to bisect the contract so that it may be governed
by different laws. The defects of this method appear patent
here. If payment in gold coins, traffic in narcotics, prices
exceeding a ceiling, are forbidden in any country, this does
not mean that the contract is blameless while performance
is reproved. The "great difficulty" admitted by Beale is in
distinguishing what is illegality of contracting and what is
illegality of performance, subject to different law; this difficulty must be immense, since the only material case is that
72

Restatement § 360.
Restatement § 360 comments b and f.
Also the Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. IO has a similar provision: "The parties
are bound by the specific legal prohibitions annulling transactions contrary to
law, provided that they are in force in the states (sic) in which the debtor is domiciled and the obligation is performable by him." This obscure provision does not
appear in the Czechoslovakian drafts or the law of I948.
74 Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 458 comment b; WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5093 § I792; note the embarrassment of ]ENKs, I Digest of English Civil
Law (ed. 3, I938) I32 § 307.
73
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where the contract itself is vitiated because of a prohibition
of performance.
In the second place, we may contend, as a result of investigations that cannot be repeated here, that under all modern
laws controlling obligations, although with some variety and
occasional uncertainties, a debtor will be excused from his
duty of specific performance (where this duty is recognized)
by impossibility or frustration; and that his duty to pay damages for nonperformance is released, if impossibility or frustration is not included in the risk to be borne by the debtor
according to the individual contract or suppletive legal rules. 75
As a simple result, we have to look to the governing law,
none other, to ascertain whether any obstacle laid in the path
of performance, frees the debtor from his duty of specific
performance, if any exists, and from damages. English courts
are certainly not more ready than others to excuse the debtor
in any venture. Let us contemplate the leading case principally
claimed to support the thesis of Dicey and Beale and many
more prudent assertions in the English and American literature.
The Ralli case 76 was decided under English law to the
effect that an English firm was held not bound to pay a certain freight difference. The firm had sold jute to a Spaniard
in Barcelona and, in a charter party made in London with
a Spanish shipping company, agreed to a freight rate for
carrying the jute from Calcutta to Barcelona. Half of the
freight was to be paid by the buyer upon arrival as part of
the purchase price. The Spanish law having established a
maximum freight for jute, the buyer refused to pay more.
Did the court really hold English law to be that, because
of a Spanish prohibition, the Englishman did not owe the
75 See Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, Ltd. [I9I8] I K. B. 540;
[I9I8]2 K. B. 467; Romer, L. J., in Walton Harvey, Ltd. v. Walker and Homfrays,
Ltd. [I9JI] I Ch. 274, 285; RABEL, I Recht des Warenkaufs 277,343. 357·
76 Supra n. 69.
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freight promised by him? This would cover the usual proposition, but the court would certainly not have agreed to such
an untenable ruling. If a German firm had bought cotton in
New York at the market price, to be paid on sound arrival
in Hamburg and the German state had decreed a ceiling
price for cotton, it is not very probable than any American
court would hold the contractual right to the price unenforceable. What characterized the case was the fact that the freight
in question, half of the contractual amount, should have been
paid by the Spanish buyer to the Spanish company in Spain.
Although one of the judges remarked that he did not look
beyond the immediate issue, it seems evident that the English
seller, if bound to pay the difference, would have lost his
recourse against the buyer in a Spanish court, and that this
was the reason why it seemed equitable to send the Spanish
company back to the law of its own country.
Whether such equitable considerations, not quite unfamiliar
to English and other courts, are sound in municipal law is
of little interest here. The really decisive consideration,
pointing to the distribution of risks, a consideration grounded
in a model English tradition, 77 was admirably followed by
the Privy Council in a few weeks after the Ralli case, 78 and
very neatly formulated in the following American decision. 79
The Tweedie Corporation of New Jersey, owner of the
vessel "Catania," let the ship on hire to the McDonald Corporation of West Virginia by a written contract in New York,
where both companies entertained offices. The vessel was to
transport laborers on four trips from Barbados, an English
colony, to Colon. New York law evidently governed. After
two trips had been made, the British government prohibited
any export of workers from Barbados. The performance,
77
78

See Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (r884) 12 Q. B. D. 589.
Trinidad Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. v. G. R. Alston and Co. (1920]
A. C. 888.
78 Tweedie Trading Co. v. James P. McDonald Co. (1902) II4 Fed. 985; other
cases are discussed by 2 BEALE 1263 § 36o.2.
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thus, was not impossible but illicit in Barbados. Did this prohibition of performance by the law of the place of performance excuse the hiring company from payment or even invalidate the contract? The court, somewhat perturbed by the
confused authorities, nevertheless penetrated to the decisive
consideration. In the spirit of the contract, as the court assumed, the McDonald Corporation had to carry the risk of
the change of laws of a foreign government at the place of
performance. This rigor may be approved or disapproved,
but the solution is sought in the correct field of excuses for
nonperformance according to the governing law of New
York, and the risks contemplated by the parties directed this
decision.

IV.
I.

NONPERFORMANCE oF THE CoNTRACT

In General

Apart from the questionable theories establishing a separate
law applicable to performance,80 in principle the law governing the contract determines all its effects, including the
requisites of default, excuses for nonperformance, and the
effects of unexcused failure to perform. 81
The English Law Reform Act of 1943, in modernizing
the rules of restitution in various cases of failure of consideration, expressly presupposes that the contract is governed
80 EspecialJy BEALE II 58, 1267, 1274; in France, VALERY 987 § 685; Judge
Learned Hand in Louis-Dreyfus et al. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (1930) 43 F.
(2d) 824 recognizes that liability and excuses for nonperformance must foilow the
same law, but nevertheless, foilowing the Restatement, excuses the debtor under
Canadian law from the fulfillment of a Minnesota contract. Cj. NussBAUM, 51 Yale
L. J. (1942) at 917 n. 149; BATIFFOL, 261 n. I, 407 n. 2.
81 United States: BATIFFOL 407-408 n. 2 recalJs the constant practice in the
cases concerning insurance and transportation.
England: Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnaise (1884) 12 Q. B. D.
589; Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, Ltd., supra n. 75.
Austria: OGH. {Oct. 24, 1928) 10 SZ. 609.
France: N1BOYET, 16 Recueil (1927) I 83; LEREBOURs-PioEONNIERE 397 § 358.
Germany: RG. (June 26, 1912) Leipz. Z. 1912, 762; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 15, 1930)
30 Bay. ObLGZ. 354, 368; LEWALD No. 303.
Switzerland: BG. (June 28, 1918) 44 BGE. II 280 (intention of the parties}.
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by English law. 82 The Act is understood thereby to subject
the right of restitution to the law of the contract and has
been criticized on this ground83 because this right should be
governed by the law of the place where enrichment was
obtained. 84 But while undue enrichment in general may have
to follow extracontractual lines in both substantive and conflicts law, consideration or an advance payment given on the
ground of a contract is to be recovered under contractual
rules. Even though, in the part concerning contracts, a code
may refer to its rules relating to undue enrichment, as the
German Code does, it is well settled that the relation created
by the contract extends to the duty of restitution. 85 Hence,
German and Swiss courts apply the law governing the contract, and a similar rule has probably been adopted in the
draft of the Montevideo Treaty in 1940. 86
Illustration. The English Act repeals the rule in the
Fibrosa case87 that a party who prepaid money under certain
accidental circumstances may recover all the money paid,
82

The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, I943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40.
G. L. WILLIAMS, 7 Modern L. Rev. (I944) 66, 69.
84 Williams follows GuTTERIDGE and LIP STEIN, "Conflicts of Law in Matters of
Unjustifiable Enrichment," 7 Cambr. L. J. (I939) 8o.
86 See BGB. §§ 323 par. 3, 325 par. I sent. 3; §§ 346, 347, 348 make clear that
restitution on the ground of rescission is not identical with recovery of undue
enrichment.
86 Germany: Under the common law: RG. (June I8, I887) 4 Bolze No. 26;
Bay. ObLG. (Nov. 16, 1882) 38 Seuff. Arch. 260, still regarded as leading cases by
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 295 n. 2. Under the actual practice, the courts apply the law
of the place of performance of each party with respect to his obligation. If a buyer
has paid the price in advance, he may recover after rescission, under the law of the
place where he had to pay under the contract. For the cases see LEWALD 252 No. 31 I
sub (2). RAAPE, IPR (ed. 1) 296ff. adds support by examining the practical results.
ZWE1GERT, "Bereicherungsanspriiche im lnternationalen Privatrecht," Siiddeutsche
Juristenzeitung I947, 247-253 at 252.
Switzerland: BG. (Nov. 1, I952) 78 BGE. II 385, 389, Revue Crit. 1953, 401.
Montevideo Treaty, draft of 1940, art. 43 says that the obligations arising
without contract are governed by the law of the place where the act is done from
which they derive "and, in the proper case (en su caso) by the law governing the
legal relations to which they correspond." This obscure text seems best construed
as above.
87 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd. [I943]
A. C.32.
83
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and the payee is not allowed to deduct his own damage and
expense. Suppose that an English firm has paid a sum under
an English contract to a party in a British jurisdiction in
which the Reform Act has not yet been adopted, why should
the payee not profit from the new and unquestionably just
law governing the contract rather than depend on the place
where by a casual circumstance the money was paid? 88
The Restatement, it is true, applies its section concerned
with the quasi-contractual obligation of restitution in an
illustration, to an agreement whereby A promises to build a
house for B on B's land. The promisor starts on the building
but does not complete it. When he sues B to recover the
amount by which A's labor and materials have benefited B,
the law of the place where the land is, allegedly applies. But
in the illustration, fortunately, it is this law that allows the
recovery. 89 Otherwise, it would have been difficult to defend
the nonapplication of the law decisive for all of the contract.
2.

Sanctions of Nonperformance

The unity of the contract must naturally be preserved also
with respect to the several sanctions of nonperformance. 90
Rescission. Whether a party is entitled to cancel a contract
and what restitution is due in this case by either party, is
determined by the law of the contract. 91 Beale, who would
88 Exactly to the same effect, FALCONBRIDGE, "Frustrated Contracts: The
Need for Law Reform," 23 Can. Bar Rev. (1945) 43 at 6o with reference to Ontario.
And see, more recently, MORRIS, "The Choice of Law in Statutes," 62 Law Q.
Rev. (1946) 170, 181; FALCONBRIDGE, Essays 429.
89 Restatement § 452 illustration 3·
90 E.g., German Reichsgericht (Jan. 10, 19II) Warn. Rspr. 1911, No. 111:
the right to exercise a lien is governed by the law of the contract rather than that
of the place where the right is exercised.
91 United States: Sokoloff v. Nat'! City Bank of New York (1924) 239 N. Y.
158, 145 N. E. 917, ajj'd (1928) 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745; American Union Bank
v. Swiss Bank Corp. (1930) 40 F. (2d) 446; (both cases recognized by 2 BEALE 1275,
as authorities contrary to his own theory). For insurance, see New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Cravens (1900) 178 U.S. 389; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Johnson,
Administrator (1934) 293 U, S. 335; and for other types of contracts, Pratt v.
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have preferred the law of the place of performance, explains
the cases by the theory of the courts that the right of rescission
flows from a sort of implied contract. 92 But this, indeed, is
the correct theory, inasmuch as it acknowledges a right
inherent in the contract.
Damages. The old conception that damages exclusively
pertain to the procedural law of the forum, has maintained
as little force with respect to breach of contract as with respect
to tort. 93 The right to recover and the measure of damages
in a violated contract are determined by the law governing
the contract. 94 This law also extends to the question whether
damages may be obtained in addition to rescission. 95 OccaDittmer (1921) sr Cal. App. SI2, 197 Pac. 36S; James N. True v. Northern Pacific
R. Co. (1914) 126 Minn. 72, 147 N. W. 948.
As an example of application of the foreign law stipulated by the parties, see
Rubin v. Gallagher (1940) 294 Mich. 124, 292 N. W. S84 (partial recovery of paid
installments in a title-retaining sale).
England: Benaim and Co. v. Debono [1924] A. C. SI4.
France: Cass. (civ.) (May 12, 1930) S.1931.r.r29, Clunet 1931, r64ff.; BATIFFOL
40S § 490·
Germany: RG. (Oct. 30, 1926) 39 Z.int.R. 276; Reichsarbeitsgericht (Dec.
21, 1932) IPRspr. 1933, 23.
92
2 BEALE 127S § 373•1•
13 The procedural theory was maintained in Massachusetts as a hangover from
the past: Grimshaw v. Bender and Dana (r8o9) 6 Mass. IS7; Ayer v. Tilden
(r86o) IS Gray (81 Mass.) 178; lves v. The Farmers' Bank (r86r) 2 Allen (84
Mass.) 236.
14 United States: Restatement§ 413 (law of the place of performance); Walker v.
Lovitt (r9rr) 2SO Ill. S43, 9S N. E. 631; Amos v. Kelley Co. (1927) 240 Mich. 257,
21S N. W. 397; Riddle v. Hudson (1917) 68 Okla. 173, 172 Pac. 921, 926; Wynne v.
McCarthy (C. C. A. roth 1938) 97 F. (2d) 964; Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
Klaxon Co. (1940) IIS F. (2d) 268, 27S; Smyth Sales Inc. v. Petroleum Heat &
Power Co. (1942) 128 F. (2d) 697, 702 (the last two dicta by Goodrich, J.).
England: D'Aimeida Araujo, Lda. v. Sir Frederick Becker & Co., Ltd. [I9S3l
2 Q. B. 329, 338 (remoteness of damage).
Canada: Supreme Court of Canada, Livesley v. Horst & Co. [1924] S. C. R. 6os,
[1925]1 D. L. R. 159·
Ontario: Schrader, Mitchell & Weir v. Robson Leather Co. [1912]3 D. L. R. 838
(lex loci contractus).
Quebec: See 3 Johnson 394 n. 2.
Germany: RG. (March 27, 1903) JW. 1903, r84; (Jan. 21, 1908) Leipz. Z. 1908,
308, and many subsequent cases; RG. (March 24, 1933) IPRspr. 1933 No. 14.
Italy: Cass. (June 20, 1938) Sett. Cass. 1938, 131, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 324 No.
173·
96 Cass. (civ.) (May 12, 1930) supra n. 91.
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sionally, as in tort, it happens in this country that a court
wrongly denies the right to damages because of a different
construction in the domestic law. The Michigan Supreme
Court in Mount Ida School v. Rood,96 refused to enforce
the right of a school to a contractual fee under an agreement
recognized to be governed by Massachusetts law, because the
plaintiff asked for the full amount allowable in Massachusetts, instead of deducting at once in his own complaint the
costs he would have incurred in case of performance, as
prescribed in Michigan. The court, to avoid the "illogical and
unjust result" of Massachusetts law, resorted to the public
policy of the forum and has been justly criticized therefor. 97
Penalties. The same law may be expected to apply to the
various types of penalties stipulated in contracts. This has
been constantly recognized by the German courts resorting
to the law governing an obligation in order to determine
the validity of a penalty promised in case of nonperformance
or delay, 98 the concurrence of the right of penalty with the
right of damages, 99 and the question of waiver. 100
The same is probably true in this country, 101 with one
restriction. The purpose in agreeing on a penalty may be
either to fix a lump amount of damages or to punish the
defaulting debtor irrespective of damage, both valuable stip96 Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud (1929) 248 Mich. 85, 226 N. W. 883,
Wiest, J., dissenting; Mount Ida School v. Rood (1931) 253 Mich. 482, 235 N. W.
227, 74 A. L. R. 1325.
97 Notes, 14 Minn. L. Rev. (1930) 665, 67o; 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1930) 64o;
So U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 126; AILES, "Substance and Procedure in the Conflict
of Laws," 39 Mich. L. Rev. (1941) 392, 411, 417. But the federal Circuit Court of
Appeals has regretfully accepted the rule that the law of the forum applies as
settled by these cases, Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches Inc. (1944) 145 F.
(2d) 8o4, 807.
98 RG. (March 15, 1892) 2 Z.int.R. 477; RG. (Dec. r, 1911) 22 Z.int.R. 311;
and other cases.
99 RG. (Jan. 5, 1887) 19 RGZ. 33 (penalty clause under English law).
100 ROHG. (Feb. r, 1875) r6 ROHGE. 14; OLG. Dresden (July ro, 1891) 2
Sachsisches Archiv fiir biirgerliches Recht 65o, cited by LEWALD No. 375a.
101 Restatement§ 422 (r); First American Nat'l Bank of Nashville v. Automobile
Ins. Co. (1958) 252 F. (2d) 62, 64.
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ulations when the evidence of actual damage is difficult to
obtain, the latter method also being useful to secure promises lacking any pecuniary estimation. Nevertheless, some
American courts persist in believing that all liquidated
damages are punishments and that they are unenforceable
despite the fact that their purpose is not "to punish an
o:flense against the public justice of the state" but to grant
a civil right to a private person. 102 These courts are said to
be supposed to refuse enforcement to a promise that they
regard as a penalty, although it is valid under the law
considered by these courts themselves as governing. 103
An analogous public policy was once announced in a
German decision which reduced an agreed sum by application of the domestic provision contained in the Civil Code
that the judge should mitigate an exaggerated penalty
according to his discretion. 104 It has been correctly objected
that such reductions cannot be essential, since the German
Commercial Code allows no such judicial mitigation.
Moratory interest allowed as damages. Finally there is
no reason why, on principle, damages for delay in a money
payment fixed by law at some percentage of the principal
sum, should not be governed by the law of the contract. 105
The contrary decisions of the French Court of Cassation are
m Words of Mr. Justice Gray in defining statutory penalties with respect to
judr,ments not falling under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Huntington v. Attrill
(1892) I46 U.S. 657, 673-4.
m Restatement § 422 (2); BEALE 1340 § 422.1 cites only two cases of I889 and
1893, respectively.
1 " Germany: BGB. § 343; OLG. Hamburg (Dec. 23, I902) 59 Seulf. Arch. 63,
14 Z.int.R. 79· Contra: see 2 FRANKENSTEIN 232; LEWALD 257·
S1milarly, Switzerland: BG. (Feb. 25, I9I5) 4I BGE. II I38.
On the other hand, in Brazil, 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 2IO states that a Brazilian
coul't may exercise a German-created right of mitigating a penalty, art. 927 of the
Brazilian C. C. not being based on public policy.
105 Germany: RG. (Feb. 20, I88o) I RGZ. 59, 6I; (Jan. 8, I930) Hans. RGZ.
1930 B 2II, 2I4.
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obsolete. 106 But in the United States, it is said that the law of
the place of performance applies. 107 Since the cases alleged
for support mostly refer to negotiable instruments, which, in
fact, are in a special category, we shall reserve the question
for a later opportunity.
3. Burden of Proof
We may repeat the statement made in the discussion of
torts that, in the prevailing theory, except in English courts,
burden of proof is controlled by the law governing the substantive rights. 108

v.

CHANGE OF LAW

The prevailing view seems to be that in any law suit the
law governing a contract applies in the form in which it is
in force at the time of the final decision. 109 Rules of law
repealed after the making of the contract are inapplicable
and replaced by the current rules. This opinion is in conformity with the view set forth in this work that all references
to a foreign law as applicable to a certain question are directed
to the whole law of the foreign state, to the body of its system susceptible of alterations, and not to a few selected rules.
106 BATIFFOL 413 § 503 has only alleged correct decisions of lower courts, but the
decision Cass. (civ.) (May 15, 1935) S.1935·I.244 clearly recognizes the law of the
place of contracting as that intended by the parties, cj. EsMEIN, 10 Z.ausl.PR.
(1936) 884.
107 2 BEALE 1335 § 418.2; STUMBERG 266 n. 28.
108
LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923) at 332 n. 74; supra pp. 283-286.
Germany: RG. (April 17, r882) 6 RGZ. 412; (Oct. 29, 1925) 79 Seuff. Arch. 353
No. 215; (May 19, 1928) 82 id. 289 No. 164.
The application of the lex fori in England has been reaffirmed by an Admiralty
Court judge and the Court of Appeals in The Roberta [1937] 58 Ll. L. Rep. 159,
177; [1938] 6o id. 84, ss.
109
England: In re Chesterman's Trusts [1923] 2 Ch. 466, 478.
France: BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 615 at 618; HAMEL, Nouv. Revue 1937,
499 at 509; BATIFFOL 68 § 74•
Germany: RG. (Jan. 27, 1927) and (March 22, 1927) IPRspr. 1926/27 No. 42
with more documentation; RG. (May 26, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058.
Italy: Cass. (March 6, 1940) Rivista 1941, 166.
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Occasionally, in this country, a contrary idea has been
advanced, as if the applicable law were that existing at the
time when the contract was made. The New York Court of
Appeals thought it necessary to excuse a deviation from this
alleged principle, when it applied the Joint Resolution of
Congress abrogating the effect of gold clauses to bonds issued
previously in New York, the new law being constitutional
and representing the public policy of the forum. 110 Evidently,
such opinions are stimulated by the doctrine prohibiting
retroactive laws from impairing vested rights. But our subject
should not be confused with constitutional problems.
At any rate, the New York Court argued on the presumption of an intention of the parties to submit to the laws of
New York. There are cases, in fact, in which the parties may
well be supposed to have tacitly agreed on a reference to a
law merely as it was at the time. However, as seen earlier,
it is controversial whether the parties are allowed to do so. m
As a rule, no such temporary limit should be understood to
inhere in either an agreement or an intention of the parties;
too many difficulties would be raised in ascertaining a substituted law. In fact, the Joint Resolution of 1933 has been
applied in a great number of decisions in various countries
as a subsequently enacted part of New York law governing
bond debentures. 112
Similarly, the main part of the German Law of Revalori-

°

11 Compaiifa de lnversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of
Finland (r935) 269 N. Y. 22, 26, r98 N. E. 6r7.
It is entirely distinguishable that under the Georgia Code (r895) § 288o, (r933)
§ 57-ro6 "every contract bears interest according to the law of the place of the
contract at the time of the contract," and therefore a defendant's plea that the
contract was usurious according to a certain Alabama law, was dismissed, because
the defendant had not proved the existence of that law at the time of the contract;
see Thomas v. Clarkson (r9o6) I25 Ga. 72, 54 S. E. 77; and for subsequent cases,
Jones v. Lawman (I9J7) s6 Ga. App. 764, no, I94 s. E. 4!6, 420. This regards a
cause of initial defect in the con tract.
1 11 Supra Chapter 28, p. 395·
112 See the surveys in Z.ausl.PR. Vols. 9-II.
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zation of r 92 5, prescribing that certain debts expressed in
"Mark" currency should be due in the amount of a percentage in new "Reichsmark," was regarded without hesitation
as an alteration of the German law.
Only the peculiar provision of this law was much contested
whereby a debtor having redeemed a mortgage with heavily
depreciated money was bound to add some supplementary
payment. While some courts of other countries repudiated
this retroactive law under the point of view of public policy,113
a Dutch court argued that a Dutchman, having bought a
house in Germany, paid the mortgage effectively under the
law then existing, and resold the house before the new law
went into force, had no connection with Germany and could
not be affected by German legislation. 114 The court, thus,
denied the continued effect of the governing law rather than
its retroactivity, a view of great force.
Finally, obligations entered into under the Czarist Russian
legislation before the 7th of November, r9I7, were prohibited by Soviet legislation from being brought before the
courts. 115 In agreement with the prevailing opinion, a Swiss
court held that as a consequence Soviet law replacing the
former law made the obligations in question unenforceable
also in Switzerland. 116 While the objection of public policy to
the legislative impairment in this case was expressly denied,
it might be granted under circumstances where the contract
has sufficiently close connection with the forum, as when the
debtor resides in the forum at the time of the decree. 117 But
even so, obligations expressed in Czarist roubles are without
113

See the cases infra Chapter 33, p. 569 n. 46.
Rb. Rotterdam Gune 13, 1930) W. 12266.
115 Art. 2 of the Introductory Decree of Oct. 31, 1922, to the Civil Code.
116 App. Ziirich (Dec. 19, 1928) 3 Z. f. Ostrecht (1929) 1403 with approving
note by FREUND.
117 In the case of Nazi-German expropriations, Weber v. Johnson (1939) 15
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 770; Anninger v. Hohenberg (1939) 172 Misc. 1046, 18 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 499·
114
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object. 118 Cases seem to be rare in which it may be reasonably
argued that an old Russian contract survives under some
substituted law. 119
In conclusion, we may state the principle that changes in
the applicable law must be observed, except where a contrary
agreement of the parties is ascertainable and permitted by
the law of the forum.
118 Lehman, J., in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1934) 266
N.Y. 71, 105, 193 N. E. 897, 910.
119 M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 426 § 406 makes the interesting suggestion that a
revolutionary overthrow of the existing law and its replacement by something new
is not included in a choice of law by the parties. In my opinion, this is a question
of interpretation, as also with respect to less exorbitant changes of law, such as the
Joint Resolution on gold clauses. The difficulties, however, of a new choice of law
made necessary by the suggestion, may be great.
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HE manifold objections raised against a free choice
of law by the parties have proved without foundation
except as justified by resort to the public policy of the
forum. 2 Equally, it has been indicated, despite various assertions, that neither the law of the place of contracting nor
that of the place of performance has a paramount role in
regulating the legality of transactions, but the forum may
have a word to say. 3 At the same time, it has appeared that
resort to the public policy of the forum is a delicate and very
rarely justifiable measure.
1 For the United States, see BEACH, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested
Rights," 27 Yale L. J. (r9r8) 656; GooDRICH, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 36 W.Va. L. Q. (1930) 156; id., "Foreign Facts and Local Fancies," 25 Va.
L. Rev. (1938) 26; 3 BEALE § 6r2.r; STUMBERG, "Conflict of Laws-Validity of
Contracts-Texas Cases," ro Tex. L. Rev. (1932) r63, r82; also STUMBERG 278-279;
HussERL, "Public Policy and Ordre Public," 25 Va. L. Rev. (1938) 37· Note, "The
Public Policy Concept in the Conflict of Laws," 33 Col. L. Rev. (r933) soB.
In the continental literature, every writer on conflicts law has discussed the
problem. Basic: KAHN, "Die Lehre vom Ordre Public (Prohibitivgesetze)," first in
39 Jherings Jahrb. (r898) r-rr2, r Abh. r6r-254· Bibliographies by NrBOYET, ro
Repert. 92, r STREIT-VALLINDAS 315-317. MARTI, "Der Vorbehalt des eigenen
Rechtes im internationalen Privatrecht der Schweiz," (Abhandlungen zum
Schweizer. Recht, ed. Gmiir-Guhl, No. 176, 1940). More recent articles by LoursLucAs, "Remarques sur l'ordre public," Revue 1933, 393, and VALERY, "Examen
critique des remarques sur l'ordre public de M. Pierre Louis-Lucas," 6r Revue Dr.
Int. (Bruxelles 1934) 194, continue the French dispute on the elements of which
ordre public consists. Are there one (NrBOYET, Manuel 547 § 443); or two, namely,
(a) in the prevailing distinction ordre public interne and international (WErss, 3
Traite 94) or (b) rather relative and absolute (LAINE, Annuaire 19o8, 47); or three
(Lours-LucAs); or four (VALERY) elements?
For a complete survey on the German practice until 1932, see MELCHIOR 324ff.
2
Supra pp. 429-431.
3
Supra p. 537·
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Under these circumstances, some observations on the
influence of public policy are indispensable in the present
connection, although we have not attempted any such generalizations in the field of family law. In fact, while the
common habit of treating public policy in conflicts law in
comprehensive terms is quite unsound, the controversy on
this much debated subject has a special meaning for obligations. The need for security of transactions involving family
or inheritance may well mean that the state of domicil or
nationality should be privileged to regulate the individual's
marriage, adoption or will. The social policy of such state
and its conception of family interests have some claim to be
preferred over the legal systems of places where parties
merely happen to meet. Where personal law and contracts
law clash, however, as in the question of the capacity of
married women to undertake obligations by contract, the
solution is controversial; American courts are divided in
recognizing the policy of the domicil or that of the state of
contracting as predominant. We have supported the English
intermediary proposition that for business contracts the law
governing the contract should apply to the exclusion of domiciliary policy. 4 Special considerations apply also with respect
to transfer of possession or title; any influence of contracts
on personalty or realty may be excepted from this chapter.
Uncertainty. Interstate and international contracts not concerned with family or inheritance rights and not directly
affecting possession or title, are secure only if they are removed as completely as possible from the play of local policies
and predilections alien to the purpose of the contract. Nevertheless, time and again, though but sporadically, courts have
measured contracts with the yardstick of their local conceptions, whether because one party was a resident of the forum
- a regrettable approach sometimes shared by New York
'See Vol.

I

(ed.

2,

1958) p.

2II

ff.
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judges; or because the agreement was completed by a "final"
act within the forum - a view sanctioned by the Restatement's exaggerated formalism; or on the ground of the parties'
national connection-as frequently but unjustly claimed by
French and Latin-American jurisdictions. In a number of
cases, contracts have been subjected to the "public interest"
of the forum without any connection with its territory.
The various general formulas used in enactments referring
to the exception of public policy/ though sometimes worthy
of attention, have been of no practical help. The C6dig~
Bustamante establishes special rules for obligations but recognizes "international public order" on an extremely vast
scale. 6 A recent law of Guatemala characteristically deprives
foreign law of all effect if it is "contrary to the national
sovereignty, the laws and the public order. 177
By common agreement, not all municipal legal rules are
a potential obstacle to the application of foreign law, not
even by any means all those considered "imperative" in the
domestic sphere. Only a "strong'' public policy in the words
of the Restatement ( § 6 I 2), or an "international public
order," as the internationally relevant part of the national
public policy is commonly called in France, prevent enforcement of the law referred to by a conflicts rule. Just what
rules pertain to this class remains in intentional obscurity. The
fantastic use of the doctrine made in certain judicial decisions
has been shown in lists of horrible cases collected long ago. 8
Over and over again, writers have emphasized that the cases
cannot be forced into any system, which is quite true in the
present state of things. Any scholar in any country, devoting
himself to a study of habits of court in this field, must feel
exactly as did the observer in this country who declared that
6

See MAKARov, Quellen, Systematisches Register p. 6; NIBOYET, Io Repert. 92 ff.
Arts. I75-I82, 246.
7 Law on Foreigners of I936, art. 2J.
8
See, for instance, KAHN, I Abhandl. 169, 2J4-2I7, 247 n. 132, 248-251; I
FRANKENSTEIN I86.
6
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he retired baflled from an examination of the American cases:
"The conclusion must be, then, that a clearly developed and
defined concept of public policy cannot be found in the cases .
. . . We do know enough to say with considerable confidence
that an investigation to determine when the courts will
apply the doctrine of public policy to deny the recognition
of a foreign right would result in the conclusion, 'you never
can tell.' " 9
You never can tell! The worst feature of the traditional
latent conflict between private international law and municipal
law is precisely this resultant uncertainty. For the sake of
relatively few doubtful cases, the sword of Damocles hangs
over each and every contract. The courts usurp a discretionary
power when to apply conflicts rules and when to sacrifice
them, a freedom exercised at the cost of the parties' freedom
to contract outside the forum. The antiquated loose talk of
comity between states, not having any contractual rights to be
enforced, perpetuates a feeling that conflicts rules are inferior
to internal rules. 10 But, for a long time, the best informed
scholars and judges have agreed that an unqualified reservation in favor of the law of the forum is a menace to extrastate
business activity. The great majority of writers, it is true,
have been satisfied with the disconsolate and resigned statement that there is no rule or method of forecasting. Perhaps,
most of them share in the conviction of the courts that public
policy ought to remain as an unlimited safety valve, although
they want it used only as an exception.
Full Faith and Credit Clause. In the United States, the
application of public policy in conflicts law must be distinguished from "matters of local concern" exempted from the
constitutional duty of states to enforce the laws and acts of
8 NuTTING, "Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," I9 Minn. L.
Rev. (I935) I96, 200.
10 See for illustration the summary in IS C. J. S. 836, 837 and the cases inns.
27-29 ibid.
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sister states. Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause
contains potential force to develop federal conflicts rules,
only few rudimentary elements for such development have
appeared. All theories for delimiting the domain of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause on the basis of the cases have failed.
As was stated in 1935, "it seems reasonably clear ... that
the Supreme Court has not constituted itself an arbiter in all
conflicts cases and that there is a field, albeit of indeterminate
boundaries, where the public policy of the state may hold
sway." 11
At the beginning of 1945, a long series of elaborate decisions had led the Supreme Court to a point where one of
the ] ustices declared:
"I cannot say with any assurance where the line is drawn
today between what the Supreme Court will decide as constitutional law and what it will leave to the states as common
law." 12
It is certainly true that a slight connection of a case with
the forum not only makes application of the domestic law
ludicrous but ordinarily also calls for the sanction of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. 13 But the inverse would not be true.
Although remaining in the sphere of constitutional independence, a court is by no means entitled to impress local views
on foreign transactions. The conflicts rule binds the court.
Confusion is sometimes encountered even in recent cases. A
federal court sitting in Missouri considered a clause of restraint of trade stipulated in the employment contract of a
branch manager. 14 The clause was valid according to Missouri
law and void according to Michigan law. The employee had
never been in Michigan; the contract was negotiated in St.
11

NuTTING, supra n. 9, at 205.
Mr. Justice JAcKSON, "Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution," 45 Col. L. Rev. (1945) r, IJ.
13 STUMBERG 279, Note in fine.
14 Holland Furnace Co. v. Connelley (1942) 48 F. Supp. 543·
12
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Louis and performed first in Illinois and thereafter in St.
Louis. The one thing done in Michigan was that the company,
resident there, assented to the contract. The court explains
that authorities are divided between lex loci contractus and
lex loci solutionis, but that the true answer, independent of
both, is given by the principle laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States that a state has to enforce a sister
state's law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, except
where its own public policy prevails. In the case at bar,
Missouri had a major interest, while Michigan had practically none. This is true, but if the contract had had sufficient
connection with Michigan to render the application of the
Michigan law natural, it would be very improper for a
Missouri court to declare the clause valid despite the Michigan
prohibition, whatever its so-called "interest." Public policy
validating foreign void agreements is possible but rarely
asserted, and for good reasons. Thus, the conflicts question
should have been plain. The decision was correct for the simple
reason that the entire contract was centered in Missouri.
Due Process Clause. From the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, it has
been occasionally deduced that a state may not resort to its
own public policy to invalidate a contract made and consummated in another state. It was thus decided in 1934 that
clauses of an insurance contract entered into in Tennessee in
the presence of the parties and their employees, valid according to a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, could not
be challenged in Mississippi at the domicil of the insured. 15
The Supreme Court expressly recognizes that a state cannot
enlarge the obligations of the parties to accord with every
statutory policy. 16 While similar reasonings may normally
16

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (1934) 292

u.s. 143·
16

I d. at 149; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 407-8.
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be based also on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
Due Process Clause can be used to cover the observance of
the law of foreign countries.
American repugnance to the use of the exception. Fortunately, American writers17 and courts are more reluctant than
all others to avail themselves of this exception. The issue has
been clarified by frank emphasis on the independent reasons
of policy supporting conflicts law.
"There surely is a policy both of good morals and commercial stability in giving legal effect to agreement lawfully
made. To deny enforcement to the foreign made contract
makes the state of the forum a shelter for those who refuse
to perform their legal obligations. Unlike the cases where a
court refuses relief to persons in pari delicto, such a rule
penalizes the obligor who, by hypothesis, was doing nothing
forbidden by law when and where his contract was made.
Both morality and expediency are opposed to such a conclusion. Fortunately, we may say with high confidence that
this attitude is passing ... we become not only less suspicious
towards other people's food and customs, but of their legal
institutions as well." 18
English courts are more impressed by regard for international comity, requiring the recognition of the legislation of
other independent states/ 9 but the result is similar, inasmuch
as public policy serves only exceptionally to bar the application of foreign law. The courts are anxious to limit the public
policy doctrine to "clear cases in which the harm to the public
is substantially incontestable and does not depend upon the
idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds." 20 It is true,
however, that the English extension of procedural, penal and
17 3 BEALE I6SI agrees with the protest: the resort to the exception "should be
extremely limited. This is especially true between the states of the United States.'·
18 GooDRICH, 36 W.Va. L. Q., supra n. I, at I7I.
u Scrutton, L. J., in Aksionairnoye Obschestvo. A. M. Luther v Sagor & Co.
[I92I]3 K. B. 532, 558.
so Lord Atkin in Fender v. St. John-Mildmay [I938] A. C I, 12.
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jurisdictional prerogatives reduces such liberality in many
instances,21 although this is more notable in the field of torts.
Recent European reaction. This highly desirable progress
in the general American attitude must be anxiously preserved,
in face of a strange literary reaction coming from Europe's
darkest currents of nationalism. Writers have consciously
yielded to a resurgent spirit that militates against the "liberal"
and "cosmopolitan" tendencies of the nineteenth century.
The usual approach has been reversed. Public policy, far
from furnishing a rare exception to conflicts law, is now
elevated to the foremost principle, and application of foreign
law subordinated, as a mercy granted when convenient to the
domestic system. No longer a kind of nuisance, resort to the
law of the forum is deemed an organic element of conflicts
law. The Italian sources of this new theory seem to flow from
fascism, on the one hand, and from the theories of "reception,"
on the other. That foreign law must not only be referred
to by the conflicts rule but also "received" into the domestic
law, has become a dangerous proposition. It will suffice to
quote in translation a few passages found in texts of writers
who would not have been expected to foster such views:
The principle followed thus far as basis of the internationalistic conception, ought to be reversed by applying
the logically opposed nationalistic conception. This application purports to consider the problem of the clause of reservation or of public order, as a problem of interpretation. The
foreign law may be enforced as special internal law in the
cases of international nature, provided that it can be assumed
that the legislator has intended its enforcement as such .. ..
Where such application cannot be founded upon the most
probable intention of the legislator, automatically the internal
common law re-enters into force, that is, the territoriallaw. 22
In the first place, the assertion seems legitimate that ...
21
22

M. WoLFF,
PACCHIONI,

Priv. Int. Law 177 § 170.
Elementi 207-208.
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the limitation by public order constitutes in a certain sense
a part of every rule of private international law. In every
conflicts rule a clause must be considered implied to the
effect that ... foreign rules are referred to only to the extent
that the insertion of such rules into the internal legal order
does not disturb the harmony of its system. 23
Recently, such a voice has been heard in this country.
Nussbaum encourages the courts to a more uninhibited use
of the public policy doctrine on the ground of local conceptions of the conflict of laws. In his opinion, the tendencies
against public policy were caused by "liberal" and international-minded illusions and still more by "dogmatic"
preferences. 24 To quote:
" ... in the question of 'public policy,' obnoxious though
this concept may appear from the cosmopolitan point of
view, the latter would practically lead to the weakening of
a country's position vis~a-vis of foreign powers. 25
"English and American courts ... are most hesitant to
resort, in terms, to public policy.... In a few cases courts
have tried to rationalize their reserved attitude, but the
reasons advanced are unconvincing. The explanation must
probably be sought in the liberal tradition of the common-law
courts .... Liberalism postulates international-mindedness
favorable to the recognition of foreign law....
"Antipathy to public policy is not confined to common law
courts. It is even more intense in the majority of continental
writers. To them, it is the 'Cerberus' lying at the threshold
of International Private Law.... In fact it is not so much
liberalism of the English brand as internationalist dogmatism
that is behind the prevailing attitude of Continental learning.
. . . The most important part of the American problem of
public policy bears upon interstate relations. With respect to
this area, American writers have taken a particularly strong
Aoo, Teoria 319-320.
NussBAUM, "Rise and Decline of the Law-af-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict
of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev. (1942) 189 at 198 and in his other articles cited id. 196.
25 NussBAUM, op. cit. preceding note at 200.
23
24
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stand against the use of public policy.... Nevertheless, the
several states, having been left in the possession of an almost
unlimited legislative power in the private law field-a power
actually exercised on the largest scale-they can hardly dispense with the protection provided by the public-policy rule
against the infusion of disturbing elements which may result
from contrary legislative policies of sister states." 26
Is it necessary to say that even the most rigid positivism
can afford to give conflicts rules established by the state itself
the same value as other state law? Or to point out that perhaps liberalism but certainly not preconception enters into
the cause when arbitrariness is utterly disliked?
B. THE PROBLEM

The familiar formulas, declaring the priority of "public
policy, laws of the state, and morality" or reservations of
"imperative laws and good morals" are too vague and comprehensive. Others, more modestly referring to public order
and good morals, are exploited far beyond their literal meaning. If you establish a conflicts rule on the premise that a
certain situation of living should be governed by a certain
foreign law and at the same time declare that this same situation under unspecified conditions may require resort to the
law of the forum, you have indeed deprived the conflicts rule
of its legal character and reverted to the fabulous "comitas
gentium," which negatived legal rules of international behavior and left every decision to uncontrollable courtesy.
Perfectly well aware of this line of thought, courts like to
repeat the old slogan of comity every time they consider a
possible breach of their otherwise recognized conflicts rules.
In the field of contracts, it would seem that the difficulties
caused by the multiformity of our legal systems may be
considerably alleviated, if territorial claims of state legis16 NussBAUM, Principles II3, IIS, 123.
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lation are definitely confined to those branches of law that
have to serve public interests. 27
I.

Policy of Public, Especially Administrative, Law

The prudent Roman jurists had a trichotomy of leges
perfectae, leges minus quam perfectae, and leges imperfectae,
according to whether contracts violating a legal prohibition
were void, punishable only, or not affected by any sanction.
Modern legislators, with their multitude of commands and
prohibitions, rather take for granted the rule that offending
agreements are void, and leave to the courts the laborious
task of construing this or that prohibition so as not to affect
validity. Despite such attempts at restrictive interpretation,
innumerable criminal, fiscal, and especially administrative
provisions do entail, often by natural consequence, sometimes
wantonly, the nullity or at least unenforceability of contravening agreements. A purpose of general state administration
or of the welfare of the population in general, is protected
by interfering with private law. Sales of poison, arms, or
liquor, employment of children, creating of monopolies,
stipulations of gold clauses, trading with the enemy, are
ordinarily void to the extent that the transactions are forbidden, not to mention contracts to overthrow the government, or to forge money.
On the other hand, it is still true, after every imaginable
controversy in the last decades, that in establishing the rules
of behavior characteristic of private law, the state fulfills its
own interest only insofar as it is interested in fair justice
as the basis of mental and physical happiness. The particular
17 The Continental literature discussing "territorial" law or lois de surete et police
sometimes approaches the distinction used here. Particularly N1BOYET 550 § 443;
10 Repert. 95 No. 7, distinguishes public order from imperative laws, and NEuMEYER, 4 Int. Verwaltungs R. 251, 431 separates public law from public policy.
However, nowhere to my knowledge has the view advocated in this chapter been
supported.
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rules serve in the first place the interests of individuals and
organizations rather than those of state or society.
If a state, not contented with the broad inroads of modern
public law into the former spheres of private law, considers
every substantive rule as mingled with consideration of community interests, it is logical to deny the existence of private
law as the National-Socialist writers have done; they detested even the name of "Civil Code."
If a continuing fundamental difference between private
and public law is conceded, the position of conflicts law in
the meaning of private international law appears distinctly
attached to private law alone, while administrative and fiscal
rules have their own scope to be delimited for each according
to its specific purpose.
It will perhaps be objected that the distinction between
private and public law, not familiar to the older common
law, has been blurred in the civil law countries by wide
spheres of mixed policies. However, the interference of
public interest, great as it is, proceeds in discernible directions.
To take the most important example, modern labor law is
composed of two parts. 28 The one, pertaining to public law,
which regulates the relations of employers and employees to
the state and other public corporations, has been extended
to include legislation on working hours, women and child
labor, social insurance, organization of unions, or compulsory
representative bodies, labor boards, and the procedure for
settlement of labor disputes. The other part consists of the
rules relating to individual contracts of employment as well
as to collective bargaining. That a tariff convention is a
contract of private law has been deduced in German law
from the three points of view that the parties are private
28
See HuECK in Hueck and Nipperdey, 1 Lehrbuch des Arbeitsrechts (1931) 8,
whn points out that this essentially theoretical question has a great practical
significance for jurisdiction of courts and application of the general rules concerning
contracts. Our query furnishes a third practical angle.
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persons, the form is that of a private contract and the purpose
is the regulation of private relations. 29
In certain situations where the border line between private
and public relations may seem doubtful, the difficulty of
deciding on the exception of public policy exists under any
theory. It is nevertheless certain from the objective point of
view of critical jurisprudence that, for instance, a statutory
provision prohibiting premature termination of an employment contract pertains to private law, when it is a perpetual
regulation of the time requisite to give notice, since, then,
it primarily protects the private interests of the workers
and the enterprises, while it belongs to public law when it
is an emergency measure in a temporary national crisis of
unemployment.
To analyze the significance of this distinction, however,
we have to contrast the application of domestic law with that
of foreign law.
Public law of the forum. The distinction is of great importance with respect to the various kinds of substantive rules
of the forum. Prohibitions, established in public law, apply
irrespective of the conflicts rules accompanying private law
institutions. As an example, we may recall the principles
elaborated in the American courts before Prohibition, in the
application of the laws of "dry" states against the sale of
intoxicating liquor.
A court of a dry state, as a matter of course, had to
enforce its own statute for the purpose of general welfare.
Except insofar as the legislature was restrained by constitutional provisions, an annotator said, the state could forbid
any action for the recovery of the purchase price of intoxicating liquor, even
"with respect to a sale every element of which, from the
solicitation of the order to the consummation of the executed
29 NIPPERDEY

in 2 Lehrbuch, just cited n. 28, (1932)
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contract by delivery of the goods, had its situs in another
state the law of which permitted such sales; and this, too,
without reference to any intention upon the part of either
party to violate or evade the laws of the forum." 30
When a court, however, was not bound by a statute, it would
not refuse to entertain such an action merely because the sale,
if made at the forum, would have been invalid, when there
was no intention to violate or evade the law of the forum.
Thus, a sale made outside the state was commonly enforced even though the order was solicited by an agent in the
state. 31 But some local statutes were construed as prohibiting
also such preliminary steps, or as outlawing any transactions
that contemplated introduction of the liquor into the forum. 32
All this resembles private international law but is essentially independent. Whether the object of a sale be liquor
or anything else, no such grounds for invalidity as error, lack
of authority of a representative, or incapacity to contract, nor
the problems of nonperformance have ever been subjected
to the law of a jurisdiction where negotiations have merely
started. No statute would undertake to impress its normal
domestic rules on contracts, "every element of which has
its situs in another state." A state may also think it suitable
to insist on annulling a sale of intoxicating liquor, narcotics,
or weapons, despite an agreement of the parties submitting
them to another law, although there is no other reason for
challenging this choice of law by the parties.
If thus, for fundamental clarification, we have to recognize
the need of a separate delimitation of each administrative
prohibition of the forum, it must be emphatically postulated
that legislators and courts confine them within narrow
boundaries. Extensions such as those described above relating
30

Note, Conflicts of laws as to sales of intoxicating liquor, 61 A. L. R. (1903)

417, 418.
31

32

E.g., Wind v. Iller & Co. (1895) 93 Iowa 316, 321, 61 N. W. 1001, 1002.
STUMBERG
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to the domain of liquor laws, or of many tax statutes, do not
favor a sound development of international law, either administrative or private. In many cases, reasonable interpretation may well be satisfied with applying a domestic administrative prohibition exactly to the same contracts that ought
to be governed by the private law of the forum, namely, the
contracts centered there. Interfering with private contracts
for purposes of general welfare is a matter delicate enough
and should not be aggravated without cogent reasons by
attacks on foreign contracts too.
When a contract, however, is not within the local domain
of the forum's prohibition, the ordinary conflicts rules apply.
The courts know perfectly well that beyond those limits, an
administrative policy of the forum is not usually susceptible
of being taken as an absolute standard, overriding conflicts
law and foreign law. A contract made and to be performed
in Mexico could produce an action for payment of delivered
intoxicating liquor, enforceable in Arizona despite the
Eighteenth Amendment then in force. 33 While, the court
said, there were previous cases reluctant to enfore a foreign
transaction which the law of the forum would disapprove,
later decisions have realized the necessity that the course
of trade
" ... should be encouraged and fostered for mutual welfare.
Of those Mexicans with whom we make valid contracts in
this country, we expect faithful performance or the right
to secure redress through Mexican courts. Adverse decisions
on grounds of policy will breed suspicion or discrimination
against us. We should be careful not to give less than we
expect to receive."
Sunday contracts. Another informing example is the treatment of Sunday contracts in American courts. Among eight
83 Veytia v. Alvarez (1926) 30 Ariz. 316, 329, 247 Pac. rr7, 121, 12:2. Contra:
Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) :25:2 S. W. 287 representing a minority view, as stated by STUMBERO 279 n. 72.
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cases cited by Beale,34 in four the validity of the transaction
was recognized under the lex loci contractus. 35 In one case,
under the lex loci solutionis,36 and in two cases where the
contract was made between persons present and naturally
subject to the law of the place of contracting,S 7 invalidity
was pronounced, evidently for individual equitable considerations. Only one case remains where the court had some
chance to validate the contract under the law of the place of
payment, but invalidated it under the law of the forum, in
which all other elements were located, as the court took care
to state. 38 Far from reading into the domestic statute an absolute standard of religious behavior, the courts are acutely
aware of the territorial limits. Prevailingly, the practice in
this field implements the policy described by Williston
whereby in the main, "the courts have been astute so to interpret contracts as to find them not to conflict with Sunday
statutes or to hold them to have become executed and,
therefore, unassailable." 89
In a similar way, it has been held in British Columbia
that a contract of indemnity for bail, there illicit, is enforceable when made in proceedings in the State of Washington
2 BEALE 1233 ns. I and 6 and 1235 n. 6.
Swann v. Swann (E. D. Ark. 1884) 21 Fed. 299, Caldwell, J., declaring that
the prohibition of Sunday contracts in Arkansas is not meant to constitute a strong
public policy; Brown v. Browning (1886) 15 R.I. 422,7 At!. 403 (contract made in
Connecticut after sunset on Sunday valid by Conn. statute); McKee v. Jones
(18go) 67 Miss. 405,7 So. 348 (sale of a horse, clearly governed by the law of Louisiana where it was permitted); Watkins Co. v. Hill (1926) 214 Ala. 507, 108 So. 244.
Adde Stamps v. Frost (1935) 174 Miss. 325, 164 So. 584 (terms agreed upon on
Sunday in Tennessee, executed on Monday; contract would have been void if
agreed to on Sunday in Mississippi).
86
Brown v. Gates (1904) 120 Wis. 349, 97 N. W. 221, rehearing denied (1904)
98 N. W. 205. See the comment by BATIFFOL son. 1.
87 Strouse v. Lanctot (Miss. 1900) 27 So. 6o6 (judgment for a resident who had
been persuaded by a traveling salesman on a Sunday to order a number of suits);
Lovell v. Boston & MaineR. Co. (1910) 75 N. H. 568, 78 At!. 621 (the waiver of
liability of the railway invalidated, but nevertheless the liability affirmed on torts
principles, the action being an "action on the case").
38
Arbuckle v. Reaume (1893) 96 Mich. 243, 55 N. W. 8o8.
39
WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4816 § 1700.
34
35
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where the agreement is lawful, such contract not being "inherently repugnant to moral and public interests." 40
In a Texas decision, the antitrust laws of Oklahoma were
held to prevent enforcement of a contract made in Minnesota,
but performable in Oklahoma. Only because the Oklahoma
statutes were not proved and were presumed to be identical
with the Texas antitrust law the latter was applied; an added
reservation of the court's right to limit "comity" may be
taken as harmless. 41
Foreign governing law. We are on traditional ground,
when a transaction is governed by a foreign private law and
declared void by this law as a consequence of a provision of
its public law. Although rarely expressed in the literature,
the opinion seems common everywhere that on principle a
foreign-governed contract is subject to all prohibitions of
the governing law, irrespective of their purpose. The foreign
private law applies, whether or not it is influenced by administrative law. 42
For what reason the private law of Michigan avoids a contract governed thereby-be it because of measures exercised
under the police power or because of measures for the protection of children, employees, or insured persons-is of no
concern to the private international law of other jurisdictions.
When a corporation is doing business in a foreign state without authorization and that state avoids contracts thus made,
the nullity is recognized wherever the law of that state is
held to govern the contract. 43 Continental courts decide in
the same way. 44
40

National Surety Co. v. Larsen [1929] 3 D. L. R. 79 (Brit. Col. C. A.), [1929]
4 D. L. R. 918, 943·
41
Watkins Co. v. McMullan (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 6 S. W. (2d) 823.
42
MELCHIOR 267 §§ 179-181 with instructive exposition of the German practice,
a Dutch and a French case. Adde Swiss BG. (Dec. 14, 1920) 46 BGE. II 490, 495·
Contra: NEUMEYER, 4 Int. Verwaltungs R. 249 n. 67 without any persuasive reason.
43
See supra pp. 205 n. 147, 213 n. 188.
44
E.g., OLG. Hamburg (May 23, 1907) Leipz. Z. 1908, 249.
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This principle, of course, is exposed to the exception of
the public policy of the forum, when the latter clashes with
the foreign public interest underlying the decision of the
private law problem. War measures of the enemy are asbolutely incapable of enforcement. Exchange restrictions serving
economic warfare in times of political peace, confiscation, or
impairment of private property, when reaching beyond the
borders of the foreign state, are repudiated. 411
2.

Policy of Private Law

If, thus far, judicial practice as a whole agrees with the
facts of international legal life, the problem is different in
the narrower sphere of the typical interests safeguarded by
private law. The problem is this: Should such social policy
as pursued in insurance or usury statutes, or the economic
policy inspiring national legislation on the liability of public
carriers override the court's own conflicts rules? For in all
these cases the interests of the individual customers are primarily protected, although the frequency of these contracts
is deemed to warrant special legislation.
To face the problem more closely, the premise of this
inquiry may be remembered, namely, that the contract at
bar is not sufficiently connected with the forum to call for
the application of the lex fori as the governing law; on
the contrary, the contract is considered to be centered in a
foreign jurisdiction. The question, then, is: Should this contract, nevertheless, be affected by the policy of the domestic
law concerning private interests?
It is submitted that this question should be strictly answered in the negative, and that the courts, particularly the
American courts, prevailingly do reach the same result,
although a few cases here and there uphold the pretension
of an unrestricted sovereign discretion.
45
For some comparative notes, see RABEL, "Situs Problems in Enemy Property
Measures," II Law and Cont. Probl. (1945) 122-123.
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While we shall continue to discuss the present role of
public policy with each particular subject, we may contemplate here some popular prototypes of a paramount policy
of the forum. 46
C. EXAMPLES

r. Wagering Contracts

Foremost under the typical examples of contracts unenforceable under cogent laws of the forum are gambling and
wagering contracts. Differences of legal treatment are frequent enough, particularly with respect to the more serious
problems of speculative bargains, to provoke conflicts of laws.
A well-known decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court
of r884 demonstrates the intransigent point of view. 47 A
speculation in stocks upon margins was validly undertaken
under the rules of New York, but the court declared it an
offense against "the plain public policy" of New Jersey,
because a transaction of exactly the same kind would have
been unlawful there. Enforcement, thus, was refused against
a resident of the forum. As Goodrich observed, "it would
be hard to find a more striking instance of an 'intolerable
affectation of superior virtue'-the famous words of Judge
46
For an outstanding example of a borderline case, we may refer to the provision
of the German law on revalorization of 1925, mentioned above p. 549, which revived
debts paid with heavily depreciated money. Public policy was advanced as an
objection by Trib. civ. Seine (April 9, 1930) Clunet 1930, 1012 and Trib. Geneve
(May 31, 1930) Revue 1930,395, and implicitly by the French Cass. (civ.) (April 14,
1934) S.1935.1.2o1, justly criticized by NIBOYET ibid. The exception of public
policy was, however, disregarded by Trib. Mixte Cairo (Feb. 17, 1930) Clunet 1931,
467, and thoroughly refuted by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Feb. 26, 1932) 58
BGE. II 124, 126. BARTIN, Note, Clunet 1931, 470 asserted territorial limits for
retroactive laws. ARMINJON, Revue 1930, 385 claimed that the German law was
inapplicable as "political." The French Court of Cassation in another case, Cass.
(req.) (Oct. 19, 1938) Gaz. Pal. 1938 II 886 reached the same result by interpreting
the intention of the parties as directed to extinguishing definitely the debt; see
contra the note ibid. For a more powerful argument see supra Chapter 32, p. 549
and n. 114.
47
Flagg v. Baldwin (1884) 38 N.J. Eq. 219, 48 Am. Rep. 308; accord, Coffe &
Carkener v. Wilhite (1916) 56 Okla. 394, 156 Pac. 169.
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Beach-by one state toward another." 48 That the Restatement
has adopted this decision 49 is inconsistent with its own praise
of uniform enforcement of rights acquired in other states.
But what in this country may count as an irregular solution, commonly occurs in many, if not most European jurisdictions. The domestic restrictions on dealing in futures are
either regarded as an absolute moral standard, or as an ineluctable screen of protection for the domiciliaries of the
forum. 5° Thus, the prevailing French doctrine always refuses
enforcement, if it would be denied by the French law of
r885, which, it is true, allows a relatively large place for
dealing in futures at exchanges. Where the contract is unenforceable under the foreign governing law itself, even though
this law may follow from party agreement, this prohibition,
too, is mostly observed. 51 The elaborate German law distinguishes between valid dealings at German stock and commodity exchanges (requiring specific personal qualifications)
and unenforceable speculative contracts. All foreign transactions that would be subject to the exception of wager, if
made in Germany, are unenforceable against persons domiciled in Germany. 52 Moreover, agreements involving business
at legitimate foreign exchanges, such as an order of a domi48

GooDRICH, op. cit. supra n. r, at 171.
Illustrations respecting gambling debts and dealing in cotton futures, to § 6r2.
60 See BRANDL, Internationales Borsenprivatrecht (Marburg 1925) rs6ff.;
AMIEux, 2 Repert. 442 No. 2Iff.; NrnoYET, IO Repert 92.; GuTzwiLLER I572;
BRANDL, 2 Rechtsvergleichendes Handworterbuch 599·
For Switzerland, see 58 BGE. II 52; 6I id. II r I7.
61
See for citations AMIEux, 2 Repert. 443 Nos. 24, 27; PILLET, 2 Traite 239,
240 § 5I4; SuRVILLE 359ff. § 248; NIBOYET, IO Repert. I32 No. 240 bis, 246. To
the same effect, Institute of International Law (Paris I9Io) Revue I9IO, 956.
Greece: App. Athens (I904, No. II50) Clunet I9o8, 245·
Switzerland: C. Obi., art. 5I3; the identical section of the former text has been
treated as of public order, BG. (Feb. IO, I905) 3I BGE. II 55, 6o; (Feb. 2, I932)
ss id. II 48, 52; (June 4> I935) 6I id. II II4·
App. Douai (Nov. 2, 1933) Clunet 1934, II95·
62 German Exchange Law (Biirsengesetz) of 1908 § 6I; BGB. §§ 762, 764; RG.
(Feb. 7, 1899) 43 RGZ. 91; (July 8, I899) 44 RGZ. 52, 54 and many subsequent
decisions. See STAUB-HEINICHEN in 4 Staub § 376, Anhang 66 n. So, 100 n. I97·
49
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ciliary to a broker in LiverpooP3 or New York 54 to sell or
buy cotton or coffee at the local exchange, 55 or to sell stock for
delivery "ultimo" at the Stock Exchange in Paris, is open to
the exception that effective delivery or reception was not
intended; foreign transactions, it is explained, are not certain
to afford the public the same guarantees as institutions under
the control of the German government. 56 In well-deserved
criticism, this attitude has been termed an offense against
the natural international boundaries. 57 The Anglo-German
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal refused to consider the German
notions. 58 The Reichsgericht, however, drew a further undesirable consequence from them, by applying the principle
that prohibited contracts may not be enforced by agreement
for foreign arbitration, jurisdiction, or foreign law. 59
As another example of intolerance, a recent Belgian decision refuses enforcement to a stock exchange operation
validly made in Paris, if it can be proved that the parties did
not intend factual delivery of the securities. 60 The Seine
Tribunal even held that because the French law prohibited
"le pari aux courses de chevaux" other than "pari mutuel,"61
a partnership to exercise a license of the Hungarian Jockey
53

RG. (Jan. 30, I9I7) 89 RGZ. 358.
RG. (Oct. I4, I9JI) I34 RGZ. 67, 70.
55
RG. (July IJ, I90I) 49 RGZ. 59: the New York broker was represented by an
agent in Hamburg, but this does not change this aspect of the case. RG. (June IS,
I903) 55 RGZ. I83 involved stock transactions at exchanges in New York and
Chicago.
56
89 RGZ. 359, supra n. 53· The Austrian Supreme Court extended the domestic
absolute prohibition on grain dealings in futures to foreign transactions and seems
to have been followed in this claim by the Czechoslovakian Supreme Court (March
2, I934) IO Z.ausl.PR. (I936) I68.
57
BRANDL, supra n. 50, I76, I8J.
58
Gruning and Co. v. Gebriider Fraenkel (Feb. 6/17, I922) I Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes 726 (contract made subject to the Rules of the Liverpool Cotton Association).
59
Germany: RG. (May IS, I904) 58 RGZ. I 52 (leading case). For thorough
criticism see LuDWIG RAISER, Das Recht der allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen
(I935) IJ9, I43 and n. 2. For other countries, see BRANDL, supra n. 50, 209 n. 52·
80
Trib. civ. Liege (Jan. IJ, I936) summarized in 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (I938)
258 No. IOI9I.
61
Cj. the analogous American statutes in the cases discussed by WILLISTON,
6 Contracts 4703 § 1665 n. 6.
54
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Club for race betting was unlawful and that a partner could
not ask for an accounting on the business done. 62
Contrary views definitely prevail in the Anglo-American
orbit. As is well known, Lord Mansfield's approach in case
· of a foreign loan given for gambling purposes was different,
stressing the fact that the loan was valid where given and
resulting in judgment for the plaintiff to the extent of the
money lent. 63 Several cases followed his application of
English law qua lex loci solutionis, presumably intended by
the parties, 64 while, in a contrary opinion, the English
gaming statutes were held to have no bearing at all on foreign games. 65 In other cases, where the contract made no
reference to English localities, actions for recovery of gain
in gambling or of a loan for gambling, were enforced on the
ground of the validity of the transaction in Baden-Baden66
or Monte Carlo. 67 Whatever law may have been declared
applicable, the courts, during the growing complication of
British legislation on gaming, 68 gave no quarter to the exception based on public policy of the forum.
In a case of 1933, a Missouri court thought that "the
overwhelming weight of authority in this country is that
gambling transactions will not be recognized as valid in states
having statutes declaring such gambling contracts and transactions illegal and void, even where they are perfectly valid
12 Trib. civ. Seine (June 2, I922) Clunet I924, 429. The court simply applied the
French law, and as the note judiciously observes, the decision should have referred
to the French ordre public-as though then it would be correct.
13 Robinson v. Bland (I76o) 2 Burr. 1077, I W. BI. 234; cf. Cozens-Hardy, L. J.,
in Moulis v. Owen (I907] I K. B. 746, 7551f.
64 Story v. McKay (I888) IS 0. R. 69 (note executed in New York payable in
Ontario); Moulis v. Owen [I907] I K. B. 746 (baccarat game in Algiers, check
payable in London).
66 Fletcher Moulton, L. J., dissenting in Moulis v. Owen, supra n. 64, at 757;
DicEY, Note, 23 Law Q. Rev. (I907) 249, approved in a Note by SIR FREDERICK
PoLLOCK, id. at 25I.
66 Quarrier v. Colston (I842) I Phillips 147.
67 Saxby v. Fulton [1909] 2 K. B. 2o8; DICEY (ed. s) 6so illlustration 2 n. (I)
approves.
68 See FALCONBRIDGE, "More Anomalies in the Law of Wagering Contracts,"
9 Can. Bar Rev. (193I) 33I.
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in the state where entered into." 69 But the court in this case
was clearly impressed by suspicion of many dishonest maneuvers, including false personation, narcotizing tablets, and
card sharpers, all this scenario being employed against rustic
innocence. Whether really much authority is available, seems
doubtful; however, games of chance, indeed are not worthy
of serious judicial consideration, nor of scholarly discussion.
With respect to dealings in futures, however, or, in another
version, with respect to contracts for commercial objects,70
although the Supreme Court of the United States has rather
purposefully avoided deciding the issue under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, 71 in conflicts law the weight of authority
is represented again by holdings of the Missouri courts.
Missouri has severe prohibitions against dealings in futures,
but these statutes are declared to have no extraterritorial effect
on contracts made in other states dealing with the rise and fall
of stocks, bonds, and commodities; the recognition includes
brokerage contracts made in the state when the transactions
are to be performed outside the state. 72 The governing law,
u Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co. (Mo. I933)
7

57 S. W. (zd) IQ91, 1093·

°CoRBIN, Cases on Contracts (ed. 2, 1933) II28 n. Io.

71 Bond v. Hume (1917) 243 U. S. IS. The Supreme Court has not contested
however, the view of the Missouri Court in the cases of the following note.
72 Edwards Brokerage Co. v. Stevenson (I90I) I6o Mo. SI6, 6I S. W. 617; dicta
and citations in Elmore-Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebraker (1919) 20:2 Mo. App. 81,
:214 S. W. :216; Claiborne Commission Co. v. Stirlen (Mo. App. I924) :262 S. W. 387.
Strangely deviating, McVean v. Wehmeier (I9:23) 215 Mo. App. 587, zs6 S. W. 1085
applying Missouri law because the contract was made in the state and ignoring the
string of cases in point. Cf. in general, MINOR 384 § I6I, 422 § I76.
The cases cited seem simply to apply the law of the place of performance. But the
federal courts have employed various methods in order to validate orders performable on a "contract-market" authorized by federal statute (7 U. S. C. A. §§ Iff.,
Supp. 1945). See Notes,4oHarv. L. Rev. (I927) 638; 8I U. ofPa. L. Rev. (I933) 881.
The statutes in question, Mo. Rev. Stat. I939, §§ 4714-4716, 4719, are sharply
distinguished from the provisions against bucket shops, Rev. Stat. 1939, §§ 47064713, which are considered to make contracts illegal irrespective of transactions
on a foreign market, and are not superseded by the federal statutes on grain futures,
see Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co. (I932) 288 U.S. 188, I96 n. 2. In a subsequent
decision, Wolcott & Lincoln v. Humphrey (I938) II9 S. W. (2d) I022, the Missouri
Supreme Court seems to overrule the entire distinction, but in fact emphasizes
merely the section, then 43I8 (Rev. Stat. I939, § 4708), which belongs to the
bucket shop law.
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hence, also determines whether there is a gaming contract. 73
Peculiar difficulties seem to arise only from the doctrine
that recovery cannot be had on a note or bill or mortgage,
illegal or void for want of consideration in the place of performance. On the latter ground, English courts have refused
enforcement of a check given as security for a foreign gambling debt but allowed the creditor to sue on the debt itself 74
and American courts have been influenced by this strange
view. 75
To justify the German refusal to enforce foreign wagers,
the argument has been advanced 76 that enforcement is a matter
of procedure, since in German law an obligation to pay is recognized to the extent that money paid to discharge a gaming
debt cannot be recovered. 77 But in correct analysis, the
absence of the right to sue is a defect of the obligation to be
classified along with voidness and other forms of inefficacy.
Lotteries. Also in the related field of lotteries, several
American courts have clearly applied the foreign law. As
early as a century ago, when an obligation was entered into
to sell lottery tickets in Kentucky, on the basis of an enactment by that state for the benefit of a college, a New York
court held that the contract, valid where performable, was
enforceable, irrespective of the prohibition of lotteries by
New York statutes. 78 In other cases, the law of the place
where the ticket was sold, or a partnership in lottery tickets
was formed, has been applied. 79 But that the policy of the
Hood & Co. v. McCune (Mo. App. I9~21) 235 S. W. I 58.
Moulis v. Owen, supra n. 64; Societe Anonyme des Grands Etablissements
du Touquet Paris-Piage v. Baumgart (I927] W.N. 78.
76 Thuna v. Wolf (I928) I32 Misc. 56, 228 N. Y. Supp. 658, declares the action
on the gambling debt itself to be possibly enforceable.
76 KAHN, I Abhandl. I88 who characteristically referred at the same time to the
then treatment of the Statute of Frauds; recently RAAPE, IPR. 92 again argues
to this effect.
77 See BGB. § 762 par. I sent. 2.
78 Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Bassford and Nones (I 844) 6 Hill sz6.
79
M'Intyre v. Parks (Mass. I84I) 44 Mass. 207; Thatcher v. Morris (I854)
II N.Y. 437; Roselle v. McAuliffe (I897) I4I Mo. 36, 39 S. W. 274; 2 BEALE I240.
73
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forum does not decide by itself, is the generally accepted
doctrine, well grounded in the territorial character of such
statutory prohibitions. In a recent revival of Dicey's80 contrary proposition, it has been asked: Why should the forum
be compelled, in a lottery action by or against a resident, to
subordinate its policy to the policy of another state? 81 But
the answer is simple. The policy of such a law does not extend to every suit coming before its courts nor to all contracts
"made" in its territory, but only to the contracts centered
within the forum. The old case in the matter of the Kentucky
lottery, mentioned before, is correct also on this point.
Indorsed gaming notes. Of particular informative value
is a series of cases dealing with innocent indorsees of notes
issued to pay gaming debts or to furnish the means for
wagering. By a universally favored rule, any illicit cause of
an obligation embodied in a negotiable instrument is no defense against an indorsee ignorant of the facts. This, in the
vast majority of countries and courts, extends to notes and
bills, originating in gambling. 82 The North Carolina court has
remarked that it would encourage vice, if a successful gambler
could obtain the value of such a note by indorsement and then
render his obligation ineffective by pleading his own wrongdoing. 83 Statutes annulling private contracts for reasons of
general social welfare, if not handled with great caution, have
an unfortunate tendency to defeat their own purpose. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has maintained a practice,
allowing the plea of prohibited gambling against an innocent
indorsee despite a contrary law governing the indorsement.
The practice goes back to a decision where the notes were all
80

DrcEY 763 illustration 8, without any case citation to support it.
NussBAUM, Principles 123, as example for the thesis quoted supra n. 26.
82 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4729 § 1676; Restatement of the Law of Contracts §
590; FALCONBRIDGE, 1 Banking and Bills of exchange (ed. 5, 1935) 712. The same is
recognized even in Switzerland which has the most intransigent attitude in Europe
against wagering, see C. OsL, art. 514 par. 1 in .fine.
sa Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Crafton (1921) r8r N.C. 404, 107 S. E. 316.
81
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dated at St. Louis and payable at the same place. The bargain
consisted of mere speculations upon the future prices of grain
and under Missouri law was void, but this defense could not
be objected against an ignorant indorsee who had acquired
the notes before maturity. The Illinois court referred to the
Criminal Code of Illinois and to its own previous views, to
the effect that the transaction was
"Not only contrary to public policy but it is a crime--a
crime against the state, a crime against religion and morality,
and a crime against all legitimate trade and business."84
That this is still the law in Illinois, 85 shows how muddled
the considerations of "public policy" are. Such violent moral
indignation, of course, may impell a court to protect the
bench from contamination with the outrageous foreign law.
Not a difference in laws or legal systems but deep-seated
moral inconsistency of a foreign-created right with the domestic principles compels resort to public policy. However, the
outburst is somewhat misplaced. A wise court should not take
the attitude of a conscientious objector, when it is asked to
give an innocent indorsee what he would receive in nearly
every other jurisdiction.
In the soundest decisions, the exception of public policy,
in fact, is reduced to the function of an objectively ascertained
moral sense:
"A contract that is valid where made and that does not
involve any moral turpitude, and is not pernicious and detestable will be enforced in a state although the laws of such
state forbid the making of such contract." 86
84

Pope v. Hanke (1S94) 155 Ill. 617, 630, 40 N. E. S39, S43.
Thomas v. The First Nat'l Bank of Belleville (1904) 213 Ill. 261,72 N. E. Sol:
although the contract is licit in Missouri and the District of Columbia, it is not
enforceable, since it violates the penal laws of Illinois! See for other cases, 38 Ill.
Ann. Stat. (1934) 4o6ff., annotations to § 329; the Supplement of 1944 has no
additions.
88 American Furniture Mart Bldg. Corp. v. W. C. Redmon Sons & Co. {Ind.
1936) 1 N. E. (2d) 6o6 at 6o9, HARPER & TAINTOR, Cases (ed. I) Soi (cognovit
85
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Various Contracts

Champerty. The old absolute prohibition of "champerty"
was conceived as a prohibitory law making void any agreement to share in the future proceeds of a law suit. The traditional English approach that the disapproval affected contracts wherever made87 is hardly to be encountered any more. 88
On the one hand, the scope of the offense of champerty has
shrunk, in the opinion of American jurisdictions, so as to
embrace no more than an officious interference, without
proper interest, in other people's obligations,89 and its collateral effects have been more or less weakened. 90 On the
other hand, the American courts usually admit any solution
offered by the law of the place where suit for enforcement of
the debt is brought. 91
Beale and other writers 92 have reproached this practice
for failing to distinguish between prohibited agreements to
be governed by the lex loci contractus and prohibited suits,
enforceable or not according to the law of the place of performance, which place seems to be identified with the place
note validly executed in Illinois; if enforcement were refused, people in Indiana
would be invited to fraud by signing notes in Illinois unavailable in their own
courts). The decision refers to International Harvester Co. of America v. McAdam
(I9IO) I42 Wis. I 14, 124 N. W. 1042; Garrigue v. Keller (I 90S) I64 Ind. 676,
74 N. E. 523, 527. These cases follow one of the rules in ELISHA GREENHooo, The
Doctrine of Public Policy in the Law of Contracts (Chicago I886) 46.
87 Grell v. Levy (r864) r6 C. B. N. S. 73; DrcEY 762 illustration 3; LEFLAR,
Arkansas Conflict of Laws 217 n. 64 points to two Arkansas cases, viz., Arden
Lumber Co. v. Henderson Iron Works (1907) 83 Ark. 240, I03 S. W. 185; WhiteWilson-Drew Co. v. Egelhoff (1910) 96 Ark. ros, IJI s.
208. But these cases
deal with notes incorporating ten per cent for attorney's fees, valid under Louisiana
law, but declared unenforceable in Arkansas, being private penalties. This is a
different type of case.
88 Alberta: Waters v. Campbell (C. A. Alberta 1913) 25 W. L. R. 838, 6 W. W. R.
957, LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 2I7 § 97·
8 Q Gilman v. Jones (I889) 87 Ala. 691, 5 So. 784, 787, 7 So. 48. For details see
WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4834ff. § I712; Restatement, Contracts § 542.
80 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 484rff. § I7IJ.
91 Richardson v. Rowland (1873) 40 Conn. 565; Gilman v. Jones (r888) supra
n. 89; Roller v. Murray (I907) 107 Va. 527, 59 S. E. 421. In Blackwell v. Webster
(1886) 29 Fed. 614 the law of the place of contracting was applied.
t2 2 BEALE 1231; STUMBERG 267.
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where the court is sitting. At the same time, this border line
is described as practically difficult to trace. But the place of
the law suit is not necessarily the place of "performance" of
an accounting between the parties to the agreement; nor
should it be material for the question which statute applies,
whether some statutes continue to make the agreement void
and the others merely prohibit the law suit. The view of the
courts should be supported, not by mechanical rules but
rather by the fact that the agreement is centered at the place
where the suit is intended to be brought. However, in each
of these opinions, the idea of an absolute prohibition affecting
all foreign agreements is left far behind.
Other examples. Similarly, it has been held in Alabama
that assignment of a life insurance policy to a person with
no insurable interest in the life of the insured was validly
executed in New York and to be enforced as against the law
of the forum, since it comprised nothing inherently bad. 93
The contrary, it is true, has recently been held to be the view
o.f Texas, by a federal court in that state. 94
Again, general opinion repudiates the use of public policy
to enforce the forum's conception of annulment for duress. 95
Examples can be multiplied. 96
Protection of personality. Statutory provisions for the protection of workers or employees in employment contracts (not
in the class of "territorial" provisions respecting health or
morality pertaining to public labor law) regularly apply
only as a part of the governing law. Some doubt has affected
the restrictions imposed on stipulations in employment con93

Haase v. First Nat'! Bank of Anniston (I9I9) 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 76r.
Griffin v. McCoach (C. c. A. 5th I94I) I2J F. (2d) sso, 55I. The Supreme
Court of the United States had previously recognized the constitutional freedom in
"public policy which protects citizens against the assumed dangers of insurance on
their lives held by strangers," Griffin v. McCoach (I94I) JIJ U.S. 498. Cj. MoRGAN,
"Choice of Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) 153 at I 57 n. 8.
96
Supra p. 525.
9
6 For other examples see WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5094 § 1792.
94
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tracts forbidding the employee to engage in activities competitive with the business for which he is engaged, during a
certain time after termination of his services. The statutes
vary greatly. Some nullify any such restraint of trade. Others
allow three months, a year, three years, or a reasonable time.
What law governs, is controversial, but prevailing opinion
seems to favor the law of the place or places where services
have been rendered. 97
The exception of public policy, however, has rarely been
used. Fry, J., did it with sweeping language in a well-known
case of a French employment, but in this instance English
law was the governing law. 98 In one case, an express stipulation for the law of the state controlling the employing company was disregarded, on the ground of public policy, as "ineffectual to avoid the statute of California, the place of performance."99 A German decision extended the local restriction to a foreign contract of a German national in a foreign
business place. 100 These two solutions are plainly wrong. The
first minimizes without justification the agreement of the
parties on the applicable law, which would have satisfied
even the theory requiring substantial connection therewith.
A protective norm of California private law was treated as
97 United States: 2 BEALE 1230; Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co. (C. C. A.
9th, N. D. Cal. 1924) 300 Fed. 1, 3· On the other hand, Holland Furnace Co. v.
Connelley (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 543 applies the local Missouri law
permitting the clause even in case Michigan law forbidding it were the governing
law. Cj. supra pp. 385, 555·
Germany: A natural effect of the rule of lex loci solutionis.
Italy: App. Genova (April 18, 1904) Riv. Dir. Com. 1904 II 361 (employment of a
teacher in Switzerland by the Berlitz School of Milan; Italian law applied, against
the pro hi hi tion of the Swiss lex loci contractus).
98 Rousillon v. Rousillon (188o) 14 Ch. D. 351, 369; see CHESHIRE 151.
99 Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co. (C. C. A. 9th 1924) 300 Fed. I, 3·
100 Germany: OLG. Hamburg (April 6, 1907) 72 Seuffert's Blatter fiir Rechtsanwendung 672, for employees of German nationality, strange, but approved by
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 274 n. I and apparently by LEWALD 244. Another decision,
OLG. Dresden Gan. 25, 1907) 14 ROLG. 345, forcibly introduces minimum terms
for giving notice (HGB. § 67) into an English employment contract of a German
employee; this has been criticized as going much too far even by NussBAUM,
D. IPR. 274 n. 1.

s8o

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

if it were a police regulation for the general welfare. The
German case is typical for the unilateral "protection" of
nationals, which easily may turn out to cause unfavorable
discrimination against these nationals abroad.
On a broader plan, individuals are protected by modern
private law against binding themselves by excessive obligations. The prototype of these provisions was the rule of the
Code Napoleon that no one can engage his services but for
a time or for a certain enterprise. 101 This fundamental law of
emancipation from serfdom has justly been treated always as
imperative also in conflicts law. 102 It is clear, however, that
not the same exalted position belongs to the varying municipal
rules determining in detail the time or place for which an
individual may validly commit his services. 103
The same is true, for instance, in the case where an irrevocable and all-inclusive power of attorney, without valuable
consideration and any proper interest of the agent, was executed in New York for exercise in Germany. The two laws
differed in allowing remedies against exploitation of the principal, but either law, if governing the contract, was good
enough. 104 It would have been different, if one of the laws
involved had not provided any aid against thoughtless disposition by a person of all his assets; but there is scarcely such
a law.
3· Immoral Transactions105
Bribery. In
101

1 88o,

the Supreme Court of the United

C. C. art. 1780.
8 LAURENT 243 § 169; WEiss, 4 Traite 376 and n. 4; 3 FIORE§ III9.
103
RouAsT, Melanges Pillet 210; CALEB, 5 Repert. 212 No. 53; more recently
also BARTIN, "Une conception nouvelle de Ia loi locale," 52 Recueil (1935) II 583,
627, denies the application of ordre public to employments in foreign countries.
To an opposite effect, 2 FRANKENSTEIN 336.
104
The problem is studied by RABEL, "Unwiderruflichkeit der Vollmacht," 7
Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 797, 8os, 8o7.
106
English cases are collected by DICEY 762-765; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law
180 § 172.
102
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States106 refused enforcement to the petition of the Turkish
Consul General against the Winchester Arms Company for
payment of a ten per cent commission unquestionably promised him by the firm. He had, by his influence, induced the
purchasing agent of his government to accept the defendant's
offer for very considerable deliveries. The Court took into
account that the Turkish government at that time may have
considered the behavior of the plaintiff, not paid for his work,
as quite blameless; but the Court stated that the contract was
corrupt.
"The services stipulated and rendered were prohibited
by considerations of morality and policy which should prevail
at all times and in all countries.... Contracts permissible by
other countries are not enforceable in our courts, if they
contravene our laws, our morality, or our policy. The contract in suit was made in this country, and its validity must
be determined by our laws. But had it been made in Turkey,
and were it valid there, it would meet with the same reprobation when brought before our courts for enforcement.m07
The Court, in my respectful opinion, was right in deciding
the case because the contract was made and to be performed
in this country and gravely violated the American sense of
propriety. The same reason explains why the Court, as it
said, would always refuse enforcement to foreign contracts
of such kind. But that "our laws" and "our policy" are as compulsory as "our morality," cannot be conceded.
Lease of a gambling house. In a well-justified contrast to
the Italian decisions granting liberal enforcement to foreign
valid gaming contracts, the Court of Cassation in Rome108
refused enforcement to an Egyptian judgment by which the
leaseholder of a gambling house was held obligated to pay
the rent. The offense was not seen so much in the aleatory
108
1o1
108

Oscanyan v. Arms Co. (188o) 103 U.S. 261.
Id., supra n. ro6, at 271, 272 and 277·
Cass. Roma (March 26, 1926) Monitore 1926, I, 4o6, Clunet 1926, 1092.
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character of the games as in the exploitation of dangerous
human passions for egoistic purposes, as it was stressed that
morality was violated. This reasoning is sound, if the refusal
of the courts to deal with res turpes is ever considered sound.
D. CONCLUSIONS

Too great a margin has been left to the discretion of courts
in disregarding the normal effects of conflicts rules. In this
opinion, I feel encouraged by the results of Nutting. He suggests, however, a transfer from the courts to the legislatures
of the selection of the domestic interests that are to be safeguarded from foreign encroachment. 109 A similar proposal
was made in 1910 by the Institute of International Law:
Every lawmaker should determine with utmost care which of
his provisions may never be replaced by foreign law. 110 But
do legislatures, in this respect, deserve more confidence than
the majority of the judges who have learned to understand
the necessary restrictions of local views? The evil could easily
be aggravated by asking too many questions of the legislatures in each type of enactment.
The principle itself, rather, must be freed from its vague
and all-inclusive character. Although no mechanical rule can
shape the elusive exception of public policy, it may well be
defined in a more reliable manner. Our results are as follows.
r. Conflicts rules delimiting the application of private law
rules exist because the substantive rules of the various civilized
jurisdictions are supposed to be exchangeable. This relationship should not be jeopardized at the forum by a pretended
superiority of its own policies or legal techniques. The task of
conflicts rules in the field of contracts is to determine to
19 Minn. L. Rev., supra n. 9, at 203, 209.
See Clunet 1910, 976. The same idea was expressed by Mr. Baron Parke in
Egerton v. Earl Brownlow (1853) 4 H. L. Cas. I, 122, to the effect that English
judges should refrain from defining the public good.
109 NuTTING,
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what state a contract belongs. This done, no uncertainty arising from uncontrollable evaluations should be tolerated.
2. However, the rules of private international law are
limited to a part of the entire legal system. They have no
power over the rules of domestic public law, including all
rules serving the interests of the state itself and the general
welfare. These rules are, or should be, accompanied by their
own territorial delimitations. In their domain, they enjoy at
the forum unconditional precedence overprivateinternational
law. There is no uncertainty about that. But the boundaries
should and may very well be chosen, quite as for our ordinary
conflicts rules, so as to include in principle only the contracts
centered within the forum.
3· Foreign private law is applicable as it is, however it may
be influenced by foreign public interests. There is no way of
distinguishing the purposes of foreign enactments and no
reason why we should recognize the validity of transactions
repudiated by the law to which we ourselves subject them, or
to invalidate transactions only because we do not agree with
the purposes of the legislation competent under our conflicts rule.
4· The only general barriers to foreign law in the sphere
of private international law, that may prove indispensable,
arise from the depth of basic moral conceptions, which in our
times naturally include those of fundamental social justice.
Therefore, we may refuse unqualified enforcement to a
foreign law allowing serfdom, legalizing contracts involving
prostitution, or denying effectual relief to children or incompetent persons. Among civilized nations, we should not expect to find any considerable number of such abnormities.
A step further, a court holding that in no case should a
debtor be forced to utter ruin by the enforcement of a contract, may admit such defense, thus far unknown to American
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law, against an American contract. 111 But the differences of
views respecting overwhelming difficulty of performance
caused by unfavorable circumstances no longer appear so
widely separated as to warrant invocation of public policy. 112
Zitelmann contrasted good morals with offense to the internal law; likewise various modern laws literally restrict
the application of public policy to cases where recognition of
the foreign law would be inconsistent with public order and
morality. 113 The idea is sound, if only it were not dissolved
into blue fog.

5· We may thus summarize:
Under Dicey's exception of public policy, a contract
(whether illegal by its proper law or not) is invalid if it or its
enforcement is opposed to English interests of state, to the
policy of English law, or to the moral rules upheld by English law. 114
In the formulation advocated here, a contract valid by the
law governing it, is nevertheless subject to the public law of
the forum to the extent of proper territorial delimitation,
and to deeply rooted and reasonable objections of good
morals, including fundamental social justice.
6. What effect is due to a judgment refusing enforcement
of a foreign-governed right on the ground of local public policy? The most common view in the conflicts laws of all countries takes it for granted that such a judgment has the full
effect of res judicata. Occasionally other ideas have been expressed. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Supreme Court
111

See BATIFFOL 404 § 487.
m I am referring to a famous problem on which it suffices, for the present, to
consult for American law, WILLISTON, 6 Contracts SSll § 1963, and for comparative law, RABEL, I Das Recht des Warenkaufs § 45·
113 I ZrTELMANN 334, 368.
Brazil: Introd. Law (I9I6) art. I7i Introd. Law (I942) art. I7.
China: Int. Priv. Law, art I.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 30.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 38.
m DICEY 51 Rule 149·

PUBLIC POLICY
of the United States, has asserted that, if a state declines to
enforce a foreign cause of action, "it merely denies a remedy,
leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that
he is free to enforce it elsewhere." 115 The Court, of course,
operated on the sole basis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and dealt with a special case of workmen's compensation.
Even so, the dictum raises serious problems. But to transfer
this solution into the sphere of conflicts law, as has been recently suggested by an eminent authority, 116 would promote
strange results. Evidently, if a court will deny enforcement
without altering the possible cause of action, it can sometimes
do so by refusing to take jurisdiction on the merits,111 in
which case we should wish the court to pronounce expressly
that it does not decide the merits. Our discussions on the applicable law, however, always presume that jurisdiction has
been assumed. If so, a court should ordinarily enforce foreign
rights, but if it does not, the common effects of taking cognizance must apply to the plaintiff. It would be rather dangerous to open an easy middle road for provincial minds.

II.

VIOLATION

oF FoREIGN LAw

The exception of public policy is generally understood to
point exclusively to the public policy of the forum. 118 A
sharp contrast thereto is marked by the thesis of English
judges that they would not assist or sanction agreements
breaching the law of a friendly foreign country. 119 It is a
remarkable proposition, despite its vague form and rare application. Apart from the mistaken rule giving the law at the
115
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper (1932.) z86 U.S. 145 at 160. The question has also been touched upon in International Harvester Co. of America v.
McAdam (1910) 142. Wis. 114, no, 12.4 N. W. 1042., 1044.
118 In addition to occasional dicta, recently this view has been taken by MoRGAN,
"Choice of Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) 153 at 156, 157.
117 This desperate method of avoiding injustice has been mentioned but not
applied in Precourt v. Driscoll (1931) 85 N. H. z8o at z83, 157 At!. SZ5 at 52.7,
cited by MoRGAN, supra n. 116, at 190.
118 See the interesting opinion of STORY §§ 2.45, Z5S-Z57·
111
Supra p. 537 n. 69.
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place of performance the power to invalidate the contract, 120
the most important case is one by which the English courts
joined an international series of decisions against smuggling.
We shall contemplate this interesting though isolated regard for foreign law.
Smuggling. 121 Under an old inherited view, foreign revenue laws are refused enforcement. 122 On this ground, English
courts in the eighteenth century disregarded a Portuguese
prohibition on export of gold123 and a French prohibition of
assignats. 124 In France, the Parlement d'Aix (1759) and the
Court of Cassation (1835) held by the same approach that a
contract contemplating the import of contraband into another
country is not void, unless it includes corruption of the customs officers, clandestine measures (ruse) being immaterial.m;
However, Pothier was the first, in the name of honesty, to
protest against this indifference, 126 and later many French and
other writers followed him. 127 The German Supreme Court
120

Supra pp. 53a f.
A good comparative monograph: MEsSINEsi, La contrebande en droit international prive (Paris I932).
122
State of Colorado v. Harbeck (I92I) 232 N.Y. 7I, I33 N. E. 357; LoRENZEN,
Cases 269; for English cases, see WESTLAKE 29I § 2I3.
In re VISSER, H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [I928) Ch. 877, 884.
SAcK, "(Non-) Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws, in International Law
and Practice," 8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I933) 559·
123
Boucher v. Lawson (1735) Hardw. 85, 89, 194, I95; dictum to the same effect
by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 34I in a tea-smuggling
case.
124
Smith v. Marconnay (1796) Peake Add. Cas. 8I N. P.; cf. 11 Eng. and Emp.
Dig. 403.
126
See MEsSINESI, supra n. 121, at 17ff.; BATIFFOL 359 § 418; Cass. (req.)
(August 25, 1835) S. 1835.1.673 (secret importation of food into Spain).
126
Oeuvres de PoTHIER, 5 Traite du contrat d'assurances (1847) § 58.
127
United States: 3 KENT 266; 2 WHARTON 1139 § 484.
England: PoLLOcK, Contracts 361.
France and Belgium: 8 LAURENT 174ff. §§ 114-117; WEiss, 4 Traite 383 n. 3;
DEsPAGNET 909 § 307; VALERY 965ff. § 669; PILLET, 2 Traite 238 § 513 and in
Clunet 1896, 1 at 8; 2 LvoN-CAEN et RENAULT, Part I, 85ff. §§ 68-70.
Germany: VoN MoHL, 1 Staatsrecht, Volkerrecht und Politik (r86o) 724;
HEFFTER, Europ. Volkerrecht (ed. 8, 1888) § 23 n. 9; NEUMEYER, 4 Int.Verwaltungs R.
423.
Switzerland: 2 BRaCHER 92 § 160.
Against an isolated contrary view of PHILONENKO, Clunet 1930, 441ff., see
BATIFFOL 356 § 414.
121
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developed a consistently strict practice, 128 repudiating sales
and agreements for carriage intended to infringe foreign
customs laws or prohibitions on importing or exporting, for
the protection of public welfare, such as, for instance, on importation of cocain into Britsh India. 129 The refusal included
also loans to finance smuggling130 and sales of alcohol deliverable on the high seas near the territorial waters of Sweden
and Finland. 131 Three French appeal courts and that of
Brussels shared in this doctrine,132 under which it is immaterial what law governs the contract.
Finally, the Court of Appeal of London joined this view
in a decision of 1928, with a dissenting vote maintaining the
old theory. 188 By a contract governed by English law,
whiskey was bought to be introduced into the United States
during prohibition. The sales contract was declared unenforceable, by Lord Sankey with a reference to Dicey's rule
respecting all prohibitions of the law of the place of performance, but by Lord Lawrence on the ground that the contract's recognition "would furnish a just cause for complaint
by the U.S. Government against our Government . . . and
would be contrary to our obligation of international comity,
. . . and therefore would offend our notions of public
morality."
The common basis of all these cases is the conviction that
128 Germany: RG. (Nov. 5, 1898) 42 RGZ. 295, 297; (Dec. 2, 1903) 56 RGZ.
179, 181; (Sept. 30, 1919) 96 RGZ. 282; and others.
Austria: OGH. (May 5, 1928) Rspr. 1928, 122 No. 253; (March 3, 1931) Rspr.
1931, 70, Clunet 1931, n8o.
129 RG. Qune 24, 1927) JW. 1927, 2288, IPRspr. 1926/27 No. 15; cj. OLG.
Stuttgart (Sept. 25, 1891) Clunet 1894, 896 (gold exportation from Russia).
130
RG. (March 10, 1927) JW. 1927, 2287, IPRspr. 1926/27 No. 17.
13 1 RG. (Oct. 26, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 20.
182 France: App. Pau (July 2, 1886) Clunet 1887, 57 (affreightment); Trib. com.
Douai (Nov. II, 1907) S. 1907.2.308 (partnership for smuggling contraband into
Belgium); App. Alger (Feb. 20, 1925) Clunet 1926, 701 (partnership for smuggling
tobacco into Spain).
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 17, r886) Clunet r887, 214.
138 Foster v. Driscoll [1929] r K. B. 470, 518, 510.
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organized smuggling violates good morals and undermines
the mores of the population along the frontiers. Many
writers, therefore, have stressed the fact that the offense is to
the forum's own public policy rather than to the foreign law.
Nevertheless, Lord Lawrence's formulation, quite adequately, establishes as a basis respect for the foreign law
under the forum's conception of public or, as it has often been
put, of international morality.
This doctrine has encountered difficulties. Its most certain
application is that where it is proved that both parties knowingly intended to circumvent a foreign prohibition on importation. On the other hand, an affreightment merely preparatory to smuggling has been held valid even in German
courts. 134 Moreover, the mere knowledge of the vendor that
the buyer intends to use the goods for smuggling is not sufficient; the contract must involve a promotion of smuggling.
Also contracts having the effect rather than the purpose of
violating foreign law have been approved. 185
Between these two extremes, courts have enforced contracts, because of the lack of some aggravating element which
they required for repudiating the bargain. Where a hotel
manager of Maine acquired liquor in Massachusetts for resale prohibited in Maine, Mr. Justice Holmes, then a judge
on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, recognized that it
would be "barbarous isolation" for a state "to enforce all
contracts made and to be performed within its territory, without regard to how much they might contravene the policy
of its neighbor's life." But, for the application of the foreign
prohibition, he required a not too remote connection of the
act of selling the liquor with the apprehended result, and in
refusing the action for the price in the instant case, he did
it on the assumption that the seller expected and desired the
134

RG. (Feb. 9, 1926) 69 Gruchot's Beitrage 78, IPRspr. 1926/27 No. 16.
us KG. (Oct. 1o, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 21.
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unlawful sale and intended to facilitate it. As a principle,
Holmes found the sale void only when the illegal intent of
the buyer is not only known to the seller but encouraged by
the sale. 136 This requirement has been taken as an expression
of the widespread tendency of American courts to restrict
the extraterritorial effect of statutes concerning intoxicating
liquor, which were considered a disturbing element in commerce. But similar arguments were used abroad to validate
contracts during the American era of prohibition. When a
dock was leased in the Detroit River on the Windsor side
for storing liquor, the Ontario court upheld the contract. One
judge noted the absence of proof that by the lease the parties
intended to commit a breach of the laws of the United States,
a surmise not being sufficient, because the judge could not
take judicial notice of the "alleged rum-running conditions
in Windsor." Another left the question open whether a conspiracy to infringe the American laws by importing liquor
was existent, since whatever the plaintiff did in Canada, was
legal and valid. 137 Also the French Court of Cassation declared valid a contract of maritime insurance covering spirits,
although the insurer admittedly knew very well that the
purpose of the voyage was to bring the vessel near American
territorial waters for transshipment. On this occasion, the
Court did not formally reiterate the century-old thesis of the
permissibility of clandestine smuggling, but thought that it
was licit to vend alcohol on the high seas and that the sellers
could not be sure of the intentions of the buyers. 138 Maritime
insurance in such cases is the more reprehensible, as it eliminates risk incurred by dishonest adventures. 139 But strangely,
136 Graves v. Johnson (1892) 156 Mass. 2II, 30 N. E. 818. Most cases concerning
liquor sales are merely applying the law of the forum.
137 Westgate v. Harris (Ont. S. Ct., App. Div.) [1929] 4 D. L. R. 643.
138 Cass. (req.) (March 28, 1928) S. 1928.1.305. N1BOYET's note ibid. and in Gaz.
Pal. 1928.1.812 points to the court's denial of an international public policy, whereas
BAT1FFOL 361 § 420 is somewhat encouraged by~the hesitance of the Court.
1n See N1BOYET, supra_n. 138.
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opinions are divided on this point. 140
Generalizations. Present American writers have adopted
the view now prevailing and seem willing to generalize it
to the effect that a contract should not be enforced, if it is
made with a view of violating the laws of another country or
at least of a sister state. 141 The English dicta mentioned before have the same tendency. They are in harmony with an
old case which rejected a contract that aimed at supporting
subversive activities. 142
A similar decision of the Tribunal de la Seine invalidating
a loan governed by French law by which a revolution in
Venezuela would have been supported, 148 inspired Niboyet
to enlarge the doctrine disapproving of smuggling contracts.144 He calls for a true "ordre public international,"
determinative of conflicts law in all countries, instead of for
individual states. There has never been doubt about the desirability of mutual respect for legislation. But the slowness
of development in this field has evident reasons. Probably,
we have to be satisfied in the near future with a prudent expansion of the idea that violation of foreign law may be
immoral.
International treaties. The normal way of securing international assistance for the purposes of a state is, of course,
the conclusion of treaties. For example, the United States
made eleven treaties to improve its opportunities for inspect140 United States: Cases for validity are cited by WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4953,
4954 n. 7·
In Germany, the OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 2I, I927) Hans. RGZ. I928 B No. 2,
IPRspr. I928 No. I9, validated maritime insurance for smuggling. Contra: LG.
Berlin III (Nov. 2, I928) IPRspr. I929 No. I3 (American Prohibition); NussBAUM,
D. IPR. 246.
The Netherlands: Condemning the insurance company, H. R. (Jan. 10, I924)
8 Revue Dor 299·
141 See WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4950 § I749·
142
Jones v. Garcia del Rio (I823) T. & R. 297.
143
Trib. civ. Seine (July 2, I932) Florsheim v. Delgado-Chalbaud, S. I934.2.73
at 75, Clunet I933, 73; Revue Crit. I934, 770; recommended for imitation, Note, 8
Tul. L. Rev. (I930) 283.
144
Note by NIBOYET, S I934.2.73-75; Revue Crit. I934, 772.
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ing and arresting vessels suspected of carrying alcohol. 145 Also
a few multipartite conventions for the suppression of smuggling have been signed. 146
This suggests a final consideration. We have discussed
the Brussels Convention sanctioning the Hague Rules and
the satisfactory middle course achieved in dealing with liability of shipowners. Certain concessions have been suggested,
recognizing prohibitions imposed by nonparticipant states on
the inclusion of exemption clauses in bills of lading. 147 It
should be expected that also, vice versa, states remaining
aloof from the multipartite treaty, nevertheless respect the
Hague Rules as adopted in the port of dispatch. If they do
not apply the law of this port as the law of the contract in
general, still they ought to recognize the true international
public policy embodied in a treaty of such merits. 148
145

MESSINESI, supra n. I2I, 6o-64; DICKINSON, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles I926)

37I.
146 Conventions for the suppression of contraband traffic in alcoholic liquor: of
Brussels (July 2, I89o, art. 92, implemented June 8, I899) 82 British and Foreign
State Papers 55 at 76 and 9I id. 6; of St. Germain on the liquor traffic in Africa
(Sept. Io, I9I9) also ratified by the United States, 8 L. of N. Treaty Series I2,
HuosoN, I Int. Legislation 352 No. 8; ofHelsingfors (August I9, 1925) 42 L. ofN.
Treaty Series 73, and 45 id. r83, HuosoN, 3 Int. Legislation I673 No. I44 and 7 id.
752 No. 484.
Pan-American Convention on the Repression of Smuggling, Buenos Aires (June
I9, 1935) HuosoN, 7 Int. Legislation roo No. 415.
147
Supra Chapter 29, p. 428 and n. I39·
148 Correct international contract practice is illustrated by a bill of lading written
in English for shipments from Antwerp whereby the jurisdiction of the courts of
Hamburg is exclusively competent but the lawsuits are "to be delivered according
to article 9I" of the Belgian Maritime Code (Hague Rules). The Commercial
Tribunal of Antwerp (Nov. I6, I939) Jur. Port d'Anvers I940, 225 has accepted
this clause as valid, since the foreign court must be presumed to respect the Belgian
public policy embodied in art. 91 cit.
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local law, I8<)-I9I, I97-201.
personallaw, I88-I89.
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Business Corporation, 7-IO.
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mixed of corporate and incorporate elements, 6, 7-Io, and
Chapter 2I, 94-I24.
Business Trust, 7, 98-Ioo, I08.
Busse, 278.
Capacity. See also Powers
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Causation, 257, 260.
Cause Licite, 5 28-5 29.
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concept, 40-42.
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by the parties, Chapters 28 and
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judicial, 432 ff.
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soo.
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procedure), 72-74, 105,
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Colombia. See also Table of Statutes.
contracts, 496, n. 35·
reciprocity, 25, 141, n. 86.
Comity, I27, I73, 554·
Commercial Property, 63.
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507.
damages, 544·
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form of, Chapter 3 I, 487-5 I 9·
formal, 458-459.
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nature, 530-532.
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public policy, Chapter 33,
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28 and 29.
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renvoi, 389,482.
and tort, 287-294.
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validity, 359,395-402,
447-455·
validity and effects distinguished,
450-453, 488, n. 5, 533, n.
54, 538, 542, 576-577·
without foreign elements,
402-403.
Contracts of Unlicensed
Corporations, 20 I -2 I 7.
Contributory Negligence, 258-260,
282.
Co-obligors, 263, 275·
Corporaci6n Creada o Reconocida,

I2,n.27·
Corporate Acts
territorial restrictions, 6 2-64,
127, I67.
Corporate Elements, 6, 94-IOO.
Corporation, Chapters I 8-20,
22-23.
concept, 4, 7, 96.
terminology, 5·
acquiring by gift or will,
I6S-I67.
admittance, unconditional,
179-I So.
administrative local law, I 90.
agency, 174, I77, I82.
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agents, 168-172, I 89.
law governing contracts,
189-190.
personal liability, 21 o, 2 I 3.
authorization of business, 173·
discretionary, I 8 3-18 5.
failure, 201-21 7·
underlegal rules, I 8 I -1 8 3.
branch
concept, 176 ff.
nature, 187-191.
bankruptcy, 74, n. 25, 190.
local law, 189-191,197-200.
personal law, I 88-189.
capacity, 72-75, 164-167.
for procedural acts, 146.
restrictions, I 49- I 58,
165-168.
for torts, 75, n. 28, 255·
charter, 69, I 26, I 28, I 39·
modification, 8 5.
corporate acts, 62-63, 128, 167.
contracts of nonlicensed
corporation, 202-2 I 7.
recognition of sanction in third
states, 205, n. I.f-7, 213,
n. 188, 567, ns. 43, H·
creation, 69.
Germanic law, 128-129.
Roman law, 1 26, 1 28.
directors, position, 8o-8 1, 168.
dissolution, 8 5-93.
doing business, Chapter 23,
173-225.
concept, 132, I.f-2-I.f-5,
175-176.
systems of permission,
179-187.
domestication, I 3 2, I 74-,
185-186.
compulsory, 1 3 2 and n. 26.
domicil, .f., 27-30.
necessary, 28-29.

end, 85-93.
equality, 26, 1So-1 81.
"exclusion," I 28, I 73, 220.
existence, 69, 125, 127, I.f-6, 167.
external relations, 8 I -8 5.
fiction theory, .f., 24-27, s6, 99.
126-129.
foreign corporation, concept, I 9·
Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter
H aftung, 8, 106.
guaranties, 197.
impositions, 174, 191-201,
(sanctions) 20 1-2 I 7.
incorporation, 4·
for foreign purposes, 45-47,83.
internal organization, 7 5-8 I.
issue of shares and bonds, I 90.
jurisdiction, 8o-81, 87, 95,
191-194·
Latin-American view, 24-27.
law applicable, Chapter I 9,
31-68.
to branches, I 88- I 9 I,
197-201.
renvoi, 50.
law of the place of central office,
.f., 33·
meaning, 37-39.
change, 38,51-55.
exceptions, 46-50.
law of the state of incorporation,
.f-,31-33·
meaning, 32,63-66.
change, 55·
exceptions, 46-4 7.
law of the place of the principal
object, 47-50.
legal character, 69 ff.
liability for branch obligations,
190.
locallaw, 189-191, 197-201.
manager, authority, 190.
liability, I 90.
meetings, 64-65, 128.
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members
acquisition, 75-77,498.
certificate, 75-76, 78.
liabilities, 79 ,8 I-8 5, I IO,
224.
meetings, 64-65, 128.
rights, 79·
seizure, 58, 62, 77-78.
merchant character, 74-75, I91.
modification of charter, 50-57,
8 5·
mortmain, I65-I68.
name, 73, I82, I88-I89.
nationality, I 7-2 7.
nationalization, 9 I -9 2, I 8 5.
nonprofit, 5, 6, I4-I 5, I37-138.
(recognition), I 8 I-I 82.
(doing business).
operation methods, I 78.
organs, I 28, I 68.
permanent establishment,
I76-I78, I87 ff.
personal law, 5, 31-93, I 88-I 89.
concurrence with other laws,
31.
distinguished from nationality,
I8 ff.
renvoi, 50.
scope, Chapter 20, 69-93.
place of business, I74, I76-I78.
powers, 72-7 5, I 5o-I68.
general and special, I 58-I68.
principal officers, 3 I, I 69.
promotion, 70.
pri?zcipe de specialite, I 59·
public, I I-I 2.
publications, I 96.
reciprocity, I33, n. 28, I39-I4I,
I79,n. 26, I87,2I7,2I9.
recognition, Chapter 22.
See Recognition.
registration, I 77, I 8o, I 86,
I94-I96.

failure, 2I4-2I7.
regulation, I73-I74·
representatives, I74, I77-I78.
residence, 28.
retaliatorystatutes, I87.
righttosue, I43-I47, 204-2I7.
service of process, I 9 I-I 94·
shareholder
liability, So-84.
meetings, 64-66, I 28.
shares
and certificates, 7 5-78.
issue, I90.
seizure, 77-78.
subscription, 70-7 I.
single acts, I 48- I 50, I 7 5- I 76.
societe en nom collectif, 96, I o 5.
societe anonyme, 8, I 39·
Soviet nationalization, 87, n. 86,
88-93·
special purposes of business, 20 I.
statutory impositions, I9I-20I.
sanctions, 20 I -2 I 7.
subscribers, 70-7 I.
succursale, I 76 ff.
taking of land, I 67-I 68.
taxation, 23, 24, 29, 65, n. I22,
I 23.
territoriallaw, I 89-I 91.
theories, 47 ff.
theory of control, 22, n. 55,
57-63.
third party protection, I I o-I I I,
I68-I72, 224.
tort, capacity for, 7 5.
types, 3-I7.
trading with, and within the
country, I 7 5.
transfer of domicil, 5 I-57.
treaties, 35, 37, I42, 2I7-220.
ultraoirestheory, I 55, I58-I64.
winding up, 8 5-8 8, 92 ff.
Currency Problems, 467.
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Damages, 276-280, 323-328,
541-547·
Dealing in Futures, 402, n. 29,
569-578.
Death
by shipwreck, 3 24.
statutes, 26I, 263, 324.
of tortfeasor, 286.
Deceit, 325-327.
De Facto Corporation, 9, 92, 97,
IO~I05,III-II~ II6, I4I
and n. 82.
De Facto Partnership, I06.
Defamation, 302 ff., 309, 3 I4 ff.
Defendant Out of State, Vicarious
Liability, 268-275.
Defendant, Proper in Torts, 263.
national protection, 24 7.
Denmark. See also Table of Statutes.
no party autonomy, 3 7 5.
Designs, Violation, 29 5.
Detention, 240, n. 37, 306-309.
Diplomatic Intervention, 24-27.
Discharge of obligation, 533, 541 ff.
Disconto-Gesellschaft Case, 78.
Documents Concerning Goods Sold,
468.
Doing Business, Chapter 23,
I73-225.
concept, I32, I42, I44-I46,
I75-I76
Dolus, Place, 33 2-3 33.
Domicil of Corporation, 4, 2 7.
Donatio Sub !ffodo, I 3.
Duress, 525,527, 578, n. 95·
Effets et Suites, 45 I-453·
Egyptian Delta Land & /n'(Jestment
Co. Case, 55·
Employment Contract, 206,
407-408.
Enemy Property, 58.
England. See also Table of Statutes.
foreign corporations, I 30, 143,
I79· I92, I95·

foreign stamp laws, 506.
general maritime law, 336 ff., 349·
illegality in contracts, 399-40I,
537-539·
locusregit actum, 488, n. 4, 49I,
n. I I.
party autonomy, 368-370, 407 ff.
presumably intended law, 448,
466, n. I20.
proper law theory, 365-368,
442-443·
restitution, 54I-543·
smuggling, 586-587.
trading with and within the
country, I75·
Enrichment, Undue, 20«}-2IO,
54I ff.
Equal Position of Alien Corporations,
26 and n. 72.
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Error, 525.
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Evasion, 402-403, 43o-43 I.
Exchange Transactions, I 8 5.
Exemptions from Liability
in contracts, 4I 7-429.
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Family Law and Tort, 257, 260,
263, 265-267.
Fault, 258, (place) 332-333.
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Fellow Servant Doctrine, 250.
Fiction Theory, 4, 24-27, 55, 94,
98, 125, 126-I28.
Filiate, I 78.
Flooding, 3 30.
Foreign Public Policy, 585-59I.
Form and Procedure, 72-73, I I9,
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542-545·
Formal Requirements
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Gambling, 57 I.
of contracts, Chapter 3 I.
Gardien, 274·
Gefahrdungshaftung, 230.
concept, 49<J-50I.
characterization, 499-50 I.
General Maritime Law, 336-339,
defective form, 5I 5-5 I 6.
349·
Germany. See also Table of Statutes.
law governing the contract,
bilateral contracts, split, 469-47I.
490,49<J-501,5o8- 5 I3.
collision,
350.
imperative, 492, 5 I 2-5 I 4·
dealing in futures, 570-572, 574·
law of the forum, 49 5-497.
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imperative, 493, 494·
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law of the place of contracting,
foreign
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487, 490-493> 5I0-512.
I83.
imperative, 488 ff., 5 IO.
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renvoi, 5 I4.
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n. I76, I78.
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place of wrong, 304-306.
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seat of corporation transfer, 52.
France
unfair competition, 297-299.
acte authentique, 5 I I -5 I 2.
unincorporated associations, 7.
commercial association, 74, n. 25.
Geschaftsbetrieb, I 76.
contracts, 448.
Geschaftssitz, 4, n. 3·
control theory, 22, 23.
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter,
foreign corporations, recognition,
H aftung, 8, 106, 498.
I3C)-I42.
transfer of membership, 7 5-77.
formalities, 490, n. IO, 499, n.
498.
Gift to Corporation, I 6 5.
47> 503-505, SI4.
fraude ala loi, 402.
Good Morals, 400-40I, 583-585.
Greece. See also Table of Statutes.
partnership, I 36, n. 56.
foreign corporations, recognition,
powers of directors, I 70.
principe de specialite, I 59·
I34,n.35, 140,n.77·
Guatemala. See also Table of Statutes.
proofs, classification, 504.
party autonomy, 37 4·
responsabilite pour risque, 230.
seat transfer, 5 I.
Hague Rules, 385, 4I8-429, 591.
smuggling, 586-587, 590-591.
The Halley Case, 242.
torts, 245-246, 346, n. 47·
Halter, 2 74·
wagering, 570-572.
Harter Act, 4I 8 ff.
writing requirements, 503-505.
clauses referring to, 3 8 5,
Fraud
391-393> 426-428.
in contract, 525.
Holding Companies
Fraudeala loi, 402,409, 43o-43 I.
bids to them, 64.

INDEX
Holy See, 15.
Hutchison v. Ross, 14··
Illegality, 399-401,537, 585, n.
119.
by the governing law, 53 7, 53 8.
at the place of contracting,
399-401.
at the place of performance,
537-541.
Illicit Conduct, 256.
Immoral Contract, 5 Bo-5 8 2.
Immovables
law of situs, 491.
Imperative Law, 362 ff., 396 ff.
Incorporation, 4, 64.
federal, 19.
multiple, 15-17, 64-65.
for out of state purposes, 44-46,
83-84.
Indemnity for Bail, 566.
Indirect Harm, 262.
Individualized Conflicts
rules, 48 2-48 5.
Injunction, 28 I.
Injury
and acting, 327-328.
and damage, 323-327.
place, 301-303.
Insurable Interest, 578.
Insurance Company, Russian,
89-90,91.
Insurance Contracts, 4I4-4I7, 526.
Insurer of Tortfeasor, Suable,
263-265.
Intention of the Parties, 362 ff.
bona fide, 406-407 ·
express, 365,369,378-386.
hypothetical, 365, 370,432 ff.
"indicia," 4 34·
presumed, 365,370,432 ff.
tacit, 365,369,386-389.
Intentional Acts, Place, 3 3 2.
International Legal Persons, I 5-I 7·

"International Theory" on Foreign
Corporation, I 29.
Interpretation of Contracts,
533-536.
Interstate Commerce, I 7 3.
Irresponsible Persons, Tort, 270,
n.73.3I7.
Isle of Guernsey, Incorporation, 64.
Italy. See also Table of Statutes.
foreign corporations, 52, n. 7 4,
73, n. 22, I33, n. 3I,
134-IH.
Joint Stock Company, 7, 39, n. 22,
98, IOO, I08, II7, I21-122.
Jurisdiction
corporation matters, 8o-8I, 87,
92, 191-194·
stipulation for, 382, n. 89.
Juristic Person, 6.
Jury, 282-283.
Labor Law, 562-563.
Latin America
contracts, 444·
form, 496-497, 5 I 3, n. 109.
party autonomy, 372-375,
403.
foreign corporations
theory, 24-27.
authorization, 14I-I42,
146-I47, ISZ, I82-186.
domestic law applied, I 97-200.
land acquisition, 167.
LawofAliens, 18, I07, 130, I32,
I 73 ff.
Law Common to the Parties
in contracts, 432, 442, n. 31.
in tort, 244-246, 345·
Law of the Contract, 48 5-486.
scope, Chapter 3 2, 5 2o-5 50.
change of, 547-5 so.
consent, 52I-528.
consideration, 5 28-5 30.
effects, 5 30 ff.

INDEX
Law of the Contract (conti1tued)
interpretation, 5 33-5 3 6.
legality, 536-541.
nature, 530-533.
nonperformance, 54I-547·
Law of Corporations, 4, 31-68.
as to branches, I 8<)-I 9 I,
197-201
Law of the Domicil
of contracting party, 524 and
n. 19.
of debtor, 475-476.
Law of the Flag, 339, 345, 347·
Law of the Forum
in contracts, 403,495, 520, 530.
exclusive, 403.
in corporation matters, 7 4, I o I,
I IO.
in torts, 237, 278, 298, 322, 35 I,
353-354·
types of organizations unknown to
the forum, 104-I05, 151,
I 53·
Law Most Favorable to Contract,
41 I, 476, 482.
Law of the Place of Contracting,
447-464. See also Place of
Contracting.
history, 445-447,450-451.
countries involved, 445-453.
criticism, 462-464.
for effects of contract, 53 2.
exclusive, 447,448-450.
for form, 48 7 ff., 5I 5-5 I 6.
Law of the Place of the Most
Important Acting, 3 I 7 ff.,
323-324, 333-335·
Law of the Place of Performance,
464-473·
history, 445-447,464-465.
countries involved, 465-466.
criticism, 469-470, 472.
exclusive, 372-374,466, n. I 19.
for mode of fulfillment, 466-468.

Law of the Place of Wrong, Chapters
24-27, 301-335·
scope, Chapter 25, 255-300.
Law of the State of Central Office
corporations, 4, 33, 45·
change, 51-55.
exceptions, 47-50.
unincorporated organizations,
Chapter 2I, 94-I24.
partnership, I I 3, I I 5·
Law of the State of Incorporation,
4> 3I-33.
meaning, 32,63-66.
change of, 55-57.
exceptions, 46-4 7.
Legal Person, 6.
international, I 5- I 7.
plurinational, IS-I6.
public, 6, I0-12.
supranational, I 5.
Letters
place of wrong, 3 I 8-3 I 9, 333·
Lex Causae. See Form, Law of the
Contract.
Lex Loci Contractus. See Law of the
Place of Contracting.
Lex Loci Delicti, 229.
Lex Loci Solutionis. See Law of the
Place of Performance.
Liability
absolute, 283-284, 3 IO, 328 ff.
of agents of corporation, 84, I 3 7,
211, 2I5.
of agents of unincorporated
association, I9, I07, n. 53·
of aircraft, 3 29.
of automobile owner, 269 ff.
of bailor of motor vehicles, 2 7 5.
of broadcaster, 3 20-3 22.
of carrier, 292,302 f., 3I6, 4I7.
for compulsory pilot, 242, 276,
34I, n. 27, 343·
of co-signer, 53 2.

INDEX
Liability (continued)
of dog owner, 273, n. 78.
of directors of corporation, 8 I,

224.
of employer, 292-293.
extent, 289 ff.
exemptions, 293·
of owner of building, 3 I 2-3 I 3·
of partners, I I 8-I I 9·
of railway, 28 3, 29o-292, 3 I o f.,

3I5, 3I6, 330.
for risk, 230, 274.
of shipowner (restrictions), 352.
of stockholders, 8 I-8 5, I I o, 2 24.
of subscribers of shares, 7I-72.
strict, 3 29.
of supplier, 3 I 9·
vicarious, 267-276.
without fault, 229 ff., 260, 27 3,

3IO, 328-330.
Libel, 240.

Libre Acces, 20, n. 49·
Licensing, I 8 I.
Limited Partnership, 7, 98, I08,

I II, 116-I I 7, 498.
Limited Partnership Association, 7.
of Michigan, I08.
Liquor Sales, 363-565, 587-589.
Litvinoff Agreement, 90.
Liverpool Cotton Association, 380,

401.
Loan, International, 382, 392-393,
andn. I29, 393-394·
Loan
legal structure, 53 I .
rate of interest, 4IO ff.
Local Actions, 246.
Lockout, 3 I4.

Locus Contractus, 444, 461.
Locus Regit Actum, 450, 487 ff.
function, 5I 7.

Lois de Surete et de Police, 2 53.
London Corn Trade Association,

379, 402, 408.
Lotteries, 574-5 7 5.
Louisiana
domicil principle abandoned,

266-267.
mercantile partnership, 94, n.

I.

Machado v. Fontes, 24o-241.
Marine Insurance, 380, 392,409,
n. 61.
Maritime Torts, Chapter 27,

336-3 55. See also General
Maritime Law.
Marriage Relations
and tort, 26 5.
Master and Servant, 272 ff.
Materiellrechtliche Verweisung,
363, 393-395·
Matrimonial Agency Fee, 402.
Merchant Quality
branch, I 9 I.
of corporation, 74-75.
of partnership, I 39·
Messenger, 3 I 7.
Mexico. See also Table of Statutes.
contracts, 497·
foreign corporations, personality,
146, n. IOI, I8o, n. 32,
I84, I85, n. 6o.
oil expropriation, 26.
Mine Damage, 332.
Misrepresentation, 525 ff.
Missouri, In re, Case, 399·
Mistake, 525 ff.
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals
on applicable law invoked by both
parties, 387-389.
on control theory, 59-60.
on party autonomy, 37I, n. 39·
on partnership, I o6, 1 24.

INDEX
Mixed Types of Organizations, 6,
1}-IO, 94-IOO.
Moratory, 546.
Mortmain, I64-I67.
Most Favored Nation, 2I8-2I9.
Name of Corporation, 73, I82,
I88-I89.
Nationality
of corporation, I 7-2 7.
of partnership, I 2 3-I 24.
Nationality of Origin of Corporation,
3I,33,n.II.
Navigation, Rules, 336 ff., 34I, 352.
Negligence, Place, 3 3 3.
Neighborhood Relations, 33o-3 3 2.
The Netherlands. See also Table of
Statutes.
contracts, 448, n. 57, 488, n. 5·
foreign corporations, 143·
New York
liability of foreign corporation
officers, etc., 2 24.
notaries, SII-512.
restriction on wills, 166-167.
Newspaper, Tort by, 3 I 1-323.
Niederfiillbach Foundation, 13.
Nonprofit Corporation, 5, 6, I4-I 5,
13 7-1 38 (recognition),
18 I-182 (doing business).
Normative Conditions
of incorporation, 69, 125 f., I 29,
I 39 f.
Norway. See also Table of Statutes.
no party autonomy, 375·
Notarial Documentation, 509-5 I 2.
Notice of Accident, 286-287.
Ojfentliche Beurkundung, 5 II.
Ojfene Handelsgesellschaft, 95, 106.
Offer, Binding Force, 521.
Omissive Torts, zs6, 3 I 2.
One-Man Company, 7I, no. 13.

Ordre Public InternatioNal,
Veritable, 5 51, n. I, 590.
Organization, Types, Chapter I 8,
3-I7.
Organs of Corporation, I 29,
I68-I69, I7o-I72.
Ormsby Rule, 64.

Pan-American Union
power of attorney, I 96, n. II 5,
510, n. 96.
recognition of corporations,
I45-I46.
Parol Evidence, 505.
Partnership
capacity, I I 7-I 23.
to be a party, I 20-I 23.
corporate elements, 9, 93-99.
between corporations, I gi, n. 89.
domicil, I I 4, I I 5.
law applicable, 113-I I 5.
of the seat, I 14.
scope, II7-I23.
liability of partners, 1 I 2-1 I 4,
II8-IIg.
limited, 7, I08.
of Cuba, 109.
of Pennsylvania, 98, I I I, I I 7·
merchant quality, 139·
nationality, I 23-I 24.
nature, 94-96, 99, I 23.
Offene H andelsgesellschaft, 9 5,
I06.
personallaw, IOI-Io8, I I 2-I I 4,
II7-I23.
United States, I I 2-I I 3·
as to branches, I go.
recognition, I36, n. 56, 138-I39.
rights of partners, I I 8- I I 9·
righttobeaparty, I20-123.
Scotch, I I 9·
societe civile, 94, n. 2, I08.
societe en nom collectif, 96, I o 5.

INDEX
Party Agreement
on the applicable law, Chapters
28, 29.
for the law of charter state, 46-4 7.
Party Autonomy, Chapters 28 and
29. See also Agreement of
the Parties.
theories, 362-370, 396 ff.
on formal requirements, 508.
present systems, 37o-390.
restrictions, Chapter 29,396-431.
Patent, Violation, 295·
Penance, 278.
Personality, Protection, 578-5 So.
Personal Law
for consent, 52 2 ff.
of corporations, Chapters 19 and
20, 31-93·
ofpartnerships, IOI-108,
I 12-114, 117-123.
of quasi corporations (United
States), 108-112, 114-115,
116-117.
of unincorporated organizations,
94-123.
Peru. See also Table of Statutes.
party autonomy, 374·
Phillipsv. Eyre, 239 ff.
Phonographic Records, 3 2 I.
Pilot, Compulsory, 242, 1.76, 341,
n. 27, 343·
Place of Business, 174, 176-178.
Place of Contracting
contracting by correspondence,
455-458, 507.
court discretion, 461.
determination, 4S 5-462,
507-508.
Place of Performance
characterization, 4 73-4 74·
lack of, 472-473.
several, 469-4 72.

Place of Wrong, Chapter 26,
301-335·
theory, 301-311,328,335.
acting, 311-3 23.
at a distance, 3 17-3 23.
injury, 301-303, 323-328.
Plaintiff in Torts, 261-263.
de Plessis-Belliere Case, 11, n. 20.
Plurinational Legal Bodies, I 5- I 6.
Poisoning, 301,327.
Power of Attorney, 196, n. 11 5,
510, n. 96.
Powers
of corporation, 7 2-7 5, I 58-164.
domestic standard, I 5o-1 58.
general and special, 158-168.
Preconstituted Proofs (France), 504.
Preparatory Acts, 311, 318, 333·
Presumptions, 284-287.
Principal and Agent, 272-275.
Principe de Specialitl, 1 59·
Pritchard v. Nor ton, 364, n. 16,
51], 529.
Privacy, 325.
Private Law
subject of conflicts law, 560 ff.,
568-569, 582.
Private Limited Company
( Gesellschaft mit heschriinkter
Haftung), 8, 106, 498.
Procedure
rules of civil procedure, 1 zz.
and substance, 7 2-7 3, 1 20, 1 2 1,
148, 151.
in torts, 276-287.
Prohibition (Liquor Sales), 563 f.,
564, 588.
Prohibitions, Legal, 399-400,
536-541, 561-569.
sanctions, 561 ff., 588-589.
Promoters, 70, 107.
Proper Law, 365-368.
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Public Law
distinguished from private law,

56z-563.
foreign, 567-568.
of the forum, 563-567.
relation to conflicts law,

56o-568, 582.
Public Legal Persons, 5, 6, I0-12.
Public Policy
contracts, Chapter 33, 55I-591.
defense, attitude of courts,

557-558.
effect, 584-58 5·
employment contract, 578.
foreign, 58 5-5 9 I.
formalities, 512-5 I 3.
Harter Act, 421.
one-man corporation, 7 I, n. I 3.
private law, 559-569, 582.
publiclaw, 559-566, 582.
recognition of foreign corporation,

I 55-I 57· 224.
Soviet nationalization, 88, 90.
tort, 240, n. 4I, 248, 248-25I,

275·
Quasi Corporations, I o8- I I 2,

I I4-115, 116-I I 7·
Railway, Liability, 283, 290-292,

3I0-3II, 3I5, 3I6, 330.
crossing, 256, n. 6, 3 I 3·
Ralli Case, 539·
Reciprocity
permission of business, I 8 7,

2I

7,

2I9.
recognition of corporation,

139-I41.
treaties, I 42, 2 I 9·
Recognition of Foreign Government,
88, 90.
Recognition of Foreign Organizations, Chapter 22, 125-172.

concept, I32-I33, 14-2,
14-f-146, 149 ff.
authorityofagents, 168-172.
authorization
general, 139-141.
special, 141-142.
capacity to be a party, 143-148,
204-215 (corporation), 86,
8 9 (dissolved corporation),
I I 7- I I 8 (partnership).
distinguished from permission for
doing business, 130, I33,

145-146.
domestic standard, I 50-158.
effects, I 43- I 58.
minimum, I43-IS8.
foundations, I 33, 141.
nonprofit corporations, I 37-138.
Pan-American Union, I46-147.
partnerships, I 36, n. 56,

I 38-I 39·
powers, 72-7s, 150-I68.
general and special, I 58- I 68.
no more than under domestic
standard, 15o-I58.
public policy, I 56-158.
reciprocity, 139, 142, n. 88, 146,
n. ror, rso, n. 122.
refusal, arbitrary, 142, n. 88, 146,
n. IOI, ISO, n. I22, 2I6.
requirements, 133-I42.
restrictions on capacity, 165-168.
theories, 125-130.
trading associations, I 35-136.
treaties, I42.
ultra oires doctrine, I 59- I 64.
unconditional, 133-I42.
Reference to Foreign Law
conditional, 393·
special, 36I-362, 390-395.
Reference to Local Conceptions,

535-536.

INDEX
Regina CJ, Lesley, 306, 308.
Registration of Foreign Corporations,
I77, I80, I86, I94--I96.
Renvoi
contract, 389, 4-82.
corporation, 50.
formalities, 5 I 4-·
Rescission, 54-3·
Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws
contracts
form, 4-87.
interpretation, 53 3.
law of the place of contracting,
359,399, n. I7,
4-4-9-4-50, 4-52-4-53·
law of the place of performance,
4-66.
place of contracting, 4-56-4-59.
corporations, etc.
acts of corporation, 1 70.
corporation, 4--7.
domestic standard, I 50-1 54•
domicil of partnership, I I 5.
law of the state of incorporation,
31.
liability of stockholders, 8 3, n.
67, 84-.
meeting place, 64-.
mortmain, I67-I68.
unincorporated associations,
5-7, 94-, 109, n. 59, 113,
n. So, I 34-, n. 33·
torts
authorized acts, 2 56,
306-308.
defendant out of state, 2 7 I.
place of, 30I-302.
principle, 229.
Restitution, 28 I, 54-1.
Restraint of Trade in Employment
Contracts, 385, 555, 579, n.
97·

Retaliatory Statutes, I 87.
Revalorization, 54-8, 569, n. 4-6.
Right to Be a Party
corporation, 73-74-, I4-3-I4-8.
partnership, I 2o--I 23.
unincorporated associations,
I 2Q--I 23, I4-8.
Right to Sue, I4-3-I4-8, 204--2I4-,
262-263.
Russian Corporations, 87, 88-93.
Sale, Theory of Two Laws,
4-69-4-71.
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp.,
270 ff.
Scotland
partnership, I I 8.
Seat, 4- and n. 3, 13·
secondary, I 77.
Security for Costs, 20, n. 4-9, 23,
n. 6o, I23.
Seizure
of goods, 230, 239,n. 35·
of shares, 5 I , 77-8 I .
Service of Process, I 9 I-I 94-·
Shareholder
liability, 8 I -8 5.
meetings, 64--6 5, I 28.
whether a person is a, 52 5-5 26.
Shares
and certificate, 7 5-79.
issue, I90.
seizure, n-8 I.
subscription, 7o--7 1.
Shooting Across Border, 30I, 307.
Siege, 4-, n. 3, 4-3, n. 4-0.
Sieged' Exploitation, 4-0.
Similarity Rule
corporations, I 5o-- I 58.
tort, 2 37-24-4-.
Single Acts of Foreign Corporation,
I4-8-I50, I75-I76.

INDEX

712

Smuggling, s86-S9I.
Sociedad, 8, 10.

Societas, 6, 7, IO, 94·
Societe Anonyme, 8, I 39·
Societe Cirlile, 94, n. 2, 108.
Societe en Nom Collectif, 96, IOS.
Sodalitates, I 28.
Solemnities of Contract,
I 2.
Spain. See also Table of Statutes.
contracts, 448, n. 55·
foreign corporations, I So.
Soviet Union. See also Table of
Statutes.
commercial agencies, 345, n. 45·
contracts, 375,449, n. 6o, 450.
foreign corporations, I 3 I, I 36.
government recognition, 88.
nationalization of corporations,
87, n. 86, 88-93.
torts, 237, n. 27.
unenforceability of obligations,
549 f.
Special Law (Applicable to Special
Problems), 3591f., 390 ff.,

soB-s

486.
Standard Contract Forms
on applicable law, 378-386.
State as Person, 6, Io-12.
Statute of Frauds, 50I-503, 505.
Statutes of Limitations, 294-29 5·
Stiftung offentlichen Rechts, I 2.
Stock Corporation, 8.
Stock Corporation en Commandite,

8.
Subcontractor, Rights of, 3 86.
Subscription, 70-7 I.
Substance and Procedure.
See Procedure.
Substantial Connection of Contract,
404-4Io, 4I I, n. 69, 427,

47I-478.
Succursale, I 76.

Sunday Contracts, 565-567.
Supplier, 3 I 9-3 20.
Supranational Legal Bodies, I 5·
Switzerland. See also Table of
Statutes.
contracts, 387, 444·
bilateral, 469, 473·
validity and effect, 398-399,

45I-452, 530.
foreign corporations, I 43, I 79,
n. 22.
Taxation, 23, 24, 29, 98, 99, n. 20,

I23·
Telephone, Defamation by,

3I7-3I8.
Territorial Theory of Foreign Corporation, 125-128, I68-I72.
Territorial Waters, Torts in,

342-346.
Theory of Control, 22, n. 55, 56-62.
Third Parties, Protection in Dealing
with Foreign Organization,

IIQ-III,I70-I72,224-225.
Tochtergesellschaft, I 78.
The Torni Case, 400, 407, n. 53,

428-429.
Tort Moral, 278.
Torts, part 7, 229-355.
concept, 22<)-235·
acting place, 3 I I-3 23.
by aircraft, 3 2 7, Chapter 2 7.
arrest, 230, 240, 307-308.
burden of proof, 28 3-2 8 7.
capacitytocommit, 74, 255·
causation, 257·
characterization, 23 2-2 35, 260.
concurrence of tort claims,

304-306.
with contract, 287-293.
conflicts principle, 235.
(exceptions) 244-2 5 I.
contacts, 3 I I 1f.

INDEX
Torts (continued)
contributory negligence,
258-259, 282.
damages, 276-280,323-327.
death of tortfeasor, 286.
statutes, 26I-263, 324.
deceit, 325-327.
defamation, 30I ff., 309, 3 I4 ff.
defendant, proper, 263-265.
ddict, 229 ff.
detention, 240, n. 37, 306-308.
and family relations, 265-267.
fault, 258.
general principles, 23 2-23 5·
on high seas, 34 7-3 5 1.
industrial property, 295-300.
injury, 323 ff.
maritime, Chapter 27,336-355.
omissive, 2 56, 3 I 2.
option for plaintiff, 287 ff.
penal law, 237, 3 I I.
place, Chapter 26, 30I-335·
plaintiff, proper, 26I-263.
policy of law of, 309-3 I I.
preparatory acts, 3 II, 3 I 8, 333·
presumptions, 284-286.
procedure and substance,
276-287.
public policy, 240, n. 4I, 247,
248-251.
quasi delict, 229.
restitution, 2 79-28 I.
sanctions, 276-281.
scope of governing law, Chapter
25,255-300.
seizure, 230, 239, 309.
separate torts, 3 I 4·
service of notice, 286.
in several states, 3 I 4-3 I 7.
similarity rule, 238-244.
statutes of limitation, 294-295.
structure, 3 28-3 3 3.
unlawful act, 256-257.

on ungoverned territory, 244·
vicarious liability, 267-27 5·
Trademark, Violation, 295, 296,
3II,322.
Trading Associations, Recognition,
I 35-I36.
Traffic Regulations, 272.
Tramways d' Alexandrie Case, 56.
Transfer
of domicil of corporation, 5 I-57,
65.
of stock, 76.
Treaties
doing business, 2 I 7-2 20.
recognition of organizations, I 43·
seat principle, 35-38.
smuggling, 589.
unincorporated organizations,
IOI-I02.
Trust, 7, I 3.
charitable, I4.
common law (business), 98-99,
I08, I09, I IO, I I I, I I6.
Ultra Vires Doctrine, I 55, I 59-I64.
Unfair Competition, 246, 295-299,
3I3, 3I5, 335·
Uniform Partnership Act, 95·
Unincorporated Business Organizations, Chapter 21, 94-124.
branches, I89.
characterization, I o I- I 02,
I03-I08.
common law trust, 98-Ioo, I09,
II].

conflict with domestic
classification, I04-108.
joint stock company, 7, 39, n. 22,
98-Ioo, Io8, II], 12I,
121-123.
law applicable, I I4-I I6.
scope, I I 6-12 3.

INDEX
Unincorporated Business Organizations (continued)
limited partnership, 7, 98, 108,
II I, 116.
method of construction, 94- I oo.
Offene Handelsgesellschaft, 95,
106.
partnership, 9, 94-IOO. See
Partnership.
personallaw, IOI-I I6.
civil law doctrine, IOI-108.
United States, I09-I I6.
scope, IOI, I I6-I 23.
application to branches, I 89.
quasi corporation, I08-I I 2,
I I4-11 5, 116-I I7.
right to be a party, I 20-I 23.
suability, I I<)- I 23.
trade unions, I 22.
treaties, I02-I04.
trust (common law business),
98-100, I08.
types unknown to forum,
105-I07.
United States. See also Table of
Statutes.
acknowledgments, by foreign
officials, 509.
in the United States, 5 I I-S I 2.
airplane accidents, 342, 348,
n. 59·
authority of agent, I 90.
automobile owner liability,
26<)-274·
burden of proof, 28 S-286.
carriers' liability, 292 ff., 417 ff.
champerty, 577-578.
choice of law by parties, 3 59, 36 2,
376-378,403-404.
contracts, general conflicts rules,
3 5<)-362, 45 3, 45 8 f., 464,
49I-492.
consent in fact, 525.

corporation, terminology, 5·
directors of corporation, I 70-I 7 2.
doing business, I49, I73, I75·
domestic law, I 90.
domestic standard, I 52- I 56.
domestication, I 8 6.
domicil, of corporation, 28.
transfer, 55.
of partnership, I I 5.
employers' liability, 292-293.
evasion, 402, 4I 2, 4I 3·
family relations, 26 5-267.
Harter Act, 38 5 ff.
insurance statutes, 4I4-4I 7·
intention of the parties, 376-378.
jurisdiction, 8o-8I, I9I-I94·
law of the state of incorporation,
3 I-32.
license statutes, I 8 I ff.
noncompliance, 202-2 I 5·
liquor sales, 56I-564, 587-588.
local actions, 246-247.
locallaw, I90-I9I, I98.
maritime law, 3 3 8 ff.
maritime torts
damages, 35 2-3 54·
formal requirements, 3 55,
n. 96.
party autonomy, 403.
place of wrong theory, 30I-303,
3I6, 323-328, 335·
presumptions, 28 5-286.
prohibition of liquor, 563-565,
587-589, 590.
public policy, defense of, 55 7.
railway liability, 290-292.
service of process, I 9 I -I 92.
shareholder liability, 8 I-84.
Soviet recognition, 88.
statute of frauds, 50I-503.
Sunday contracts, 564.
supplier's liability, 3 I 9-3 20.
territorial theory, I 67.
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unfair competition, 296,
298-300.
usu.ry statutes, 4 I 0-4 I 4,
480-48I.
wagering, 569-576.
Universitas, I 29.
Unlawfulness, 2 56-2 57.
Usu.ry Cases, 407, n. 52, 4I0-4I4,
429.
Venezuela. See also Table of Statutes.
foreign corporations, I 2, n. 26,
IH, n. 97·
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Vessels, 336, ff., 4I7 ff.
internal management, 344·
state vessels, 344-345·
Vita Food's Case, 400, 406-407.
Wagering Contracts, 569-576.
WaiverofTort, 288.
War Damage Compensation, 62.
Warsaw Convention, 342, 4I9,
n. I06.
War Seizures of Stock, 77-So.
Youngv. Masci, 269 ff.
Zappa Case, I I, n. I 9·
Zweigniederlassung, I77·
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